Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Jami and Ryan Conner appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims for medical malpractice, breach of contract, and loss of consortium. The Conners alleged that Jami unexpectedly became pregnant due to Dr. Bryan Hodges' negligent performance of a bilateral tubal ligation. The district court concluded that the medical malpractice claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations, as Jami suffered some damage that was objectively ascertainable at the time of the surgery. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Conners' breach of contract and consortium claims but vacated the judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim. View "Conner v. Hodges" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a medical malpractice claim brought by Scott and Meri Bybee against Dr. Patrick Gorman. The district court granted Dr. Gorman's motion for summary judgment after concluding that the Bybees' medical expert had failed to show adequate familiarity with the applicable standard of health care practice in the relevant community as required by Idaho Code sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, rendering his opinion inadmissible. Finding that the trial court erred by that decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bybee v. Gorman" on Justia Law

Steven Kraselsky, personal representative of the estate of his deceased mother Marcia Kraselsky, sued Dr. Calderwood and Dr. Calderwood's employer, Huntsville Clinic, alleging that Marcia died as a result of Dr. Calderwood's order that Marcia be given Demerol in spite of the fact that Dr. Calderwood knew she had previously professed to having an allergy to Demerol. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Calderwood and Huntsville Clinic, and Steven appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court. "Assuming, arguendo, that Dr. Calderwood breached the standard of care by ordering that Demerol be administered to Marcia, and, noting again that Dr. Calderwood strongly contests that fact, the summary judgment entered by the trial court is nevertheless due to be affirmed because there is no evidence in the record indicating that the administration of the Demerol to Marcia proximately caused the decline in her health leading to her death." View "Kraselsky v. Calderwood" on Justia Law

Susan and Rodney Drown filed a medical malpractice action against Associated Women’s Health Specialists, P.C. (Health Specialists) asserting vicarious liability claims arising from the acts or omissions of its physicians. During the relevant period, Health Specialists was insured through a professional liability policy issued by Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange (Exchange). Health Specialists settled for the full amount of the policy and assigned to the Drowns its rights to recover against Exchange. Health Specialists was subsequently declared insolvent, and the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (Association) assumed liability for the Exchange’s obligations. The Association then commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no obligations for the Drowns’ claims. Defendants, the Drowns and Health Specialists, counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Exchange’s preinsolvency breach of its duty to defend Health Specialists did not estop the Association from challenging its liability under the policy; and (2) the policy unambiguously did not cover Health Specialists for its vicarious liability in this case. View "Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Drown" on Justia Law

Robert E. Anderson, M.D. and Selma Doctors Clinic, PC, d/b/a Selma Doctors Clinic ("SDC") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting plaintiff Barbara Craig's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, and to reinstate the final judgment entered in favor of Dr. Anderson and SDC. This matter stemmed from a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action filed by Barbara G. Craig as the administrator of the estate of her husband William Craig. Dr. Anderson performed hernia surgery on Mr. Craig at Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC"), following which, he died. Mrs. Craig sued Dr. Anderson, SDC, and VRMC alleging that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of Mr. Craig and that their conduct proximately caused his death. The trial court found that Mrs. Craig failed to qualify her expert on the applicable standard of care, and accordingly, was unable to establish that Dr. Anderson violated the applicable standard of care. Mrs. Craig filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial. In the motion, Mrs. Craig contended that the trial court erred in excluding the expert's testimony. The trial court denied this motion, but granted her Rule 60(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she argued that Dr. Anderson had committed perjury and had perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court by testifying that he had performed an ulcer surgery when, in fact, he had not done so. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Mrs. Craig's Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The Court therefore granted Dr. Anderson's request and issued the writ. View "Craig v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Dr. Melvin Levine worked as a pediatric physician at Children’s Hospital Medical Center from 1966 to 1985. After leaving Children’s Hospital, Levine resumed practicing medicine as an employee of the University of North Carolina School of Medicine (UNC) in North Carolina. In 2011, eleven former patients of Levine at UNC (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this negligence action against Children’s Hospital, alleging that Children’s Hospital knew or should have known Levine was conducting inappropriate genital examinations of minors during his employment at Children’s Hospital yet failed to report Levine’s conduct. Due to this alleged negligence, Plaintiffs asserted that Levine was able to continue his abuse of patients, including Plaintiffs, during his employment at UNC. The superior court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Children’s Hospital did not owe a legally cognizable duty of reasonable care to Plaintiffs requiring it to take affirmative action to protect them from Levine. View "Roe No. 1 v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits. View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against healthcare providers (Defendants). During pretrial discovery, Plaintiff filed two separate motions to compel, which the trial court denied. Prior to trial, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action. The trial court entered an agreed order incorporating the discovery conducted and taken in the 2010 action into the 2012 action. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rulings, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motions to compel in the nonsuited action. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court’s agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, objections, or rulings made by the court in the 2010 nonsuit action into the 2012 action, these rulings could not be challenged in this appeal. View "Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp." on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's award of damages in a medical malpractice suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., contending that the district court should have applied the Texas periodic payment statutory scheme, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code 74.501-507. The court agreed, vacating the district court's judgment insofar as it failed to fashion a damages award similar to that contemplated by the Texas periodic payment statutory scheme and awarded post-judgment interest not in compliance with 31 U.S.C. 1304(b)(1)(A). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee, Sr., et al. v. United States" on Justia Law