Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Appellee Maria Brady had a lengthy history of foot problems. By 2007, both of her feet were in pain due to toe deformities. Appellee’s podiatrist, William Urbas, D.P.M., successfully treated toes on her left foot with surgery; he then turned his attention to her right foot. One of Appellee’s primary complaints on her right foot pertained to a hammer-toe condition of her second toe: this deformity caused the middle of Appellee’s second toe to rise above the plane of the foot, which in turn caused rubbing and pain when Appellee wore shoes. Dr. Urbas performed a total of four operations between March 2008 and January 2010. Before each surgery, he explained the risks and complications that could occur, and Appellee signed a consent form acknowledging her awareness of these possible outcomes. The first operation did not finally alleviate Appellee’s condition, and Dr. Urbas eventually performed three more surgeries, each involving, among other things, the removal of additional bone material with the expectation that the foot would, over time, generate soft tissue to fill the gap and provide flexibility. Nevertheless, Appellee’s pain persisted and, in the end, her toe was less stable and significantly shorter than it had been initially. In August 2010, Appellee consulted a different podiatrist, Dr. Harold Schoenhaus, who performed a bone-graft operation which returned the toe to approximately ninety percent of its original length. This procedure also had the effect of restoring some of the toe’s stability and substantially reducing the pain. Appellee testified that she was pleased with the outcome of Dr. Schoenhaus’ surgery and that she returned to all levels of activity. In December 2010, Appellee filed a complaint against Dr. Urbas, alleging that he negligently treated her toe in the three follow-up surgeries performed after March 2008. In this appeal by allowance involving alleged medical negligence, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a doctor may introduce evidence that the patient was informed of and acknowledged various risks of surgery, although the complaint does not assert a cause of action based on a lack of informed consent. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting the consent evidence, Appellee appealed. The Superior Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. In concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion, the Superior Court court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia regarding the relevancy of consent evidence in a medical malpractice case: assent to treatment does not amount to consent to negligence, regardless of the enumerated risks and complications of which the patient was made aware. In a trial on a malpractice complaint that only asserts negligence, and not lack of informed consent, evidence that a patient agreed to go forward with the operation in spite of the risks of which she was informed is irrelevant and should be excluded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence that a patient affirmatively consented to treatment after being informed of the risks of that treatment is generally irrelevant to a cause of action sounding in medical negligence. View "Brady v. Urbas" on Justia Law

In 2008 Knox, the mother of Keys and the sister of Smith underwent surgery on her thyroid. When Knox was transferred from a post-anesthesia care unit to a medical-surgical unit, a nurse noticed Knox’s breathing was “noisy,” and called the hospital’s rapid assessment team to evaluate her. During the medical team’s efforts Knox was without a pulse for a number of minutes and as a result of her blocked airway, she suffered a permanent brain injury. She died after life support was withdrawn. A jury awarded Keys and Smith damages on their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that plaintiffs meaningfully comprehended the medical negligence that led to the death of their family member at the time the negligence was occurring. View "Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phyllis Paetsch was referred to Spokane Dermatology Clinic for Botox injections to smooth facial wrinkles. Paetsch had never heard of the clinic, had never been there before, and was not aware of the staff or medical reputation of the clinic. She made an appointment for treatment and was told that her appointment would be with Dan Rhoads. Spokane Dermatology Clinic is a professional services company owned solely by Dr. William Werschler. The clinic also employed another doctor as a dermatologist and three certified physician's assistants (PA-Cs), one of which was Dan Rhoads. Paetsch completed some medical history and patient profile forms, signed them, then was escorted to her appointment room. She was told "the doctor" would be in soon. Shortly thereafter, a man in scrubs entered and introduced himself as "Dan." Rhoads injected Paetsch with both Botox and Restylane. He injected Restylane into Paetsch's forehead, not knowing that the federal Food and Drug Administration did not approve the use of Restylane in the forehead as it increased the risk of necrosis. While initially pleased with the results, Paetsch later developed a headache, the symptoms of which worsened. Rhoads misdiagnosed her condition as an infection and prescribed antibiotics and anti-inflammatories to control it. These treatments were ineffective, and Paetsch's condition continued to deteriorate. Paetsch sought treatment from her primary care provider. The clinic properly diagnosed the condition as necrosis caused by the use of Restylane in the forehead; the Restylane had expanded throughout the forehead, cutting off the only flow of blood to the skin. This diagnosis was too late to treat the condition, and the provider could only scrape the dead tissue from Paetsch's face. The necrosis resulted in deep, permanent scarring to Paetsch's forehead. Paetsch filed suit against Spokane Dermatology Clinic and against Dr. Werschler personally for the failure to obtain her informed consent to treatment and for medical malpractice by Dr. Werschler and Dan Rhoads. At trial, Paetsch presented evidence that Dr. Werschler presented himself as her doctor through the use of consent forms, that he owed her a duty of care, and that he breached that duty. Paetsch also presented evidence that as a PA-C, Rhoads was an agent of the physician and that Dr. Werschler's failure to adequately supervise Rhoads breached the standard of care. After the close of evidence, the trial court granted Dr. Werschler's motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissing Dr. Werschler from personal liability on the ground that no jury could find that he breached a duty to Paetsch under the evidence. Following this motion, Spokane Dermatology Clinic was the only remaining named defendant. Despite dismissing Dr. Werschler personally, the court instructed the jury that the clinic could be held liable for Dr. Werschler's medical negligence, as he was an employee of Spokane Dermatology Clinic. The jury was never told that Dr. Werschler was dismissed as a defendant, and the majority of the jury instructions remained unchanged. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the jury instructions allowed Paetsch to argue her theory of the case and the jury found that the defendant was not negligent. View "Paetsch v. Spokane Dermatology Clinic, PS" on Justia Law

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law

In 2011, after about two weeks of reporting symptoms and being treated for constipation and gas, Allard, a prisoner at the Clarinda Correctional Facility of the Iowa Department of Corrections , suffered a bowel obstruction and perforation. Allard had emergency surgery where a colostomy bag was installed and his bowel was repaired. Allard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison staff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that material questions of fact existed regarding the appropriateness of the care Allard received. Although Allard demonstrated that CCF medical staff failed to properly diagnose his bowel obstruction, and demonstrated that failure to treat the bowel obstruction led to a bowel perforation, Allard failed to put forward evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Allard v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against Defendants, medical providers, alleging, inter alia, claims of medical malpractice and negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice (1) did not overlook genuine disputes as to material facts that would preclude summary judgment; (2) did not err in finding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not properly be applied to the facts of this case; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment in light of what Defendant alleged was the “egregious conduct” of his former attorney. View "Laplante v. Rhode Island Hospital" on Justia Law

AEG hired Dr. Murray as entertainer Michael Jackson’s personal physician for a concert tour. Michael died of acute propofol intoxication while under Murray’s care. Katherine Jackson, on behalf of herself and as guardian of Michael’s children, Michael Jr., Paris-Michael and Prince Michael, filed suit for negligence hiring, retention, and supervision. The jury found that Murray was not unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily adjudicating negligence because AEG did not owe Michael a duty to refrain from exerting pressure over Murray; AEG did not undertake to provide protective services to Michael; and AEG owed Michael no duty arising out of the contract with Murray. The court also did not err in summarily adjudicating respondeat superior because the undisputed facts establish that Murray was an independent contractor as a matter of law; AEG is not liable under the peculiar risk doctrine as an independent contractor; and Murray was not an agent of AEG. The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors with a modified jury instruction along with the special verdict form; the special verdict was legally sufficient. View "Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of Seth Cromer at the pediatric intensive-care unit of Children’s Hospital Medical Center. Seth’s mother and father, individually and as administrator, brought this medical-negligence action against the hospital, alleging that Seth’s death was caused by the negligence of multiple hospital employees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including an instruction on foreseeability when it instructed the jury on the hospital’s standard of care. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) foreseeability of harm is generally relevant to the determination of the scope of a physician’s duty in a medical-malpractice action, and therefore, giving a foreseeability instruction in such an action is not manifestly incorrect; (2) where the parties in this case did not dispute that the physician understood that the chosen course of treatment carried some risk of harm, the instruction regarding foreseeability was not necessary; and (3) the unneeded jury instruction on foreseeability did not prejudice Plaintiffs’ substantial rights, and therefore, reversal was not justified. View "Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron" on Justia Law

Bradly Brothers received medical treatment at Kimball County Hospital after suffering injuries in a single-vehicle accident. After a chiropractor subsequently discovered multiple fractures in Brothers’ finger, Brothers filed a tort claim pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act and later filed a complaint against Kimball County, the Hospital, and a Physician. The district court dismissed the County and entered summary judgment for the Hospital and the Physician. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a county hospital is a separate legal entity from the county, and because the County in this case could have no liability under the facts alleged, any error by the district court in failing to allow Brothers to present evidence on the County’s motion to dismiss was harmless; and (2) the Hospital and Physician were properly dismissed due to Brothers’ failure to meet the Act’s filing requirements. View "Brothers v. Kimball County Hosp." on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law