Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 2001 plaintiff received prenatal care from a clinic that receives federal funds. Its physicians and the clinic are deemed federal employees for purposes of malpractice liability, so that the United States could be substituted as a party to a suit. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1); claims would be governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and neither would face liability. For complex situations, the clinic contracted with UIC for specialists. Plaintiff's baby died following a difficult delivery. She sued the clinic, its doctor, the delivery hospital, and two UIC physicians who assisted. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services denied claims for damages. The district court entered summary judgment for the UIC doctors under the Illinois Good Samaritan Act, which shields physicians who provide "emergency care without fee to a person," 745 ILCS 49/25, but declined to dismiss the case against the government, which had been substituted for the clinic. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the district court had derivative jurisdiction. Although the salaried UIC doctors did not receive a direct financial benefit from the delivery, their employer billed the clinic for services. There was evidence that one doctor submitted a billing form with respect to the delivery; the other made a "bad faith" decision not to bill. View "Rodas v. Seidlin" on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with prostate cancer, Philip Baker filed a notice of claim in accordance with the Health Security Act, alleging that his primary care physician violated the applicable standard of care by failing to refer him to a urologist earlier, thus delaying his diagnosis. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the doctor, finding that the three-year statute of limitations barred Baker's claims for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than three years before he filed his notice. In so ruling, the court declined to recognize the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, which allows a patient to assert a cause of action for professional negligence based upon two or more related negligent acts or omissions by a health care provider or practitioner if some, but not all, of the acts or omissions occurred outside of the statute of limitations period. The Supreme Court vacated the partial summary judgment, holding that the language of the Health Security Act authorizes claims of continuing negligent treatment. Remanded. View "Baker v. Farrand" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the applicable standard that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Donna Shipley filed a medical malpractice action against two doctors and a hospital, alleging various claims for medical negligence. The trial court granted the hospital and one doctor summary judgment. After disqualifying Shipley's medical experts, the trial court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendant, Dr. Williams, and dismissed Shipley's case. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to disqualify Shipley's medical experts but reversed the grant of summary judgment on Shipley's negligence claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court's judgment disqualifying Shipley's medical experts; (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reinstated summary judgment in Dr. Williams' favor on one of Shipley's negligence claims; and (3) vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment on Shipley's remaining claims. Remanded. View "Shipley v. Williams" on Justia Law

This case arose when Pauline Thomas brought her daughter, Jane Doe and four of her grandchildren, including John Doe and R.N.T. to the Emergency Room at the Hennepin County Medical Center and reported her concerns that Jane Doe might have been sexually abused by R.N.T. Appellants brought suit against appellees claiming that the 72-hour hold placed on John Doe, the internal examination of Jane Doe, and the examination of John Doe violated the children's rights under the Fourth Amendment and that the seizure and search of both children violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all appellants. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and denied appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court rejected appellants' contention that appellees failed to move for summary judgment on all of appellants' claims; that the district court ignored questions of material fact; and that the district court at times used the wrong legal standards when analyzing the facts. The court also held that because it affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment against appellants, the court did not reach the denial of appellants' partial motion for summary judgment. View "Doe, et al. v. Dr. Al Tsai, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

After Madeleine Willson died of metastatic breast cancer and acute aspiration pneumonia, Robert Willson filed a complaint against Benefis Hospitals, Peace Hospice, and Dr. T. Brice Addison for medical malpractice. Robert alleged that the administration of medication expedited Madeleine's death and that Madeleine did not give informed consent to administration of the medications. Benefis filed two motions for summary judgment, the first of which argued that Robert had failed to establish causation through qualified expert testimony. Robert filed a motion for summary judgment seeking default judgment as a sanction for Benefis' alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in favor of Benefis and Dr. Addison. The court denied Robert's motion, finding Robert failed to prove spoliation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Benefis and Dr. Addison, and (2) although the district court denied Robert's motion for summary judgment for the wrong reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where sanctions were not appropriate. View "In re Estate of Willson v. Addison" on Justia Law

Alyssa Ray received treatment from Dr. Kara Yamamoto, an employee of Kapiolani Medical Specialists (KMS). Alyssa's parents brought an action in circuit court against KMS for negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The jury found that (1) Dr. Yamamoto's treatment of Alyssa was negligent but it was not a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries; and (2) Dr. Yamamoto failed to properly inform the Rays, and her failure was a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim and entered judgment in favor of the Rays. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the circuit court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim, and a new trial was required because the negligent treatment and informed consent verdicts were irreconcilable; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying KMS' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent; and (3) the circuit court erred by admitting certain testimony and failing adequately to cure the error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists" on Justia Law

On the last day of a three-year limitations period, Eric Katz filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice in the death of his mother. After discovery, Katz amended the petition by adding several defendants and dropping others. At the time of the amendment, the statute of limitations had expired. Only one defendant named within the limitations period remained in the case. The newly added defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was not commenced against them within the limitations period and that the amendment adding them did not relate back to the date of the original filing. The circuit court overruled the motions to dismiss, and the new defendants filed petitions for writs of prohibition. The two separate writ petitions were consolidated for decision. The Supreme Court issued preliminary writs for the petitions. The Court held that the amended petition did not relate back to the filing of the initial petition, and therefore, the statute of limitations barred Katz's lawsuit for wrongful death against the new defendants. The preliminary writs in this case were made permanent. View "State ex rel. Holzum v. J. Schneider" on Justia Law

Following the death of his mother, Jeffery McCabe asserted a medical malpractice claim against his mother's medical care providers, who agreed to a settlement sufficient to allow McCabe to petition Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund for additional compensation. McCabe then filed an action pursuant to the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS), seeking additional recovery from the Fund for, inter alia, medical expenses and attorney fees. The trial granted granted partial summary judgment to the Fund, finding that the AWDS does not allow recovery of attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment, holding that reasonable attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of an action under the AWDS are within the damages permitted by the statute. Remanded. View "McCabe v. Comm'r, Ind. Dep't of Ins." on Justia Law

Defendant Hematology-Oncology of Indiana, a health care provider, appealed a trial court judgment awarding attorney fees and litigation expenses brought under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) and the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court entered judgment against defendants for $108,509 in attorney fees and litigation expenses in addition to a $229,148 judgment on the jury verdict for damages exclusive of attorney fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney and litigation expenses was authorized by the AWDS; and (2) the total judgment, including both the jury's damage verdict and the attorney fees and expenses, exceeded the cap limiting damages against individual providers under the MMA. The Court affirmed in part and remanded to limit the provider's aggregate liability to the $250,000 cap prescribed by the MMA. View "Hematology-Oncology of Ind., P.C. v. Fruits" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme. View "Tristani, et al. v. Richman, et al." on Justia Law