Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, the administrators of Decedent's estate, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a thoracic surgeon and the surgeon's employer. Plaintiffs attached to their original complaint an opinion letter from a physician who was board certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiovascular disease. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' original complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of filing a medical malpractice lawsuit mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-109a(a) as a result of their failure to attach to their complaint an opinion letter from a similar health care provider. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Defendants waived their right to challenge the sufficiency of the original complaint and its attachment by failing to timely file a motion to dismiss. Remanded. View "Morgan v. Hartford Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife (the Kaplans) filed suit against Mayo Clinic Rochester, Inc., other Mayo entities (collectively, Mayo), and Mayo doctors David Nagorney and Lawrence Burgart, making a number of claims arising out of plaintiff's erroneous diagnosis of pancreatic cancer and plaintiff's surgery based on that diagnosis. The Kaplans subsequently appealed the judgments in favor of Mayo and Dr. Burgart on their negligent-failure-to-diagnose and contract claims. The court held that the error, if any, in admitting a certain medical file, which included insurance documents, into evidence did not affect the Kaplans' substantial rights and the Kaplans were not prejudiced by the district court's decision not to give a limiting instruction. The court agreed with the district court that the Kaplans' assertion that the biopsy slides might have been tampered with was based on rank speculation where they failed to present evidence that the slides had been changed in any way. The court also held that the Kaplans have shown no basis for granting them a new trial on their claim for negligent failure to diagnose. The court held, however, that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law where the Kaplans have offered sufficient evidence in their case-in-chief to support a breach-of-contract claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kaplan, et al. v. Mayo Clinic, et al." on Justia Law

Denise Estes filed suit against Dr. David Lonbaken, a podiatrist, for medical malpractice, alleging that Lonbaken negligently treated a neuroma on her foot and seeking damages. Estes filed the complaint in Buffalo County. Lonbaken moved to change venue to Hughes County, claiming Hughes County was the proper venue because Estes' surgery and follow-up treatment took place in Hughes County. The trial court granted Lonbaken's motion to change venue. At issue on appeal was whether Buffalo County was a proper venue for the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the facts creating the necessity for bringing the action took place exclusively in Hughes County, and as such, the proper venue was Hughes County. View "Estes v. Lonbaken" on Justia Law

A newborn suffered severe brain damage because doctors failed to promptly diagnose and treat an infection contracted at his 2003 birth. He was born prematurely and certain tests, normally done during pregnancy, were not performed by the federally-subsidized clinic where the mother received care. The clinic and its doctors are deemed federal employees under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)-(n), and shielded from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In 2005 the parents filed suit in state court and, in 2006, HHS denied an administrative claim for damages. Within six months of the denial the case was removed to federal court. In 2010, the district court held that the claim was filed within the two year statute of limitations under the FTCA (28 U.S.C. 2401(b)) and awarded more than $29 million in damages against the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A claim only accrues when a plaintiff obtains sufficient knowledge of the government-related cause of his injury; the plaintiffs were reasonably diligent. View "Arroyo v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2001 plaintiff received prenatal care from a clinic that receives federal funds. Its physicians and the clinic are deemed federal employees for purposes of malpractice liability, so that the United States could be substituted as a party to a suit. 28 U.S.C. 2679(d)(1); claims would be governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and neither would face liability. For complex situations, the clinic contracted with UIC for specialists. Plaintiff's baby died following a difficult delivery. She sued the clinic, its doctor, the delivery hospital, and two UIC physicians who assisted. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services denied claims for damages. The district court entered summary judgment for the UIC doctors under the Illinois Good Samaritan Act, which shields physicians who provide "emergency care without fee to a person," 745 ILCS 49/25, but declined to dismiss the case against the government, which had been substituted for the clinic. The Seventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the district court had derivative jurisdiction. Although the salaried UIC doctors did not receive a direct financial benefit from the delivery, their employer billed the clinic for services. There was evidence that one doctor submitted a billing form with respect to the delivery; the other made a "bad faith" decision not to bill. View "Rodas v. Seidlin" on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with prostate cancer, Philip Baker filed a notice of claim in accordance with the Health Security Act, alleging that his primary care physician violated the applicable standard of care by failing to refer him to a urologist earlier, thus delaying his diagnosis. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the doctor, finding that the three-year statute of limitations barred Baker's claims for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than three years before he filed his notice. In so ruling, the court declined to recognize the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, which allows a patient to assert a cause of action for professional negligence based upon two or more related negligent acts or omissions by a health care provider or practitioner if some, but not all, of the acts or omissions occurred outside of the statute of limitations period. The Supreme Court vacated the partial summary judgment, holding that the language of the Health Security Act authorizes claims of continuing negligent treatment. Remanded. View "Baker v. Farrand" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the applicable standard that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Donna Shipley filed a medical malpractice action against two doctors and a hospital, alleging various claims for medical negligence. The trial court granted the hospital and one doctor summary judgment. After disqualifying Shipley's medical experts, the trial court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendant, Dr. Williams, and dismissed Shipley's case. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to disqualify Shipley's medical experts but reversed the grant of summary judgment on Shipley's negligence claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court's judgment disqualifying Shipley's medical experts; (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reinstated summary judgment in Dr. Williams' favor on one of Shipley's negligence claims; and (3) vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment on Shipley's remaining claims. Remanded. View "Shipley v. Williams" on Justia Law

This case arose when Pauline Thomas brought her daughter, Jane Doe and four of her grandchildren, including John Doe and R.N.T. to the Emergency Room at the Hennepin County Medical Center and reported her concerns that Jane Doe might have been sexually abused by R.N.T. Appellants brought suit against appellees claiming that the 72-hour hold placed on John Doe, the internal examination of Jane Doe, and the examination of John Doe violated the children's rights under the Fourth Amendment and that the seizure and search of both children violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all appellants. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees and denied appellants' motion for partial summary judgment on their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court rejected appellants' contention that appellees failed to move for summary judgment on all of appellants' claims; that the district court ignored questions of material fact; and that the district court at times used the wrong legal standards when analyzing the facts. The court also held that because it affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment against appellants, the court did not reach the denial of appellants' partial motion for summary judgment. View "Doe, et al. v. Dr. Al Tsai, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

After Madeleine Willson died of metastatic breast cancer and acute aspiration pneumonia, Robert Willson filed a complaint against Benefis Hospitals, Peace Hospice, and Dr. T. Brice Addison for medical malpractice. Robert alleged that the administration of medication expedited Madeleine's death and that Madeleine did not give informed consent to administration of the medications. Benefis filed two motions for summary judgment, the first of which argued that Robert had failed to establish causation through qualified expert testimony. Robert filed a motion for summary judgment seeking default judgment as a sanction for Benefis' alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in favor of Benefis and Dr. Addison. The court denied Robert's motion, finding Robert failed to prove spoliation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Benefis and Dr. Addison, and (2) although the district court denied Robert's motion for summary judgment for the wrong reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where sanctions were not appropriate. View "In re Estate of Willson v. Addison" on Justia Law

Alyssa Ray received treatment from Dr. Kara Yamamoto, an employee of Kapiolani Medical Specialists (KMS). Alyssa's parents brought an action in circuit court against KMS for negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The jury found that (1) Dr. Yamamoto's treatment of Alyssa was negligent but it was not a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries; and (2) Dr. Yamamoto failed to properly inform the Rays, and her failure was a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim and entered judgment in favor of the Rays. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the circuit court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim, and a new trial was required because the negligent treatment and informed consent verdicts were irreconcilable; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying KMS' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent; and (3) the circuit court erred by admitting certain testimony and failing adequately to cure the error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists" on Justia Law