Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Lisa Mullins, the widow and administrator of the estate of Charles Mullins, filed a complaint against Appellants, a doctor and a medical facility, alleging negligence in the treatment of Charles that resulted in his death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on Lisa's alleged contributory negligence and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial. On remand, Lisa filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge sitting in the court of common pleas from retrying the issue of the medical negligence of Appellants at a second jury trial. The court of appeals granted the writ to prevent the judge from retrying the negligence issue in the case against Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that the court erred in determining that a retrial of the negligence claim against Appellants patently and unambiguously violated the court's mandate in the prior appeal. View "State ex rel. Mullins v. Court of Common Pleas (Curran)" on Justia Law

Appellants, Little Rock Healthcare (LRHC), a nursing care facility; Donald Bedell, the sole member of the governing body for LRHC; and Heartland Personnel Leasing, appealed from a judgment in favor of Appellee Brenda Williams, as personal representative of the Estate of Minnie Valentine, who died after being discharged from LRHC. The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing Bedell and remanding for a new trial as to LRHC and Heartland, holding (1) the circuit court erred by denying Bedell's directed-verdict motion and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as Bedell owed no personal duty to Valentine; and (2) the circuit court erred in excluding Valentine's post discharge medical evidence, which error was prejudicial and warranted a new trial. View "Bedell v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(B), as amended by S.B. 80, was unconstitutional, in violation of the Ohio Constitution, because it was a procedural law that conflicted with Ohio R. Civ. P. 42(B). Section 2315.21(B) created a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages had been asserted. The state Court of Appeals held that section 2315.21(B) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 24(B), in violation of the separation of powers required by the state Constitution, by purporting to "legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by the Civil Rules." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over Rule 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, as it is a substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule. View "Havel v. Villa St. Joseph" on Justia Law

Appellants, Theresa and Eddie Paulino, filed an action against Appellees, QHG of Springdale and NorthWest Arkansas Hospitals (collectively, NMC), for negligent credentialing and negligent retention after three surgeries left Mrs. Paulino unable to walk. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NMC, concluding that, inter alia, the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing, nor did a cause of action for negligent credentialing exist in Arkansas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that (1) the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing; (2) there did not exist nor was it necessary to create a tort for negligent credentialing; and (3) because the nurse that monitored the surgeries was the employee of an independent contractor, NMC could not be held liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the nurse. View "Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc." on Justia Law

After giving birth to a newborn who suffered severe developmental issues resulting from a lack of glucose, Joe and Kathryn Norris (Norris) filed a medical malpractice action against, among others, Dr. Blayne Fritz, a physician who cared for the newborn. The morning before trial, Fritz moved to limit the scope of the testimony of Dr. Tom Strizich, the treating pediatrician, arguing that Norris failed to provide sufficient notice as to Strizich's opinions regarding a newborn's blood glucose level. The district court granted Fritz's motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fritz. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to vacate its judgment and order a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Strizich's testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care where (1) Strizich was a hybrid witness for purposes of standard of care testimony; and (2) Fritz could not reasonably claim surprise or prejudice from Strizich's proposed testimony. View "Norris v. Fritz" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Kristy and Timothy Wilcox, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a general surgeon (Doctor) and his employer, alleging that Doctor negligently performed laparoscopic gallbladder surgery on Kristy. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the written opinion of a similar health care provider that accompanied the certificate of good faith, as mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(a), did not satisfy the "detailed basis" requirement of the statute because it failed to explain the particular manner in which Doctor had breached the standard of care. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a written opinion satisfies the "detailed basis" requirement of section 52-190a(a) if it states the similar health care provider's opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached, and the factual basis of the similar health care provider's conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care; and (2) the written opinion in the present case was sufficiently detailed to satisfy section 52-190a(a). View "Wilcox v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

In McQuitty I, Dylan McQuitty, by and through his parents, successfully sued Ms. McQuitty's physician and his practice (collectively, Spangler) for having failed to obtain Ms. McQuitty's informed consent to treatment, which resulted in severe injuries to Dylan during his birth. In a series of post-trial motions following McQuitty I, Spangler moved to reduce the verdict in favor of the McQuittys. After the verdict but prior to resolution of the post-trial motions, Dylan died. The circuit court found that Dylan's death did not absolve the portion of the judgment allocated to Dylan's future medical expenses. The Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly denied Spangler's motions for post-trial relief; (2) the post-verdict death of Dylan did not absolve Spangler from the finality of the jury's award of future medical expenses; (3) the hospital, for which summary judgment was entered in its favor as to liability and damages during McQuitty I, was not a joint tort-feasor under Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, such that its settlement release from the McQuittys did not entitle Spangler to a reduction of the judgment against them; and (4) post-judgment interest on the verdict accrued from the date of the original judgment. View "Spangler v. McQuitty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Dr. Mary Jane Benson, Dr. George C. Rees, and West Florida Hospital, alleging that the doctors were negligent in rendering medical care to her, which resulted in excessive liver damage. Plaintiff's claim against the hospital were based on both vicarious liability for Dr. Benson's negligence, as well as liability for the direct negligence in granting medical staff privileges to both doctors, which led to the medical care and procedures performed. The court approved the First District's decision because it held that the trial court correctly ordered the disclosure of a blank application for medical staff privileges. Section 381.0287(b)1 impermissible attempted to limit the disclosure requirements of article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution (Amendment 7), and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq., did not preempt Amendment 7. In accordance with the court's decision, the court disapproved of the decision of the Fourth District in Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc. v. Taitel and its contrary holding that a blank form used by a hospital for nurse credentialing was confidential and protected by disclosure. View "West Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., etc. v. See, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, a doctor and hospital, for medical malpractice. Defendants filed motions for a preliminary determination requesting that the trial court dismiss the complaint due to Plaintiff's dilatory conduct. The trial court denied the request. The court of appeals (1) determined that the trial court's order was a final judgment, and (2) affirmed the trial court's order as to the hospital but reversed as to the doctor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's order was not a final appealable judgment because it did not dispose of all claims as to all parties and because the trial court's order did not contain the "magic language" of Ind. R. App. P. 2(H)(2). View "Ramsey v. Moore" on Justia Law

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.View "Lomando v. United States" on Justia Law