Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

This case interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.050, which provides civil and criminal immunity to the reporters of suspected child dependency, neglect, and abuse. On the basis of that immunity, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, Norton Hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, and Dr. Ketan Mehta, in a civil suit filed by Brandi Peyton for medical malpractice, negligence, and emotional distress, among other claims. Peyton alleged negligence in generating, interpreting, and reporting toxicology reports that showed Peyton had a high blood alcohol concentration the evening before giving birth to a baby. The court of appeals reversed, opining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to who initiated the toxicology screening, which, in the court's view, affected the availability of immunity under sections 620.050(1) and 620.050(14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Appellants acted in good faith under Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.030 in reporting the toxicology reports; and (2) Appellants were therefore entitled to immunity under section 620.050(1) as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a medical negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Hospital after Appellant's husband, who had been admitted to a psychiatric unit in Hospital where suicide precautions were taken, hung himself and died. The circuit court court ordered the disclosure of various documents that Hospital claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court of appeals found the documents were privileged and granted Hospital's requested writ of prohibition stopping the circuit court from order the disclosure of the documents. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' order, holding that the writ was erroneously granted, as Hospital failed to show that the privilege applied. View "Collins v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

This was an appeal after summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. A kidney donor brought suit after his donated kidney was rendered useless by allegedly negligent medical treatment provided to the donee. At issue was whether a duty of care is owed to a kidney donor by the physicians providing posttransplant treatment to the donee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in this instance, a physician does not owe a duty of care to a kidney donor during the posttransplant treatment and care of the donee, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Olson v. Wrenshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent several medical procedures performed by Defendants, two medical doctors. Two years and three months after the treatment ended, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against Defendants. Upon a motion by Dr. Grigsby, one of the doctors, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly found that, as a matter of law, Dr. Grigsby failed to show Plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her legal injury; but (2) when a plaintiff alleges a course of negligent treatment, a defendant may show that the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations without identifying the specific procedure within the course of treatment that caused the patient's injury. Rather, to prevail, a defendant need only show that the plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered that the course of treatment was negligent. Remanded. View "Arnold v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Appellants, several individuals and the administratrix of the estate of Arvilla Langston, filed a medical-malpractice action against Appellees, Sparks Regional Medical Center (SRMC) and Sparks Medical Foundation, alleging that Langston died as the result of SRMC's alleged failure to properly care for, diagnose, and treat Langston. Appellees filed an amended answer, and the circuit court dismissed the case on the grounds of charitable immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to strike the amended answer. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Appellees. Appellants subsequently filed an amended complaint attempting to raise a pre-death claim not pled in the initial complaint. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for reconsideration and new trial and granted SRMC's motion to strike Appellants' amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment; (2) Appellants' failed to preserve for appeal their argument that the circuit court erred in failing to rule on a loss-of-chance theory of recovery; and (3) the circuit court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in striking Appellants' amended complaint. View "Neal v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Appellant, a medical doctor practicing medicine in Kansas and Missouri, appealed from the district court's order denying her petition to revoke an administrative subpoena issued by the Kansas Board of Healing Arts. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that Appellant was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-2839a(b)(3)(B). On the merits of the appeal, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition based on its conclusion that the Board had authority under the Kansas Healing Arts Act to investigate and subpoena Appellant, a Kansas licensee who was practicing under the Act, even though the investigation was based upon her practice of medicine in Missouri. View "Ryser v. State" on Justia Law

Two female patients sued a medical doctor, the professional association bearing his name, and a clinic, alleging the doctor assaulted the patients by groping their breasts while examining them for sinus and flu symptoms. Although they maintained the claims were not health care liability claims (HCLCs), the patients served the doctor and professional association with reports from a physician who, based only on the assumption that allegations in the plaintiffs' pleadings were true opined that the defendant doctor's alleged actions did not fall within any appropriate standard of care. The trial court denied Defendants' motions for dismissal on the suit on the basis that the claims were HCLCs and that the reports were deficient. The court of appeals affirmed without considering the reports' adequacy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA) creates a rebuttable presumption that a patient's claims against a physician or health care provider based on facts implicating the defendant's conduct during the patient's care, treatment, or confinement are HCLCs; and (2) the record did not rebut the presumption as it related to the TMLA's expert report requirements, nor were the expert reports served by the plaintiffs adequate under the TMLA. Remanded. View "Loaisiga v. Cerda" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a medical action against Petitioner, a medical doctor. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether a completed case information report, on which an election of a jury trial is noted and which is filed with the complaint, but not served on the opposing party, is a proper vehicle for demanding a jury trial. The court of special appeals held that it was and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, which had reached the opposite result. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a case information report form, being neither a "paper" nor a "pleading" and, in any event, having not been served on the opposing party, is neither a proper nor timely means of demanding a civil jury trial pursuant to Md. R. 2-325(a) and (b). View "Duckett v. Riley" on Justia Law

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public. View "McCullum v. Tepe" on Justia Law

Six days after his birth, Plaintiff suffered irreversible brain damage. Through his mother as guardian ad litem, Plaintiff sued his pediatrician and the hospital in which he was born. Before trial, Plaintiff and the pediatrician agreed to settlement of $1 million. At a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded both economic and noneconomic damages. The jury found the pediatrician was fifty-five percent at fault and the hospital forty percent at fault. The court of appeal reversed the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Plaintiff economic damages against the hospital after applying the common law "release rule," under which Plaintiff's settlement with the pediatrician also released the nonsettling hospital from liability for Plaintiff's economic damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law release rule is no longer to be followed in California; and (2) therefore, the defendant hospital remained jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's economic damages. View "Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp." on Justia Law