Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Doctor for medical malpractice arising out of surgeries to treat her tracheal stenosis. Doctor filed a motion in limine to prevent Plaintiff's subsequent treating physician from testifying about the standard of care. The district court granted the motion because Plaintiff's treating physician did not meet the requirements of Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-3412. Under the statute, Plaintiff's treating physician must have spent at least fifty percent of his professional time within the two years before Plaintiff's first surgery in actual clinical practice if Plaintiff wished him to testify as an expert on the applicable standard of care. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Doctor because, in the absence of expert testimony on the standard of care, Plaintiff could not carry her burden of proof. the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fifty percent rule for expert witnesses under section 60-3412 is inapplicable to treating physicians; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Doctor. View "Schlaikjer v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

In Powell I, Plaintiff sued Doctor and others for medical malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Appellees in 2007. The appellate court held that the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, vacated the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for dismissal. By the time the complaint was dismissed in 2011, the statute of limitations had expired on the merits of the substantive claims. In Powell II, Plaintiff filed a second, identical statement of claim in 2007. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in 2008 under the doctrine of res judicata. In 2011, Plaintiff filed in Powell II a motion to reopen case and vacate judgment, arguing that the circuit court's reliance on the preclusive effect of the decision in Powell I was faulty. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held (1) in Powell II, the judge did not err in granting summary judgment because, at the time, the doctrine of res judicata barred the maintenance of the litigation based on the 2007 grant of summary judgment in Powell I; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion to reopen case and vacate judgment. View "Powell v. Breslin" on Justia Law

After undergoing surgery for a heart valve replacement, Kathy Young died. Kathy's husband, Greg Oury, brought this medical malpractice suit on behalf of Kathy's estate, alleging that the doctor who performed the surgery (Doctor) (1) was negligent in recommending the specific procedure that he used in the surgery, the Ross procedure; and (2) failed to obtain Kathy's informed consent because he did not tell her that the Ross procedure was controversial and that Kathy was not a good candidate for the procedure. During the trial, Doctor displayed a chart indicating patient survival rates of various valve replacement surgeries. The court later deemed inadmissible the chart and Doctor's related testimony because the chart had not been disclosed before trial and because the admission lacked foundational support. The jury returned a verdict for Doctor. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court's erroneous admission of Doctor's chart and testimony allowed the jury to hear unsupported and surprise evidence directly related to the issue of informed consent, and there being no clear and timely curative instruction, the evidence in all probability prejudicially influenced the jury in its decision. View "Young v. Oury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's wife died after various physicians failed to diagnose and treat her obstructed bowel. Plaintiff, acting individually and as a personal representative of his wife's estate, filed a medical malpractice complaint against Community Hospitals of Indiana, Inc. (Community). A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $8.5 million. Community subsequently made an oral motion to reduce the jury awarded to $1.23 million - the cap imposed by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (Act). Plaintiff objected to the reduction of the damage award alleging that the cap was unconstitutional and requesting an evidentiary hearing to develop his constitutional challenges. The trial court denied Plaintiff's request and entered judgment in the amount of $1.25 million. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff forfeited his opportunity to conduct an evidentiary hearing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. View "Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc." on Justia Law

Keely Foster, a minor, and her parents, Kim and Kevin Foster, sued Keely's pediatric orthapedic surgeon, Dr. Michelle Klaumann, for injury done to a nerve in Keely's leg while Keely was undergoing surgery. After a trial, the jury found in favor of Klaumann. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the jury verdict, holding (1) it was not error to instruct the jury on both a general physician standard of care and a specialist standard of care when the parties did not dispute Klaumann was a specialist; and (2) the "best judgment" instruction does not misstate the law by instructing the jury that the physician has a right to use his or her best judgment in the selection of the choice of treatment. View "Foster v. Klaumann" on Justia Law

Parents, individually and on behalf of their daughter (Daughter), filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital under respondeat superior, alleging that Hospital's employee, an obstetrical nurse (Nurse), breached the standard of care which caused permanent injury to Daughter. The jury returned a verdict for Hospital. The court of appeals affirmed. Parents appealed, contending that one jury instruction erroneously directed the jury to apply a community nursing standard of care when all of their twelve negligence claims were governed by a national standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instruction given was correct for the negligence allegation based upon chain of command because it was governed by a community standard of care. View "Bates v. Dodge City Healthcare Group" on Justia Law

The Labairs lost their newborn baby after an early delivery by C-section. The Labairs retained Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (Carey) to pursue their medical malpractice claim against their obstetrician. More than two and a half years later, Carey filed a complaint against the obstetrician. However, Carey failed to file an application with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP) before filing a complaint with the district court as required by statute and further failed to file an MMLP application within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice claims. The district court later dismissed the Labairs' medical malpractice case with prejudice as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The Labairs subsequently filed a complaint for legal malpractice against Casey. The district court entered summary judgment for Carey, concluding that Carey's conduct of failing to file the application with the MMLP did not cause the Labairs injury or damages because the Labairs failed to show that the underlying medical malpractice claims would have succeeded but for the error. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the Labairs' loss of their medical malpractice case was an injury; and (2) the damages associated with that injury remained unproven. View "Labair v. Carey " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order striking the testimony of plaintiff's rebuttal expert witness, and portions of two of plaintiff's previously disclosed expert witnesses. The underlying case centered on a medical malpractice claim brought by the parents of a minor child against a hospital, its management and the doctor that delivered the child. The minor was allegedly injured at birth after his umbilical cord wrapped around his neck, depriving his brain of oxygen. The parties disputed the cause of the child's injuries: Plaintiffs argued the child was injured by preventable intrapartum events (namely Defendants' alleged negligence); defendants argued the injuries occurred days, or possibly weeks prior to birth. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded plaintiff's expert's rebuttal testimony because her testimony properly refuted a central theory of the defendants' case. The trial court also abused its discretion when it excluded the disclosed experts' testimony because the late disclosure of their testimony did not harm the defendants, as required for sanctions under Rule 37. Accordingly, the Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Warden v. Exempla" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against a dentist (Dentist) and his dental practice, alleging that Dentist's failure to diagnose and treat his dental conditions resulted in a bone infection and a worsening of his dental problems, which caused severe and permanent physical and emotional damage. In preparation for trial, there was an ex parte predeposition conference conducted between Plaintiff's nonparty treating physician and counsel provided by Defendant's insurance company. Plaintiff contended that the ex parte meeting violated the State's physician-patient confidentiality statute as delineated in Fla. Stat. 456.057(8). The Supreme Court held that section 456.057 prohibits such meetings and quashed the decision of the Fourth District holding otherwise. In particular, the Court held that an ex parte meeting such as the one attempted here is prohibited irrespective of whether the attorney and physician claim they will discuss only non-privileged matters. View "Hasan v. Garvar" on Justia Law

Welch called 911. A Wishard ambulance arrived. Welch was 34 weeks pregnant. Paramedics ascertained that her water broke and she had a prolapsed umbilical cord. After consulting with her obstetrician’s office, paramedics contacted the Beech Grove emergency room and transported her there. Beech Grove did not have an obstetrics facility. Rather than delivering the baby, the physician sent Welch in the Wishard ambulance to another hospital, where the baby was delivered by Caesarean section. He had suffered hypoxia resulting in severe brain damage. Plaintiffs alleged that Wishard violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the situation did not fit the definition of “come to the emergency room:” that an individual in an ambulance owned and operated by the hospital is deemed to have come to the emergency room unless the ambulance is operated under communitywide emergency medical service protocols that direct it to transport the individual to a hospital other than the owner. The Wishard ambulance was operating under EMS protocols when it transported the plaintiffs. Although the definition was adopted after the incident, it was merely a clarification. View "Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. IN" on Justia Law