Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In this health care liability case, Plaintiffs, before filing their health care liability complaint, gave Defendants written notice pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed their case. The next year, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint, raising the same claims against the same defendants. Plaintiffs did not give Defendants pre-suit notice before filing the second action. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 29-26-121(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that, since the complaints were essentially identical, the statute required only that Defendants be notified once. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding (1) section 29-26-121(a)(1) requires that plaintiffs notify prospective defendants of a forthcoming health care liability lawsuit before the filing of each complaint, and the sanction for failure to comply with the statute is dismissal without prejudice; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case failed to provide the required pre-suit notice. View "Foster v. Chiles" on Justia Law

Santana-Concepcion underwent exploratory brain surgery around a “symptomatic arachnoid cyst” during which a neurosurgeon placed a shunt to relieve pressure created by the cyst. Santana-Concepcion, along with her husband and four children, later filed suit against the neurosurgeon and the hospital at which the surgery was performed, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, holding (1) the claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children were time-barred; (2) the medical malpractice claim of Santana-Concepcion’s minor children was foreclosed by the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claim of the minor children failed on the element of causation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on (1) the medical malpractice claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children and the informed consent claims of the adult children, as they were not filed within the limitations period; (2) the minor plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims, as they were unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the application of the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claims of the minor plaintiffs for lack of causation. View "Santana-Concepcion v. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc." on Justia Law

Luvetta Goff died as a result of complications from elective surgery performed by Appellants at the University of Kentucky Hospital (UK Hospital). Goff’s estate filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice action against Appellants. During discovery, the estate requested an “incident” or “event” report generated by a UK Hospital nurse concerning the surgery through the UK Healthcare Safety Evaluation System. Appellant sought a protective order concerning the report, arguing that it fell within the federal privilege created by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. The court of appeals granted Appellants the writ. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals regarding the scope of the privilege under the Act, holding (1) the court of appeals was misguided in its ultimate limitations on the scope of the privilege; and (2) information normally contained in an incident report is not privileged under the Act and may be discovered, following an in camera review, and its information compelled. Remanded. View "Tibbs v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against healthcare providers (Defendants). During pretrial discovery, Plaintiff filed two separate motions to compel, which the trial court denied. Prior to trial, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action. The trial court entered an agreed order incorporating the discovery conducted and taken in the 2010 action into the 2012 action. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rulings, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motions to compel in the nonsuited action. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court’s agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, objections, or rulings made by the court in the 2010 nonsuit action into the 2012 action, these rulings could not be challenged in this appeal. View "Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp." on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

An Estate filed an adult wrongful death medical malpractice action against a nursing home. The Estate settled its claim against the nursing home for $250,000, the maximum liability of the health care provider under Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). Thereafter, the Estate filed a petition to determine the amount of excess damages it was due from the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund. The Estate and the Fund agreed on the amount of damages but left the attorney fee component of damages for determination by the trial court. The trial court ordered the Fund to pay the Estate $50,440 for attorney fees. The Fund appealed, arguing that, in an action to recover for the wrongful death of an adult, the fifteen percent limit on attorney fees imposed by the MMA (the "fee cap provision") should be applied such that the Fund should not be required to pay a claimant an amount for attorney fees exceeding fifteen percent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fee cap provision applies to cap the fees that the plaintiff’s lawyer may charge as to the award the client receives from the Fund but does not lessen the Fund’s liability to a claimant. View "Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case was stillborn. Plaintiffs, as coadministrators of the estate of the decedent, filed this action against Defendants, who provided prenatal care to the decedent’s mother, alleging that Defendants’ negligent failure to diagnose and treat the mother’s gestational diabetes caused the decedent’s stillbirth. At the close of Plaintiffs’ evidence the trial court granted Defendants' motion for a directed verdict, concluding that Plaintiffs had insufficient evidence to establish their claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in precluding two of their expert witnesses - physicians board certified in obstetrics and gynecology - from opining that the mother’s untreated gestational diabetes caused the decedent’s stillbirth. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the expert testimony on the basis that the expert witnesses were not qualified to render an opinion on the cause of the decedent’s stillbirth. Remanded. View "Weaver v. McKnight" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted the Medical Liability Act, which contains a statute of repose that operates as a bar to claims that are not brought within ten years of the date of the medical treatment. In this case, alleged negligence occurred during the birth of a child in 1996. No suit was filed until 2011, five years after the repose statute’s deadline. The hospital moved for summary judgment, asserting that the repose statute barred the claim. The mother responded that the Act’s ten-year statute of repose violates the open court and retroactivity provisions of the Texas Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the Act’s repose statute against the mother’s as-applied constitutional challenges, holding (1) the mother’s open courts challenge failed due to the mother’s lack of diligence in filing suit; and (2) the mother’s retroactivity challenge failed because a compelling public purpose justified the legislation and granted the mother a three-year grace period to file suit. View "Tenet Hosps. Ltd. v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Luvetta Goff died as a result of complications from surgery performed by Appellants at the University of Kentucky Hospital. Goff’s estate filed an action against Appellants, alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice. This appeal arose from a discovery dispute regarding an alleged incident report generated by a surgical nurse concerning the surgery. Appellants petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition preventing the trial court from ordering production of the report, arguing that it fell within the federal privilege created by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. The court of appeals granted the writ but concluded that the Act’s privilege was limited. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals regarding the protective scope of the privilege under the Act, holding that information normally contained in an incident report is not privileged under the Act and may be discovered, following an in camera review, and its information compelled. Remanded to the trial court for an in camera review. View "Tibbs v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

The patient in this case alleged that his physician negligently performed a surgical procedure and breached his duty to obtain informed consent. The patient also sued the supervising health services corporation based on vicarious liability and independent negligence. The jury found both the physician and the corporation negligent and apportioned liability between them. On appeal, the physician and corporation argued the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings, incorrectly instructed the jury on proximate cause, and wrongly awarded pre- and post-judgment interest. In cross appeals, the physician and corporation sought review of the trial court’s decision to submit a supplemental question to the jury, as well as its failure to alter the damages award based on the jury’s response to that supplemental question. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the patient. The trial court should not have requested supplemental information from the jury after the verdict. Although the trial court decided not to modify the verdict, the jury’s response to the supplemental question arguably could have affected other proceedings between the physician and corporation. The case was remanded with instructions to the Superior Court to vacate the supplemental verdict. View "Shapria, M.D. et al. v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., et al." on Justia Law