Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Joan Johnson, as personal representative of the Estate of Herman B. Johnson, and Marguerite Johnson, Herman Johnson's widow, appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their action against Mid Dakota Clinic. On the morning of December 18, 2012, Herman Johnson experienced confusion and swelling of his legs and calves. That morning, Joan Johnson, Herman Johnson's daughter and attorney-in-fact, called the Veteran's Administration Clinic to schedule an appointment for Herman, but the VA Clinic did not return her call. As a result, Joan Johnson called Mid Dakota to schedule an appointment. Although she had requested a specific doctor, she was advised she would not be able to see him that day and was given an appointment with Donald Grenz, M.D. later that afternoon. Upon arriving at Mid Dakota Clinic at Gateway Mall, Joan and Herman Johnson checked in with the receptionist approximately seven minutes late for the appointment. Because they were more than five minutes late, they were told Dr. Grenz would not see them but they could reschedule with Dr. Grenz for another day or go to the emergency room or the "Today Clinic," a walk-in clinic within Mid Dakota's main clinic downtown. Joan and Herman Johnson subsequently left the clinic to seek alternative care. Upon entering the east vestibule of the Gateway Mall, Joan Johnson decided to seek the assistance of the VA Clinic, which was located in the mall immediately adjacent to Mid Dakota. As Joan and Herman Johnson turned to re-enter the mall, Herman Johnson fell and hit his head on the floor of the vestibule. As a result, he suffered a laceration along his forehead. Joan Johnson then returned to Mid Dakota and announced that Herman Johnson had fallen and was injured. A registered nurse employed by Mid Dakota assisted Herman Johnson until he was taken by ambulance to St. Alexius Medical Center and was admitted for observation. While Herman Johnson was hospitalized, he suffered two episodes of respiratory arrest, and he died on December 27, 2012. The Johnsons sued Mid Dakota for negligence, breach of contract and professional negligence. Because the Johnsons failed to present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sharp Memorial Hospital (dba Sharp Rehabilitation Center) appealed the trial court's order granting plaintiff-respondent's Berthe Kabran's motion for new trial following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice in which the jury found Sharp was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff's predecessor, Dr. Eke Wokocha, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Sharp argued on appeal that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because the motion was untimely, rendering the order void. It further argued the court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the new trial motion was cumulative and consistent with defense expert trial testimony, and thus would not change the outcome of the trial. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that no jurisdictional defect appeared in the court's new trial order and, as a result, Sharp could not raise its appellate contentions as to the motion's timeliness for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the new evidence and ruling on the record that plaintiff should have been granted a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial" on Justia Law

Twenty-nine individual Respondents filed eight separate civil actions alleging that Petitioners - three pharmacies and a physician - and other medical providers negligently prescribed and dispensed controlled substances causing Respondents to become addicted to and abuse the controlled substances. Petitioners moved for summary judgment asserting that Respondents’ claims were barred as a matter of law on the basis of Respondents’ admissions of their own criminal activity associated with the prescription and dispensation of controlled substances by Petitioners. Specifically, Petitioners maintained that Respondents’ actions were barred by the “wrongful conduct” rule and/or the doctrine of in pari delicto. The circuit court concluded that the actions were not barred but certified questions regarding the issue to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that any wrongdoing on the part of Respondents must be assessed under the Court’s precepts of comparative negligence and does not per se operate as a complete bar to Respondents’ causes of action. View "Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below" on Justia Law

Following their two-month-old’s death from whooping cough, Plaintiffs sued Kristin Ault, D.O. and her employer, ETMC First Physicians, alleging that Dr. Ault’s negligence caused the infant’s death and that ETMC was vicariously liable for the negligence. After Plaintiffs served Defendants with an amended expert report, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the expert’s opinions as to causation were conclusory because the report failed to link the expert's opinions to the underlying facts. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and ordered the lawsuit dismissed in light of conflicting statements in the report, which the court held failed to link the expert’s conclusions to the underlying facts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the report was not conclusory but was a good faith effort to comply with the Texas Medical Liability Act’s requirements. View "Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a severe adverse reaction to a compounded drug administered by her physician that left her permanently blind in both eyes. Plaintiff sued the compounding pharmacy and several of its licensed-pharmacist employees. Taking the position that Plaintiff had asserted health care liability claims governed by the Texas Medical Liability Act (Act), the defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to serve them with an expert report. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the pharmacist defendants were not health care providers, the claims against them were not health care liability claims, and therefore, the Act did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act applies to Plaintiff’s claims against the pharmacist defendants; (2) under the applicable version of that Act, Plaintiff was required to serve the defendants with an expert report within 120 days of filing suit; and (3) because Plaintiff failed to do so, her claims must be dismissed. Remanded. View "Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller" on Justia Law

Billy Jo Ries gave birth to a daughter who, due to the loss of approximately one-third of her blood during delivery, suffered multiple organ failure and brain damage. The Rieses filed suit against the hospital, the physician who delivered their daughter, and the neonatologist who treated their daughter after her birth, alleging medical negligence. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony from an expert that was not scientifically reliable under the Daubert standard. The physician appealed, arguing that the court of appeals impermissibly substituted its findings for the trial court’s findings regarding the reliability of the expert testimony and erroneously determined that the error required reversal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony, and if there was error, it was harmless. View "Oliphant v. Ries" on Justia Law

In this health care liability case, Plaintiffs, before filing their health care liability complaint, gave Defendants written notice pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed their case. The next year, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint, raising the same claims against the same defendants. Plaintiffs did not give Defendants pre-suit notice before filing the second action. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 29-26-121(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that, since the complaints were essentially identical, the statute required only that Defendants be notified once. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding (1) section 29-26-121(a)(1) requires that plaintiffs notify prospective defendants of a forthcoming health care liability lawsuit before the filing of each complaint, and the sanction for failure to comply with the statute is dismissal without prejudice; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case failed to provide the required pre-suit notice. View "Foster v. Chiles" on Justia Law

Santana-Concepcion underwent exploratory brain surgery around a “symptomatic arachnoid cyst” during which a neurosurgeon placed a shunt to relieve pressure created by the cyst. Santana-Concepcion, along with her husband and four children, later filed suit against the neurosurgeon and the hospital at which the surgery was performed, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, holding (1) the claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children were time-barred; (2) the medical malpractice claim of Santana-Concepcion’s minor children was foreclosed by the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claim of the minor children failed on the element of causation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on (1) the medical malpractice claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children and the informed consent claims of the adult children, as they were not filed within the limitations period; (2) the minor plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims, as they were unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the application of the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claims of the minor plaintiffs for lack of causation. View "Santana-Concepcion v. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc." on Justia Law

Luvetta Goff died as a result of complications from elective surgery performed by Appellants at the University of Kentucky Hospital (UK Hospital). Goff’s estate filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice action against Appellants. During discovery, the estate requested an “incident” or “event” report generated by a UK Hospital nurse concerning the surgery through the UK Healthcare Safety Evaluation System. Appellant sought a protective order concerning the report, arguing that it fell within the federal privilege created by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. The court of appeals granted Appellants the writ. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals regarding the scope of the privilege under the Act, holding (1) the court of appeals was misguided in its ultimate limitations on the scope of the privilege; and (2) information normally contained in an incident report is not privileged under the Act and may be discovered, following an in camera review, and its information compelled. Remanded. View "Tibbs v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against healthcare providers (Defendants). During pretrial discovery, Plaintiff filed two separate motions to compel, which the trial court denied. Prior to trial, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action. The trial court entered an agreed order incorporating the discovery conducted and taken in the 2010 action into the 2012 action. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rulings, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motions to compel in the nonsuited action. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court’s agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, objections, or rulings made by the court in the 2010 nonsuit action into the 2012 action, these rulings could not be challenged in this appeal. View "Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp." on Justia Law