Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an obstetrician and gynecologist (OB-GYN) licensed to practice medicine in Illinois since 1975, was reappointed to the staff at Northwestern in 2000 and 2001. In 2002, plaintiff applied for reappointment; the division chief of gynecology at the hospital, reviewed one of plaintiff’s gynecological surgeries and deemed that it did not meet relevant criteria; 21 of his cases were then reviewed. Plaintiff sued, following revocation of his privileges to practice at the hospital following a peer review conducted pursuant to the Illinois Hospital Licensing Act, 210 ILCS 85/1. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding that the hospital was immune from suit and that it had complied with its bylaws and had not engaged in any wilful and wanton conduct. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting constitutional challenges to the immunity granted by the Licensing Act. View "Valfer v. Evanston NW Healthcare" on Justia Law

Ho Im Bae died from acute morphine intoxication at Lakeside Adult Family Home. Esther Kim, the personal representative of Bae's estate, brought tort claims against several individuals involved in Bae's care. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review came from Alpha Nursing & Services Inc. and two of its nurses, who did not provide nursing services to Bae, but who were alleged to have observed signs of abuse and physical assault that should have been reported to the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and law enforcement. Specifically, the issue was whether the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA) created an implied cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that one of the nurses did not have a duty to report and the other nurse fulfilled her reporting duty by contacting DSHS. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue: "[t]he AVAA creates a private cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment." A separate issue was whether the claims against one of the nurses should have been dismissed for insufficient service. The nurse, Christine Thomas, moved to Norway, and plaintiff personally served her there almost a year after filing and amended complaint and properly serving Alpha. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the nurse's motion to dismiss: "Consistent with Norway's ratification of the Hague Convention, however, the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in serving Thomas through Norway's designated central authority." View "Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home" on Justia Law

The parents of Kenia Lopez-Rosario, an adult with several physical and cognitive disabilities, petitioned the circuit court appoint them as Lopez-Rosario’s co-guardians. The circuit court granted guardianship to the parents. Subsequently, Lopez-Rosario had surgery to remove her gallbladder, and the surgeon, Dr. Christine Habib, allegedly made an error that injured Lopez-Rosario. Lopez-Rosario filed a negligence suit against Dr. Habib and her employer. Defendants filed a plea in bar/motion to dismiss, arguing that Lopez-Rosario could not file suit in her own name because her parents had been appointed as her guardians. The circuit court granted the plea in bar/motion to dismiss, concluding that Lopez-Rosario did not have standing to sue in her own name. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Va. Code 64.2-2025, Lopez-Rosario’s parents had the authority and obligation to prosecute lawsuits on Lopez-Rosario’s behalf, and therefore, Lopez-Rosario lacked standing to file suit in her own name. View "Lopez-Rosario v. Habib" on Justia Law

Kirk Lloyd sought to be admitted at United Hospital to stop his pattern of self-harm. United informed Lloyd and his mother, Melinda Binkley, that Lloyd would not be admitted to United’s inpatient mental-health program and released Lloyd. The next night, Lloyd committed suicide. Binkley, acting as trustee, filed a medical-malpractice action against Allina Health System and its staff (collectively, Respondents) alleging that Respondents’ negligent failure to properly examine, evaluate, and provide services to Lloyd caused his death. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to immunity for their good-faith actions under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act. The district court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondents’ good-faith decision to deny Lloyd admission to the inpatient mental health unit is entitled to immunity; but (2) it is not clear that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on all of Binkley’s claims. Remanded. View "Binkley v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

Stephanie Mills had a thyroidectomy, performed by Dr. Ghaphery at Wheeling Hospital. Mills’s nerves surrounding her thyroid gland were severed during the thyroidectomy, resulting in bilateral vocal cord paralysis. Mills filed suit against Dr. Ghaphery, A.D. Ghaphery Professional Association, and Wheeling Hospital, Inc. (collectively, Wheeling Hospital), alleging medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and negligent credentialing. Mills sought discovery of certain documents from Wheeling Hospital. When the Hospital failed to respond to the discovery requests, Mills filed a motion to compel. The circuit court ordered the majority of the disputed documents to be disclosed. Wheeling Hospital sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the circuit court’s order, asserting that the disputed documents were protected by the statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted as moulded the requested writ, holding (1) certain of the challenged documents, including those comprising Dr. Ghaphery’s request to renew his staff privilege, are specifically protected by the peer review privilege; and (2) the circuit court did not conduct a thorough in camera review of the remaining challenged documents, and Wheeling Hospital did not provide a sufficiently detailed privilege log to permit the circuit court to determine whether such documents are protected by the peer review privilege. View "State ex rel. Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Hon. Wilson" on Justia Law

The Klaines filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dressen and against Southern Illinois Hospital Services (SIHS), for the negligent credentialing of Dressen. During discovery SIHS provided 1,700 pages of documents. SIHS refused to provide other documents, which it listed in a privilege log, citing the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101) and the Health Care Professional Credentials Data Collection Act (410 ILCS 517/1). The circuit court agreed with SIHS, with the exception of documents contained in Group B, Group F, and Group J. SIHS complied with respect to Group B, but continued to maintain that the documents in Groups F and J were privileged. Group F consists of Dressen’s three applications to SIHS for staff privileges. Group J contains “procedure summaries and case histories” that list surgical procedures that Dressen performed at SIHS. The circuit court held SIHS in contempt and imposed a $1 monetary sanction. On interlocutory appeal, the court affirmed, with modifications: all references to an external peer review report contained in Dressen’s application for staff privileges were to be redacted, and any patient identifying information was to be redacted to the extent required by 45 C.F.R. 164.512(e). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis for holding that a physician-patient privilege applies to raw data regarding treatment and procedures performed. View "Klaine v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint against Defendant, a medical doctor, alleging claims based on medical negligence, Defendant’s failure to obtain informed consent, and battery. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to the medical battery claim. After a trial as to Plaintiffs’ informed consent claim, the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ battery claim; but (2) the district court erred by excluding expert testimony that a fine-needle aspiration biopsy was a viable non-surgical alternative to a surgical biopsy. View "Bradley v. Sugarbaker" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendant, a licensed clinical social worker, alleging negligence, negligence per se, and intentional infliction of emotional distress for providing counseling services for their minor daughter without their consent. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”). Plaintiffs responded that their claims were not subject to the THCLA’s procedural requirements because their claims sounded in ordinary negligence. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims, concluding that the THCLA encompassed Plaintiffs’ claims because they related to the provision of “health care services” by a “health care provider.” The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the Supreme Court’s analysis in determining if Plaintiffs’ claims sounded in ordinary negligence or health care liability. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding (1) the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, which amended the THCLA, statutorily abrogated the Court’s decision in Estate of French; and (2) Plaintiff’s complaint was subject to the THCLA, which required them to provide pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith. View "Ellithorpe v. Weismark" on Justia Law

After the death of Charles Cornell, Sherry Cornell filed a complaint against numerous defendants, including petitioner Stephen Tam, M.D., alleging medical malpractice. Dr. Tam filed an omnibus motion in limine requesting in part that Plaintiff’s noneconomic damages be capped pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.035, which limits the recovery of a plaintiff’s noneconomic damages in a healthcare provider’s professional negligence action to $350,000. The district court denied the motion, concluding (1) section 41A.035 is unconstitutional, as it violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right to trial by jury; (2) the statutory cap does not apply to the case as a whole, but a separate cap applies to each plaintiff for each of the defendants; and (3) the statutory cap does not apply to medical malpractice claims. Dr. Tam subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to vacate its order denying his motion in limine. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the district court erred in (1) finding the statute unconstitutional; (2) finding the statutory cap applies per plaintiff and per defendant; and (3) finding the statute only applies to professional negligence and not to medical malpractice. View "Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In 2011, 74-year-old Garnell Wilcoxon lived alone. He suffered a stroke, awoke on the floor of his bedroom covered in sweat, feeling sore and with no memory of how he got there. Wilcoxon was admitted to the Troy Regional Medical Center for analysis and treatment for approximately one year before he died. Following Wilcoxon's death, Brenda McFarland, one of Wilcoxon's daughters, filed a complaint as the personal representative for Wilcoxon's estate, asserting claims for : (1) medical malpractice; (2) negligence; (3) breach of contract; (4) negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention; and (5) loss of consortium. In its answer, Troy Health asserted, in part, that McFarland's claims were barred from being litigated in a court of law "by virtue of an arbitration agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant." Troy Health then moved to compel arbitration, asserting that forms signed by one of Wilcoxon's other daughters, acting as his attorney-in-fact, contained a valid and enforceable arbitration clause. McFarland argued that "Wilcoxon did not have the mental capacity to enter into the contract with [Troy Health,] and he did not have the mental capacity to give legal authority to enter into contracts on his behalf with" relatives who initially helped admit him to Troy Health facilities when he first fell ill. According to McFarland, "[t]he medical records document that Wilcoxon was habitually and/or permanently incompetent." Therefore, McFarland argued, both a 2011 arbitration agreement and a 2012 arbitration agreement were invalid. The circuit court denied Troy Health's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McFarland failed to prove that Wilcoxon was mentally incompetent when he executed a 2012 durable power of attorney naming his other daughter as his attorney-in-fact, and also failed to demonstrate that Wilcoxon was "permanently incompetent" before that date, and because there was no other issue concerning the validity of the 2012 arbitration agreement. View "Troy Health and Rehabilitation Center v. McFarland" on Justia Law