Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The case involves a wrongful-death lawsuit filed by the executors and an independent administrator of the estates of deceased residents of a nursing home, Geneva Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, doing business as Bria Health Services of Geneva. The plaintiffs allege that Bria negligently and willfully failed to control the spread of COVID-19, leading to the deaths of the decedents between March and May 2020. The complaints assert that Bria's failure to quarantine symptomatic staff and residents and to implement effective hygiene and equipment procedures caused the decedents to contract COVID-19 and die from related complications.The Kane County Circuit Court denied Bria's motions to dismiss the negligence claims but allowed Bria to file a motion to certify a question for interlocutory appeal. The certified question was whether Executive Order 2020-19 provided blanket immunity for ordinary negligence to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellate court modified the question to clarify that the immunity in question derived from section 21(c) of the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act and answered the modified question affirmatively, stating that Bria would have immunity from negligence claims if it could show it was rendering assistance to the State during the pandemic.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and agreed with the appellate court's modification of the certified question. The court held that Executive Order 2020-19, which triggered the immunity provided in section 21(c) of the Act, grants immunity for ordinary negligence claims to healthcare facilities that rendered assistance to the State during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court affirmed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether Bria was indeed rendering such assistance. View "James v. Geneva Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

Bruce Kelley and his spouse, Nancy Kelley, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Vermont state court after Bruce Kelley was paralyzed from the waist down while residing at Franklin County Rehabilitation Center (FCRC). They alleged that Dr. Teig Marco, employed by Richford Health Center, Inc. (RHC), negligently treated Kelley, leading to his paralysis. RHC is a federally funded community health center deemed a member of the Public Health Service under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA).The United States intervened and removed the case to federal district court, asserting that RHC and Dr. Marco were covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) due to their deemed status. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont held an evidentiary hearing and determined that the FSHCAA did not apply to Dr. Marco’s treatment of Kelley because Kelley was not a patient of RHC, and the treatment did not fall under the specified statutory criteria for nonpatients. Consequently, the District Court remanded the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court agreed that Kelley was not a patient of RHC and that Dr. Marco’s treatment did not meet the criteria for FTCA coverage for nonpatients under the FSHCAA. The court concluded that the treatment did not qualify as after-hours coverage or emergency treatment and that RHC had not sought a particularized determination of coverage from the Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, the remand to state court was appropriate, and the District Court's order was affirmed. View "Kelley v. Richford Health Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Arasely Soto, a public school teacher, was injured during a routine medical procedure and had to retire. She sued her medical providers for malpractice and also sought disability retirement benefits from the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). She and her husband, Raul Soto, settled with several of the medical malpractice defendants. CalSTRS brought an action against the Sotos, seeking to enforce its right to subrogation or reimbursement from the Sotos' settlement with the malpractice defendants.The trial court granted CalSTRS’s motion for summary adjudication on its declaratory relief cause of action and denied the Sotos’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that CalSTRS was entitled to seek reimbursement from the Sotos and rejected the Sotos’ defense that Civil Code section 3333.1 bars any subrogation claim that CalSTRS would have asserted against the malpractice defendants. The Sotos filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two to vacate the trial court’s orders.The appellate court agreed with CalSTRS’s argument that it has a statutory reimbursement claim against the Sotos, and the evidence in this case does not support application of section 3333.1 to bar CalSTRS’s claim. The court denied the Sotos' petition for writ of mandate. View "Soto v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A medical malpractice lawsuit was filed by Dwan and Aaron Bray, individually and on behalf of their minor child, against Dr. Timothy J. Thress and various other medical entities. The suit, which was initially filed in state court, related to alleged negligence in Dwan Bray's prenatal care and the subsequent birth of their child. However, Thress was employed by a federally funded health center during his treatment of Bray. Under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA), the lawsuit was removed to federal court and the United States was substituted as the defendant.The U.S. government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the Federal Tort Claims Act’s (FTCA) administrative exhaustion requirement. The plaintiffs countered by moving to remand the action to state court, arguing that the FSHCAA did not apply. The district court denied both of plaintiffs’ motions, finding the FSHCAA applicable and any attempt to amend plaintiffs’ complaint futile. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ FTCA claim without prejudice and remanded plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants to state court. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal of their FTCA claim.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. It held that Thress's conduct was covered by the FSHCAA, and that the plaintiffs' attempts to amend their complaint were futile since they had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the FTCA before instituting the lawsuit. View "Bray v. Bon Secours Mercy Health, Inc." on Justia Law

A case in Connecticut involved a couple, Aaron Lynch and Jean-Marie Monroe-Lynch, who sought damages for alleged medical malpractice by the state of Connecticut in relation to therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) services and prenatal care provided at a state hospital. The couple were unable to conceive without medical assistance and pursued TDI services. The hospital staff failed to adhere to guidelines regarding the use of cytomegalovirus (CMV) positive donor sperm for CMV negative patients, leading to Jean-Marie being inseminated with CMV positive donor sperm. Jean-Marie later became pregnant with twins. During her pregnancy, an ultrasound revealed conditions associated with an in utero CMV infection, however, the hospital staff failed to inform Jean-Marie or take appropriate follow-up action. One of the twins died in utero from a severe CMV infection and the other was born with severe, lifelong medical conditions as a result of congenital CMV.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state could not claim sovereign immunity as the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims, not informed consent claims. The court also held that the plaintiffs' son, who was born with severe medical conditions as a result of the state's negligence, was entitled to compensation. The court found no merit in the state's claim that the damages awarded were speculative or predicated on the concept that nonexistence can be preferable to impaired existence. The court concluded that common-law negligence principles were adaptable to provide a remedy for injuries such as those sustained by the plaintiffs' son. This decision affirms the trial court's award of over $34 million in damages to the plaintiffs. View "Lynch v. State" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "In re Wang v James" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law

In 2018, Terri Richardson Mattson (“Mattson”) and her husband filed this action against the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and its employee, Laurie Gallegos, a certified physician assistant (“Defendants”), alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent related to outpatient mental health services Mattson received from Defendants. As a part of those services, Gallegos prescribed Mattson Prozac (fluoxetine), an antidepressant. Roughly one month later, the day of her follow up appointment with Gallegos, Mattson woke up, took a firearm from her gun cabinet, went to the liquor store, bought a bottle of vodka, drank the entire bottle while driving to her follow up appointment, and when she arrived in the Department’s parking lot, fired the gun into her head. Mattson survived but suffered extensive injuries. Subsequently, Mattson and her husband filed this action. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on two grounds: (1) Defendants were immune from liability under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) because Mattson’s claims arose out of injuries sustained while she was receiving services from a “mental health center”; and (2) the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity did not apply as a matter of law. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision that Mattson’s and her husband’s claims fell within the purview of the “mental health center, hospital or similar facility” immunity provision in Idaho Code section 6-904A(2). However, the Court reversed the district court’s decision that there was no triable jury question under the “reckless, willful and wanton conduct” exception to immunity. The Supreme Court found Mattson alleged sufficient facts at summary judgment to demonstrate that a reasonable person could find that Defendants’ acts or omissions were “reckless, willful and wanton[.]” Thus, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mattson v. IDHW" on Justia Law