Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether Georgia's expert witness statute permits a physician in a medical malpractice action to testify as to the standard of care applicable to a nurse midwife, where the physician regularly renders the medical treatment at issue, but did not supervise the midwife in accordance with the statute. The Supreme Court construed the statutory language in light of the legislative purposes behind the law and concluded that the statute did not permit such testimony, even if the physician satisfied the "active practice" requirement. To be qualified to give expert medical testimony, a physician or other health care provider (regardless of her experience in "active practice") must satisfy either the "same profession" or "supervision" requirement of the statute. View "Hankla v. Postell" on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action to recover for injuries that their son sustained during delivery. The issues before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether ORCP 59 H limits an appellate court's ability to review objections to a trial court's instructional rulings and whether a statutory cap on noneconomic damages constitutionally can be applied to actions brought by children injured during birth. The Court of Appeals held that, because defendant had not excepted to the trial court's rulings as ORCP 59 H requires, it could not seek appellate review of those rulings. On appeal and again on review, the parties debated whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury and whether applying a statutory cap to the jury's damages award would violate the Oregon Constitution. The jury returned a general verdict finding that defendant was "negligent in one or more ways alleged by plaintiffs" and, awarded plaintiffs economic damages and noneconomic damages. On appeal, defendant argued that both rulings were incorrect because the informed consent statute had no application to a vaginal delivery. The Supreme Court concluded that because an action for medical malpractice was one for which "the right to jury trial was customary in 1857," Article I, section 17, prohibited the legislature from limiting the jury's determination of noneconomic damages. Having reached that conclusion, the Court did not address plaintiffs' other arguments on constitutional grounds.View "Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

While being held in Saginaw County Jail on a misdemeanor charge relating to failure to pay court fines, Rouster succumbed to sepsis and died as a result of a perforated duodenal ulcer. Before his death, he had complained of stomach pain, engaged in bizarre behaviors indicative of mental-health problems, and displayed signs of agitation. His estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the medical staff members who interacted with Rouster during the final 36 hours of his life, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Experts agreed that prompt medical attention could have saved his life and that Rouster received substandard care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that it could not conclude that the medical staff became aware of Rouster’s serious medical need and deliberately refused to provide appropriate treatment.View "Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty." on Justia Law

Michelle McCall received prenatal medical care at a United States Air Force clinic as an Air Force dependent. McCall died after delivering her son as a result of severe blood loss. Petitioners filed an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The federal district court found the United States liable under the FTCA. The court concluded that Petitioners’ economic damages amounted to $980,462 and Petitioners’ noneconomic damages totaled $2 million. However, the district court limited Petitioners’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages to $1 million after applying Fla. Stat. 766.118, Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on medical malpractice claims. The district court subsequently denied Petitioners’ motion challenging the constitutionality of the wrongful death statutory cap. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of Florida law and answered by holding the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. View "Estate of McCall v. United States" on Justia Law

Inmate Santiago, complaining of severe pain and a rash, was seen by Dr.Mosher on January 31. Mosher prescribed Tylenol for pain and antibiotics to treat what she thought might be Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The next day Dr. Ringle diagnosed erythema nodosum (EN), an uncomfortable but non-dangerous skin inflammation that typically disappears in about six weeks but may recur. EN has no known cure. Ringle prescribed an anti-inflammatory and an antibiotic. Four days later, Santiago was transferred to OSU Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with EN and arthralgias, a severe joint-pain condition, and prescribed an anti-ulcer agent and a different anti-inflammatory. Santiago was seen on February 20 by an OSU dermatologist, who recommended a topical steroid, compression hose, and SSKI, which may help treat EN but is not standard treatment. Each day, February 22- 25, Santiago asked prison nursing staff about the treatments. Staff denied knowledge until, on the 25th, nurses found Santiago’s unsigned chart on Ringle’s desk. Ringle had been on vacation. Mosher signed the order on February 27. Santiago received the topical steroid on February 29 and compression stockings on March 10. Santiago waited longer for the SSKI, which is a non-formulary drug. The district court rejected Santiago’s suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on the delays. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Santiago did not prove that the delay caused a serious medical need or deliberate indifference.View "Santiago v. Ringle" on Justia Law

Jamie Gaddy appealed a circuit court judgment that dismissed with prejudice Gaddy's medical-malpractice action against certified nurse anesthetist Lisa Brascho. According to Gaddy, the reason she requested the dismissal of her trial court case against Brascho was to seek appellate review of the trial court's decision granting Brascho's motion in limine. However, the Supreme Court has previously stated that "where the plaintiff knowingly and willingly agrees to a stipulation of dismissal, he has no standing to appeal." Therefore, based on Gaddy's failure to demonstrate to the Supreme Court that it had jurisdiction over Gaddy's appeal, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Gaddy v. Brascho " on Justia Law

In the first appeal of this medical malpractice suit, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a judgment for defendant Dr. Linda Peterson, holding that the trial court abused its discretion when it misconstrued the rules of evidence on the relevancy and admissibility of plaintiff Lita St. John's proffered evidence. On remand, defendant asked for reconsideration of the evidentiary rulings and reinstatement of the judgment. Concluding that the Supreme Court's opinion still left open the question whether the evidence was admissible, and ruling that it was not, the trial court declined to grant plaintiff a new trial and reinstated the judgment for defendant. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "Many issues addressed by motions in limine, including evidentiary issues, are frequently reexamined during trial and the trial court may change rulings based on the actual evidence at trial. Thus, it was an error for the trial court in this case to reinstate a judgment based on reconsidering and ruling on a motion in limine outside of the context of a trial. We reverse the trial court's decision and remand for a new trial." View "St. John v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Toma E. Smith, as personal representative of the estate of Tiffani P. Smith, appeals the grant of a summary judgment in favor of Dr. James Fleming, and a judgment entered in favor of Dr. Winfield S. Fisher III and the University of Alabama Foundation on her wrongful death claims. Dr. Fisher and the Foundation cross-appealed, arguing that the action should have been dismissed as being void ab initio. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Fleming. The Court concluded the trial court did not err in its judgment in favor of Dr. Fisher and the Foundation. View "Smith v. Winfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Jennifer Pratt sued Joseph Petelin, M.D. for medical negligence. The district court submitted four factual theories of negligence to the jury, which returned a general verdict against Dr. Petelin. Dr. Petelin appealed, claiming three of the four factual contentions submitted to the jury were unsupported by sufficient evidence. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Dr. Petelin waived this argument by not objecting to the general verdict form and requesting a special verdict. View "Pratt v. Petelin" on Justia Law