Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his left ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “meals lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that more than a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The court granted the doctors summary judgment, reasoning that waiting before immobilizing Petties’s ankle could not have constituted deliberate indifference because several physicians held different opinions and that a jury could not reasonably find that rejection of the recommendation for physical therapy constituted deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A jury could not reasonably find that the treatment of Petties’s ankle rose to the level of a constitutional violation. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law

After Chan’s mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued Curran for medical malpractice. Chan challenged the trial court’s post-verdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code 3333.2. Chan challenged the MICRA cap as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial, based on her assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. The court of appeal rejected Chan’s claims, stating that the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate. View "Chan v. Curran" on Justia Law

Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC; D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Aurora Cares, LLC (alleged to be doing business as "Tara Cares"); and Aurora Healthcare, LLC (collectively, "the defendants"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its February 6, 2015, order denying their "Motion to Quash Depositions and Motion for Protective Order, and Motion to Reconsider January 30, 2015[,] Order." The defendants also requested that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to grant their motion. In May 2006, Myrtis Hill was a patient at Fairfield. While under Fairfield's care, Hill suffered a broken leg when a Fairfield employee, while attempting to transfer Hill to a bedside commode, allegedly dropped her to the floor thereby breaking Hill's right leg and causing severe injury to both of her legs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the defendants demonstrated they had a clear legal right to the relief they requested, and that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a protective order. Hill's "Motion for Award of Damages based on [the defendants'] pattern and practice of filing frivolous appeals" was denied. View "Ex parte Fairfield Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Shonda Ambers-Phillips and her husband, Richard Phillips, filed a medical malpractice action against SSM DePaul Health Center for leaving foreign objects in Ambers-Phillips’s abdomen nearly fourteen years earlier. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, concluding that Mo. Rev. Stat.’s ten-year statute of repose applied, making the Phillipses’ claims time-barred and subject to dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in not holding that the statute of repose for foreign-object medical malpractice claims was equitably tolled until Ambers-Phillips discovered the wrong; and (2) statutes of repose are not unconstitutional if not subject to equitable tolling. View "Ambers-Phillips v. SSM DePaul Health Ctr." on Justia Law

In November 2011, following a physical attack on his father, David Brown, Jeffery Brown was involuntarily committed by the Mobile Probate Court to Searcy Hospital, a long-termcare facility for mental illness operated by the Alabama Department of Mental Health. Brown was 19 years old at the time of his commitment and had a long history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalizations. At Searcy Hospital Brown was assigned a "treatment team." Dr. Amee Kozlovski, a licensed physician and psychiatrist employed by the Alabama Department of Mental Health, was the head of Brown's treatment team and was responsible for making the ultimate judgment about whether Brown met the criteria for discharge from Searcy. During his time at Searcy Hospital, Brown had several incidents of self-injurious behavior but was otherwise fully compliant with his treatment. The treatment team reached a consensus that Brown had met the conditions for discharge. Despite reservations expressed by Brown's family that he would run away from a group-home facility, Brown was discharged a group home owned and operated by Altapointe Health Systems, Inc. Dr. Kozlovski approved the discharge. Shortly after discharge, Brown left Safe Haven without the knowledge of Safe Haven's staff. Ten days later, Brown's body was found lying on a road in Mobile, apparently been struck and killed by a motorist. David Shamlin, as the court-appointed administrator of Brown's estate, initiated the underlying wrongful-death action, naming as defendants Dr. Kozlovski and Altapointe. The complaint alleged that Dr. Kozlovski had been negligent and/or wanton in numerous respects. Dr. Kozlovski filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the claims against her were barred by the doctrine of State-agent immunity. Based on the trial court record the Supreme Court concluded Dr. Kozlovski was entitled to State-agent immunity from the wrongful-death action asserted against her. Accordingly, she had shown a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to enter summary judgment in her favor. View "Ex parte Amee Kozlovski, M.D." on Justia Law

Ronald Hines was a Texas-licensed veterinarian who practiced since the mid-1960s. He worked mainly in traditional veterinary practices until he retired in 2002. After his retirement, he founded a website and began to post articles about pet health and care. These general writings soon turned to more targeted guidance and, as he acknowledged in his complaint, he began “to provide veterinary advice to specific pet owners about their pets.” This advice was given via email and telephone calls, and Hines “never physically examine[d] the animals that are the subject of his advice,” though he did review veterinary records provided by the animal owners. Texas required veterinarians to conduct a physical examination of an animal or its premises before they can practice veterinary medicine with respect to that animal. In 2012, the Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners informed Hines that by providing veterinary advice without a physical examination, he had violated Texas law. Hines eventually agreed to: abide by the relevant state laws, including the physical examination requirement, one year of probation; a stayed suspension of his license; a $500 fine; and to retake the jurisprudence portion of the veterinary licensing exam. Hines thereafter filed suit in federal court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He argued that the physical examination requirement violates his First Amendment right to free speech as well as his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Board moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the Board’s motion in part and denied it in part. With respect to the equal protection claim, the court concluded that because the law did not discriminate on the basis of any suspect classification, the count was evaluated pursuant to rational basis review, and held that the physical examination requirement passed that deferential standard. The court dismissed Hines’s substantive due process claim for similar reasons. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the First Amendment claims. It recognized that states have broad power to regulate professionals, but determined that because the physical examination requirement “regulate[s] professional speech itself,” it is subject to the First Amendment. Relying on federal Supreme Court precedent, the district court held that Hines had stated a plausible claim that the Board had infringed his First Amendment rights. The Board moved to certify for interlocutory review the district court’s order. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's review thus centered on whether Hines' First or Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court concluded it offends neither, reversing the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amendment counts and affirming the district court’s granting of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment counts. View "Hines v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of her children, sued two physicians for medical malpractice. During the ensuing trial, one of the jurors fainted while she was sitting in her chair in the jury box. One of the defendant physicians immediately rose to assist the juror, after which the juror recovered and was excused. Plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The jury subsequently returned verdicts for the physicians. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial as to both physicians. The physician who did not help the ailing juror sought further review. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals as to the appellant, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the jury verdict to stand as to the physician who had not rendered medical assistance because nothing in that physician’s behavior during the incident could have “engendered any particular good will in her favor.” Remanded. View "Jack v. Booth" on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old J.K. underwent an appendectomy performed by Appellee, but complications arose requiring additional surgery and medical treatment. Appellants, on behalf of J.K., filed a medical malpractice claim against Appellee. Appellee moved to dismiss, alleging that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-3-107(a)(ii). The district court granted the motion. Appellants appealed, arguing that the statute, as applied to minors, violates the Wyoming Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed and therefore reversed, holding that section 1-3-107(a)(ii) violates the open courts provision of Wyoming’s Constitution by restricting a minor’s access to the courts. Remanded. View "Kordus v. Montes" on Justia Law