Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Hughes died after hanging himself from his bed in the Butler County Prison, where he was incarcerated on charges of robbery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and abuse of the drugs cocaine and Concerta. Hughes showed no outward signs that he was suicidal, but he did have a history of depression and asked to see Tepe, the prison psychiatrist, about anti-depression medication. Hughes and Dr. Tepe never met. Hughes had told an intake worker that he had attempted suicide and had been hospitalized for suicidal ideation. There was a suicide alert in the computer system and Hughes told a paramedic that he had not been taking his prescribed medication. Hughes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to her son’s serious medical need. Tepe sought summary judgment, arguing that he was The district court held that Tepe could not assert a qualified-immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent and public policy do not support immunity for a privately paid physician working for the public. View "McCullum v. Tepe" on Justia Law

In 1998, Barbara Lanier's two-year-old son Darrell Gill Jr. died while being treated at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMC) for a a rare genetic disorder – Chediak-Higashi Syndrome (CHS). Lanier filed a complaint against UMC alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. In 2008, the case was resolved by bench trial in circuit court with a verdict in favor of Lanier of $250,000. UMC appealed, raising four issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for directed verdict; (3) whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred by granting Lanier's motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for a directed verdict. Because the Court reversed and rendered the case on that issue, the remaining issues were moot. View "University of Mississippi Medical Ctr. v. Lanier" on Justia Law

This appeal involed a medical malpractice claim brought against a chiropractor for negligently causing a patient to suffer a stroke after treatment. In 2007, Appellant Martha Arregui sought treatment for her neck and back pain from Respondent Dr. Rosalinda Gallegos-Main. Arregui originally alleged that Dr. Gallegos-Main owed her a duty to treat her in a medically competent manner under Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act, and failed to do so when Arregui was diagnosed several weeks later as having suffered a stroke after a neck manipulation by Dr. Gallegos-Main. Arregui filed suit against the chiropractor and the facility, Full Life Chiropractic, in 2009. Dr. Gallegos-Main deposed Arregui's expert witness and discovered that she had no knowledge of the local standard of care. Consequently, Dr. Gallegos-Main moved for summary judgment, arguing that Arregui failed to meet the requirements for establishing a claim for medical malpractice which requires expert testimony regarding the local standard of care. Three days after the deadline, Arregui filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and included an affidavit from her expert with a sworn statement that she consulted a local chiropractor and was now familiar with the local standard of care. Dr. Gallegos-Main filed a Motion to Strike the affidavit as untimely and as a sham affidavit. Arregui unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing the court erred in striking her expert's affidavit and presented a new argument in the alternative that the court improperly granted summary judgment because the Medical Malpractice Act did not apply to chiropractors. The district court entered a final order denying the motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Arregui v. Gallegos-Main" on Justia Law

In this joint and several liability medical malpractice case, Defendant Dr. Martin Tuma sought a reduction of the final judgment rendered against him by the amount of his codefendants' settlement. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the common-law "setoff rule," whereby a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor is entitled to a setoff from any adverse verdict in the amount of the cotortfeasor's settlement, and the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, which limits a medical malpractice plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages. Both the circuit court and Court of Appeals held pursuant to "Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc." that the common-law setoff rule applied and that the setoff must be applied to the jury's verdict before application of the cap on noneconomic damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that "Markley" was correctly decided and thus held that the Legislature did not abolish the common-law setoff rule in the context of joint and several liability medical malpractice cases. "[The Court affirmed] the Court of Appeals in this regard and further clarif[ed] that where the Legislature has retained principles of joint and several liability, the common-law setoff rule applie[d]. The lower courts' sequencing of the setoff and the noneconomic damages cap, however, result[ed]in an outcome contrary to the Legislature's requirement that medical malpractice plaintiffs 'shall not' recover more noneconomic losses than the amount determined by MCL 600.1483. . . . Because application of the setoff to the jury's verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations," the Court held further that a joint tortfeasor's settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule. View "Velez v. Tuma" on Justia Law

Following the death of Waeschle’s mother, the medical examiner performed an autopsy to determine the cause of her death. While the mother’s remains were returned to Waeschle, the medical examiner retained the brain for further study without Waeschle’s knowledge. After Waeschle discovered that her mother’s brain had been retained and later incinerated as medical waste, she sued, alleging due process violations. The district court dismissed state law claims but declined to dismiss the due process claim, finding that, under Michigan’s clearly established law, next-of-kin have an interest in their deceased relative’s remains/body parts. Following remand and certification of the question, the Michigan Supreme Court responded that: Assuming that a decedent’s brain was removed by a medical examiner to conduct a lawful investigation into the decedent’s cause of death, the decedent’s next of kin does not have a right under Michigan law to possess the brain in order to properly bury or cremate the same after the brain is no longer needed for forensic examination. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to sanction plaintiff for frivolous appeal. View "Waeschle v. Oakland Cnty. Med. Exam'r" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., practicing through a medical practice which bore his name, negligently failed to advise Plaintiff or his dentist of the known risks associated with a tooth extraction while Plaintiff was taking intervenous doses of a medication called "Zometa," prescribed for multiple myleoma. Defendant allegedly approved the procedure; Plaintiff's dentist pulled the tooth. Following the procedure, Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw. All parties agreed that the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff's malpractice claims would expire October 9, 2009. By a letter dated in September, Plaintiff's counsel proposed to Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement to toll the statute of limitations for ninety days so that the parties could pursue settlement. Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all defendants did. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement with all defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on October 7, 2009. Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to Plaintiff's counsel in January, 2010. Plaintiff did not filed the acceptance with the court at that time. The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011 based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim. Three days later, Plaintiff filed the signed acceptances of service. Dr. Eisemann moved to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Eisemann defendants are equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Beebe v. Eisemann" on Justia Law

Plaintiff began experiencing severe headaches and swelling in his left eye in 2007 while incarcerated. Shortly after his release, plaintiff was diagnosed with Ewing’s Sarcoma, a serious form of bone cancer. According to plaintiff, surgery would have been sufficient to treat the disease had prison staff detected it earlier. However, due to the late diagnosis, chemotherapy and radiation are now necessary. In his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court held that plaintiff pled sufficient facts upon which one could draw the inference that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and committed medical malpractice. The doctor and nurse filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing that their involvement with plaintiff was minimal and cannot form the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference or gross negligence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the defendants entitled to qualified immunity. Neither negligent medical care, nor delay in providing medical care, can rise to the level of a constitutional violation absent specific allegations of sufficiently harmful acts or omissions reflecting deliberate indifference. View "Reilly v. Vadlamudi" on Justia Law

Appellant Harrill & Sutter filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging a violation of Arkansas's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Appellant had previously filed a medical-malpractice action against three physicians, who were employed by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). Mariam Hopkins was hired to represent the physicians. Appellant subsequently filed a FOIA request asserting that because Hopkins represented public employees, Hopkins's file was a public record. Hopkins refused to allow Appellant to inspect the file, and Appellant filed the present case. The circuit court found (1) Hopkins, her firm, and the physicians were not the custodians for the FOIA request to UAMS or to the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees; (2) Appellees did not have administrative control of the public records of those entities; (3) the records sought by Appellant were not public records under FOIA and, therefore, were not subject to a FOIA request; and (4) the litigation files and documents sought by the FOIA request were subject to attorney-client privilege and were work-product. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that FOIA did not apply. View "Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Guy and Midge Ledbetter sued Defendant-Appellant Derek Howard and his employer Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc. for malpractice. Plaintiffs alleged that the doctor misread an x-ray which caused delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. A jury found in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied the judgment but granted a new trial when evidence of juror misconduct surfaced. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The foreperson assured the trial court in voir dire that she would not allow her expertise and experience to override the evidence presented at trial. Nevertheless, she not only did so on a personal level, but went further by communicating her alleged professional knowledge and experiences to her fellow jurors with the apparent intent to sway their votes in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the juror's affidavit was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 2606(B); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations. View "Ledbetter v. Howard" on Justia Law