Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

At the trial of this medical-negligence case, plaintiff’s only expert abandoned his pretrial opinion, and over the objection of the defendant, testified to a new opinion that was never disclosed in discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court should have granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reversed in part and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant. View "Cleveland v. Hamil " on Justia Law

After a patient's death, the patient's family sued the VA for medical malpractice. The VA settled with the family and determined that the settlement was "for the benefit of" plaintiff, who was a treating physician. Plaintiff then filed suit against the VA alleging violations of his due process rights and violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that the district court did not err by dismissing the procedural due process claim because plaintiff failed to plead the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest; the district court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's substantive due-process claim because plaintiff's pleadings were insufficient; the VA's factfinding procedures were adequate and the district court properly rejected de novo review; the district court did not grossly abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to supplement the record; and the VA's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, and the district court did not err by granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Rochling v. Dept. of VA, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gilbert and Shelagh McCormack appealed a superior court's denial of their motion for a new trial on the grounds of alleged juror bias. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether plaintiffs' motion was timely; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under "In re Nash," (614 A.2d 367 (1991)); and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under "implied bias." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "McCormack v. Rutland Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia ("MCG") were entitled to official immunity in treating a patient at MCG's Children's Medical Center. Plaintiffs-Appellees Kenneth Jones and Clara Ramon filed a medical malpractice action against Appellants Prem Singh Shekhawat, M.D. and Wayne Mathews, M.D., along with other defendants, arising from treatment rendered to Plaintiffs' child at the Center in 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellants, concluding that they were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants, in treating Plaintiffs' child, were acting within the scope of their employment with the State, using the Supreme Court's holding in "Keenan v. Plouffe," (482 SE2d 253 (1997)). After further review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Keenan" should have been overruled, because it conflated the standard for official immunity with that for sovereign immunity. Utilizing the proper analysis, the Court held that Appellants were entitled to official immunity because they were acting within the scope of their state employment in rendering the medical care at issue. View "Shekhawat v. Jones " on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a non-health care provider could be a joint tortfeasor with a health care provider being sued for medical malpractice. The non-health care provider in this case was an answering service tasked with relaying calls from a patient to their doctor after office hours. The patient learned that the service failed to convey his messages to his doctor despite the doctor giving the service explicit instructions to call. The patient sued the doctor for malpractice, and included the answering service. The service moved to dismiss, claiming that it could not be considered a joint tortfeasor under the statute under which the doctor had been sued. Finding that the clear language of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) applied to filing suit against the non-health care provider, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings which granted and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the non-health care provider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

The State Board of Dentistry fined Plaintiff-Appellant Lon Peckham, DMD for failing to adequately inform a patient prior to performing a procedure, and for publishing misleading material on his website. The district court affirmed the Board's decision. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the district court's affirming of the Board's final Order. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support findings that Plaintiff failed to inform a patient prior to performing a procedure or for publishing misleading material. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court. View "Peckham, DMD v. State Bd of Dentistry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Heather Turner appealed a superior court judgment that ruled in favor of Defendants-Appellees Michael Conway, M.D., Eric Kalish, M.D. and their practice, Delaware Surgical Group. Plaintiff sued defendants over what was initially an appendectomy, but ended with a "mass" on her liver from "something that had spilled out from prior surgeries" performed by the two doctor defendants. Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion in improperly admitting defendants' expert evidence . Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Turner v. Delaware Surgical Group, P.A., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Wall (Patient) filed a petition for medical negligence against Dr. John S. Marouk, D.O. (Physician). Wall alleged that the physician negligently cut the median nerve in his right arm during a carpal tunnel surgery, resulting in loss of feeling in his right fingers. The patient did not attach an affidavit of merit as required by 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19. The physician filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the patient failed to include the affidavit of merit. In response to the physician's motion to dismiss, the patient argued that 12 O.S 2011 sec.19 was unconstitutional based on this court's holding in "Zeier v. Zimmer." The trial court entered a certified interlocutory order denying the physician's motion to dismiss, and giving the patient twenty days from the date of the order to file an affidavit of merit or face dismissal of the cause. The trial court subsequently entered an amended certified interlocutory order stating that 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 required an affidavit of merit finding the patient's arguments unpersuasive. The Supreme Court granted the patient's Petition for Certiorari to consider the constitutionality of 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Title 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 created a monetary barrier to access the court system, and then applied that barrier only to a specific subclass of potential tort victims, those who are the victims of professional negligence. The result was a law that was unconstitutional both as a special law, and as an undue financial barrier on access to the courts. "Although we express no opinion on the viability of the patient's claim, because we hold 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 to be unconstitutional, an affidavit of merit is not required." The district court's order requiring submission of an affidavit of merit was overruled, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wall v. Marouk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Defendant Cox Retirement Properties, alleging Richard Douglas died as a result of the facility's negligent care and treatment. Defendant moved to dismiss the case for Plaintiff's failure to comply with 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 19. Section 19 was enacted in 2009 as part of H.B. 1603, known as the Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009. Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing the CLRA of 2009 was unconstitutional logrolling in violation of the single-subject rule of Article 5, section 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and certified the dismissal order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari and held that hold that H.B. 1603 violated the single-subject rule of Article 5, section 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution and was unconstitutional and void in its entirety. View "Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas R. Taylor filed this action seeking to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1001, he then filed a request for a prelitigation screening panel four days later. The panel appointed regarding the alleged malpractice in this case conducted its proceedings and then issued its report on April 19, 2011. Although Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2011, he did not attempt to serve the summons and complaint upon any of the Defendants within six months after filing the complaint as mandated by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 16, 2011, defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss this action as to it for the failure of Plaintiff to serve the summons and complaint upon it within the six-month period. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the district court to stay this lawsuit "nunc pro tunc from January 24, 2011, to April 19, 2011, or, alternatively, to extend [Plaintiff's] deadline for serving all Defendants to this lawsuit from July 19, 2011, to October 12, 2011." The district court entered an order denying Plaintiff's motions and granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Because the partial judgment was not yet final due to the fact that there was no judgment resolving the claims against the remaining defendants, the Supreme Court then issued a notice that the appeal would be dismissed. Plaintiff then filed an amended notice of appeal timely appealing both the initial judgment and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: if there is not good cause for the failure to serve a defendant with the summons and complaint within six months after the complaint was filed, Rule 4(a)(2) states that "the action shall be dismissed as to the defendant without prejudice." Had Plaintiff served the Defendants before the prelitigation screening panel had completed its work, the worst that could have happened is that the district court would have stayed the court proceedings until after the panel had completed its work and for thirty days thereafter. Even if Plaintiff had thought he should wait until thirty days after the panel issued its report before serving the Defendants with a summons and complaint, he had from May 19, 2011, until July 20, 2011 to do so, but did not even attempt service during that time. View "Taylor v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law