Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A woman who was diagnosed with placenta previa during her pregnancy developed placenta accreta spectrum (PAS) during a cesarean section at a hospital, which led to a massive hemorrhage and an emergent hysterectomy. After extensive surgery, she was moved to the ICU for monitoring. The ICU physician and a medical staffing agency were responsible for her care there. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children sued the ICU doctor and the staffing agency, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. The plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding deviations from the standard of care by the ICU doctor.The Superior Court of Rockdale County presided over the trial. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only the ICU physician and the staffing agency. The jury found both defendants liable, awarding $10 million to the estate for pain and suffering and $32 million to the children for wrongful death. After trial, the defendants moved for a new trial and, alternatively, to amend the judgment to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The court denied both motions, concluding the cap had been waived and, in the alternative, that the statutory cap was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees under Georgia law after the defendants rejected a qualifying settlement offer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding portions of the defendants’ expert testimony, nor did it err in its jury instructions, as any alleged error was affirmatively waived by the defendants. The Court also held, consistent with its contemporaneous decision in Clark v. Leigh and Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases cannot constitutionally be applied to the jury’s verdict in this case. The award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs was affirmed. Judgment affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A patient suffered an injury during knee surgery in March 2022 and, together with his wife, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the operating surgeon and the orthopedic clinic in January 2023. Iowa law requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a certificate of merit affidavit within sixty days after the defendant’s answer to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs served a certificate of merit within the deadline. However, the document was not sworn before an authorized officer and did not include the phrase “penalty of perjury” as required by Iowa statutes. Over a year later, the plaintiffs served an amended certificate that met the affidavit requirements, but it was well past the statutory deadline.After the defendants answered and discovery proceeded for more than a year, the defendants moved to dismiss in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the timely certificate did not comply with statutory requirements. The district court found that the initial certificate was neither a true affidavit nor a permissible substitute under the relevant statutes. The court also concluded that the late-filed, proper affidavit could not cure the statutory violation because it was not filed within the required sixty days and there was no extension by agreement or motion. The district court dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that substantial compliance with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement means providing either a true affidavit executed before an authorized person or a statement under penalty of perjury within sixty days. The plaintiffs failed to do either within the deadline, and their later submission could not cure the defect. The court also rejected arguments that the defendants had waived the affidavit requirement or that the statutory scheme violated the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Rarick v. Smidt" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute granting immunity to health care providers from civil liability for certain acts or omissions occurring between March 12, 2020, and July 11, 2020. Savannah Wren, whose pregnancy was considered high risk, experienced the stillbirth of her child after multiple visits to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital. She alleged negligent care and subsequently filed suit for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and associated medical professionals.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by WIS. STAT. § 895.4801. Wren challenged the statute’s constitutionality on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violations of her rights to redress, jury trial, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court struck her supplemental equal protection claim and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice, finding the statute constitutional.Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. It held that § 895.4801 was facially unconstitutional because it deprived litigants of their right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed only whether § 895.4801 facially violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that because the legislature has the authority to abrogate or suspend common law causes of action under Article XIV, Section 13, and because the statute eliminated Wren’s causes of action during the specified period, her right to a jury trial did not attach. The court concluded that § 895.4801 does not implicate the constitutional jury trial right, reversed the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved issues. View "Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc." on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania state prisoner with a history of opioid addiction participated in a prison Medication Assisted Treatment program, receiving Suboxone to help control his cravings. After prison officials twice accused him of possessing contraband and diverting his medication to other prisoners, he was removed from the treatment program. Instead of abruptly ending his medication, a prison doctor tapered his doses over a week to reduce withdrawal symptoms. The prisoner later suffered withdrawal effects and mental health challenges but was not reinstated in the program despite his requests. He claimed the diversion finding was unfair but did not allege personal animus or pretext by the officials involved.He filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against various prison officials and a doctor, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a state-law negligence claim. The District Court dismissed all claims, finding the federal claims inadequately pleaded and the state-law claim procedurally improper for lack of a certificate of merit under Pennsylvania law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the complaint failed to allege deliberate indifference to medical needs as required by precedent; the officials’ actions were judged to be good-faith medical decisions, not constitutionally blameworthy conduct. The court also affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim, finding no plausible allegation that the prisoner was excluded from treatment “by reason of” his disability, but rather for diversion of medication. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the state-law negligence claim, as recent Supreme Court precedent abrogated the procedural requirement relied upon by the District Court, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "DiFraia v. Ransom" on Justia Law

Several women incarcerated at a Michigan prison developed painful, persistent rashes between 2016 and 2019. Their complaints were largely ignored by prison staff, and medical providers initially misdiagnosed the condition, ruling out scabies, a highly contagious skin infestation. The prison’s contracted health care provider, Corizon Health, and its infectious disease coordinator were tasked with managing infectious diseases but failed to control the outbreak. Only after an outside dermatologist diagnosed scabies did prison officials begin widespread treatment and quarantine measures, though these efforts were not immediately effective. Four inmates who suffered from these conditions filed suit, seeking damages and injunctive relief against both the medical providers and high-level prison officials who had not directly treated them.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied motions for judgment on the pleadings by the Michigan Department of Corrections and Wayne State Officials. The district court held that the inmates had plausibly alleged that all defendants, including non-treating prison officials, committed clearly established Eighth Amendment violations and were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the gross negligence claims could proceed under Michigan law, as the complaint adequately alleged that the officials proximately caused the harms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, under existing precedent, non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers did not clearly constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the inmates’ federal damages claims against these officials, finding no clearly established law requiring them to override medical judgments. However, the court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, concluding that proximate cause under Michigan law could not be resolved at the pleading stage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Townsend" on Justia Law

Four women incarcerated at the Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Michigan suffered from persistent, painful rashes between 2016 and 2019. Despite repeated complaints, medical staff—contracted through Corizon Health—failed to diagnose scabies, instead providing ineffective treatments and attributing the condition to environmental factors like improper laundering. It was only after an outside dermatologist intervened that scabies was correctly identified, prompting prison-wide treatment efforts. However, these efforts were delayed and, in some cases, inadequate, resulting in prolonged suffering for the affected inmates.After their experiences, the four women filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against multiple defendants, including high-level Michigan Department of Corrections officials and Wayne State University medical officers, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and state-law negligence. The district court found that the women’s complaint plausibly alleged “clearly established” Eighth Amendment violations by all defendants and denied the officials’ request for qualified immunity. The court also rejected a claim of state-law immunity, finding that the officials could be the proximate cause of the inmates’ injuries under Michigan law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denials. The Sixth Circuit held that existing precedent did not “clearly establish” that the non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers was so unreasonable as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, it reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the federal damages claims. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, finding the plaintiffs adequately pleaded proximate cause under Michigan law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Machelle Pearson v. MDOC" on Justia Law

Allen Turner died from surgical complications, leading his daughter, Norkesia Turner, to sue Drs. William Thompson and Heather Nolan, and their employer, the Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. (MCCG), for medical malpractice and wrongful death. The jury awarded Turner approximately $7.2 million in noneconomic damages for wrongful death. MCCG moved to reduce this award to the statutory cap of $350,000 under OCGA § 51-13-1 (b) and (c), but the trial court denied the motion, citing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, which found such caps unconstitutional.MCCG appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the Nestlehutt decision foreclosed MCCG's argument. The Court of Appeals held that the $7.2 million award did not need to be reduced to the statutory cap. MCCG then petitioned the Supreme Court of Georgia for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to address whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the precedent regarding the constitutional right to trial by jury.The Supreme Court of Georgia did not decide whether the application of OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps to the $7.2 million award would violate Turner’s constitutional right to a jury trial. Instead, it found that the lower courts had not applied the correct analytical framework from Nestlehutt to the wrongful death claim. The Supreme Court clarified that the holding in Nestlehutt was specific to medical malpractice claims and did not control the issue in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "THE MEDICAL CENTER OF CENTRAL GEORGIA, INC. v. TURNER" on Justia Law

In November 2019, Kathleen Welch was admitted to Tulane Medical Center for acute pancreatitis and diabetic ketoacidosis. After her discharge, she was admitted to BridgePoint Healthcare for rehabilitation, where she developed pressure ulcers. She was later transferred to United Medical Physical Rehabilitation Hospital, where her condition persisted. Welch filed a claim for injuries related to her pressure ulcers, naming BridgePoint and United Medical as defendants. United Medical, not being a qualified healthcare provider under the relevant statute, faced a lawsuit alleging negligence.United Medical filed an exception of no cause of action, citing La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i), which limits liability to gross negligence or willful misconduct during a public health emergency. The trial court granted the exception, applying the gross negligence standard but did not rule on the statute's constitutionality. Welch appealed, and the appellate court upheld the trial court's application of the statute but remanded the case for a ruling on its constitutionality. On remand, the trial court found the statute constitutional, and Welch sought supervisory review.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that La. R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c)(i) is constitutional, as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in ensuring access to healthcare during a public health emergency. The court found that the statute does not violate the Louisiana Constitution's due process or access to courts provisions and is not a prohibited special law. The statute's application to all healthcare providers equally and its rational basis for limiting liability during emergencies were key factors in the court's decision. View "WELCH VS. UNITED MEDICAL HEALTHWEST-NEW ORLEANS L.L.C." on Justia Law

In this case, Claudia Kennedy, as the executor of Donald R. Gerres's estate, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Western Reserve Senior Care and Dr. Sataya Acharya, among others, alleging that substandard medical care led to Gerres's death in October 2013. Kennedy initially filed the lawsuit in September 2014, voluntarily dismissed it in January 2019, and refiled it within a year.The trial court denied the healthcare providers' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that the four-year statute of repose for medical claims barred Kennedy's refiled action. However, after the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani, which held that the saving statute does not preserve claims refiled after the statute of repose expires, the healthcare providers sought summary judgment. The trial court denied this motion but later granted a directed verdict in favor of the healthcare providers after Kennedy's opening statements.Kennedy appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2305.15(A) tolled the statute of repose because Dr. Acharya had moved out of Ohio. The Eleventh District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that applying the tolling statute to Dr. Acharya, who left Ohio for legitimate business purposes, violated the dormant Commerce Clause.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 2305.15(A) does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to a physician who moved out of Ohio to practice medicine in another state. The court found that the tolling statute serves a legitimate local purpose and does not impose a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its benefits. The judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kennedy v. W. Res. Senior Care" on Justia Law