Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In this case, Tiffany Bingham challenged the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act’s four-year statute of repose after her medical malpractice claim against Dr. George C. Gourley and Dr. McKay L. Platt was dismissed. Bingham underwent surgeries in 2010, experienced complications, and discovered in 2017 that the surgeries had caused damage, leading to the removal of her kidney. She filed her lawsuit in 2020, more than four years after the alleged malpractice, prompting the dismissal of her claim under the statute of repose.The Fourth District Court in Provo dismissed Bingham’s complaint, concluding that the statute of repose was constitutional. The court found that the statute did not violate the Open Courts Clause, the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that the statute was a non-arbitrary means of addressing the social and economic issues related to rising medical malpractice insurance costs and was reasonably necessary to achieve the legislative goal of stabilizing insurance premiums.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Bingham failed to demonstrate that the statute of repose violated the Open Courts Clause, as the legislature’s findings of a health care crisis were fairly debatable and the statute was a reasonable means to address that crisis. The court also found that the statute did not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision, as it was reasonably necessary to achieve the legislative goals and actually and substantially furthered those goals. Finally, the court concluded that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as it was rationally related to a legitimate public purpose and did not impair a fundamental right. View "Bingham v. Gourley" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice and hospital negligence claim filed by Jami Lynn Golden against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center in July 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Despite a computer-generated sepsis alert, Golden was discharged with instructions to follow up in two to three days. Her condition worsened, and she was later admitted to Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit in septic shock. As a result, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.Floyd Healthcare Management moved to dismiss Golden's claim, arguing that the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose had expired. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the repose statute was tolled by the "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the repose statute was not tolled by the emergency order.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the emergency order did indeed toll the repose statute, and that there was no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled. The court concluded that Golden's claims were not time-barred, and that the application of the emergency order to toll the repose statute did not violate Floyd Healthcare Management's due process rights. View "GOLDEN v. FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Richard Rodgers, a prisoner with a history of scoliosis and back pain, had steel rods implanted in his back prior to his incarceration. During his time in prison, the rods broke, but this went undetected for over a year due to two radiologists misreading his x-rays. The prison's primary care physician, Dr. William Rankin, discovered the broken rods and arranged for corrective surgery. Rodgers sued the radiologists and Dr. Rankin, alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.The district court dismissed Rodgers' claims against the radiologists, finding that he did not state a viable constitutional claim against them. The court allowed Rodgers to proceed against Dr. Rankin but eventually granted summary judgment in his favor. The court found that Rodgers had not provided evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Rankin had violated the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate indifference toward Rodgers' serious medical condition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court agreed that Rodgers' allegations against the radiologists amounted to no more than negligence, which is insufficient to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Regarding Dr. Rankin, the court found that the evidence would not support a reasonable finding that he acted with deliberate indifference to Rodgers' serious medical condition. The court noted that Dr. Rankin was the one who discovered the radiologists' errors and arranged for Rodgers' corrective surgery. View "Rodgers v. Rankin" on Justia Law

In the case presented, plaintiff Bette Bennett alleged that she suffered a traumatic brain injury due to medical negligence by the defendant, the United States. However, the cause of her injury was not diagnosed until after the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under Washington law had expired, making it impossible for her to timely commence her lawsuit. The United States moved to dismiss her complaint as time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to decide whether the statute of repose violates certain provisions of the Washington Constitution. The court held that while the legislature has broad authority to set time limits for commencing an action, the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under RCW 4.16.350(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute implicates the fundamental right of state citizenship by limiting the pursuit of common law claims against certain defendants, but it does not satisfy the "reasonable ground" test under the state constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of repose is unconstitutional under independent state law. The court declined to reach the second certified question regarding whether the statute of repose unconstitutionally restricts a plaintiff's right to access the courts in violation of the Washington Constitution. View "Bennett v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two California statutes— Civil Code section 3333.2, which caps the number of damages a plaintiff may recoup for noneconomic losses at $250,000 (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2, subd. (b)); and Business and Professions Code section 6146, which sets limits on the amount of contingency fees a law firm may charge in representing a plaintiff in a professional negligence action against a health care provider. (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2 and Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 6146 are sometimes referred to collectively as the challenged statutes.)   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge civil code section 3333.2 and Business and Professions Code Section 6146. Further, the court held that the heirs do not have standing because the heir’s alleged injuries are insufficient to confer upon them standing to challenge the statutes in question. Moreover, the court could not conclude Plaintiffs will suffer hardship if declaratory relief is withheld. View "Dominguez v. Bonta" on Justia Law

This case presented the questions of whether and how Alaska Statute 09.55.548(b) applied when the claimant’s losses were compensated by an employer’s self-funded health benefit plan governed by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that an ERISA plan did not fall within the statute’s “federal program” exception. Therefore AS 09.55.548(b) required a claimant’s damages award to be reduced by the amount of compensation received from an ERISA plan. But the Supreme Court also concluded that the distinction the statute draws between different types of medical malpractice claimants was not fairly and substantially related to the statute’s purpose of ensuring claimants do not receive a double recovery — an award of damages predicated on losses that were already compensated by a collateral source. "Because insurance contracts commonly require the insured to repay the insurer using the proceeds of any tort recovery, claimants with health insurance are scarcely more likely to receive a double recovery than other malpractice claimants. The statute therefore violates the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution." View "Knolmayer, et al. v. McCollum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's medical malpractice case without prejudice for failure to file an affidavit of merit within 180 days pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Appellant argued (1) section 538.225 violates multiple provisions of the Missouri Constitution, (2) the defense of failure to file an affidavit of merit was waived, and (3) he substantially complied with the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's constitutional claims were without merit; (2) section 538.225 is not an affirmative defense that can be waived if not pleaded in an answer; and (3) to the extent substantial compliance with section 538.225 is possible, Appellant failed to substantially comply. View "Giudicy v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities" on Justia Law

Dean, incarcerated since 2012, developed kidney cancer. Seven months after he first presented symptoms, Dean had kidney-removal surgery. The cancer had already spread to his liver, Dean remains terminally ill. Dean sued his doctors and their employer, Wexford, a private corporation that contracts to provide healthcare to Illinois inmates, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Dean cited delays in his diagnosis and treatment, caused by his doctors’ failure to arrange timely off-site care, and on a policy that requires Wexford’s corporate office to pre-approve off-site care.A jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages, which was reduced to $7 million. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Dean has endured great suffering, but he did not produce enough evidence to hold any of the defendants liable for violating the Eighth Amendment. Dean’s claim against Wexford hinged on two expert reports from another case that critique the medical care, and process for medical care, that Illinois provides, through Wexford, to its prisoners. Those reports are hearsay, but the district court allowed Dean to use them for a non-hearsay purpose: to prove that Wexford had prior notice of the negative assessments of its review policy. One report postdated all events relevant to Dean and could not have given Wexford prior notice. The other report alone was insufficient to hold Wexford liable under the exacting “Monell” requirements in this single-incident case. View "Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's reduction of a damages award in favor of Appellant in a medical negligence case against University Physician Associates (UPA) and various physicians (collectively, the Physicians), holding that the circuit court did not err.Appellant filed this lawsuit alleging that the Physicians acted negligently in the Caesarean delivery of her child and in her postpartum care. The jury allocated 100 percent of fault to the Physicians and awarded $30,000 in past economic damages, $300,000 in past non-economic damages, and $700,000 in future non-economic damages. The circuit court concluded that Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.210.2(2)'s non-economic damages for catastrophic personal injury applied and reduced the non-economic damages award from $1 million to $748,828. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 538.210's non-economic damage caps do not violate Mo. Const. art. I, 22(a); and (2) the Physicians' points on appeal lacked merit. View "Ordinola Velazquez v. University Physician Associates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brenda Bergeron, individually and on behalf of her husband, Donald Bergeron, filed a medical malpractice claim against Donald Richardson, M.D. and Paul Hubbell, III, M.D. A medical review panel unanimously found Defendants breached the standard of care. Two of the three panel members found Defendants caused Mr. Bergeron’s pain, illness, and death. Plaintiff then filed wrongful death and survival actions against Defendants. Nearly six years later, Defendants filed a motion for bond for cost pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4522. Plaintiff opposed the motion on several grounds, namely : (1) the motion was untimely under the plain language of the statute; (2) the costs claimed by Defendants were expenses, not actual taxable costs; and (3) she challenged the constitutionality of the statute. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for bond for cost, finding it untimely. The trial court concluded Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4522 precluded a motion for a cost bond after the defendant’s answer is filed. Because the motion was denied, the trial court found the constitutional claim moot. The Court of Appeal reversed, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concurring with the trial court that defendants' motion for bond for costs was untimely. View "Bergeron v. Richardson et al." on Justia Law