Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A Pennsylvania state prisoner with a history of opioid addiction participated in a prison Medication Assisted Treatment program, receiving Suboxone to help control his cravings. After prison officials twice accused him of possessing contraband and diverting his medication to other prisoners, he was removed from the treatment program. Instead of abruptly ending his medication, a prison doctor tapered his doses over a week to reduce withdrawal symptoms. The prisoner later suffered withdrawal effects and mental health challenges but was not reinstated in the program despite his requests. He claimed the diversion finding was unfair but did not allege personal animus or pretext by the officials involved.He filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against various prison officials and a doctor, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a state-law negligence claim. The District Court dismissed all claims, finding the federal claims inadequately pleaded and the state-law claim procedurally improper for lack of a certificate of merit under Pennsylvania law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the complaint failed to allege deliberate indifference to medical needs as required by precedent; the officials’ actions were judged to be good-faith medical decisions, not constitutionally blameworthy conduct. The court also affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim, finding no plausible allegation that the prisoner was excluded from treatment “by reason of” his disability, but rather for diversion of medication. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the state-law negligence claim, as recent Supreme Court precedent abrogated the procedural requirement relied upon by the District Court, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "DiFraia v. Ransom" on Justia Law

Several women incarcerated at a Michigan prison developed painful, persistent rashes between 2016 and 2019. Their complaints were largely ignored by prison staff, and medical providers initially misdiagnosed the condition, ruling out scabies, a highly contagious skin infestation. The prison’s contracted health care provider, Corizon Health, and its infectious disease coordinator were tasked with managing infectious diseases but failed to control the outbreak. Only after an outside dermatologist diagnosed scabies did prison officials begin widespread treatment and quarantine measures, though these efforts were not immediately effective. Four inmates who suffered from these conditions filed suit, seeking damages and injunctive relief against both the medical providers and high-level prison officials who had not directly treated them.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied motions for judgment on the pleadings by the Michigan Department of Corrections and Wayne State Officials. The district court held that the inmates had plausibly alleged that all defendants, including non-treating prison officials, committed clearly established Eighth Amendment violations and were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the gross negligence claims could proceed under Michigan law, as the complaint adequately alleged that the officials proximately caused the harms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, under existing precedent, non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers did not clearly constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the inmates’ federal damages claims against these officials, finding no clearly established law requiring them to override medical judgments. However, the court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, concluding that proximate cause under Michigan law could not be resolved at the pleading stage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Townsend" on Justia Law

Michael Hickson, who had become severely disabled following cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury in 2017, was hospitalized multiple times for recurring infections but recovered from several serious episodes. In June 2020, while hospitalized for pneumonia, sepsis, and suspected COVID-19, his doctors at St. David’s Healthcare assessed him as having a 70% chance of survival. Despite this, he was placed on hospice care and a do-not-resuscitate order was issued, with medical staff indicating that his inability to walk or talk equated to a poor quality of life. Life-sustaining treatment, including food and fluids, was withdrawn, even as his condition temporarily improved. Michael’s family, led by his wife Melissa Hickson, sought answers and attempted to visit him, but were repeatedly denied access and information. Michael ultimately passed away, and subsequent public statements by the hospital disclosed protected health information and cast aspersions on Melissa’s fitness as a guardian.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed or granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, including disability discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 1557 of the ACA, § 1983 claims, state-law medical negligence, informed consent, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendations for dismissal of the disability discrimination and § 1983 claims; the district court overruled these objections and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The remaining state-law claims were later resolved on summary judgment.Upon de novo review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disability discrimination claims based on alleged denial of medical treatment solely due to disability are cognizable and may proceed. The court also vacated and remanded the dismissals of the informed consent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims and other state-law claims. View "Hickson v. St. David's Healthcare Partnership" on Justia Law

C.B., a 34-year-old man with developmental and psychiatric disabilities, died while residing at the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment, a secure state-run facility operated by the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Although C.B. was admitted voluntarily, the facility imposed substantial restrictions on his liberty, including limits on leaving the premises and accessing medical care. In the days leading up to his death from cardiomyopathy, C.B. exhibited clear symptoms of heart failure and repeatedly asked staff for help, but his pleas were allegedly ignored or inadequately addressed by his caretakers.J.M., C.B.’s mother and administrator of his estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of C.B.’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence and medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claim, holding that C.B., as a voluntarily admitted resident, had no constitutional right to adequate medical care, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court also denied J.M.’s motion to amend her complaint to add a new defendant, finding lack of diligence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that C.B. was entitled to substantive due process protections regardless of his voluntary admission status. The court clarified that when the state exercises sufficient control over a resident’s life such that the individual cannot care for himself, due process guarantees apply, consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

David Ray Gunter, who had a mechanical heart valve and required daily anticoagulant medication (Coumadin), was arrested and detained at two North Carolina county jails. During his detention, Gunter did not consistently receive his prescribed medication, missing doses over several days due to failures by the contracted medical provider and jail staff. After his release, he suffered serious medical complications, including blood clots and subsequent surgeries. Gunter alleged these injuries were the result of inadequate medical care during his incarceration.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for defendants on Gunter’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including deliberate indifference and Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence that jail officials or contracted medical providers acted with deliberate indifference or that county policies caused the deprivation. The district court also granted summary judgment to Southern Health Partners, Inc. (SHP) on the medical malpractice claim, finding that Gunter’s expert testimony did not establish a breach of the standard of care by SHP, and excluded expert evidence it found speculative. However, the district court found genuine disputes of fact regarding medical malpractice claims against two individual medical providers, but ultimately found no proximate cause. The district court denied Gunter’s motion to compel deposition of the defendants’ expert as untimely and granted a motion to strike a post-deposition declaration from Gunter’s expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Gunter’s deliberate indifference claim against the medical provider defendants, the Monell claim against the counties, and the medical malpractice claims against SHP and two medical providers, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained. The appellate court also reversed the exclusion of certain expert testimony and the grant of the motion to strike, but affirmed the denial of the motion to compel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Swink v. Southern Health Partners Inc." on Justia Law

While incarcerated at a North Carolina state prison in February 2016, Manuel Moreno developed flu-like symptoms and sought medical attention. A nurse examined him and recorded slightly elevated respiration, but otherwise normal vital signs. Dr. Carol Bosholm, the on-duty physician, did not personally examine Moreno but reviewed the nurse’s notes, diagnosed sinus congestion and pharyngitis, and prescribed antibiotics. That same day, several inmates from Moreno’s housing area also reported similar symptoms, and some tested positive for influenza. Dr. Bosholm ordered Moreno and others to be quarantined for seventy-two hours, leaving general instructions for monitoring but no specific orders to check oxygen saturation or respiratory rates. Over the weekend, medical staff made routine rounds, but there is no record that Moreno’s oxygen or respiration were measured, nor that he reported worsening symptoms. By Monday, Moreno’s condition had deteriorated significantly, leading to hospitalization, a seizure, and long-term complications.Moreno filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging state law medical malpractice and gross negligence, as well as a federal claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court excluded his expert’s testimony on the standard of care for the malpractice claim, finding the expert did not meet North Carolina’s requirements for such testimony. At trial, the court granted Dr. Bosholm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, concluding Moreno failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, breach of the standard of care, or the heightened culpability required for gross negligence and deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required application of North Carolina’s expert competency rule for medical malpractice claims, and that Moreno’s expert was properly excluded. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the gross negligence and deliberate indifference claims, upholding judgment for Dr. Bosholm. View "Moreno v. Bosholm" on Justia Law

William Carter, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, was arrested for unauthorized use of 911 and spent eight days in the Shreveport City Jail. During his incarceration, Carter, who had pre-existing bedsores, did not receive adequate medical care for his wounds, which allegedly led to their infection and his subsequent hospitalization. Carter's mother, suing on his behalf, filed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana state negligence law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Joel Nitzkin before trial. After a jury trial, the court granted the defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ADA/RA claim, concluding that the claim was about medical treatment rather than an actionable disability claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the § 1983 and state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the ADA/RA claim amounted to a complaint about medical negligence, which is not actionable under the ADA. The court found that the failure to change Carter's bandages was a medical treatment issue, not a failure to accommodate under the ADA. Additionally, the court held that Carter's placement in a segregated cell for his safety did not constitute intentional discrimination under the ADA. The court also did not address the exclusion of Dr. Nitzkin's testimony, as it was only relevant to the ADA claims, which failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Carter v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin prisoner, Armin Wand III, developed appendicitis in February 2018. He was seen by Nurse Beckey Kramer on February 13, 2018, but she did not diagnose appendicitis at that time. The next day, February 14, she recognized the symptoms and sent him to the hospital for emergency surgery. Wand sued Kramer and other officials, claiming inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and state law negligence for not recognizing his need for emergency care on February 13.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied summary judgment for Kramer and another defendant, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The court recruited an experienced lawyer for Wand, but only for settlement purposes. After settlement efforts failed, the lawyer withdrew, and Wand's subsequent motion for recruitment of another lawyer was denied. The court noted Wand's legal blindness and severe stutter but believed he could represent himself with the court's assistance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Wand's trial testimony contradicted his earlier claims, stating he did not report lower right quadrant pain to Kramer on February 13, which was crucial for diagnosing appendicitis. The court concluded that Wand's case was substantively weak and that he had not shown prejudice from the lack of recruited counsel. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Kramer, holding that Wand did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have changed the trial's outcome. View "Wand v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Randy Wiertella died in the Lake County Adult Detention Facility on December 10, 2018. Dennis Wiertella, as the Administrator of Randy's estate, filed a lawsuit claiming that Randy's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by Jail staff Diane Snow, RN, and Christina Watson, LPN. Randy had been booked into the Jail without his essential medications for heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, and a psychiatric disorder. Despite multiple requests, he did not receive all necessary medications, leading to his death from hypertensive cardiovascular disease.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Snow and Watson's motion for summary judgment, which sought dismissal based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Snow and Watson were aware of the substantial risk to Randy's health and whether they failed to respond reasonably.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Snow and Watson were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that both nurses were aware of Randy's serious medical conditions and the need for continuous medication. Despite this knowledge, they failed to ensure that Randy received his essential medications in a timely manner. The court concluded that their actions were unreasonable and violated Randy's constitutional rights. The court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Estate's § 1983 claim. View "Wiertella v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Raymond Tackett, an inmate with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), suffered from Hepatitis C (HCV) and did not receive direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), a treatment that cures HCV. He died on November 29, 2019, from complications related to HCV. His daughter, Skyler Tackett, as the personal representative of his estate, filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical malpractice claim against the medical professionals who treated him, Wexford Health Services, and Dr. Kristen Dauss, the Chief Medical Officer of the IDOC. She later dismissed all claims except the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dauss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Dauss, finding that she took reasonable steps to expand access to DAAs and was not responsible for the treatment decisions that led to Mr. Tackett’s death. Ms. Tackett appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that Ms. Tackett presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Dr. Dauss liable in her individual capacity. The court noted that Mr. Tackett was in a treatment priority group and that Nurse Myers had requested DAAs for him, but there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions or the IDOC policy prevented him from receiving the treatment. The court concluded that while Mr. Tackett’s death was tragic, there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. View "Tackett v Dauss" on Justia Law