Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Dr. Michael Brandner suffered a heart attack in September 2009 and was admitted to Providence Alaska Medical Center for emergency bypass surgery. Dr. Kenton Stephens was the cardiac surgeon who performed the operation; Dr. Robert J. Pease administered anesthesia. Dr. Brandner was also a medical doctor, licensed to practice plastic and reconstructive surgery. Bradner sued the anesthesiologist and medical providers involved in the surgery. The superior court dismissed Bradner’s claims on summary judgment, concluding that Bradner had offered no admissible evidence that the defendants breached the standard of care or caused the patient any injury. On appeal Bradner relied on his expert witness’s testimony that certain surgical procedures were suboptimal and that patients generally tended to have better outcomes when other procedures are followed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that this testimony was insufficient to raise any issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants had violated the standard of care in a way that caused injury to the patient. View "Brandner v. Pease" on Justia Law

Dr. Thomas A. Staner, a board-certified neurosurgeon and neurologist, performed a lumbar laminectomy on Wilfred Borden at Brookwood Medical Center. Two days later, he complained of excruciating pain in his lower back and legs. He was taken to the emergency room. A hematoma was discovered and causing compression of the cauda equina. As a result of the damage caused by the hematoma, Wilfred was permanently disabled and unable to work, suffered from constant pain, had problems walking, and suffered from incontinence of bladder and bowel and from impotence. Wilfred and Pam sued Dr. Staner, Alabama Neurosurgeons, P.C., Dr. Staner's practice, and Brookwood in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Wilfred asserted a claim under the Alabama Medical Liability Act against the defendants, and Pam asserted a claim based on loss of consortium. Brookwood filed a motion for a summary judgment. The trial court entered an order granting Brookwood's summary-judgment motion as to any claim alleging a duty and breach of the standard of care on the part of Brookwood's ER department. However, it denied the motion for a summary judgment as to the Bordens' claims against Brookwood based an alleged breach of the standard of care by Brookwood's medical/surgical nurses. At the close of the Bordens' evidence, Brookwood moved for a judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted the motion as to the issue of future medical expenses but denied it as to the Bordens' remaining claims. Brookwood renewed its motion for a judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court denied that motion. After deliberating for approximately six hours, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wilfred as to his medical malpractice claim and fixed damages at $5 million. It also found in favor of Pam as to her loss-of-consortium claim and fixed damages at $2.5 million. The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict. Brookwood appealed. In this case, the Bordens did not present expert testimony to establish a breach of the applicable standard of care. Therefore, Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it denied Brookwood's motions for a judgment as a matter of law as to Wilfred's medical-malpractice claim. The case was remanded for the trial court to render judgment as a matter of law in favor of Brookwood. View "Brookwood Medical Center v. Borden" on Justia Law

Anita Marion sued Noland Hospital Birmingham, LLC, and Noland Health Services, Inc. (collectively, "Noland"), Walter R. Ross, Jr., M.D., and Bernis Simmons, M.D., seeking damages resulting from the death of her husband, Arthur Marion. In 2009, Arthur underwent a kidney-stone removal procedure. Dr. Taylor Bragg performed the procedure, and Simmons was the anesthesiologist. During the procedure, Arthur suffered a heart attack. Arthur was revived, but the heart attack caused him to suffer hypoxic encephalopathy, which left him in a non-responsive state. Arthur was transferred to Noland Hospital Birmingham and was admitted by Ross. Arthur remained at Noland Hospital until he was transferred back to the hospital that originally treated him to receive dialysis for renal failure. Arthur passed away shortly transfer. The essence of Anita's claim against Simmons was that he breached the applicable standard of care by failing to position Arthur properly during his kidney-stone-removal procedure, and that breach caused Arthur's blood to be unable to circulate properly, which in turn caused Arthur's heart attack and hypoxic encephalopathy. As to Ross, Anita claimed that he breached the applicable standard of care by prescribing Rocephin, an antibiotic, to treat an infection Arthur was developing. Arthur had a documented allergy to Ancef, which, like Rocephin, was a cephalosporin. Anita alleged that Ross failed to note Arthur's allergy, and that, if Dr. Ross had noted the allergy, he would not have prescribed a cephalosporin to treat Arthur's infection. As to Noland, Anita alleged the hospital breached the applicable standard of care by failing to train its nurses to check for contraindications to medications. On October 3, 2014, the third day of jury deliberations, Ross, Simmons, and Noland moved for a mistrial, arguing that the trial court (specifically, the court clerk) answered questions from the jury outside the presence of counsel. The court denied the motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Simmons but against Ross and against Noland. Noland and Ross each filed a postjudgment motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment. In those motions, Noland and Ross argued again that they were entitled to a new trial because of the trial court's communications with the jury. The trial court denied the motions. Ross, Noland and Anita appealed, Anita explicitly stating in her notice of appeal that she was not challenging the jury's verdict as to Simmons; only that, if the Supreme Court reversed the judgments in her favor against Ross and Noland and remanded the case for a new trial, her claim against Simmons be reinstated too. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that Anita made no attempt to address Ross's and Noland's allegations that the trial court instructed the jury as to the burden of proof outside the presence of the parties and counsel. Because the Court reversed as to Ross and Noland, the Court considered Anita's claim against Simmons, and declined her request. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ross v. Marion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as guardian ad litem for Jakari Baize, filed a complaint against Defendants, healthcare providers, alleging negligence in failing properly to treat Jakari for a severe case of jaundice that left him permanently disabled. After discovery had been conducted and certain expert witnesses had been deposed, Plaintiff dismissed all claims against all defendants without prejudice. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for an award of expert witness fees for the actual time that the experts Plaintiffs had designated spent testifying during their respective depositions as costs under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-305. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by awarding the expert witness fees as costs because Defendants were statutorily required to subpoena the expert witnesses as a prerequisite for obtaining such relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the General Assembly eliminated the traditional subpoena requirement associated with the taxing of certain expert witness fees as costs in civil actions; and (2) therefore, the trial court correctly taxed expert witness fees in accordance with section 7A-305(d)(11) against Plaintiff. View "Lassiter v. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dow Tillson underwent an elective procedure to remove a cataract in his left eye. Defendant Dr. Richard Lane, M.D., performed the procedure at Springfield Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that within twenty-four hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson’s left eye showed signs of infection. Dr. Lane made a presumptive diagnosis of endopthalmitis, but did not refer Mr. Tillson to a retinologist for treatment. Within forty-eight hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson was permanently blind in his left eye. Plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, and defendants the doctor and hospital, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the superior court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tillson v. Lane" on Justia Law

A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant’s motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations was not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal. View "Thornhill v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Darla Keck filed a medical malpractice case against doctors Chad Collins, DMD, and Patrick Collins, DDS after she experienced complications following sleep apnea surgery. The Doctors moved for summary judgment, arguing she lacked a qualified medical expert who could provide testimony to establish her claim. In response to the motion, her counsel filed two timely affidavits and one untimely affidavit from her medical expert. The trial court granted a motion to strike the untimely affidavit. Considering the remaining affidavits, the court ruled that the expert did not connect his opinions to specific facts to support the contention that the Doctors' treatment fell below the standard of care. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the Doctors. The Court of Appeals reversed. Although it agreed that the two timely affidavits lacked sufficient factual support to defeat summary judgment, it held that the trial court should have denied the motion to strike and should have considered the third affidavit. This affidavit, the court held, contained sufficient factual support to defeat summary judgment. This case raised two issues for the Supreme Court's review on appeal of the Court of Appeals' reversal: (1) whether the trial court used the appropriate standard of review for the challenged ruling to strike untimely filed evidence submitted in response to the summary judgment motion; and (2) whether the expert's timely second affidavit showed a genuine issue for trial that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff to defeat summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to consider the factors from the governing caselaw, "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," ( 933 P.2d 1036 (1997)), on the record before striking the evidence. The Court also held that the second, timely-filed affidavid showed a genuine issue for trial that ciould have defeated summary judgment. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal. View "Keck v. Collins" on Justia Law

Dusty McIlwain brought his two-year-old son Hunter to the Natchez Community Hospital emergency room because Hunter had been vomiting, crying, and complaining of pain. Dr. Michael Wheelis, the emergency room doctor, knew Dusty and previously had worked with Carol McIlwain (a nurse), Dusty’s mother and Hunter’s grandmother. Dr. Wheelis was aware that Hunter had suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage previously as a result of a motor vehicle accident. That night, Dusty and Carol McIlwain informed Dr. Wheelis only that Hunter had abdominal pain and had vomited. Dr. Wheelis did not observe any neurological symptoms. After deciding that Hunter should be kept overnight in the hospital for observation, Dr. Wheelis, who had no authority to admit patients, spoke with Dr. Jennifer Russ, a pediatrician, at the request of the family, at approximately 2:10 a.m. After conferring, Drs. Russ and Wheelis diagnosed Hunter with dehydration and gastroenteritis. Several hours later, Hunter had a seizure, and was moved to the intensive care unit (ICU). Approximately 24 hours after he was admitted to the hospital, a CT scan of Hunter revealed that he suffered an aneurysm. He slipped into a coma and was pronounced dead several hours after the test. Jennifer McIlwain filed a medical malpractice suit against the doctors involved with Hunter's treatment. Trial was held more than ten years after Hunter had died, and ended in a deadlock. The trial court declared a mistrial. Following entry of the Order of Mistrial, the defendants filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing that Jennifer McIlwain had failed to establish her burden of proof as to the issue of causation. The trial court granted the motions and entered a final judgment of dismissal as to all claims in favor of all defendants. Jennifer timely filed this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found that Jennifer offered sufficient evidence of the requisite elements of a medical-negligence case against Dr. Wheelis; therefore, the trial court erred in granting Dr. Wheelis’s motion for JNOV. However, Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Miller failed to develop evidence that a violation of the standard of care in the setting in which she practiced was equivalent to that as applied to Dr. Russ, and the Court found the trial court did not err in granting Dr. Russ’s motion for JNOV. View "McIlwain v. Natchez Community Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended its Rules of Civil Procedure to require malpractice plaintiffs to file a certificate of merit (COM) within 60 days of bringing suit, under penalty of dismissal. Five years later, to dismissal of meritorious claims due to technical oversights, the Court amended the Rules again, setting conditions that had to be met before a defendant could seek dismissal. The Third Circuit previously held that the COM requirement is substantive state law that must be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity. Schmigel sued Dr. Uchal, who performed Schigel’s laparoscopic adjustable gastric band surgery in Pennsylvania before moving to Florida. Realizing that no COM had been filed, Uchal waited out the 60-day window, then filed a motion to dismiss. The next day, Schmigel’s counsel filed an “answer,” attaching the missing COM, and arguing that Uchal had not waited 30 days after giving notice of the deficiency to allow for cure before filing his motion to dismiss, The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that conditions precedent to dismissing an action for failure to comply with the COM requirement, including fair notice to a plaintiff, are substantive law that must be applied in federal court. View "Schmigel v. Uchal" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff Lisa Tyra received a kidney transplant at defendant William Beaumont Hospital, with a kidney made available by defendant Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan. Plaintiff allegedly suffered complications because the kidney did not constitute a proper match, and she filed suit asserting defendants should have identified this fact before the surgery. When plaintiff filed her complaint, the 182-day notice period set forth in MCL 600.2912b(1) had not yet expired. Organ Procurement moved for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s complaint was filed prematurely, and the period of limitations had since expired. The hospital and Dr. Steven Cohn, the transplant surgeon, joined the motion and the trial court later granted the motion. The trial court reasoned that, under "Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp," (691 NW2d 424 (2005)), the prematurely filed complaint failed to toll the running of the period of limitations and plaintiff could not cure the error by refiling the complaint. The legal issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the controlling caselaw authority governing this case, "Zwiers v Growney," (778 NW2d 81 (2009)), was overruled by the Michigan Supreme Court in "Driver v Naini," (802 NW2d 311 (2011)). The Court of Appeals held that Zwiers was not overruled in Driver. Because the Supreme Court concluded to the contrary, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part in both "Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich," (850 NW2d 667 (2013)), and "Furr v McLeod," (848 NW2d 465 (2014)). In "Tyra," the Court reinstated the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and in "Furr," the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. View "Tyra v. Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan" on Justia Law