Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Dodd v. Jones
Julene and William Dodd sued their attorney, Rory Jones, for legal malpractice after he missed the statute of limitations deadline for filing their medical malpractice lawsuit. The Dodds needed to prove that their original medical malpractice case had merit and that they would have won if Jones had filed on time. However, the district court struck the testimony of the Dodds’ experts, which was key to establishing the viability of their medical malpractice claim. The court found that the disclosures were untimely and that the experts failed to properly establish knowledge of the local standard of care, a foundational requirement of Idaho law. As a result, the Dodds’ legal malpractice claim was dismissed, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of Jones.The Dodds appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, arguing that the district court erred by ruling that Jones was not judicially estopped from arguing that no medical malpractice occurred and by excluding their expert testimony. They also raised claims of judicial bias. The Supreme Court of Idaho found that Jones could not be judicially estopped from claiming that no medical malpractice occurred because he was not a party in the original medical malpractice case but was representing the Dodds. The court also upheld the district court’s exclusion of the Dodds’ expert testimony, finding that the experts did not demonstrate familiarity with the local standard of care in Nampa, Idaho, at the time of the alleged malpractice.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the Dodds failed to establish an essential element of their legal malpractice case. The court also awarded attorney fees to Jones under Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2, finding that the appeal was pursued frivolously and without foundation, and sanctioned the Dodds’ attorney, Angelo Rosa, for his conduct during the appeal. View "Dodd v. Jones" on Justia Law
Webster v. University of Mississippi Medical Center Grenada
Shanta Webster filed a complaint in the Grenada County Circuit Court against the University of Mississippi Medical Center-Grenada (UMMC-Grenada) and Drs. Aimee Watts and Kimberly Farmer, alleging medical negligence in the performance of a hysterectomy and post-operative care. Webster served the complaint to Dr. Watts, Dr. Farmer, and Dodie McElmurry, the CEO of UMMC-Grenada. The defendants requested an extension to answer the complaint and later claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Webster argued that service of process was proper under Rule 4(d)(8) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.The Grenada County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that service of process was improper because it was not made to the Attorney General as required by Rule 4(d)(5) for state institutions. Webster appealed the dismissal, maintaining that UMMC-Grenada is a community hospital and that service on the CEO was sufficient.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and upheld the trial court's decision. The court found that UMMC-Grenada is not a separate entity but a part of UMMC, a state institution. Therefore, service of process should have been made to the Attorney General under Rule 4(d)(5). Webster failed to serve the Attorney General within the 120-day period required by Rule 4(h), rendering the service invalid. Additionally, the court noted that Drs. Watts and Farmer, acting within the scope of their employment, were immune from personal liability under the MTCA.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal, concluding that proper service of process was not effected, and the individual defendants were immune from liability. View "Webster v. University of Mississippi Medical Center Grenada" on Justia Law
Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group
Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (DCCMG) and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting five causes of action: negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, was exposed to HIV patient’s blood during a procedure due to Dr. Panguluri’s actions. The complaint did not allege that Glenn contracted HIV but claimed harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The Maniagos did not request oral argument and did not appear for the hearing. Subsequently, they voluntarily dismissed their entire action with prejudice to expedite an appeal of the adverse rulings.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs’ request without a final judicial determination of their claims. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is a ministerial act and not appealable. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law
Ng v. Super. Ct.
In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent negligence by other doctors led to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and a survival claim.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center's motion to strike portions of Ng's complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct, even when based on the same incident of medical malpractice. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The court granted Ng's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and issue a new order denying the Medical Center's motion to strike. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law
Greenwood Leflore Hospital v. Boykin
Clover Boykin filed a lawsuit against Greenwood Leflore Hospital (GLH) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that GLH intentionally withheld her medical records, preventing her from filing a medical malpractice suit. Boykin claimed that GLH's actions violated her constitutional right of access to the courts. GLH responded with a motion to dismiss, arguing that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law, the employee was immune from suit, GLH was never served, and the suit was time-barred.The Leflore County Circuit Court denied GLH's motion to dismiss and granted Boykin additional time to serve GLH. GLH then sought an interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi granted. Boykin did not file a brief in response to the appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi accepted Boykin's failure to file a brief as a confession of error and found that Boykin's claims failed as a matter of law. The court held that HIPAA does not provide a private right of action and that Boykin could not use § 1983 to enforce a federal statute that does not give her an individual right. The court reversed the trial judge's denial of the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of GLH. View "Greenwood Leflore Hospital v. Boykin" on Justia Law
Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center
Clayton D. Richards underwent a medical procedure at Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) in August 2013, resulting in bilateral lower extremity paralysis. He initially filed a negligence lawsuit against VUMC in December 2014, which he later voluntarily dismissed. Richards refiled his complaint in January 2021, relying on Tennessee's saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105, which allows a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit within one year of a voluntary nonsuit. However, the trial court dismissed his complaint, ruling that Richards did not comply with the saving statute's terms.The Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed Richards' refiled complaint, holding that it was not filed within the one-year period required by the saving statute. Richards argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) provided him with a 120-day extension to the one-year saving statute, making his lawsuit timely. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, agreeing that the 120-day extension did not apply to the saving statute.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not extend the one-year refiling period provided by the saving statute. The court emphasized that the 120-day extension applies only to statutes of limitations and repose, not to the saving statute. Consequently, Richards' refiled complaint was untimely, and the trial court's dismissal of the case was upheld. View "Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center" on Justia Law
Lewis v Sood
Clarence Lewis, an inmate at Hill Correctional Center, sued various medical staff members, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his health issues, violating the Eighth Amendment. Lewis claimed misdiagnosis and mistreatment of diabetes, COPD, irritable bowel syndrome, and Hepatitis C. He also contended that his grievance about a delay in diabetes medication was not properly addressed.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Lewis's motions for recruited counsel, stating he could represent himself and obtain relevant documents. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, concluding no reasonable juror could find deliberate indifference. The court also granted summary judgment for Dr. Paul, citing claim splitting due to a similar prior lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, finding no reasonable likelihood that recruited counsel would have changed the outcome. The court noted that Lewis's disagreement with his diagnoses and treatments did not constitute deliberate indifference. As for Administrator Lindor, her limited role and the lack of harm from the medication delay further supported the judgment.However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Dr. Paul, agreeing with Lewis that the district court's application of claim splitting was erroneous. Dr. Paul had raised this defense too late, effectively acquiescing to the claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Dr. Paul, with the district court advised to reconsider Lewis's request for recruited counsel if the claim proceeds to trial. View "Lewis v Sood" on Justia Law
Mallet v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
While incarcerated at Woodborne Correctional Facility, Antonio Mallet sought medical care for urinary obstruction and painful urination, symptoms indicative of prostate cancer. Despite a cystoscopy revealing concerning results, prison doctors did not conduct further tests for prostate cancer, instead prescribing medication for a benign enlarged prostate. Mallet was released on parole in January 2019 and was diagnosed with late-stage prostate cancer in May 2021. He filed a lawsuit on February 25, 2022, against the State of New York, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), its acting commissioner, and three medical providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs and other constitutional violations, as well as state law claims for malpractice and negligence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Mallet’s constitutional claims as untimely, reasoning that the claims accrued by the time he was released from custody in January 2019, thus falling outside the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in New York. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it plausible that Mallet’s deliberate indifference claim had not accrued by February 25, 2019, making his complaint potentially timely. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Makram and Dr. Stellato, finding them plausible, but affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Professor Ritaccio and the constitutional claims against New York State, DOCCS, and Annucci due to sovereign immunity. The court vacated the dismissal of the remaining constitutional claims and state law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mallet v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision" on Justia Law
Callens v. Episcopal Foundation of Jefferson County
Betty Callens, an 81-year-old woman, underwent left-hip-replacement surgery on September 23, 2019, at Grandview Medical Center. After her discharge on September 27, 2019, she was transferred to Brookdale Skilled Nursing Facility for rehabilitation. Callens alleged that she received poor nursing care at Brookdale, leading to a fall on October 3, 2019, which resulted in another fracture of her left hip and a fractured left femur. She was readmitted to Grandview for further surgeries and was later diagnosed with Clostridioides difficile. On October 15, 2019, Callens was transferred to St. Martin's for rehabilitation. On October 21, 2019, while being bathed by a nurse at St. Martin's, Callens alleged that the nurse applied excessive pressure to her healing hip, causing another dislocation.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of St. Martin's, concluding that Callens failed to provide medical-expert testimony to establish a breach of the standard of care or causation of her injuries. Callens's motion to strike the affidavit of St. Martin's expert, Michael Britton, R.N., was denied. The court found that Britton was qualified as a similarly situated health-care provider.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Callens's case did not fall under the "layman" exception, which allows for the absence of expert testimony in cases where the lack of skill is apparent to a layperson. The court determined that the care provided to Callens involved complex medical procedures beyond the understanding of an average layperson, thus requiring expert testimony. The court also upheld the qualification of Britton as a similarly situated health-care provider, noting that he had provided hands-on care in the relevant field during the year preceding Callens's injuries. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of St. Martin's was affirmed. View "Callens v. Episcopal Foundation of Jefferson County" on Justia Law
Gierek v. Anonymous 1
In late 2019, a hospital sent letters to over a thousand patients, including Linda Gierek, informing them of potential exposure to infectious diseases due to a technician's failure to fully sterilize surgical instruments. Gierek filed a class-action complaint against the hospital, asserting claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and medical malpractice. She sought class certification for similarly situated patients and their spouses. The trial court consolidated Gierek’s action with a similar class-action claim filed by Cheyanne Bennett.The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund intervened, arguing that the claims sounded in ordinary negligence and thus the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) did not apply. The hospital argued the opposite. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, stating the MMA applied, and denied the motion for class certification, citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction while a proposed complaint was pending before a medical-review panel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MMA’s applicability but reversed the trial court’s decision on class certification jurisdiction.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the MMA covers all claims for medical malpractice, not limited to bodily injury or death. The court also held that class certification is a proper preliminary determination under the MMA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. View "Gierek v. Anonymous 1" on Justia Law