Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law

Aletha Porcaro was admitted to The Heights of Summerlin, a skilled nursing facility, for rehabilitation after surgery. Upon her discharge, she contracted COVID-19 and died eight days later. Her daughter, Rachelle Crupi, filed a lawsuit against The Heights and its parent companies, alleging that they failed to implement effective COVID-19 safety protocols. The claims included negligence, wrongful death, and other related causes of action.The Heights removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court. In state court, The Heights moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and Nevada’s Emergency Directive 011 granted them immunity from Crupi’s claims. The district court dismissed the professional negligence claim but allowed the other claims to proceed.The Heights then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, seeking to dismiss the remaining claims based on the same immunity arguments. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and concluded that the PREP Act does not apply to a lack of action or failure to implement COVID-19 policies. The court also determined that Directive 011 does not grant immunity to health care facilities, as it applies to individual medical professionals, not facilities.The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that neither the PREP Act nor Directive 011 provided immunity to The Heights for the claims brought by Crupi. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the remaining claims to proceed. View "The Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law

Daniel McCurry and Carie Powell sued Dr. Inder Singh for malpractice, alleging he violated a duty of care by refusing to treat their mother, Carol McCurry, who died while awaiting transfer to another hospital. Carol was brought to Methodist Hospital with shortness of breath and was diagnosed with an aortic dissection and a possible heart attack. Dr. Michael Brandon, the treating emergency physician, consulted Dr. Singh, an on-call interventional cardiologist at Mercy General Hospital. Dr. Singh initially agreed that Carol needed acute catheterization but later decided she was not a candidate for the procedure. Consequently, Dr. Singh did not accept her transfer, and Carol died before she could be transferred to another facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh, ruling that he did not owe a duty of care to Carol because no physician-patient relationship existed between them. The court found that Dr. Singh did not affirmatively treat or directly advise Carol, and thus, no legal duty was established.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a physician's duty of care arises only when a physician-patient relationship is established, which did not occur in this case. Dr. Singh's consultation with Dr. Brandon and his decision not to treat Carol did not create such a relationship. The court also declined to apply the reasoning from an Arizona case cited by the plaintiffs, emphasizing that under California law, the duty of care is contingent upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh was affirmed. View "McCurry v. Singh" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

Quintez Talley, an incarcerated individual, sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status to appeal without prepaying filing fees. The appellees argued that the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred Talley from proceeding IFP, claiming that three of his previous cases were dismissed on grounds that qualify as strikes under the PLRA. Talley contended that only one of these cases constituted a strike.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's federal claim for failure to state a claim and his medical malpractice claim for not complying with Pennsylvania procedural rules. The court did not dismiss the entire action on strike-qualifying grounds, so this case did not count as a strike. In another case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's complaint for failure to state a claim but granted him leave to amend. Talley did not amend within the deadline, but the court did not formally close the case before Talley filed his notice of appeal, so this case also did not count as a strike. In a third case, the same court dismissed Talley's claims for failure to state a claim and noted his failure to file a certificate of merit for his medical malpractice claim. This dismissal was on strike-qualifying grounds, making it a strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that only one of Talley's previous cases constituted a strike. The court held that the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim for procedural non-compliance did not qualify as a strike, and the case where Talley was given leave to amend but did not do so was not formally closed, thus not a strike. The court granted Talley's motion to proceed IFP, allowing him to appeal without prepaying filing fees. View "Talley v. Pillai" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Michael Wollan was admitted to Essentia Health and died two days later. Mary Wollan, on behalf of Michael's heirs, filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Essentia, seeking economic and noneconomic damages. The jury found Essentia at fault and a proximate cause of Michael's death, but also found a non-party at fault, allocating 25% fault to Essentia and 75% to the non-party. The jury awarded $500,657 in total damages, which included $116,657 in past economic damages.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, held a jury trial and entered a judgment against Essentia, including costs and disbursements totaling $639,292.06. Essentia's motion for a new trial was denied by the district court.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the jury's verdict inconsistent and irreconcilable, particularly the award of past economic damages, which exactly matched the amount requested by Wollan but did not align with the 25% fault allocation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Essentia's motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, noting that the jury's damage award was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to the record.Additionally, the Supreme Court addressed other issues likely to arise on remand, including the admissibility of settlement evidence and the district court's exclusion of such evidence under N.D.R.Ev. 408. The court upheld the exclusion of settlement evidence, finding no abuse of discretion. The award of costs and disbursements was also reversed, consistent with the reversal of the judgment. View "Wollan v. Innovis Health" on Justia Law

Monty Clarence Petersen filed a complaint on January 27, 2020, alleging that Jennifer J. Simon, APRN, committed medical malpractice by prescribing Lovenox within 24 hours of his surgery on January 25, 2018, causing him injuries. A summons was issued on October 31, 2022, and served on Simon on January 9, 2023. Simon moved to dismiss the complaint because Petersen did not serve it within six months of filing, as required by Montana Code Annotated § 25-3-106.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Missoula County granted Simon's motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, citing the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations under § 27-2-205, MCA. The court interpreted the statute to allow dismissal with prejudice if the defendant had made an appearance and other substantive law supported such dismissal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that § 25-3-106, MCA, mandates dismissal without prejudice for untimely service unless the defendant has made an appearance, which only affects the need for service, not the nature of the dismissal. The court found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based solely on untimely service. The Supreme Court also noted that it could not issue an advisory opinion on whether a new complaint would be barred by the statute of limitations or statute of repose, as no new complaint had been filed.The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the complaint with prejudice and remanded the case for entry of an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. View "Petersen v. Simon" on Justia Law

The administrator of a deceased woman’s estate filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against a doctor, the doctor’s employer, a hospital, and Medicare. The doctor and his employer included the affirmative defenses of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process in their answer. Over two years later, they moved for summary judgment, arguing that the case had not commenced timely because the doctor had not been served with the complaint. The administrator opposed, claiming the doctor waived his defense by participating in the litigation. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed.The administrator appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, urging it to overrule its decision in Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., which held that active participation in litigation does not waive the defense of insufficiency of service of process if properly raised and preserved. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to overrule Gliozzo, reaffirming that the defense is not waived by participation in litigation if it is properly raised and preserved. The court emphasized that the burden of perfecting service lies with the plaintiff and that the rules of civil procedure govern the conduct of all parties equally.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Dr. Ahmad properly preserved his insufficiency-of-service-of-process defense and that the administrator never perfected service of the complaint on him. Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the claims against Dr. Ahmad and his employer. The judgment of the First District Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Ackman v. Mercy Health W. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law