Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Roberta Evans underwent a total hip replacement surgery performed by Dr. Mark B. Wright at St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center. Post-surgery, Evans experienced persistent pain and discomfort, which led her to seek a second opinion. Another doctor confirmed that her hip bone socket was abnormally anteverted, and subsequent revision surgery revealed a periprosthetic joint infection. Evans filed a lawsuit against Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s, alleging negligence in their follow-up care and treatment.The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho dismissed Evans’s case, ruling that her claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). The court found that Evans’s surgical complications were objectively ascertainable by March 4, 2019, indicating that some damage was present. Her motion for reconsideration was denied.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Evans’s medical malpractice claim was time-barred, as the statute of limitations began when her symptoms indicated some damage, which was before April 6, 2019. The court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Evans’s complaint and that her equitable estoppel argument was without merit. The court denied attorney fees to both parties but awarded costs to Dr. Wright and St. Luke’s as the prevailing parties. View "Evans v. Wright" on Justia Law

David Francisco, a retired endodontist, sought treatment from Dr. Kevin Art of Affiliated Urologists, Ltd. in 2018. Dr. Art performed a urological procedure and prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin (Cipro) without discussing its use with Francisco. The FDA's black box warning for Cipro indicated serious risks, especially for elderly patients with a history of corticosteroid use, which applied to Francisco. After taking Cipro, Francisco experienced severe adverse reactions, including tendon ruptures and peripheral neuropathy.The Superior Court in Maricopa County dismissed the Franciscos' case for failing to provide a preliminary expert opinion affidavit as required by A.R.S. § 12-2603. The Franciscos argued that the FDA warning itself should establish the standard of care, negating the need for expert testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that the FDA warning could be sufficient to establish the standard of care without expert testimony.The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that FDA warnings cannot substitute for expert testimony to establish the standard of care in medical malpractice cases. The Court emphasized that medical judgment is required to determine the appropriate standard of care, which must be established by expert testimony. The Court also rejected the Franciscos' argument that the statutory requirements for expert testimony violated the anti-abrogation clause of the Arizona Constitution, finding that the statutes permissibly regulate medical negligence actions.The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal of the case. View "FRANCISCO v AFFILIATED UROLOGISTS" on Justia Law

Greg Phillips died on October 11, 2019, after receiving medical care from Dr. Anna Robbins at Logan Health. On April 22, 2021, Phillips' estate filed a medical malpractice claim with the Montana Medical Legal Panel (MMLP), which issued a decision on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, on January 5, 2022, Phillips filed a complaint in the District Court alleging wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, a survivor’s claim, and respondeat superior. However, the complaint was not served on Logan Health. On February 10, 2023, Phillips filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) adding claims of common law negligence and negligent misrepresentation, which was served on Logan Health on February 20, 2023.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court dismissed the FAC with prejudice on April 28, 2023, because Phillips failed to serve the original complaint within the six-month period required by § 25-3-106, MCA, and the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims under § 27-2-205, MCA, had expired. Phillips' motion to alter, amend, or set aside the dismissal was denied on June 13, 2023, as the court found that the statute of limitations resumed running after the six-month service deadline passed and that the FAC did not relate back to the original complaint.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The court held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the six-month period for serving the complaint and that the FAC was filed outside the two-year limitations period. The court also determined that Logan Health's motion to dismiss did not constitute an appearance under § 25-3-106, MCA, and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Phillips' post-judgment motion. View "Phillips v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, representing their minor son, sued a hospital and a doctor for medical malpractice after their baby suffered birth injuries during delivery. They sought $6,000,000 in damages. Under Puerto Rico law, damages would be capped at $150,000 if the doctor was a faculty member at the hospital at the time of the birth. The defendants claimed the doctor was a faculty member, but could not produce a contract to prove it. The district court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing and concluded that the doctor was a faculty member, thus applying the statutory cap on damages.The U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico adopted a magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation, which stated that the applicability of the statutory cap was a matter of law. The district court found that the doctor was a faculty member based on testimony and letters from the medical school, despite the absence of a contract. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the applicability of the statutory cap was a factual question that should have been decided by a jury.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that whether the doctor was a faculty member at the time of the birth was a factual question requiring a jury's determination. The court found that the evidence was not one-sided enough to compel the district court's conclusion and that the district court improperly took the question from the jury. The First Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Perez-Perez v. Hospital Episcopal San Lucas Inc." on Justia Law

Anne G. McNair experienced a perforated esophagus and infection following cervical fusion surgery performed by Dr. Joshua D. Beck at North Lincoln County Hospital District, d/b/a Star Valley Health. Dr. Beck, employed by Orthopaedics of Jackson Hole, P.C., d/b/a Teton Orthopaedics, continued to treat her post-surgery. McNair filed a complaint against Dr. Beck, Teton, and Star Valley, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and vicarious liability. The district court dismissed her complaint, citing the statute of limitations, and denied her motion to amend the complaint, deeming it futile.The District Court of Lincoln County granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, concluding that McNair's claims were filed beyond the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. The court determined that the continuous treatment rule did not apply, as McNair's injury stemmed from a single act of negligence during the surgery on December 30, 2020. Consequently, the court found that the statute of limitations began on December 31, 2020, the date McNair was discharged from the hospital, making her April 2023 filings untimely. The court also denied McNair's motion to amend her complaint, asserting that any amendment would be futile.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its application of the continuous treatment rule. The Supreme Court held that the continuous treatment rule applies when a medical provider has provided ongoing care for the same or related complaints. The court noted that McNair's complaint alleged continuous treatment by Dr. Beck and Teton into early 2021, which could extend the statute of limitations. The court also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying McNair's motion to amend her complaint, as the proposed amendments did not show on their face that the claims were untimely. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McNair v. Beck" on Justia Law

Jessica Wiseman and her children sued Dr. Nathan Rencher and others for the wrongful death of Eric Wiseman, alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence. Rencher, the only defendant subject to Idaho's prelitigation screening panel requirement, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Wisemans failed to comply with this requirement. He supported his motion with the panel’s advisory decision, filed under seal. The district court granted Rencher’s motion, concluding that the Wisemans did not meet the prelitigation requirement based on the advisory decision. The Wisemans also sought to disqualify the district judge, which was denied.The district court, part of the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho, ruled that the advisory decision could be considered to determine compliance with the prelitigation requirement. The court found the statutes ambiguous and concluded that they allowed limited review of the advisory decision. The court also ruled that the statutes controlled over conflicting Idaho Rules of Evidence. Consequently, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Rencher, finding no genuine issue of material fact regarding the Wisemans' compliance with the prelitigation requirement.The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the prelitigation screening statutes unequivocally precluded judicial review of the advisory decision for any purpose. The court emphasized that the statutes clearly stated there should be no judicial review and that parties should not be affected by the panel’s conclusions. The Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court declined to disqualify the district judge on remand, distinguishing this case from precedent and finding no appearance of bias. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal, as both prevailed in part. View "Wiseman v. Rencher" on Justia Law

Pearl Ray and Andrew Ray, Sr. sued medical providers in Illinois state court for medical malpractice, which allegedly injured Pearl and caused Andrew to suffer a loss of consortium. They settled with all but one defendant. Pearl was enrolled in a federal health benefits plan, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association (BCBSA) was the plan’s carrier. Under the plan, BCBSA sought reimbursement from the settlement for benefits paid to Pearl. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reduce BCBSA’s reimbursement by their attorney’s fees and costs under Illinois’s common fund doctrine.The case was removed to federal court by BCBSA, arguing federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially denied the remand motion but later reconsidered and remanded the entire case, concluding it lacked federal question jurisdiction. BCBSA appealed, asserting federal question jurisdiction and federal officer removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The court held that federal question jurisdiction was not present, as federal common law did not govern the reimbursement dispute, following the precedent set by Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois v. Cruz. However, the court found that BCBSA met the requirements for federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, as it was acting under a federal agency (OPM) and had a colorable federal defense.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded, instructing the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the motion for adjudication while remanding the rest of the case to state court. View "Ray v. Tabriz" on Justia Law

Shelly Blackston underwent a liposuction procedure performed by Dr. Alva Roy Heron, Jr. in Virginia. During the procedure, she experienced severe pain, which Dr. Heron attempted to alleviate with additional anesthesia. After returning to her home in Maryland, Blackston continued to suffer pain and developed an infection, leading to hospitalization and multiple surgeries. She filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, alleging medical malpractice and failure to obtain informed consent.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County held a five-day trial, after which the jury found in favor of Blackston on both claims. The jury awarded her $2,300,900 in damages, including $2,000,000 in non-economic damages. Petitioners filed post-trial motions, including a motion for statutory remittitur, arguing that Maryland’s cap on non-economic damages should apply. The circuit court granted the motion in part, reducing the non-economic damages to $755,000, consistent with Maryland’s statutory cap.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s decision, holding that Virginia’s damages cap applied because the injury occurred in Virginia where the procedure took place. The court reasoned that the infection, which constituted the injury, was introduced during the surgery in Virginia.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that Virginia substantive law applied under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, which requires the application of the law of the state where the last element of the tort occurs. The court found sufficient evidence that Blackston suffered a cognizable injury during the surgery in Virginia, making Virginia’s damages cap applicable. Thus, the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was affirmed. View "Doctor's Weight Loss Centers, Inc. v. Blackston" on Justia Law

In the first case, a young woman with severe headaches due to excess brain fluid had a shunt catheter implanted. She later returned to the emergency room with worsening symptoms, and a brain scan was performed. Dr. Swofford, a diagnostic radiologist, verified the scan results, but the emergency procedure to relieve her brain pressure failed, and she died. The plaintiff, representing the decedent's estate, sued Dr. Swofford and his practice for medical malpractice. The trial court ruled that the relevant specialty was diagnostic radiology, not neuroradiology, and thus excluded the plaintiff's neuroradiologist expert. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding neuroradiology to be the relevant specialty, allowing the expert to testify.In the second case, a plaintiff sued Dr. Colton for medical malpractice after multiple rhinoplasties resulted in a nasal deformity. Dr. Colton was certified in otolaryngology and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Armstrong, had the same certifications but spent most of his time on otolaryngology. The trial court found the expert's qualifications unclear and denied a motion to strike his testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the relevant specialty was facial plastic and reconstructive surgery, and excluded the expert because he did not spend the majority of his time in that specialty.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed both cases. It held that the Woodard decision, which conflated "specialty" and "subspecialty," was incorrect. The Court clarified that "specialty" refers to general board certifications recognized by major certifying entities and does not require matching subspecialties. In Stokes, the Court affirmed that diagnostic radiology was the relevant specialty, allowing the neuroradiologist to testify. In Selliman, the Court remanded the case to determine whether facial plastic and reconstructive surgery is a subspecialty, requiring further fact-finding by the trial court. View "Estate Of Horn v. Swofford" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s daughter, Alexandrianna Lowe, who had an opioid addiction, was admitted to Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore University Medical Center (JSUMC) for complications related to Type 1 diabetes. Two days later, Lowe was found unresponsive, and hospital staff administered anti-opioid medication but failed to check her blood sugar levels. An autopsy revealed no illicit drugs in her system. Plaintiff filed a complaint against JSUMC and others, alleging negligence. At the time of filing, plaintiff had not been appointed administratrix ad prosequendum of her daughter’s estate and did not have access to Lowe’s medical records.The trial court dismissed Dr. Michael Carson from the case as he was not involved in the events leading to Lowe’s death. Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of Merit (AOM) by Dr. Joseph Fallon, which defendants argued was insufficient because it did not name the surviving defendants, did not state that Dr. Fallon was a similarly licensed physician, and did not indicate that Dr. Fallon reviewed Lowe’s medical records. Without holding a Ferreira conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to submit a sufficient AOM. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that the AOM submitted by plaintiff complied with N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. The Court found that the AOM statute does not require the affiant to state that they reviewed medical records or to name a specific defendant by name. The Court emphasized the importance of holding a timely and effective Ferreira conference to resolve issues related to the AOM. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, including consideration of plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint to add Dr. Vikas Singh as a defendant. View "Moschella v. Hackensack Meridian Jersey Shore University Medical Center" on Justia Law