Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Michael Summerfield brought a medical malpractice suit against St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd. (St. Luke’s), following the surgical removal of his gallbladder. During surgery, the attending surgeon, employed by St. Luke’s, unknowingly spilled and left a gallstone in Summerfield’s peritoneal cavity. When it was later determined that the gallstone was not in the removed gallbladder, the surgeon failed to inform Summerfield of the incident, warn him of any potential complications, or properly document the incident in his medical records. St. Luke’s moved for summary judgment, challenging the admissibility of the opinions offered by Summerfield’s expert witness. St. Luke’s claimed Summerfield’s expert, as an emergency medicine and wound care physician, was unable to establish the requisite knowledge of the applicable standards of care and breaches thereof by St. Luke’s and the attending surgeon. The district court initially agreed with St. Luke’s and granted its motion for summary judgment. Summerfield then filed a motion for reconsideration and attached a supplemental declaration from his expert witness that established the requisite foundation. The district court considered this additional evidence and granted Summerfield’s motion. However, the district court later reversed itself, relying on Ciccarello v. Davies, 456 P.3d 519 (2019), which held that a trial court was afforded discretion in determining whether to consider new declarations accompanying a motion for reconsideration if they were untimely for consideration at summary judgment. Summerfield appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, contending the district court’s sua sponte reversal of itself was in error and contrary to previous decisions issued by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part, and reversed in part. The Court affirmed district court’s decision to grant St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment on Summerfield’s claim that Dr. Ocmand breached the standard of care for not noticing the spilled gallstone and not retrieving it because Dr. Madsen did not establish a sufficient foundation to testify as to the appropriate standard of care. The Court also affirmed the district court’s sua sponte decision to reverse itself and not consider Dr. Madsen’s third affidavit and reinstate judgment for St. Luke’s on this same ground. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision to grant St. Luke’s motion for summary judgment as to Summerfield’s claims that Dr. Ocmand breached the standard of care by failing to inform Summerfield of the spilled gallstone and by failing to note the spilled gallstone in Summerfield’s medical chart because Dr. Madsen laid a sufficient foundation to testify as to these matters. View "Summerfield v. St. Luke's McCall" on Justia Law

Stark had surgery in 2007 to implant a pelvic mesh device. The surgery was not successful, and she had follow-up surgeries that also were not successful. In 2018, she learned for the first time that her problems with the pelvic mesh device might have resulted from a defect in the product itself. She consulted a lawyer and later that year filed this suit against the manufacturer. The district court concluded that Stark should have realized much earlier that the product might have been defective and granted summary judgment based on the two-year statute of limitations.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The statute of limitations began to run only when Stark should have realized that her mesh-related complications might have been wrongfully caused by another person. As a general rule, the failure of a medical procedure or product to cure a patient does not necessarily signal that anyone acted wrongfully, particularly when the patient experiences known complications that do not necessarily result from tortious actions. In addition here, Stark’s medical history included Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, which two of her doctors told her could explain her continued problems. The combination of that general principle and her specific circumstances could allow a reasonable jury to decide that this suit was timely. View "Stark v. Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon, Inc." on Justia Law

A jury entered a verdict for the defense in a medical malpractice suit, finding medical negligence but also finding that the negligence did not cause harm. During later conversations with jurors, plaintiffs’ representatives learned that at least some jurors believed the verdict was incorrectly entered because, although there were at least 10 votes (among the 12 jurors) to find that there was medical negligence, there were not 10 votes to find that the medical negligence did not cause harm. Juror affidavits then were prepared and filed with a motion for a new trial. The trial court admitted the affidavits into evidence and exercised its discretion to order a new trial in the interests of justice. The defendants petitioned for the Alaska Supreme Court's review of the new trial order, and the Supreme Court concluded it was error to admit the juror affidavits into evidence and, therefore, there was no evidentiary basis for the trial court to grant a new trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order for a new trial and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants consistent with the jury verdict rendered in court at the close of the trial. View "Trescot v. Foy" on Justia Law

Bettye McNutt filed a complaint against Dr. Vivian Sze Ting Lo, Methodist-Olive Branch Hospital (Methodist), and others asserting the wrongful death of her son due to medical malpractice. Because Dr. Lo had not been served with a presuit notice of claim, the circuit court dismissed the claims against Dr. Lo and, because the statute of limitations had expired, the dismissal was with prejudice. After Dr. Lo’s dismissal, Methodist filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that McNutt’s vicarious liability claims based on Dr. Lo’s conduct were extinguished when Dr. Lo was dismissed with prejudice. The circuit court denied the motion for partial summary judgment, and Methodist appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found the circuit court properly denied partial summary judgment. Although Dr. Lo was dismissed with prejudice, the dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits, and McNutt did not enter into a settlement release and indemnity agreement with Dr. Lo. View "Methodist Healthcare-Olive Branch Hospital v. McNutt" on Justia Law

Kelly Bowman and her husband Vernon, brought a medical malpractice suit against St. John Hospital and Medical Center, Ascension Medical Group Michigan, and Tushar Parikh, M.D., alleging that Parikh erroneously advised Kelly Bowman that a growth in her breast was benign, on the basis of his interpretation of a 2013 mammogram. For the next two years, she felt the lump grow and sought follow-up care. In April 2015, she underwent a biopsy, which revealed “invasive ductal carcinoma with lobular features.” In May 2015, she was diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer and underwent a double mastectomy, which revealed that the cancer had spread to a lymph node. In August 2016, soon after learning that the cancer had spread to her bone marrow, she sought a second opinion from a specialist and learned that the 2013 mammogram might have been misread. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending the Bowmans' complaint was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision. During the pendency of the proceedings, Kelly Bowman died, and her estate was substituted as plaintiff. The question for the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion was on whether Kelly Bowman "should have discovered the existence of [her claim] over six months before initiating proceedings. The Court answered, "no:" the record did not reveal Kelly Bowman should have known before June 2016 that her delayed diagnosis might have been caused by a misreading of the 2013 mammogram. "the available facts didn’t allow her to infer that causal relationship, and the defendants have not shown that Ms. Bowman wasn’t diligent. The present record does not allow us to conclude, as a matter of law, that Ms. Bowman sued over six months after she discovered or should have discovered the existence of her claim. And so we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings." View "Estate of Kelly Bowman v. St. John Hospital & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Carolyn Bowen sued Cottage Grove Nursing Home for wrongful death and medical negligence on behalf of her husband, Guy Bowen. Guy Bowen had been a resident of Cottage Grove since June 2016. In May 2017, Guy was diagnosed with prostate cancer that had metastasized into his organs and bones. In October 2017, Guy fell in the shower at Cottage Grove and sustained multiple fractures. The attending radiologist noted that the fractures were likely pathologic. Guy was transferred to a rehabilitation facility and then to Pleasant Hill Nursing Home. Guy did not return to Cottage Grove. On March 18, 2018, Guy presented to the emergency department at UMMC with various pain. A CT scan showed diffuse metastatic disease through his liver and widespread osseous disease in his bones. Guy died five days later. Carolyn in her suit, Carolyn claimed that Guy’s fall at Cottage Grove, in which he sustained multiple fractures, was the cause of Guy’s death five months later. Cottage Grove filed a summary-judgment motion for Carolyn’s failure to produce medical-expert testimony. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the trial court erred by denying Cottage Grove’s summary-judgment motion. "Cottage Grove met its summary-judgment burden by showing that Carolyn had failed to produce sworn expert testimony establishing a prima facie case of medical negligence." View "Cottage Grove Nursing Home, L.P. v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brenda Bergeron, individually and on behalf of her husband, Donald Bergeron, filed a medical malpractice claim against Donald Richardson, M.D. and Paul Hubbell, III, M.D. A medical review panel unanimously found Defendants breached the standard of care. Two of the three panel members found Defendants caused Mr. Bergeron’s pain, illness, and death. Plaintiff then filed wrongful death and survival actions against Defendants. Nearly six years later, Defendants filed a motion for bond for cost pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4522. Plaintiff opposed the motion on several grounds, namely : (1) the motion was untimely under the plain language of the statute; (2) the costs claimed by Defendants were expenses, not actual taxable costs; and (3) she challenged the constitutionality of the statute. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for bond for cost, finding it untimely. The trial court concluded Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4522 precluded a motion for a cost bond after the defendant’s answer is filed. Because the motion was denied, the trial court found the constitutional claim moot. The Court of Appeal reversed, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concurring with the trial court that defendants' motion for bond for costs was untimely. View "Bergeron v. Richardson et al." on Justia Law

John Dee and Brenda Peterson appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital ("Triad") on the Petersons' claims asserted in their medical-malpractice action. John was admitted to Flowers Hospital ("the hospital") in August 2014 for treatment of abdominal pain and fever that was caused by colitis. John was suffering from chronic lymphocytic leukemia, end-stage renal disease, and diabetes. While he was admitted to the hospital in August 2014, John had a peripherally inserted central catheter ("PICC line") in his left shoulder. According to the Petersons, after John had suffered "constant pain and aggravation" around the area where the PICC line was inserted, a doctor agreed to have the PICC line removed the following morning. The Petersons asserted that, a nurse, Matthew Starr, was busy with other patients to immediately remove the line. The Petersons contended that another doctor was then called, that the doctor advised the nurses treating John to take out the PICC line, and that the nurses refused. The Petersons asserted that Starr "abandoned" John. Thereafter, John experienced a deep vein thrombosis ("DVT") in his upper left arm, which caused swelling and tissue necrosis. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Petersons did not make an argument supported by sufficient authority to demonstrate the trial court erred. "They failed to present expert medical testimony from a similarly situated health-care provider to establish the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard, and proximate causation linking the actions of hospital staff to John's injury." View "Peterson v. Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital" on Justia Law

Yshekia Fletcher appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of the Health Care Authority of the City of Huntsville d/b/a Huntsville Hospital ("the Authority") on Fletcher's claims asserted in her medical-malpractice action. In 2016, Fletcher was admitted to Huntsville Hospital to undergo a laparoscopic tubal-ligation surgery. Before the surgery, Fletcher's doctor, Dr. Leon Lewis, explained to Fletcher that he might have issues performing the surgery because of her obesity. During the procedure, Fletcher was placed in a Trendelenburg position - a position that lowers the head of the patient by manipulating the angle of the operating table. While in Trendelenburg, Fletcher began to slip downward off the operating table. Nursing staff caught Fletcher’s body and gently placed her on the operating room floor, where the surgeon removed the trocars and closed the incisions. After the procedure, Fletcher underwent a CT scan of her head, neck, and hip, which were normal. She was admitted overnight and discharged the following day. Fletcher later complained of hip pain after the incident. She was evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon, who noted that she had a contusion and that she had had right-hip surgery as a child. Fletcher was admitted to the hospital overnight and discharged the following day with a walker. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Authority based on Fletcher's failure to present expert medical testimony. View "Fletcher v. Health Care Authority of the City of Huntsville d/b/a Huntsville Hospital" on Justia Law

Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. ("Jackson Hospital") appealed the denial of its postjudgment motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial following the entry of a judgment on a jury verdict against Jackson Hospital and in favor of plaintiff, Cameron Murphy. In February 2011, Murphy, after experiencing back pain, was referred for treatment to Dr. Margaret Vereb, a board-certified urologist employed by Jackson Hospital. Dr. Vereb determined that Murphy had kidney stones and recommended a ureteroscopy procedure to remove the stones. During that procedure, Dr. Vereb used a glidewire to establish the correct surgical path to Murphy's kidneys through his urinary tract. Dr. Vereb then used a laser to break the kidney stones into smaller fragments for removal. Following an uneventful period of recovery, the surgery was deemed successful, and Murphy was released. During a postoperative evaluation two days later, it was reported that Murphy had been experiencing pain, but he was assured that such symptoms were normal. Murphy was prescribed pain medication and discharged. In June 2011, however, Murphy experienced painful urination and blood in his urine. An X-ray performed at that time revealed that a piece of the glidewire used during the ureteroscopy procedure remained lodged in Murphy's bladder. Upon seeking treatment from another urologist, a 5.6 centimeter glidewire fragment was removed from Murphy's bladder. Murphy subsequently sued both Dr. Vereb and Jackson Hospital alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act ("the AMLA"). The Alabama Supreme Court found Murphy presented no evidence -- in the form of expert testimony or otherwise -- that Jackson Hospital breached the applicable standard of care in any manner, Murphy failed to present evidence substantiating an essential element of his defective-equipment claim against Jackson Hospital, and therefore the jury's verdict on that claim was unsupported. Therefore, Jackson Hospital was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law in its favor. The judgment entered on the jury's verdict against Jackson Hospital was reversed. View "Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. v. Murphy" on Justia Law