Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In February 2013, the decedent was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive and later died in the hospital. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff for elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud, alleging that their failure to provide necessary care led to his death. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any claims. The award allowed for further submissions to address any omitted issues. The Estate requested an amendment, arguing the arbitrator had omitted damages for pre-death loss of dignity. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering. Respondents moved to vacate this award, arguing the First Interim Award was final. The arbitrator denied the motion, stating the First Interim Award was not final and had omitted a necessary issue.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, finding the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s order, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court directed the trial court to confirm the Final Award issued on September 30, 2022, which included the damages for pre-death pain and suffering. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Daniel McCurry and Carie Powell sued Dr. Inder Singh for malpractice, alleging he violated a duty of care by refusing to treat their mother, Carol McCurry, who died while awaiting transfer to another hospital. Carol was brought to Methodist Hospital with shortness of breath and was diagnosed with an aortic dissection and a possible heart attack. Dr. Michael Brandon, the treating emergency physician, consulted Dr. Singh, an on-call interventional cardiologist at Mercy General Hospital. Dr. Singh initially agreed that Carol needed acute catheterization but later decided she was not a candidate for the procedure. Consequently, Dr. Singh did not accept her transfer, and Carol died before she could be transferred to another facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh, ruling that he did not owe a duty of care to Carol because no physician-patient relationship existed between them. The court found that Dr. Singh did not affirmatively treat or directly advise Carol, and thus, no legal duty was established.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a physician's duty of care arises only when a physician-patient relationship is established, which did not occur in this case. Dr. Singh's consultation with Dr. Brandon and his decision not to treat Carol did not create such a relationship. The court also declined to apply the reasoning from an Arizona case cited by the plaintiffs, emphasizing that under California law, the duty of care is contingent upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh was affirmed. View "McCurry v. Singh" on Justia Law

In 2020, several residents at a skilled nursing facility died from coronavirus infections. Family members of the deceased sued the facility and its alleged alter egos, asserting claims including elder abuse, negligence, and wrongful death. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by family members rather than the decedents. The trial court denied the motion, finding no evidence that the family members had authority to sign on behalf of the decedents, and that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For one agreement where a family member had power of attorney, the court exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid conflicting results.The Shasta County Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. It found that the defendants did not provide evidence that the family members had authority to sign the arbitration agreements on behalf of the decedents. Additionally, the court ruled that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For the agreement involving a power of attorney, the court denied arbitration to prevent conflicting rulings between court and arbitration proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to establish that the family members were authorized agents of the decedents. The court also found that the family members did not sign the agreements in their individual capacities, and thus were not bound by them. Furthermore, the court upheld the trial court's discretion to deny arbitration for the claim involving a power of attorney to avoid conflicting rulings. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Center" on Justia Law

Arasely Soto, a public school teacher, was injured during a routine medical procedure and had to retire. She sued her medical providers for malpractice and also sought disability retirement benefits from the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS). She and her husband, Raul Soto, settled with several of the medical malpractice defendants. CalSTRS brought an action against the Sotos, seeking to enforce its right to subrogation or reimbursement from the Sotos' settlement with the malpractice defendants.The trial court granted CalSTRS’s motion for summary adjudication on its declaratory relief cause of action and denied the Sotos’ motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that CalSTRS was entitled to seek reimbursement from the Sotos and rejected the Sotos’ defense that Civil Code section 3333.1 bars any subrogation claim that CalSTRS would have asserted against the malpractice defendants. The Sotos filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two to vacate the trial court’s orders.The appellate court agreed with CalSTRS’s argument that it has a statutory reimbursement claim against the Sotos, and the evidence in this case does not support application of section 3333.1 to bar CalSTRS’s claim. The court denied the Sotos' petition for writ of mandate. View "Soto v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case involves a wrongful death claim against San Antonio Regional Hospital, brought by Joseph Musharbash, following the death of his adult son, Michael, who was treated for a traumatic brain injury at the hospital. Musharbash alleges that the hospital provided inadequate care by failing to properly evaluate Michael's injuries and undertake appropriate courses of action. Specifically, he claims that surgical intervention was performed too late and that the nursing staff failed to adequately monitor Michael, inform his doctors of his status, and advocate for the need for earlier surgical intervention.The hospital moved for summary judgment, arguing that Musharbash's only expert, Rhona Wang, a certified registered nurse anesthetist, lacked the requisite skill or experience to opine on the standard of care or causation elements of the claim. The trial court denied the hospital's motion for summary judgment, finding that Wang's declaration demonstrated triable issues about the standard of care and causation elements of Musharbash's claim. The hospital then petitioned for writ relief.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, granted the petition. The court found that Wang's qualifications did not establish that she had the specialized knowledge required to opine on the standard of care applicable to an intensive care unit neurosurgeon deciding whether a severe traumatic brain injury requires immediate surgical intervention, or whether that standard of care was breached. The court also found that Wang's declaration did not establish she was competent to opine on causation. As Wang was Musharbash's only proffered expert, her lack of competence to opine on the applicable standard of care and causation was fatal to his claim. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital's motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting the motion for summary judgment. View "San Antonio Regional Hospital v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A patient filed a complaint concerning Dr. Dore, a Board-certified psychiatrist. The Board discovered suspected irregularities in Dore's prescription of controlled substances. Dore declined to answer questions. The Board served her with an investigative subpoena seeking medical records supporting the prescription of the controlled substances to a family member and with investigative interrogatories requesting information about the family member's treatment and employment with Dore. Dore refused to produce the records and objected to the interrogatories. Her family member objected to the subpoena.The Board sought an order compelling compliance and provided reports from the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES) database. A Board-certified psychiatrist opined it was necessary to obtain the family member’s medical records to evaluate whether Dore complied with the standard of care, noting an AMA ethics opinion counseling physicians against treating family members except in emergencies. Dore's expert, a psychiatrist and licensed California attorney, disagreed with the assertion that prescribing controlled substances to family members presumptively violates the standard of care. The family member explained his reason for seeking treatment from Dore, identifying the medications she prescribed, and describing the treatment she provided.The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, which ordered compliance, impliedly concluding the Board established good cause to justify the production of the family member’s private medical information. The Board had a compelling interest in investigating Dore’s allegedly improper conduct. View "Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal of his medical negligence claim against Defendant County of Santa Clara, after the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because the applicable statute of limitations is three years when both MICRA and section 945.6 apply, not one year. Except in circumstances inapplicable here, “any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented” must be brought within six months after the County’s rejection of the claim. The court held that, here, where both section 945.6 and MICRA apply, Plaintiff was obligated to meet the deadlines set forth in both statutes.   Further, the court held the allegations of the fac do not support a delayed discovery exception to the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff failed in the FAC to plead specific facts to show he could not have earlier made this discovery, even with reasonable diligence. Accordingly, because Plaintiff filed his suit more than a year after his amputation, the trial court did not err in sustaining the County’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds. View "Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a stroke on August 18, 2009. He was hospitalized at St. John’s Regional Medical Center for two weeks, followed by a month in St. John’s inpatient rehabilitation facility. He entered Oxnard Manor, a skilled nursing facility, on October 3. Four days later, on October 7, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement. It stated that he gave up his right to a jury or court trial, and required arbitration of claims arising from services provided by Oxnard Manor, including claims of medical malpractice, elder abuse, and other torts. Plaintiff remained a resident at Oxnard Manor until his death nine years later, individually and as Plaintiff’s successors in interest, sued Oxnard Manor for elder abuse/neglect, wrongful death, statutory violations/breach of resident rights, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Oxnard Manor filed a petition to compel arbitration. Both sides relied on medical records to demonstrate whether Plaintiff had the mental capacity to consent to the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that evidence here that Plaintiff scored below the level necessary to “solve complex problems such as managing a checking account” supports the conclusion that he was unable to manage his financial affairs. But regardless of whether the presumption of Civil Code section 39, subdivision (b) applied, substantial evidence established that Plaintiff lacked the capacity to enter an arbitration agreement. View "Algo-Heyres v. Oxnard Manor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two California statutes— Civil Code section 3333.2, which caps the number of damages a plaintiff may recoup for noneconomic losses at $250,000 (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2, subd. (b)); and Business and Professions Code section 6146, which sets limits on the amount of contingency fees a law firm may charge in representing a plaintiff in a professional negligence action against a health care provider. (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2 and Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 6146 are sometimes referred to collectively as the challenged statutes.)   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge civil code section 3333.2 and Business and Professions Code Section 6146. Further, the court held that the heirs do not have standing because the heir’s alleged injuries are insufficient to confer upon them standing to challenge the statutes in question. Moreover, the court could not conclude Plaintiffs will suffer hardship if declaratory relief is withheld. View "Dominguez v. Bonta" on Justia Law

In November 2015, while hospitalized at Fremont, an acute psychiatric facility, McGovern was assaulted by another patient. In March 2016, McGovern’s attorney sent Fremont a letter, requesting that Fremont preserve evidence, and stating that counsel would be gathering more information and would present Fremont’s insurance carrier with a pre-litigation demand. It requested that Fremont place its carrier on notice. On October 27, 2016, McGovern’s counsel sent Fremont a Notice of Intent to Commence Action For Medical Negligence Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 364, which requires that a plaintiff give a healthcare provider 90 days’ notice before commencing an action for professional negligence. Subsection (d) tolls the limitations period for 90 days if the notice is served on the defendant within the last 90 days of the applicable statute of limitations. which expired on November 7, 2016, in McGovern's case.McGovern filed suit on January 20, 2017. The trial court granted Fremont summary adjudication, finding that the March letter constituted a section 364 notice. so the complaint was not timely filed, and McGovern failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code 15610.57. The court of appeal reversed. The March letter lacked the requisite elements for section 364 compliance and was not a notice of intent. McGovern’s professional negligence causes of action are not time-barred, The court also reversed an order quashing a subpoena for the assailant’s mental health records. View "McGovern v. BHC Fremont Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law