Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disability. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages significantly. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that the absence of a timely CT scan made it impossible to prove the extent of damages caused by Dr. Fowler's negligence.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not seriously impaired by the ruling. Montoya then filed a writ petition challenging this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence showing Dr. Fowler's negligence in failing to order a CT scan, a reasonable possibility that a timely CT scan followed by a thrombectomy would have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden of proof to Dr. Fowler to show that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from their own negligence when it results in the absence of critical evidence.The Court of Appeal granted Montoya's petition, directing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction. However, the appellate court did not mandate a specific instruction, leaving it to the trial court to determine the appropriate instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. View "Montoya v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Kimberly Montoya filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Aaron Fowler, alleging that he failed to call a "code stroke" when she exhibited signs of a stroke while under his care. As a result, a CT scan was delayed, leading to severe disabilities. Montoya argued that immediate action would have mitigated her damages. She requested a burden-shifting jury instruction, asserting that it was impossible to prove the extent of her damages due to the absence of a timely CT scan.The Superior Court of Orange County denied Montoya's request for the burden-shifting instruction, reasoning that such an instruction was not appropriate in cases involving omissions and that Montoya's ability to establish damages was not significantly impaired. Montoya then filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge this decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that if Montoya could present evidence that Dr. Fowler was negligent in failing to order a CT scan, that a CT scan followed by a thrombectomy could have mitigated her damages, and that the CT scan was critical to establishing causation, then public policy requires shifting the burden to Dr. Fowler to prove that his negligence did not cause her damages. The court issued a writ of mandate instructing the lower court to vacate its ruling denying the requested jury instruction, allowing the trial court to reconsider the instruction based on the evidence presented at trial. Montoya was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Montoya v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting claims for negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, alleged that Dr. Panguluri’s mishandling of a syringe containing an HIV patient’s blood caused the blood to splash into his face and eye. The complaint did not claim that Glenn contracted HIV but stated that both plaintiffs suffered harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the plaintiffs' claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The plaintiffs did not amend their complaint but instead filed a voluntary dismissal of their entire action with prejudice, intending to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s adverse rulings.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ appeal. The court held that a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs' request, without a final judicial determination of their claims, is not an appealable order. The court emphasized that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sabrina Zaragoza was admitted to Mercy Medical Center Merced with abdominal pain and later diagnosed with a bile leak. Dr. Nadir Adam performed a gallbladder removal surgery (cholecystectomy) on her. Following complications, including a bile leak and multiple subsequent surgeries, Zaragoza filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Adam and others, alleging negligence in her treatment.The San Francisco County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Adam. The court relied on the declaration of Dr. Eric Morse, a medical expert who reviewed Zaragoza's medical records and concluded that Dr. Adam performed the surgery within the standard of care and that the bile leak was a recognized risk of the procedure, not due to negligence. Dr. Morse also attributed Zaragoza's complications to a bowel perforation caused by a subsequent procedure performed by another doctor, Dr. Uppal. Zaragoza did not submit an opposing expert declaration.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reversed the summary judgment. The appellate court found that Dr. Morse's declaration was conclusory and lacked a reasoned explanation for his opinions. Specifically, Dr. Morse did not adequately explain how he ruled out negligence by Dr. Adam or how he determined that the bile leak was not due to surgical error. The court emphasized that expert declarations must provide detailed factual bases and reasoned explanations to support their conclusions. The appellate court concluded that Dr. Adam failed to meet his initial burden of showing the absence of a triable issue of material fact and directed the trial court to deny the motion for summary judgment. View "Zaragoza v. Adam" on Justia Law

Glenn and Geneanne Maniago filed a lawsuit against Desert Cardiology Consultants’ Medical Group, Inc. (DCCMG) and Dr. Praveen Panguluri, asserting five causes of action: negligence, loss of consortium, assault, battery, and unfair business practices. Glenn, a scrub technologist, was exposed to HIV patient’s blood during a procedure due to Dr. Panguluri’s actions. The complaint did not allege that Glenn contracted HIV but claimed harm from the exposure.The Superior Court of Riverside County sustained demurrers to most of the claims with leave to amend, overruled the demurrer to Glenn’s negligence claim, and struck the punitive damages allegations. The Maniagos did not request oral argument and did not appear for the hearing. Subsequently, they voluntarily dismissed their entire action with prejudice to expedite an appeal of the adverse rulings.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal from a voluntary dismissal entered by the clerk at the plaintiffs’ request without a final judicial determination of their claims. The court emphasized that a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is a ministerial act and not appealable. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the appropriate vehicle for challenging interlocutory rulings is a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal from a voluntary dismissal. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent negligence by other doctors led to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and a survival claim.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center's motion to strike portions of Ng's complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims are separate and distinct, even when based on the same incident of medical malpractice. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The court granted Ng's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its previous order and issue a new order denying the Medical Center's motion to strike. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center, Inc. and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent doctors failed to confirm the correct placement, leading to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and medical malpractice claims.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center’s motion to strike portions of Ng’s complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims, even when based on the same medical malpractice, are separate and distinct. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The appellate court granted the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to strike and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A three-year-old child, Charlie L., was brought to the emergency department at PIH Health Hospital-Whittier with abdominal pain. The emergency department physician ordered "stat" X-ray and ultrasound images, which were remotely reviewed by Dr. Peyman Kangavari, an on-call radiologist. Dr. Kangavari reported that the images showed no bowel obstruction. The child was discharged but returned to the hospital shortly after with severe symptoms, leading to multiple surgeries and long-term health issues.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlie L., through his mother, filed a negligence action against Dr. Kangavari, alleging medical malpractice for failing to diagnose the bowel obstruction. Dr. Kangavari moved for summary judgment, supported by an expert declaration from Dr. John Lieu, asserting adherence to the standard of care. Charlie L. opposed the motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Ravi Srinivasa. The trial court ruled that Health and Safety Code section 1799.110 applied, requiring stricter qualifications for expert witnesses in emergency medical cases. The court found Dr. Lieu qualified but Dr. Srinivasa not, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1799.110’s stricter qualifications for expert witnesses apply to on-call radiologists providing emergency medical services. The court found that neither Dr. Lieu nor Dr. Srinivasa met the qualifications required under section 1799.110. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Charlie L. v. Kangavari" on Justia Law

Marites Murphy was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma in February 2020. Fire Department paramedics Jude Prokop and Shay Burke responded to the scene. Murphy repeatedly told the paramedics she was not injured and did not want medical assistance, even after being warned she might have a serious injury. The paramedics assessed her capacity to refuse treatment and left the scene. Hours later, Murphy suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She sued the City of Petaluma and the paramedics for medical negligence, alleging they failed to properly assess her condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance Murphy claimed was owed. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which Murphy refused.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the paramedics did not owe Murphy a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine because she repeatedly refused such assistance. The court distinguished this case from others where first responders had undertaken to provide medical care. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to Murphy and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Therefore, the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide the level of medical care Murphy alleged was required. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law