This was the third of appeal of this medical malpractice action. The third appeal concerned Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant-doctor was negligent for failing to refer Plaintiff to a doctor who specialized in repairing vesicovaginal fistulas. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion in limine precluding Plaintiff from proffering statements from Defendant’s deposition regarding her treatment of three former patients who suffered vesicovaginal fistulas. The court further reaffirmed its earlier finding that Plaintiff’s proffered evidence regarding Defendant’s treatment of the three patients was not relevant. Moreover, the circuit court reaffirmed most of the redactions previously made to Defendant’s deposition. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) when it denied admission of evidence regarding Defendant’s treatment of other patients; and (2) did not err by denying admission of expert testimony that Defendant breached the standard of care by failing to inform Plaintiff that repairing vesicovaginal fistulas was not her specialty. View "St. John v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice action against her physician and the clinic that provided her prenatal medical care alleging negligence in her care and treatment during pregnancy, resulting in the fetal demise of her unborn child. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ physician but affirmed summary judgment for the clinic, holding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the physician’s negligence raised by Plaintiff’s designated expert medical testimony; and (2) the trial court properly entered summary judgment for the clinic with respect to the theory that the clinic was vicariously liable as principal for the acts and omissions of its physicians. View "Stafford v. Szymanowski" on Justia Law

The parents of a minor son filed a medical malpractice suit on their own behalf and on behalf of their son (Plaintiffs) against the Physician who delivered their son and the Hospital where the delivery took place. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants acted negligently in connection with their son’s birth, resulting in their son suffering from trauma, shoulder dystocia, and Erb’s Palsy. The jury concluded that both the Hospital and Physician were negligent but that only the Physician’s negligence proximately caused the child’s impairments. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not err by not allowing Plaintiffs’ attorney to ask a Hospital nurse leading questions; (2) the judge did not commit plain error by not including one of Plaintiffs’ proposed jury instructions; and (3) the jury did not render an inconsistent verdict. View "Rosa-Rivera v. Dorado Health, Inc." on Justia Law

Approximately 10 years after Marc Silverman, D.D.S. performed a root canal on one of Newberry’s teeth, Newberry returned to Silverman because the tooth was hurting. Silverman examined the tooth, offered a tentative diagnosis unrelated to the root canal, and sent Newberry on his way. Several years later, Newberry and Silverman repeated this exercise, with the same outcome. Finally, in 2012, Newberry sought a second opinion and found out that his original root canal had not been properly completed. When Newberry requested his records, Silverman claimed that the old records were no longer available. Newberry sued. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings with respect to Newberry’s fraud claim, but affirmed on all other grounds. Newberry’s claims of dental malpractice, negligence, and infliction of emotional distress were time-barred. The spoiliation claim failed because Newberry’s complaint against Silverman was not disrupted by the allegedly destroyed dental records. View "Newberry v. Silverman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice after Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the certificate of good faith was noncompliant with the requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-122(d)(4) that a certificate of good faith filed in a medical malpractice action disclose the number of prior violations of the statute by the executing party. Defendants appealed, arguing that the action should have been dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff did not disclose that there were no prior violations by Plaintiff’s counsel. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 29-26-122(d)(4)’s requirement does not also require disclosure of the absence of any prior violations of the statute. View "Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ibach" on Justia Law

Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC; D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Aurora Cares, LLC (alleged to be doing business as "Tara Cares"); and Aurora Healthcare, LLC (collectively, "the defendants"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its February 6, 2015, order denying their "Motion to Quash Depositions and Motion for Protective Order, and Motion to Reconsider January 30, 2015[,] Order." The defendants also requested that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to grant their motion. In May 2006, Myrtis Hill was a patient at Fairfield. While under Fairfield's care, Hill suffered a broken leg when a Fairfield employee, while attempting to transfer Hill to a bedside commode, allegedly dropped her to the floor thereby breaking Hill's right leg and causing severe injury to both of her legs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the defendants demonstrated they had a clear legal right to the relief they requested, and that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a protective order. Hill's "Motion for Award of Damages based on [the defendants'] pattern and practice of filing frivolous appeals" was denied. View "Ex parte Fairfield Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Joan Johnson, as personal representative of the Estate of Herman B. Johnson, and Marguerite Johnson, Herman Johnson's widow, appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their action against Mid Dakota Clinic. On the morning of December 18, 2012, Herman Johnson experienced confusion and swelling of his legs and calves. That morning, Joan Johnson, Herman Johnson's daughter and attorney-in-fact, called the Veteran's Administration Clinic to schedule an appointment for Herman, but the VA Clinic did not return her call. As a result, Joan Johnson called Mid Dakota to schedule an appointment. Although she had requested a specific doctor, she was advised she would not be able to see him that day and was given an appointment with Donald Grenz, M.D. later that afternoon. Upon arriving at Mid Dakota Clinic at Gateway Mall, Joan and Herman Johnson checked in with the receptionist approximately seven minutes late for the appointment. Because they were more than five minutes late, they were told Dr. Grenz would not see them but they could reschedule with Dr. Grenz for another day or go to the emergency room or the "Today Clinic," a walk-in clinic within Mid Dakota's main clinic downtown. Joan and Herman Johnson subsequently left the clinic to seek alternative care. Upon entering the east vestibule of the Gateway Mall, Joan Johnson decided to seek the assistance of the VA Clinic, which was located in the mall immediately adjacent to Mid Dakota. As Joan and Herman Johnson turned to re-enter the mall, Herman Johnson fell and hit his head on the floor of the vestibule. As a result, he suffered a laceration along his forehead. Joan Johnson then returned to Mid Dakota and announced that Herman Johnson had fallen and was injured. A registered nurse employed by Mid Dakota assisted Herman Johnson until he was taken by ambulance to St. Alexius Medical Center and was admitted for observation. While Herman Johnson was hospitalized, he suffered two episodes of respiratory arrest, and he died on December 27, 2012. The Johnsons sued Mid Dakota for negligence, breach of contract and professional negligence. Because the Johnsons failed to present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint against Respondent-doctor alleging that Respondent was negligent in failing to diagnose and treat her post-surgical infection. Because Plaintiff failed to file the required expert report to prosecute her first claim against Respondent, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed a three-count complaint that was similar to her first complaint and that included a new claim of negligence related to her initial surgery. The circuit court dismissed the complaint because the claim was filed after the expiration of the relevant period of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not rely on the saving provision of Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-119(b) to refile her untimely claim because she voluntarily dismissed her previous claim. View "Wilcox v. Orellano" on Justia Law

Askew, a military veteran and a former U.S. Postal Service employee, underwent a cardiac stent placement at the St. Louis Veterans Administration Medical Center. He was readmitted with an infection and the medical center responded negligently. As a result of the infection and attendant loss of blood, Askew suffered severe anoxic brain injury and amputation of his right leg. In Askew’s suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, the government did not dispute liability. The government requested that the court structure an award for future medical damages as a trust to provide periodic payments to Askew, with a reversionary interest in favor of the government upon Askew’s death. The district court declined to order a reversionary trust, awarded $253,667 in past economic damages, $525,000 in past non-economic damages, $4,000,000 in future economic damages, and $2,000,000 in future non-economic damages to Dirk Askew. The court awarded $1,525,000 to Askew’s wife for loss of consortium. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, describing the reversionary trust remedy as the most reasonable analogy to the relief available against a private individual in like circumstances under Missouri law. View "Askew v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, joined by her husband, filed a lawsuit alleging that she suffered permanent injuries due to Defendant’s surgical malpractice. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded, along with economic damages, noneconomic damages for pain and suffering amounting to $1.45 million. Defendant moved to reduce the award of noneconomic damages to $500,000 pursuant to Fla. Stat. 766.118(2), which became effective after Plaintiff underwent the disputed surgical procedure. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was not retroactive. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was constitutionally permissible to retroactively apply section 766.118 because Plaintiff had no vested right to a particular damage award and thus suffered no due process violation. On remand, the trial court entered a judgment for Plaintiff based on the $500,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The Third District affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision in Miles II, disapproved Miles I, and remanded with instructions that the original final judgment be reinstated, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to hear this appeal; and (2) generally, a litigant’s substantive and vested rights may not be infringed upon by the retroactive application of a substantive statute. View "Miles v. Weingrad" on Justia Law