In 2002, Barry Jameson filed a complaint against Dr. Taddesse Desta asserting numerous claims stemming from Desta's allegedly negligent medical treatment of Jameson's hepatitis while Jameson was serving time at the Donovan Correctional Facility. In three separate prior appeals, the Court of Appeal reversed judgments in favor of Desta, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On remand from Jameson III, Jameson filed a motion for summary judgment and/or adjudication. The trial court denied the motion in its entirety and set the matter for trial. After the parties provided opening statements at an unreported jury trial, Desta orally moved for nonsuit. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Desta. On appeal, Jameson argued the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for summary judgment; (2) in granting Desta's motion for nonsuit; (3) in failing to have the trial proceedings recorded by a court reporter; (4) by displaying bias and prejudice throughout the proceedings; and (5) that the court's rulings denied him a fair trial. Jameson argued that the sum of all these alleged errors denied him due process. After review, the Court of found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Jameson v. Desta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dow Tillson underwent an elective procedure to remove a cataract in his left eye. Defendant Dr. Richard Lane, M.D., performed the procedure at Springfield Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that within twenty-four hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson’s left eye showed signs of infection. Dr. Lane made a presumptive diagnosis of endopthalmitis, but did not refer Mr. Tillson to a retinologist for treatment. Within forty-eight hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson was permanently blind in his left eye. Plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, and defendants the doctor and hospital, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the superior court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tillson v. Lane" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a jury verdict rendered in favor of Rutland Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Rutland Regional Medical Center, and related entities (“RRMC”) and Dr. Santiago Cancio-Bello arising from injuries due to claimed medical malpractice in connection with the birth of Amy and Robert Labates’ daughter in 2007. Following the return of the jury verdict in favor of RRMC and Cancio-Bello, the Labates moved for a new trial on several different grounds, many of which concerned alleged juror misconduct, including a claim that a juror read an e-mail sent by RRMC to its employees during the trial and therefore tainted the verdict. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing and this appeal followed. The only issue before the Supreme Court centered on that e-mail. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Labate v. Rutland Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Marcia Marie sued her rheumatologist for malpractice. In a “battle of the experts” case, the trial court first denied a motion in limine by Marcia and her husband Donald Marie to exclude entries made by Dr. Dennis Boulware, a consulting physician, in his medical records and then denied the Maries’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) after a judgment was entered in favor of the rheumatologist, Dr. Heather North and Gulfshore Medical Consultants. Finding that the trial court did not err, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marie v. North" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice action against Dennis Rodin and Waterbury Orthopaedic Associates, P.C., alleging that Rodin negligently failed to timely diagnose Plaintiff’s compartment syndrome, resulting in severe injuries to Plaintiff’s lower left leg. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in restricting Plaintiff’s use of an article from a medical journal to impeach certain witnesses; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Plaintiff from questioning Defendants’ expert witness about his previous experience as an expert on behalf of Rodin; and (3) although the trial court should have allowed Plaintiff to make an offer of proof and mark a document for identification in connection with the proffered questioning of Defendants’ expert witness, the improprieties were not harmful to Plaintiff. View "Filippelli v. Saint Mary's Hosp." on Justia Law

A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant’s motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations was not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal. View "Thornhill v. Ingram" on Justia Law

After the death of Charles Cornell, Sherry Cornell filed a complaint against numerous defendants, including petitioner Stephen Tam, M.D., alleging medical malpractice. Dr. Tam filed an omnibus motion in limine requesting in part that Plaintiff’s noneconomic damages be capped pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.035, which limits the recovery of a plaintiff’s noneconomic damages in a healthcare provider’s professional negligence action to $350,000. The district court denied the motion, concluding (1) section 41A.035 is unconstitutional, as it violates a plaintiff’s constitutional right to trial by jury; (2) the statutory cap does not apply to the case as a whole, but a separate cap applies to each plaintiff for each of the defendants; and (3) the statutory cap does not apply to medical malpractice claims. Dr. Tam subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the district court to vacate its order denying his motion in limine. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the district court erred in (1) finding the statute unconstitutional; (2) finding the statutory cap applies per plaintiff and per defendant; and (3) finding the statute only applies to professional negligence and not to medical malpractice. View "Tam v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Darla Keck filed a medical malpractice case against doctors Chad Collins, DMD, and Patrick Collins, DDS after she experienced complications following sleep apnea surgery. The Doctors moved for summary judgment, arguing she lacked a qualified medical expert who could provide testimony to establish her claim. In response to the motion, her counsel filed two timely affidavits and one untimely affidavit from her medical expert. The trial court granted a motion to strike the untimely affidavit. Considering the remaining affidavits, the court ruled that the expert did not connect his opinions to specific facts to support the contention that the Doctors' treatment fell below the standard of care. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the Doctors. The Court of Appeals reversed. Although it agreed that the two timely affidavits lacked sufficient factual support to defeat summary judgment, it held that the trial court should have denied the motion to strike and should have considered the third affidavit. This affidavit, the court held, contained sufficient factual support to defeat summary judgment. This case raised two issues for the Supreme Court's review on appeal of the Court of Appeals' reversal: (1) whether the trial court used the appropriate standard of review for the challenged ruling to strike untimely filed evidence submitted in response to the summary judgment motion; and (2) whether the expert's timely second affidavit showed a genuine issue for trial that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff to defeat summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to consider the factors from the governing caselaw, "Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance," ( 933 P.2d 1036 (1997)), on the record before striking the evidence. The Court also held that the second, timely-filed affidavid showed a genuine issue for trial that ciould have defeated summary judgment. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal. View "Keck v. Collins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants-medical providers. Before filing suit, Plaintiff consulted with a medical expert from whom he obtained a supporting declaration required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Plaintiff, however, did not attach the declaration to the complaint but instead filed the complaint by itself and filed the separately captioned declaration the following morning. Plaintiff’s complaint incorporated the medical expert’s declaration by reference and both were served together on Defendants before the statute of limitations ran. The district court dismissed the malpractice action on the grounds that Plaintiff’s action was defective because it was filed without the expert affidavit supporting its allegations required by section 41A.071. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 41A.071 did not require dismissal under the circumstances of this case. View "Baxter v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against William Shaffer, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, alleging that Dr. Shaffer failed to obtain her informed consent before operating on her. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Dr. Shaffer, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judgment should be set aside because the trial court’s jury instructions misstated the law regarding informed consent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction given in this case was erroneous because it failed to incorporate the law applicable to a medical provider’s duty to obtain informed consent. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Sargent v. Shaffer" on Justia Law