Nicole Scarcelli filed the underlying medical malpractice action against Dr. Rajai Khoury and Khoury Surgical Group, Inc. (collectively, Dr. Khoury) in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, West Virginia. Dr. Khoury filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing that the parties would be better served if the action were filed in the State of Ohio, where the cause of action arose and where Scarcelli resides. Scarcelli responded that her choice of forum was entitled to great deference because Dr. Khoury resides in Ohio County and because Ohio County is the principal place of business of Khoury Surgical Group. The circuit court denied Dr. Khoury’s motion to dismiss after considering the factors enumerated in West Virginia’s forum non conveniens statute. Dr. Khoury subsequently filed this proceeding in prohibition challenging the circuit court’s order denying his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the circuit court did not exceed its authority in allowing Scarcelli’s action to go forward in Ohio County, West Virginia. View "State ex rel. Khoury v. Hon. Cuomo" on Justia Law

Stephanie Mills had a thyroidectomy, performed by Dr. Ghaphery at Wheeling Hospital. Mills’s nerves surrounding her thyroid gland were severed during the thyroidectomy, resulting in bilateral vocal cord paralysis. Mills filed suit against Dr. Ghaphery, A.D. Ghaphery Professional Association, and Wheeling Hospital, Inc. (collectively, Wheeling Hospital), alleging medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and negligent credentialing. Mills sought discovery of certain documents from Wheeling Hospital. When the Hospital failed to respond to the discovery requests, Mills filed a motion to compel. The circuit court ordered the majority of the disputed documents to be disclosed. Wheeling Hospital sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the circuit court’s order, asserting that the disputed documents were protected by the statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted as moulded the requested writ, holding (1) certain of the challenged documents, including those comprising Dr. Ghaphery’s request to renew his staff privilege, are specifically protected by the peer review privilege; and (2) the circuit court did not conduct a thorough in camera review of the remaining challenged documents, and Wheeling Hospital did not provide a sufficiently detailed privilege log to permit the circuit court to determine whether such documents are protected by the peer review privilege. View "State ex rel. Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Hon. Wilson" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the issue on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was whether the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding plaintiff’s expert medical testimony under MRE 702. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants after excluding the opinion testimony of plaintiff’s expert, concluding that it was inadmissible because it was not reliable and did not meet the requirements of MCL 600.2955. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, reversed the circuit court and remanded, concluding that the circuit court incorrectly applied MRE 702 and abused its discretion by excluding the expert's testimony. The expert admitted that his opinion was based on his own personal beliefs. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence that the expert's opinion was generally accepted within the relevant expert community, there was no peer-reviewed medical literature supporting his opinion, plaintiff failed to provide any other support for the expert's opinion, and defendant submitted contradictory, peer-reviewed medical literature. As such, the Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert's testimony. The Court of Appeals clearly erred by concluding otherwise. View "Ehler v. Mirsa" on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old Haley Gores was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Steven Smith when Smith lost control of the vehicle. Haley was treated by Dr. Lisa Miller for injuries she received during the accident. Dawn Gores, Haley’s mother and conservator, signed a general release in exchange for a settlement with Smith and Smith’s insurer. The release did not specifically name the treating physician or clinic, but it released al other claims that might develop from the accident. Haley and Dawn subsequently filed a malpractice suit against Dr. Miller and Yankton Surgical Associates (YSA), Dr. Miller’s practice group. Dr. Miller and YSA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the release discharged Plaintiffs’ claims against them. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that, based on the language of the release, the malpractice claims were discharged as a matter of contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the release barred Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of contract. View "Gores v. Miller" on Justia Law

While Latoya was pregnant with Arianna, she received prenatal care during 12 visits at the Will County Community Health Center, which received grant funding from the U.S. Public Health Service, 42 U.S.C. 254b. On September 2, 2008, Latoya entered Silver Cross Hospital emergency room, suffering from abdominal pain. In the labor and delivery unit, Dr. Marsheh decided to induce labor. Although Dr. Marsheh was also affiliated with the Health Center, he did not treat Latoya during her prenatal care appointments. During the delivery, Arianna became stuck in the birth canal. Arianna was born on September 4 and weighed 11.7 pounds. Arianna taken to the Intensive Care Unit; her right arm was put in a splint, having sustained an injury during birth. Before leaving the hospital, Arianna was diagnosed with Erb’s Palsy, involving the weakness of the arm as a result of an injury to the brachial plexus, the nerves surrounding the shoulder. On May 4, 2011, Latoya, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Finding the claims not timely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting all of Latoya’s claims of equitable tolling. View "Blanche v. United States" on Justia Law

This case concerned the application of the relation-back doctrine to wrongful-death claims. The trial court allowed James O. Kidd, Sr., the personal representative of the estate of Madeline Kidd, to use relation back to sustain his claims against various health-care providers. Some of those providers, defendants Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, Dr. Roger Alvarado, Dr. Barbara Mitchell, and IMC-Diagnostic and Medical Clinic, P.C., sought review of the trial court's order by filing separate petitions for permissive appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in permitting the relation-back doctrine, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mobile Infirmary Association v. Estate of Madeline Kidd" on Justia Law

Appellant Alesa Easterling brought this medical malpractice suit against Respondent Eric Kendall, M.D., alleging that Kendall was negligent in failing to diagnose her with a carotid artery dissection, and that such misdiagnosis delayed her treatment and resulted in her suffering permanent neurological damage. At trial, the district court granted Kendall’s motion for a directed verdict. The district court concluded that Easterling failed to prove a medical malpractice claim because she failed to present expert testimony to show that Kendall’s misdiagnosis was the proximate cause of her injuries. Easterling appealed, contending that expert testimony was not required under Idaho law to prove proximate cause in a medical malpractice action. Additionally, Easterling appealed the district court’s orders excluding opinion testimony from Easterling’s retained expert and treating physicians on the issue of causation and denying her motion to present rebuttal opinion testimony on causation in her case in chief. Kendall requested attorney fees on appeal. As to Easterling's claims of error on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. The Court found Kendall was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Easterling v. Kendall, M.D." on Justia Law

The Klaines filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dressen and against Southern Illinois Hospital Services (SIHS), for the negligent credentialing of Dressen. During discovery SIHS provided 1,700 pages of documents. SIHS refused to provide other documents, which it listed in a privilege log, citing the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8-2101) and the Health Care Professional Credentials Data Collection Act (410 ILCS 517/1). The circuit court agreed with SIHS, with the exception of documents contained in Group B, Group F, and Group J. SIHS complied with respect to Group B, but continued to maintain that the documents in Groups F and J were privileged. Group F consists of Dressen’s three applications to SIHS for staff privileges. Group J contains “procedure summaries and case histories” that list surgical procedures that Dressen performed at SIHS. The circuit court held SIHS in contempt and imposed a $1 monetary sanction. On interlocutory appeal, the court affirmed, with modifications: all references to an external peer review report contained in Dressen’s application for staff privileges were to be redacted, and any patient identifying information was to be redacted to the extent required by 45 C.F.R. 164.512(e). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, finding no basis for holding that a physician-patient privilege applies to raw data regarding treatment and procedures performed. View "Klaine v. S. Ill. Hosp. Servs." on Justia Law

Real parties in interest filed a professional negligence action against several healthcare providers. All defendants settled except for Petitioners. During pretrial proceedings, real parties in interest filed a motion in limine to bar Petitioners from arguing the comparative fault of the settled defendants at trial and including those defendants’ names on jury verdict forms. The district court granted the motion. Petitioners subsequently asked the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to allow Petitioners to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and to include those defendants’ names on the jury verdict form for the purpose of allocating liability among all defendants. At issue before the Supreme Court was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.045, which makes healthcare provider defendants severally liable in professional negligence actions for economic and noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the provision of several liability found in section 41A.045 entitles a defendant in a healthcare provider professional negligence action to argue the percentage of fault of settled defendants and to include the settled defendants’ names on applicable jury verdict forms where the jury could conclude that the settled defendants’ negligence caused some or all of the plaintiff’s injury. View "Piroozi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

John Wickel appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims for medical malpractice against Dr. David Chamberlain. Wickel sought treatment from Dr. Chamberlain for internal and external hemorrhoids. After Wickel was anesthetized, Dr. Chamberlain discovered an anal fissure. Dr. Chamberlain believed, based upon his discussions with Wickel prior to surgery, that the best course was to treat the anal fissure while Wickel was under anesthesia in order to address all issues in one operation. Dr. Chamberlain performed a fissurectomy and an internal lateral sphincterotomy. Following surgery, Wickel experienced significant pain and developed a perianal abscess. Wickel had several post-operation appointments with Dr. Chamberlain to address ongoing pain. At Wickel’s March 3, 2010, appointment, Dr. Chamberlain noted that the abscess appeared healed and released Wickel from his care. The pain continued, and Wickel returned to Dr. Chamberlain’s office on March 17, 2010, at which time Dr. Chamberlain diagnosed Wickel with a chronic anal fistula and recommended colorectal surgery. Wickel then saw Drs. William Peche and Peter Bossart in Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Peche performed a procedure in June of 2010 and noted that the staple line from the PPH procedure was too close to the dentate line which resulted in physical damage to Wickel’s sphincter. After minimal improvement, Wickel saw Dr. Bossart. Dr. Bossart performed an anal fistulectomy in August of 2010. By 2012, Wickel still suffered discomfort and incontinence. An independent medical exam opined that Wickel’s pain following the surgery by Dr. Chamberlain was attributable to improper placement of the staple line within the anal canal. After the district court granted Dr. Chamberlain’s motion for summary judgment, Wickel moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Wickel appealed and Dr. Chamberlain cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for entry of a final judgment conforming to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(a), and Wickel filed a second motion for reconsideration. The district court denied Wickel’s second motion for reconsideration, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion. Following entry of a final judgment, both parties amended their notices of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to decide the second motion for reconsideration; as a result, the district court did not reach the merits of Wickel's motion or Dr. Chamberlain's cross-appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Wickel’s second motion for reconsideration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wickel v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law