Pratikshya Gurung (“the Estate”) was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. The Estate filed in the circuit court a medical negligence action against Norton Hospital. During the course of discovery, the Estate requested production from Norton of various hospital documents relating to patient safety. Norton argued that the documents were not discoverable. The trial court compelled the production of the disputed documents and denied Norton’s privileged claim. Norton filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and a request for an order staying execution of the trial court’s discovery order. The Estate, in turn, received an emergency hearing with the trial court. Before the hearing on Norton’s emergency motion in the court of appeals and after the Estate’s emergency hearing with the trial court, the trial court handed the copies of the disputed documents directly to counsel for the Estate. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Norton’s writ petition as moot. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles. Remanded for consideration of Norton’s asserted privilege. View "Norton Hospitals, Inc. v. Hon. Barry Willett" on Justia Law

Decedent was a resident of Courtyard Gardens Health and Rehabilitation, LLC for nearly one year when she transferred to another nursing home. Decedent subsequently executed a purported durable power of attorney in favor of Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant, as power of attorney for Decedent, filed suit against Courtyard Gardens alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Arkansas Long-Term Care Residents’ Rights Act. After Decedent died, the circuit court entered an order substituting as the nominal plaintiff Appellant, as special administrator of Decedent’s estate and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Decedent (“the Estate”). Courtyard Gardens moved for summary judgment, asserting that the complaint and amended complaint filed by Appellant under the power of attorney given to him by Decedent were nullities because the power of attorney was invalid and that the circuit court should dismiss the action because the statute of limitations on the Estate’s claims had expired. The circuit court granted Courtyard Gardens’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the power of attorney was invalid and in granting summary judgment based on the conclusion that the complaints were nullities. View "Quarles v. Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from post-operative injuries plaintiff Richard Dupuy sustained based on a hospital’s alleged failure to properly maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical instruments. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs’ claims that the hospital failed to properly maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical instruments fell within the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”). The Supreme Court concluded the claims did fall within the MMA and reversed the ruling of the district court which held to the contrary. View "Dupuy v. NMC Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Spine Hospital of Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), after surgery at a VA medical center rendered him quadriplegic. The district court found the VA liable for plaintiff's injuries and awarded him $4,468,859.91 in damages. Both parties appealed. The court vacated the district court's decision insofar as it offset the award for future medical care and supplies, holding that federal law does not require that a veteran injured as a result of the VA’s malpractice be forced to continue under VA care or lack of financial resources and be subject to a concomitant offset, and New York state law does not warrant such an offset. The court also held that the district court failed to provide adequate analysis to support both its denial of plaintiff’s motion to increase the ad damnum and its decision to set the award for past and future pain and suffering at $2 million, and the court remanded with directions that the district court consider anew plaintiff’s motion to increase the ad damnum, taking into account the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician, and determine damages without an offset for future receipt of medical care and supplies from the VA, consistent with this opinion. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s decision not to further offset the award for future home health services on the ground that the provision of such services going forward is not reasonably certain. View "Malmberg v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Charles and Janice Lepper filed a medical malpractice suit against defendants Eastern Idaho Health Service, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (EIRMC) and Dr. Stephen R. Marano, (Dr. Marano). The Leppers alleged Dr. Marano rendered Charles a paraplegic. The Leppers appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that based on the language of its Scheduling Order, the Leppers’ expert witness disclosures required disclosure of all expert witness opinions, including foundational facts required by statute. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated and remanded."We decline to hold the Leppers to a higher disclosure standard than what was required by the plain language of the Scheduling Order. Again, the district court was free to issue a more detailed scheduling order explicitly requiring such foundational facts, but without doing so, the Leppers could not be held to more demanding disclosure requirements that they had no prior notice of. We note that the supplemental affidavits in this case detailing the applicable standard of care for both experts were provided well before the discovery deadline. In any event, we hold that because the district court read requirements into its Scheduling Order that did not appear on the face of the order, the court abused its discretion in excluding [The Leppers'] experts." Because the district court's decision regarding the experts carried through and was the basis of the denial of the Leppers' motions for reconsideration, the Court determined the district court abused its discretion in those decisions too. View "Lepper v. Eastern Idaho Health Services" on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas Strong and Brian Hawk appealed a district court's order dismissing their case pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failing to prosecute, and 40(c) for unjustified inaction for over six months. The case arose out of neuron simulator implant procedures, in which both appellant alleged he received an inappropriate amount of anesthesia from respondents, causing complications after the surgeries. Initially, in 2006, appellants commenced their claims by filing a prelitigation screening with the State Board of Medicine. Several months later, Hawk filed for bankruptcy. The district court stayed the medical malpractice claim until the bankruptcy proceedings had concluded. In 2007, respondents sent appellate counsel a stipulation to bifurcate the case so that Strong's case could proceed. Appellants' counsel did not agree to the bifurcation. Hawk's bankruptcy case closed in 2008. In 2010, respondents moved to lift the stay and dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. Appellants noted that Hawk had not disclosed the present underlying cause of action during his bankruptcy proceedings. The district court granted Appellants sixty days to rectify the bankruptcy matters. Appellants then requested the bankruptcy court to reopen the case and the district court again stayed its proceedings pending the resolution of the disclosure issue in the bankruptcy schedules. In 2013, the bankruptcy trustee ultimately determined that the action was of no value to the bankruptcy estate and reclosed the case. In 2014, respondents filed a renewed motion to dismiss, which was ultimately granted. Because there was no showing of actual demonstrated prejudice, the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b) was reversed, but the dismissal under Rule 40(c) was affirmed. View "Strong v. Intermountain Anesthesia" on Justia Law

Essex issued a professional liability insurance policy to Galilee Medical Center, covering claims against Galilee physicians, including Angarita. Galilee’s application asked, “Do[] the Applicant’s employees or independent contractors use drugs for weight reduction for patients?” Galilee answered no. The question continued: “If yes, attach a list of drugs used and percentage of practice devoted to weight reduction.” Galilee did not identify any drugs. Galilee also answered “no” to whether its employees performed any experimental procedures and to “With the exception of surgery for obesity, does your practice include weight reduction or control by other [sic] than diet or exercise? 5.(b) Do you dispense any drugs? 5.(c) Do you use injections for weight control? 9.(a) Do you use experimental procedures, devices, drugs, or therapy in treatment or surgery?” In 2011, Ravelo, Angarita’s former patient, sued Angarita and Galilee for medical negligence based on mesotherapy treatments administered by Angarita. Mesotherapy is a non-surgical treatment involving injections into subcutaneous layers of fat, to dissolve deposits of fat and provide a more desirable body shape. Mesotherapy is not FDA-approved. Angarita admitted to providing mesotherapy treatment to more than 5,000 patients, including Ravelo. Essex denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment rescinding the Policy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Essex, based on the misrepresentations in the applications. View "Essex Ins. Co. v. Angarita" on Justia Law

In 1988, Department of Professional Regulation investigator visited Gekas, a Springfield, Illinois dentist, and expressed concern that Gekas had administered nitrous oxide to a child. He ordered Gekas to provide information on all prescriptions on a continuing basis. Gekas contacted Deputy Governor Riley for assistance. After a meeting, the Department imposed less onerous requirements. In 2002, a Department investigator raided Gekas’ offices, with the assistance of the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. After failed negotiations, the Department issued a cease and desist order against Gekas for the unlicensed practice of medicine and prescribing controlled substances while not a licensed physician and sought to have his license suspended, on grounds that Gekas had prescribed 4,600 doses of Hydrocodone and Vicoprofen to a patient. Gekas contacted his Senator. In 2008, the cease-and-desist was vacated and the complaint dismissed. Gekas submitted a FOIA request concerning the administrative complaint. The Department responded that no public documents were available. In 2009, Gekas filed suit; it was dismissed by stipulation in 2010. Meanwhile, a Chairman on the Illinois Board of Dentistry issued subpoenas against Gekas, stating that there was reasonable cause to believe that Gekas had violated the Illinois Dental Practice Act. Gekas filed suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding no evidence of retaliatory motive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gekas v. Vasiliades" on Justia Law

Carolyn Gray brought a medical malpractice action against White River Medical Center and its insurer (collectively, WRMC), alleging failure to intervene, vicarious liability, lack of qualified staff, nondelegable duty, and breach of contract. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of WRMC, dismissed Gray’s breach of contract claim, and, for the remaining claims, allowed Gray ten days to amend her complaint. Gray amended her complaint. WRMC renewed its original motion to dismiss. Gray then filed a second amended complaint alleging negligent hiring of an independent contractor. WRMC moved to dismiss Gray’s additional claim. The circuit court granted WRMC’s remaining motions to dismiss. Gray appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order, holding that the circuit court’s order did not contain specific factual findings that there was no just reason for delay in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Gray v. White River Health Sys. Inc." on Justia Law

Jesse's father, Crow, a retired physician, was aware that Jesse had a history of fights and arrests, including brandishing a gun on the highway. Crow first met Ryann after she married Jesse and saw her fewer than 10 times. Once, Crow went to their house and found the couple intoxicated. Ryann was in pain and stated that her foot had been run over by a stranger. Crow’s wife arranged for Ryann to see Dr. Williams. Ryann’s injuries were consistent with her explanation. Ryann did not mention abuse. Ryann’s mother, Pipitone, later learned that Jesse had run over Ryann’s foot. Jesse, with help from Crow, paid Ryann $5,000. Ryann signed an agreement, stating that the incident was an accident; Pipitone signed as a witness. Pipitone eventually reported the abuse to the police. Ryann’s sister also reported. Ryann was not cooperative. Ryann admitted that Jesse had deliberately run her over, that she felt threatened, and that he had “guns and a lot of illegal things.” Six months after their marriage Jesse murdered Ryann, and with assistance, dismembered and dumped her body into the San Francisco Bay. Jesse committed suicide in jail. Pipitone brought a wrongful death action against Doctors Crow and Williams for failure to report suspected abuse under Penal Code 11160. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, on grounds of duty and causation. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Pipitone v. Williams" on Justia Law