Holly and Robert Labair filed a legal malpractice claim for Steve Carey and Carey Law Firm (collectively, Carey) related to Carey’s representation of them in a medical malpractice action. The district court granted summary judgment to Carey. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court for a trial to establish two required components of the damages element of the Labairs’ claim: (1) that it was more probable than not that they would have recovered a settlement or judgment but for Carey’s negligence, and (2) the value of the lost settlement and/or judgment. After a trial, the jury indicated that the Labairs would not have settled the underlying medical malpractice claim. The district court formally entered judgment in favor of Carey. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court erred in instructing the jury to decide whether Plaintiffs would have settled the underlying medical malpractice suit. Remanded for a new trial on the question of the value of the lost opportunity to settle. View "Labair v. Carey" on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court alleging medical malpractice and derivative claims against Defendants for medical care Plaintiffs received in 2008. Plaintiffs dismissed their claims without prejudice and, in 2012, filed a qui tam action in federal district court. In 2013, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file an amended complaint adding state law medical-malpractice claims. The federal district court denied leave and granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court alleging state malpractice claims. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the case, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim because both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose applicable to Plaintiffs’ claims had expired. The trial court further determined that 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), the federal tolling statute, applies only to protect claims while pending in federal court, and because Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint to add the malpractice claims was denied, the state claims were never pending and were not protected. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that once a claim has vested, the statute of repose can no longer operate to bar litigation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court appropriately dismissed the case because neither the saving statute nor the tolling statute applied in this case. View "Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review was a res nova issue of whether a claim for negligent credentialing fell within the purview of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA) and was, therefore, subject to its statutory cap on damages. After completion of the medical review process, plaintiffs Brandi, Veronica, and Joseph Billeaudeau proceeded in their suit against Opelousas General Hospital Authority (OGH), among other defendants, for injuries Brandi sustained allegedly arising from the medical malpractice of Dr. Kondilo Skirlis-Zavala, an independent contractor working in the OGH’s emergency department (ED). Along with their medical malpractice claims, plaintiffs specifically alleged OGH was negligent in credentialing Dr. Zavala and subsequently moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a determination that their negligent credentialing claim was not subject to the LMMA’s cap on damages. The District Court granted the motion and ultimately certified the judgment as final. The Court of Appeal affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ negligent credentialing claim did not fall within the provisions of the LMMA. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeal. View "Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

McDonald, an Illinois inmate in the segregation unit, suffered an asthma attack in his cell. There were no emergency call buttons. Hours later. his cellmate banged on the door to alert the guards. A guard eventually escorted McDonald to the prison’s healthcare unit, run by Wexford, a private company. McDonald was wheezing and using his accessory muscles to breathe. Nurse Reuter started him on oxygen and administered medications, then phoned Dr. Larson, who was the only on-call doctor for several correctional facilities. He slept through the call. He finally returned her call and prescribed several medications. Thirty minutes later, McDonald was still using his accessory muscles to breathe. Larson then ordered his transfer to a hospital via ambulance and called ahead. In the ER, Dr. Reyes treated him with medications for about two hours, then inserted a breathing tube. McDonald died. The court rejected his estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the warden and Wexford, which focused on the lack of a permanent medical director and the lack of emergency call buttons in segregation cells. Claims against Larson, Reuter, and the guards tried to a jury, which returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the warden consciously disregarded a substantial risk of harm to McDonald nor establish that a Wexford policy caused a constitutional injury. View "Chatham v. Davis" on Justia Law

Tina McColl filed a complaint against Michael Lang, N.D., a licensed naturopathic physician, after Lang used black salve to remove a blemish on Lang’s nose, which resulted in an infected third degree burn on McColl’s nose. The jury found Lang departed from the standard of care in his treatment of McColl, which resulted in damages. The jury, however, unanimously denied punitive damages. McColl appealed, seeking a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) granted Lang’s motion to exclude evidence of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibition against selling, marketing, or manufacturing drugs not FDA approved and the FDA warning letters regarding the use of black salve as a cure for cancer; and (2) denied McColl’s motion to exclude the testimony of Lang’s expert on the standard of care for a naturopathic physician. View "McColl v. Lang" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit against plaintiff's pain management physician, Howard L. Rosner, M.D., and Cedars for professional negligence and loss of consortium. Rosner's treatment rendered plaintiff a quadriplegic. A jury found that both Rosner and Cedars had been negligent, but that only Rosner’s negligence had been a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's severe injuries. The jury nonetheless apportioned 40 percent of fault to Cedars, apparently on the basis of its finding that Rosner was Cedars’s ostensible agent. Both defendants appealed. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, plaintiff knew or should have known that Rosner was not Cedars’s agent where he received actual notice and was treated in a nonemergency context. Therefore, Cedars’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. The court also concluded that the jury's negligence finding was supported by substantial evidence; the special verdict form used in this case properly required the jury to make findings only as to ultimate facts for plaintiffs’ sole cause of action; the trial court was not required to grant a new trial, but instead acted properly to eliminate the ambiguity or inconsistency by striking the jury’s apportionment of fault; and substantial evidence supports the jury’s award of future economic damages and costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed with respect to Rosner and reversed with respect to Cedars. View "Markow v. Rosner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against St. Anthony’s Medical Center alleging that St. Anthony’s provided negligent medical care that caused him to develop a stage IV pressure ulcer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him $883,000 in compensatory damages. The trial court entered its judgment without post-judgment interest. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was entitled to post-judgment interest pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 408.040.1. St. Anthony cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in entering its judgment without post-judgment interest; (2) the trial court’s application of Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.300 to deny Plaintiff post-judgment interest did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling St. Anthony’s motion for remittitur of damages. View "Dieser v. St. Anthony's Medical Center" on Justia Law

After plaintiff suffered injury during a gallbladder surgery that will have lifelong repercussions, she filed suit for malpractice, and sought damages for the resulting diminution in her earning capacity. The court held that the jury must fix a plaintiff’s future earning capacity based on what it is “reasonably probable” she could have earned. In this case, because plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to establish that it was “reasonably probable” she could have obtained employment as an attorney or any evidence on the earnings of lawyers, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the jury’s $730,000 award for lost earning capacity was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that, given the unusual facts of this case, the trial court acted within its discretion in granting a new trial on damages rather than entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of a new trial on damages, and provided additional guidance as to a handful of evidentiary issues likely to arise during the retrial. View "Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This case related to J.H.’s developmental dysplasia of the hip (DDH). Early diagnosis of DDH in children is important because early treatment is much easier, less invasive, less complicated, and more effective. Risk factors for a child to develop DDH include: breach birth, female gender, premature birth, first-born child, and high birth weight. J.H. was born five weeks short of full term in September of 2008. She was Galyena Hoffer's first child. Various doctors who examined J.H. during the first six weeks of her life did not observe signs of DDH. Between November 13, 2008, and October 5, 2009, Dr. Scott Shappard saw J.H. for five well-baby examinations. J.H. subsequently had problems while learning to walk that appear to have resulted from DDH. Because of these problems, the Hoffers took her to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Stanley Waters, for two visits in February and December of 2010. Dr. Waters recognized that J.H. had DDH, but did not tell the Hoffers that she needed immediate treatment. In May of 2012, the Hoffers took J.H. to Dr. Larry Showalter. Dr. Showalter identified an inch and a half leg difference and the presence of an asymmetrical skin fold. Dr. Showalter immediately ordered x-rays and subsequently performed open reduction surgery in August of 2012, when J.H. was four years old. He testified that the results of the surgery have “so far” been good, but there are risks of “big complications” in the future. One of the Hoffers’ expert witnesses, Dr. David Butuk, opined that Dr. Shappard failed to comply with the community standard of health care practice because of his disregard for the presence of an obvious asymmetrical skin fold, a difference in leg length, and repeated expressions of parental concern. Dr. Shappard, Genesis Medical Center, P.A., and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively “Providers”) appealed an $847,974.46 judgment entered against them after a jury trial when Galyena Hoffer and her husband Randy sued on J.H.'s behalf. The jury found that Dr. Shappard negligently and recklessly failed to diagnose J.H.’s medical condition. The district court denied the Providers’ post-trial motions seeking to correct the verdict, a new trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Providers appealed the denial of these motions and further asserted that the district court erred at trial by refusing to send an exhibit back to the jury room for deliberations and in its jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hoffer v. Shappard" on Justia Law

Tim Agee, individually and on the behalf of the estate of his wife, Eva, sued Baptist Health Richmond, Inc. and other medical care providers alleging that Eva’s death was the result of medical negligence. During discovery, Agee requested from Baptist Health the production of certain documents. Baptist Health refused to produce the documents, claiming that they were protected from disclosure by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. Agee filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted in part. Thereafter, Baptist Health filed an original action in the court of appeals seeking a writ of prohibition. The court of appeals denied the request, citing the plurality opinion in Tibbs v. Bunnell. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s discovery order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the correct result in this case lay in middle ground between the plurality and the dissenting opinions in Tibbs. Remanded with instructions for the trial court to undertake the review set forth in this opinion. View "Baptist Health Richmond, Inc. v. Hon. William Clouse" on Justia Law