Appellants Lucia Navo, Serena Navo, and Nicole Navo appealed the dismissal on summary judgment of a case arising out of the death of Ellery Navo during a surgery at Bingham Memorial Hospital (“BMH”). At trial, Appellants argued that BMH was liable both for its own negligence and for the negligent actions of certified nurse anesthetist Ryan Sayre (“Sayre”), an independent contractor who administered anesthesia services at BMH. Appellants supported their claim that BMH itself had been negligent with expert testimony from Dr. Samuel Steinberg. The district court held, inter alia, that: (1) Dr. Steinberg’s testimony was inadmissible because Appellants had failed to provide evidence that he was familiar with the relevant local standard of care; (2) Appellants had failed to provide any evidence that BMH employees had acted negligently; (3) Appellants had failed to plead that Sayre was an agent of BMH under a theory of apparent authority; (4) even if Appellants had properly pleaded a theory of apparent authority, they failed to provide evidence sufficient to create an issue of material fact; and (5) BMH was not entitled to discretionary costs, including attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in holding that Appellants were barred from arguing "apparent authority in response the BMH's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding no genuine issue of material facts existed as to whether Sayre was BMH's agent under "apparent authority." The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs and fees and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Navo v. Bingham Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice case premised in part on the doctrine of informed consent. Appellant Teresa Allen swallowed a small nail. She went to Duncan Regional Hospital's emergency room. Appellee John Harrison, D.O., emergency room physician (Physician), examined Allen. An X-ray confirmed the presence of a foreign body in Allen's stomach, just below the diaphragm. Based on Physician's assessment and clinical judgment, Physician discharged Allen prescribing: (1) "a high-fiber diet to let the nail pass;" (2) return to the hospital if she had any problems; and (3) follow up with her family doctor in three days. A few days later following severe vomiting, Allen went to the emergency room at Southwestern Hospital in Lawton. That same day, the hospital performed emergency surgery to remove the ingested nail from Allen's intestines. At that time, Allen was treated for a perforated and infected bowel. In addition, Allen endured two additional surgeries to treat the complications that arose from the initial surgery. Allen sued Duncan Regional Hospital and Physician for the defendants' alleged medical negligence and failure to obtain Allen's informed consent. Specifically, Allen contended that Physician failed to disclose the potential risk in letting the nail pass through her digestive system as well as the alternatives to his recommended course of treatment. Had Physician effectively discharged his duty to disclose, Allen would have "chosen the option of no treatment or a different course of treatment." The issue presented on certiorari review was whether the doctrine of informed consent required a physician to obtain the patient's consent before implementing a nonsurgical or noninvasive course of treatment. "Inherent in the question presented, is whether a physician-in addition to discussing with the patient treatment alternatives that the physician recommends-should discuss medically reasonable alternatives that the physician does not recommend." After review of the trial court record, the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered both of those questions in the affirmative. View "Allen v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Joseph Mickels died from an incurable, terminal brain tumor. Mickels’ family (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death action against Defendant, a physician, for negligently failing to diagnose the tumor. Plaintiffs presented evidence that even though Mickels certainly would have died of his brain tumor with or without Defendant’s alleged negligence, he would not have died as early as he did had the brain tumor been properly diagnosed. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs could not establish that Defendant’s negligence caused Mickels’ death so as to be actionable under Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.080.1. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that Plaintiffs cannot sue for wrongful death under section 537.080.1, but the allegations in the petition do state a cause of action for negligence that would have been actionable under Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.020 if brought by Mickels’ personal representative. Remanded. View "Mickels v. Danrad" on Justia Law

Shannon Dodson died as a result of a dissection of her left main coronary artery during a cardiac catheterization. Dodson’s family (Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death action against the physician who treated Dodson and his employer (collectively, Defendants). The jury returned a verdict in the amount of almost $2 million for economic damages and $9 million for noneconomic damages. The trial court reduced the noneconomic damages to $350,000 pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.210(1). Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the section 538.210 noneconomic damages cap does not violate the separation of powers principle, equal protection, or the right to trial by jury in wrongful death cases; (2) the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict on the issue of aggravating circumstances damages at the close of Defendants’ evidence; and (3) there was no error in Defendants’ other issues on appeal. View "Dodson v. Ferrara" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the parents of a newborn baby, alleged that on June 12, 2012, their son died as a result of the medical malpractice of the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants (Richard Baker, M.D. and Mary Beerworth, M.D.). It was undisputed that this filing was within the period established by the applicable statute of limitations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the denial of motions to dismiss filed by the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants. Both sets’ motions were predicated on plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve process. On appeal, the Baker defendants argued that the trial court’s grant of an enlargement of time to serve process expired prior to plaintiffs’ serving of the summons and complaint, while the Hospital defendants contended that although they signed a waiver of service, plaintiffs failed to file that waiver with the court before the expiration of the service period. Both sets of defendants also appealed the trial court’s conclusion that even if plaintiffs’ service was found to be untimely, it retained the authority to retroactively grant a motion for enlargement of time and extend the period for service after the running of the statute of limitations on the basis of excusable neglect. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. Baker" on Justia Law

The parents of Kenia Lopez-Rosario, an adult with several physical and cognitive disabilities, petitioned the circuit court appoint them as Lopez-Rosario’s co-guardians. The circuit court granted guardianship to the parents. Subsequently, Lopez-Rosario had surgery to remove her gallbladder, and the surgeon, Dr. Christine Habib, allegedly made an error that injured Lopez-Rosario. Lopez-Rosario filed a negligence suit against Dr. Habib and her employer. Defendants filed a plea in bar/motion to dismiss, arguing that Lopez-Rosario could not file suit in her own name because her parents had been appointed as her guardians. The circuit court granted the plea in bar/motion to dismiss, concluding that Lopez-Rosario did not have standing to sue in her own name. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Va. Code 64.2-2025, Lopez-Rosario’s parents had the authority and obligation to prosecute lawsuits on Lopez-Rosario’s behalf, and therefore, Lopez-Rosario lacked standing to file suit in her own name. View "Lopez-Rosario v. Habib" on Justia Law

In November 2009, Plaintiff underwent a knee-replacement surgery at Sanford USD Medical Center. The day after the surgery, when he was still hospitalized, Plaintiff fell while walking with assistance from a patient-care technician. After being discharged, Plaintiff underwent inpatient rehabilitation and outpatient physical therapy. In September 2012, Plaintiff sought additional physical therapy for the alleged effects of the injury resulting from his fall. When Sanford declined to pay for additional treatment, Plaintiff commenced this action. Sanford moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.1 as a medical malpractice claim. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he commenced his action within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to general-negligence actions and that the circuit court erred in determining his action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s action against Sanford was one for error or mistake, and therefore, section 15-2-14.1’s two-year period of repose applies; and (2) principles of estoppel and tolling are inapplicable to a period of repose, and the continuous-treatment rule did not toll section 15-2-14.1’s period of repose under the facts of this case. View "Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Regina Corr sued Dr. Charles Robinson for medical malpractice. The jury awarded Corr $55,634.78 for past medical expenses and $420,000 for pain and suffering. Robinson filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Dr. Robinson argues that the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony, in admitting testimony from Regina’s expert that was outside her expert’s designation, and in denying his request for a remittitur. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Robinson v. Corr" on Justia Law

After Enrique Ojeda-Morales (Ojeda) died, his widow and his sister (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a negligence action against two doctors, including Dr. Jorge Rodriguez-Wilson (Dr. Rodriguez), and related medical facilities. The medical facilities and one medical doctor (collectively, the settling parties) entered into settlement agreements with Plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the settling parties from the case, leaving Dr. Rodriguez as the sole defendant. After a trial, the jury concluded that Dr. Rodriguez’s negligent care was the proximate cause of Ojeda’s death and awarded Plaintiffs $475,000. The district court issued a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Dr. Rodriguez sought to alter the judgment, arguing that the jury’s damages award should be offset against the $700,000 that Plaintiffs received from the settling parties. The district court agreed and vacated the jury award. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling, holding (1) the district court improperly vacated the jury award, as the district court misapplied Puerto Rico law when it implemented a dollar-for-dollar offset, and furthermore, Dr. Rodriguez waived any argument that he was entitled to offset; and (2) Dr. Rodriguez engaged in obstinate conduct trial trial, and therefore, the district court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees. View "Gomez v. Rodriguez-Wilson" on Justia Law

Kirk Lloyd sought to be admitted at United Hospital to stop his pattern of self-harm. United informed Lloyd and his mother, Melinda Binkley, that Lloyd would not be admitted to United’s inpatient mental-health program and released Lloyd. The next night, Lloyd committed suicide. Binkley, acting as trustee, filed a medical-malpractice action against Allina Health System and its staff (collectively, Respondents) alleging that Respondents’ negligent failure to properly examine, evaluate, and provide services to Lloyd caused his death. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to immunity for their good-faith actions under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act. The district court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondents’ good-faith decision to deny Lloyd admission to the inpatient mental health unit is entitled to immunity; but (2) it is not clear that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on all of Binkley’s claims. Remanded. View "Binkley v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law