Appellant Sean Wright, a former inmate of the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) who was incarcerated at an out-of-state correctional facility under contract with DOC, filed a medical malpractice and 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action against officials employed by the out-of-state correctional facility and by DOC. The civil rights claims alleged that the corrections officials were deliberately indifferent to Wright's medical needs. The superior court granted summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice action as barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Subsequently the court granted summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claims against the inmate. In the course of the proceedings, Wright unsuccessfully sought to have the superior court judge removed for alleged bias. Wright appealed these decisions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wright v. Anding" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that an infection developed after negligent medical treatment was provided by the defendants. Accordingly, they filed a Request for Medical Review Panel and, subsequently, a lawsuit. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ writ application to determine whether the medical review panel complaint was sufficient to survive an exception of prematurity. After review, the Court found the brief descriptions of malpractice contained in the complaint were broad enough to encompass the specific allegations contained in the petition for damages. Thus, the Court reversed the lower courts’ grant of the exception of prematurity and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coulon v. Endurance Risk Partners, Inc." on Justia Law

This medical malpractice case arose from the death of Lyric Pitts, seven month old daughter of plaintiffs David Pitts, Jr. and Kenyetta Gurley. A jury found in favor of defendant Dr. Rhoda Jones. Plaintiffs moved for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV), or alternatively for a new trial. The district court granted the JNOV and conditionally granted the new trial. The court of appeal reversed and reinstated the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' writ application to review the correctness of the lower courts' rulings on the JNOV and new trial. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's ruling reversing the district court's grant of the JNOV. However, the Court reversed the ruling of the court of appeal relative to the new trial, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's grant of a new trial. View "Pitts v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Kimberly Montano, a New Mexico resident, sought bariatric surgery for her obesity in early 2004. At that time Eldo Frezza, M.D. was the only doctor from whom Montano could receive that surgery and still be covered by her insurer. Montano believed that she needed the procedure and that she could not afford it without medical insurance coverage. Dr. Frezza was employed as a bariatric surgeon and professor and served as chief of bariatric surgery at Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center in Lubbock, Texas. The issue this case ultimately presented for the New mexico Supreme Court’s review was whether a New Mexico resident who had been injured by the negligence of a state- employed Texas surgeon name that surgeon as a defendant in a New Mexico lawsuit when Texas sovereign immunity laws would require that the lawsuit be dismissed. The Court initially presumed that comity should be extended because cooperation and respect between states was important. “However, this presumption is overcome and a New Mexico court need not fully extend comity if the sister state’s law offends New Mexico public policy” In this case, the New Mexico Court applied the Texas provision requiring that the case against the surgeon be dismissed because do View "Montano v. Frezza" on Justia Law

Inmate Diggs injured his knee in a fight in 2006 and complained to medical staff about knee pain and instability 14 times. In 2009, Dr. Ghosh, the prison’s medical director, recommended that Diggs be assigned to a lower bunk and ordered an MRI, which revealed that his right ACL had a complete tear. Ghosh got approval from Wexford, the private company that contracts with Illinois to provide prison medical care, for Diggs to receive orthopedic follow‐up. Notwithstanding recommendations by the outside providers, Diggs received no physical therapy and no follow‐up. After several delays and changes in staff, Diggs unsuccessfully filed an emergency grievance, requesting surgery and complaining that his placement effectively confined him to his cell. In 2015, a Wexford physician reportedly stated that no local doctor would perform the surgery. Diggs sued, alleging that the doctors and warden were deliberately indifferent to his torn ACL and intentionally had caused him emotional distress. He sought an injunction to compel the warden to authorize surgery. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants, finding that the doctors had treatment choices and that Diggs did not establish that the warden knew about the supposed mistreatment nor that the defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, finding that a reasonable jury could rule in favor of Diggs on the deliberate indifference claims. View "Diggs v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

This case was an original mandamus proceeding, arising from a medical negligence action in which plaintiff-relator sought damages for physical injuries. Plaintiff filed suit seeking damages for physical injuries suffered as the result of a foot surgery that, as alleged in his complaint, left him with "severe and permanent injury to his right foot and ankle leaving him unable to use his foot and suffering constant pain and numbness." The issue on appeal was whether plaintiff, who, without objection by his counsel, answered questions in a discovery deposition about the treatment of his physical condition by health care providers, thereby waived his physician-patient privilege under OEC 511, so as to allow pretrial discovery depositions of those health care providers. The Oregon Supreme Court court allowed plaintiff’s petition for an alternative writ of mandamus, in which he challenged a circuit court order that allowed the providers’ depositions. After review, the Court concluded that, by answering questions about his treatment at his discovery deposition, plaintiff did not "offer" (and thereby voluntarily disclose) that testimony so as to waive his privilege. Accordingly, the Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order allowing the depositions. View "Barrier v. Beaman" on Justia Law

Pearson, a Pennsylvania prisoner, was hospitalized twice in April 2007: first for surgery to remove his appendix and later for surgery to repair a urethral tear caused by insertion of a catheter during the first surgery. Pearson claims that he was in intense pain for several hours before each hospitalization and that medical staff were dismissive of his complaints. In 2009, he filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials and an independent medical contractor were deliberately indifferent to those needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After remands, the district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed with respect to one defendant, a nurse, but otherwise affirmed. Rhodes claimed that the nurse refused to examine him and forced him to crawl to a wheelchair, claims that do not require extrinsic proof or expert testimony. Pearson did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the other defendants were deliberately indifferent. View "Pearson v. Prison Health Service" on Justia Law

Rasho, an Illinois inmate since 1996, has a history of mental illness. After he stopped taking his medication and had escalating symptoms, he was transferred to Pontiac’s Mental Health Unit, where he remained until 2006, when he was transferred to the Segregation Unit. Rasho believes that he was transferred, not because he no longer required specialized treatment, but in retaliation for complaints he lodged against prison staff. According to Rasho, after he was transferred, he was denied minimally adequate mental health care for more than 20 months. Rasho filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Rasho put forward sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could decide that two doctors caused him to be transferred for reasons unrelated to medical judgment. The court affirmed with respect to defendants with more tenuous connections to his mental health treatment: two doctors who allegedly failed to supervise properly the contract between IDOC and its medical provider and the warden. An individual defendant is liable under section 1983 only if personally responsible for the constitutional violation. View "Rasho v. Elyea" on Justia Law

Bernard Norton, by and through Kim Norton, brought a wrongful death action against a number of defendants who were affiliated with a nursing home in which his wife, Lola Norton, died. Bernard claimed that negligent treatment caused Lola’s death. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of all claims in accordance with an agreement entered into by Lola at the time she was admitted to the nursing home. The trial court granted the motion to stay and compel arbitration, and Bernard appealed, contending that, as a wrongful death beneficiary, he could not be bound to Lola’s arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that Lola’s beneficiaries were not required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and entered into by a decedent and/or her power of attorney, which bound the decedent and her estate to arbitration, was also enforceable against the decedent’s beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. The Court found that such an arbitration agreement did bind the decedent’s beneficiaries with respect to their wrongful death claims, and, accordingly, reversed the Court of Appeals. View "United Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Norton" on Justia Law

In 2011, John Wyman first visited Julie L. Scott, P.A., to address a lesion he had discovered on his left heel. P.A. Scott diagnosed the lesion as an infected wart, prescribed antibiotic ointment, and instructed John to return for a follow-up appointment, scheduled for January 5, 2012. For reasons unclear, John did not attend the follow-up appointment. John returned to see P.A. Scott on April 19, 2012, because his lesion did not improve. Still believing the lesion was an infected wart, P.A. Scott froze it off during that appointment. She again instructed John to return for a follow-up appointment, scheduled for May 10, 2012. For reasons unclear, John did not attend the follow-up appointment. He never again returned to see P.A. Scott. John’s lesion, however, failed to improve. It would later be diagnosed as a stage IIIC malignant melanoma tumor, and not a wart. Nearly two years after the date of the biopsy, on August 28, 2014, the Wymans filed a pre-litigation screening application with the Idaho State Board of Medicine. On September 5, 2014, the Wymans lodged a complaint in district court, alleging medical malpractice claims against P.A. Scott and her employer, Center for Lifetime Health, LLC, for their alleged failure to perform a biopsy that would have revealed cancer. In the following medical malpractice suit against Scott, her employer and the hospital, the district court concluded a two-year statute of limitations barred the Wymans' claims. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wyman v. Eck" on Justia Law