Legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s conclusion in this case that the negligence of a premature infant’s treating neonatologist, more likely than not, proximately caused the infant’s loss of vision.D.B. was born extremely premature. As a result of D.B.’s retinopathy of prematurity (ROP), a retinal disorder that afflicts premature infants with low birth weights, D.B. became totally bind in her right eye, and the vision in her left eye was severely impaired. Plaintiffs, D.B.’s parents, sued D.B.’s neonatologist and his professional association, claiming that their negligence caused D.B.’s vision loss. The jury found that Defendants’ negligence caused D.B.’s injuries. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that Plaintiffs take nothing, concluding that they failed to adduce any non-conclusory evidence of causation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the neonatologist’s negligence in assessing and treating D.B.’s ROP proximately caused her vision impairment. View "Bustamante v. Ponte" on Justia Law

In an effort to increase chances of conception, Lacy Dodd underwent surgery to remove ovarian cysts and, potentially, one fallopian tube. During the surgery, Lacy’s physician, Dr. Randall Hines, discovered that both of Lacy’s ovaries appeared abnormal to the extent that they seemed cancerous. Dr. Hines consulted, intraoperatively, with his colleague, Dr. Paul Seago. Dr. Seago concluded that both ovaries lacked any appreciable amount of normal tissue and were highly suspicious for malignancy; he recommended that it was in Lacy’s best interest to remove both ovaries. Dr. Hines agreed and removed both ovaries. A biopsy later revealed that Lacy’s ovaries were not cancerous. Lacy and her husband, Charles Dodd, filed a pro se complaint against Dr. Hines, Dr. Seago, and Mississippi Reproductive Medicine, PLLC, claiming that her ovaries were removed without consent. Lacy also alleged defendants were negligent in failing to obtain informed consent from the patient and/or her family to proceed with the procedure, failing to test tissues and analyze the results; and misdiagnosing Lacy’s condition as malignant. The trial court found that Lacy had consented to the removal of her ovaries based on a consent form executed by Lacy prior to the surgery and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Despite the sole issue of consent before the trial court, it entered a final judgment with respect to all of Lacy’s claims alleged in her complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that Lacy’s claim was “battery-based” and held that Lacy did not give express consent for the removal of her ovaries and the consent form did not summarily provide consent to remove her ovaries. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, holding that there is a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment as to whether Lacy consented to the removal of her ovaries in accordance with the Court’s decisions in Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So. 2d 203 (Miss. 1986), and Fox v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 596 (Miss. 1992). The trial court’s judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings for reasons different than those of the Court of Appeals. View "Dodd v. Hines" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a case certified to it by the Twelfth District Court of Appeals in this medical malpractice case, holding that, for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2317.43(A), a statement expressing apology is “a statement that expresses a feeling of regret for an unanticipated outcome of the patient’s medical care and may include an acknowledgment that the patient’s medical care fell below the standard of care.” Under the statute, statements expressing apology are inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an admission against interest. The trial court in this case excluded the statements of a medical doctor, concluding that the statements were an “attempt at commiseration” and were therefore inadmissible under the apology statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 2317.43(A) is unambiguous and that the doctor’s statements were correctly excluded. View "Stewart v. Vivian" on Justia Law

Pharmacist Joseph McNamara, Jr. appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Benchmark Insurance Company ("Benchmark") in Benchmark's indemnity action against McNamara. Benchmark commenced the indemnity action in an effort to recover funds expended to settle a medical-malpractice action brought against Southern Medical, Inc., Benchmark's insured and McNamara's employer. The medical-malpractice action was brought against Southern Medical by Ricky Avant and Kim Avant and was based, at least in part, on the alleged tortious acts and omissions of McNamara. Because the act complained of occurred in January 2010 and Benchmark sued McNamara in February 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded Benchmark's indemnity action was time-barred under section 6-5-482, Ala. Code 1975. Thus, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Benchmark and in denying McNamara's motion for a summary judgment. View "McNamara v. Benchmark Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Dr. Eyston Hunte and his medical practice petitioned for mandamus relief. A former patient, Lisa Johnson, filed suit against Hunte, alleging Hunte sexually abused her during a health examination. Johnson served discovery requests on Hunte and his practice, which included a request to produce "each and every claim or complaint that has been made against [Hunte] by a patient for assault or inappropriate touching." Hunte objected to this request on the ground that this information was protected from discovery. Johnson filed a motion to compel Hunte to produce the requested documents. Hunte and EAH, in turn, filed a motion for a protective order. The trial court denied Hunte's motion for a protective order and ordered Hunte to respond to the discovery requests within 21 days. It was evident to the Alabama Supreme Court that a the 2001 complaint submitted to the Alabama Board of Medical Examiners by former patient and provided to Hunte as a part of the proceedings before the Board was the type of document declared privileged and confidential under section 34-24-60, Ala Code 1975. Furthermore, the Court noted that Johnson had not filed an answer and had not presented any facts or argument to the Supreme Court indicating that the 2001 complaint was not privileged or that it was otherwise subject to discovery. Thus, the Court concluded that Hunte has shown a clear right to an order protecting the 2001 complaint in Hunte and EAH's possession from discovery. The Court granted Hunte’s petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Dr. Eyston Hunte" on Justia Law

In this action brought by Plaintiff against three physicians for their alleged failure to timely diagnose her cancer, the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law and dismissing Dr. Terry Goering, Plaintiff’s primary care physician. The Supreme Court remanded this case for retrial against Dr. Goering, holding (1) considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could have found that Dr. Goering owed a duty to Plaintiff and breached the standard of care and caused harm to Plaintiff; and (2) the error was not harmless, as the jury’s verdict determining that the other two physicians were not liable for Plaintiff’s damages did not determine the issues relating to Plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Goering. View "Russell v. May" on Justia Law

The Alaska professional licensing division brought an accusation of professional misconduct against doctor David Odom, M.D., alleging that he acted incompetently when he prescribed phentermine and thyroid hormone for one of his patients. The division sought disciplinary sanctions against the doctor. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge issued a proposed decision concluding that the division had failed to show that the doctor’s conduct fell below the standard of care in his field of practice and that no disciplinary sanctions were warranted. But the Medical Board instead adopted as its decision the proposal for action submitted by the division and revoked the doctor’s medical license. On appeal to the superior court, the case was remanded to the Board for consideration of the doctor’s own late-filed proposal for action. The Board reaffirmed its decision to revoke the doctor’s medical license, and the superior court affirmed that decision. The doctor appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Because the Medical Board’s decision to revoke the doctor’s medical license was not supported by substantial evidence, the Court reversed the superior court’s affirmance of that decision. View "Odom v. Alaska Div. of Corporations, Bus. & Prof. Licensing" on Justia Law

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing prospective juror 24 to serve on the jury in this medical negligence case.Following a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant hospitals. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to strike for cause juror 24 because she expressed a disqualifying bias in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding, without additional questioning, that prospective juror 24 was not disqualified because she was successfully rehabilitated when the entire voir dire was considered, including her later statement that she could follow the trial court’s instructions. View "Thomas v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities" on Justia Law

The family of the deceased and administrator of his estate filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), after a radiologist with the VA failed to identify a cancerous mass. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the United States, holding that although the VA failed to deliver the standard of care that the deceased deserved, the evidence presented was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the VA's negligence proximately caused plaintiffs' damages. Because the medical malpractice claims failed, so too must the wrongful-death claims. View "Day v. United States" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant’s motion to set aside the jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff. On appeal, Defendant argued that Plaintiff did not plead a claim for battery in her complaint and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on battery and informed consent and in denying his motion to strike that claim. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant, holding (1) the initial complaint did not allege a claim for battery, and the trial court erred in instructing the jury on battery; (2) Plaintiff failed to establish proximate causation in connection with a theory of informed consent; and (3) the appropriate remedy for the errors was a remand for a new trial on Plaintiff’s original theory of negligence. View "Allison v. Brown" on Justia Law