Johnny Eades sought treatment from numerous healthcare providers, including Petitioners Palmetto Primary Care Physicians, LLC and Trident Emergency Physicians, LLC, for a blockage and aneurysm of the left iliac artery in July and August of 2009. Three years later, Mr. Eades and his wife filed a Notice of Intent to File Suit (NOI) to bring a medical malpractice action in Charleston County, South Carolina. Two days after filing the NOI, the Eades filed answers to interrogatories listing Dr. Paul Skudder as an expert witness, along with an affidavit from Skudder pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). This case required the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide whether an expert witness affidavit submitted prior to the commencement of a medical malpractice action complied with section 15-36-100(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). The trial court found the affidavit insufficient based on the expert's practice area and dismissed the NOI. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute permitted the production of an affidavit from an expert who did not practice in the same area of medicine as the allegedly negligent doctor. View "Eades v. Palmetto Cardiovascular" on Justia Law

Johnny Eades sought treatment from numerous healthcare providers, including Petitioners Palmetto Primary Care Physicians, LLC and Trident Emergency Physicians, LLC, for a blockage and aneurysm of the left iliac artery in July and August of 2009. Three years later, Mr. Eades and his wife filed a Notice of Intent to File Suit (NOI) to bring a medical malpractice action in Charleston County, South Carolina. Two days after filing the NOI, the Eades filed answers to interrogatories listing Dr. Paul Skudder as an expert witness, along with an affidavit from Skudder pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). This case required the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide whether an expert witness affidavit submitted prior to the commencement of a medical malpractice action complied with section 15-36-100(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). The trial court found the affidavit insufficient based on the expert's practice area and dismissed the NOI. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute permitted the production of an affidavit from an expert who did not practice in the same area of medicine as the allegedly negligent doctor. View "Eades v. Palmetto Cardiovascular" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain statements proffered by Plaintiff.On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in excluding statements that she argued should have been admitted as lay opinion under Va. R. Evid. 2:701 and that the trial court erred in excluding a statement the decedent made after the surgery, contending that the statement should have been admitted under the Deadman’s Statute, Va. Code 8.01-397. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the lay opinion testimony concerning what was disclosed to the patient in this case and what the patient may have one was speculative and inadmissible; and (2) the trial court properly excluded a statement the patient made after the surgery as irrelevant. View "Martin v. Lahti" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action in which a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the circuit court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s evidence on the ground that Plaintiff failed to prove causation.Plaintiff sued Defendant-doctor, alleging that Defendant negligently perforated her small bowel during a laparoscopic total hysterectomy, failed to detect the perforation, and failed to obtain a general surgery consultation to repair the injury. At the end of Plaintiff’s case-in-chief, the circuit court denied Defendant’s motion to strike the evidence. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not prove causation and was unable to do so from the evidence presented to the trial court, and therefore, the circuit court should have granted Defendant’s motion to strike the evidence on the basis of lack of causation. View "Dixon v. Sublett" on Justia Law

The circuit court abused its discretion in this medical malpractice action when it refused to qualify Plaintiff’s only proposed expert witness (Dr. Aboderin) and granted summary judgment for Defendant.After voir dire, Defendant moved to exclude Dr. Aboderin’s testimony on the ground that she failed to meet the two-prong test of Va. Code 8.01-581.20, which governs qualification of medical malpractice expert witnesses. The trial court sustained Defendant’s objection, thus excluding Dr. Aboderin from testifying. Because Dr. Aboderin was Plaintiff’s only proposed expert witness, Plaintiff was unable to establish that Defendant breached the standard of care or that any breach was the proximate cause of her daughter’s injuries. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to qualify Dr. Aboderin as an expert witness because there was evidence that she satisfied both the knowledge and active clinical practice requirements of section 8.01-581.20. View "Holt v. Chalmeta" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was treated for shoulder problems beginning in 1998; defendant performed her surgery in 1999. Post-operative visits followed during the next year. After her one-year appointment, plaintiff did not see defendant for 19 months. Defendant performed another surgery in January 2002. Plaintiff returned for a post-operative visit in April. Plaintiff returned in September 2003, followed by a gap in treatment. Plaintiff returned in April 2006. Defendant referred plaintiff to his partner for a third surgery because defendant was no longer performing shoulder surgeries. She consulted defendant's partner but began seeing a new surgeon in July 2006. Plaintiff sued in September 2008, alleging that defendant negligently performed her original surgery and subsequently failed to diagnose the flawed surgery. The Supreme Court denied a motion to dismiss.The Court of Appeals affirmed. CPLR 214-a provides that a medical malpractice action must be commenced within 2½ years of the relevant act or the "last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the [challenged] act, omission, or failure." A claim's accrual date is at the end of treatment "when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint." Plaintiff raised issues of fact as to whether she and defendant intended a continuous course of treatment. View "Lohnas v Luzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was treated for shoulder problems beginning in 1998; defendant performed her surgery in 1999. Post-operative visits followed during the next year. After her one-year appointment, plaintiff did not see defendant for 19 months. Defendant performed another surgery in January 2002. Plaintiff returned for a post-operative visit in April. Plaintiff returned in September 2003, followed by a gap in treatment. Plaintiff returned in April 2006. Defendant referred plaintiff to his partner for a third surgery because defendant was no longer performing shoulder surgeries. She consulted defendant's partner but began seeing a new surgeon in July 2006. Plaintiff sued in September 2008, alleging that defendant negligently performed her original surgery and subsequently failed to diagnose the flawed surgery. The Supreme Court denied a motion to dismiss.The Court of Appeals affirmed. CPLR 214-a provides that a medical malpractice action must be commenced within 2½ years of the relevant act or the "last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the [challenged] act, omission, or failure." A claim's accrual date is at the end of treatment "when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint." Plaintiff raised issues of fact as to whether she and defendant intended a continuous course of treatment. View "Lohnas v Luzi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court that denied Plaintiff’s discovery motions and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this wrongful death action alleging medical malpractice.Plaintiff, personally and as personal representative of the estate of Mickley Lynn Ellis, sued Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc. and its agents in their individual and official capacities after Ellis, who was incarcerated in the Saunders County jail, died from a bilateral pulmonary embolism while being treated at the Saunders Medical Center. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding no material issue of fact as to causation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Ewers v. Saunders County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Kerry and Scott Tomlinson (parents) and their son, T, brought separate negligence claims against defendants Mary K. Wagner, MD., Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, and Legacy Emanuel Hospital & Health Center. In their respective claims, plaintiffs alleged that defendants provided medical services to the parents’ older son, M, failed to timely diagnose M’s genetic disorder, and failed to inform the parents of that disorder. They further alleged that, “[h]ad defendants, and each of them, timely diagnosed [M’s] DMD, [the parents] would not have produced another child suffering from [DMD].” The trial court entered a judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that neither the parents nor T were patients of defendants and, therefore, the court reasoned, defendants owed no obligation of professional care toward them. The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment as to the parents but affirmed as to T. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court judgment dismissing this action. Under the parents’ theory of relief, the relevant injury was not the resulting life, but the negligent deprivation of information that was important to the parents’ protected interest in making informed reproductive choices. T’s claim necessarily depended on the premise that T had a legally protected interest in not being born, rather than risk being born with DMD. "[T]he doctrinal implications of recognizing T’s right to recover such damages would be significant." The Court concluded the factual allegations were sufficient as to the parents' claim. With respect to T's claims, however, the Court determined the "threshold difficulty with T’s argument is that it puts the damages cart before the liability horse; that is, T’s argument blurs the line between the identification of a cognizable injury and the determination of damages resulting from the injury. . . based on the facts that T alleges, defendants could not have caused T a physical harm." View "Tomlinson v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC" on Justia Law

The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff’s expert report did not represent a good-faith effort to meet the requirements of the Texas Medical Liability Act and in dismissing Plaintiff’s health care liability claims.Plaintiff sued Defendants, a certified registered nurse anesthetist and his employer, asserting medical malpractice claims relating to the nurse’s administration before cataract surgery. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff’s expert report was deficient with respect to the elements of standards of care, breach of standards of care, and causation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the report satisfied the good faith effort the Act requires. View "Baty v. Futrell" on Justia Law