The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Defendant in this wrongful death medical negligence action, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant negligently caused the death of their mother when he perforated her bowel during a hernia repair surgery and failed to recognize and properly treat the bowel. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err by permitting Defendant to testify regarding a new causation opinion - different from the opinion he gave during his deposition - for the first time at trial; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted cumulative evidence from Defendant’s expert witnesses. View "Shallow v. Follwell" on Justia Law

The petitioner, the estate of Fredrick O'Brian Elliott, deceased, by and through his personal representative, Sonya Windham ("the estate"), filed a petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Alabama Supreme Court to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its March 7, 2018, order insofar as it denied certain requests for production of documents made by the estate. The estate filed a wrongful-death action against Baptist Health System, Inc., d/b/a Princeton Baptist Medical Center ("PBMC"), and Courtney Johnston (collectively, "the defendants") and various fictitiously named defendants. Elliott was admitted to Princeton Baptist Medical Center complaining of nausea, vomiting, and gastritis; that, as part of his treatment, Elliott "was ordered to undergo full bowel rest by having Trans-Peritoneal Nutrition (TPN) administered through a Peripherally Inserted Central Catheter (PICC Line)." Johnston, Elliott's nurse, came into Elliot's room and discarded a partially full TPN bag, "following doctor's orders," which Elliott's family questioned since Elliott had not finished his entire nutritional dose. The complaint alleged that because Johnston misread the chart and prematurely discarded the TPN bag, it started an irreversible chain reaction: Elliott became febrile, his temperature spiked, he developed an infection such that it damaged his heart, leading to cardiac arrest. Nine days after the TPN incident, Elliot died. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the estate's motion to compel certain information requested in interrogatories based solely on the assertions of defendants' counsel: they did not satisfy their burden of establishing that the information requested was privileged. As such, the Supreme Court granted mandamus relief and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Ex parte the Estate of Fredrick O'Brian Elliott, deceased, by and through his personal representative, Sonya Windham." on Justia Law

St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center appealed a jury verdict awarding Rodney and Joyce Herrett $3,775,864.21 in a medical malpractice action wherein St. Luke’s admitted liability. On appeal, St. Luke’s argued that the district court erred by denying its motion for mistrial, admitting certain expert testimony, and improperly instructing the jury as to recklessness. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Herrett v. St. Luke's Magic Valley RMC" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District Court of Appeal affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s action and remanded with instructions to reinstate Plaintiff’s complaint, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint where the record established that Plaintiff’s presuit expert was qualified and that Defendants did not suffer prejudice for any alleged noncompliance with discovery.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) where the facts regarding a presuit expert’s qualifications are unrelated, the proper standard of review of a trial court’s dismissal of a medical malpractice action based on its determination that the plaintiff’s presuit expert witness was not qualified is de novo; (2) before a medical malpractice action can be dismissed based on a trial court’s finding that the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with the informal presuit discovery process for medical malpractice actions, the trial court must find that such noncompliance prejudiced the defendant; and (3) Plaintiff’s presuit medical expert in this case clearly met the statutory requirements for medical experts, and Plaintiff complied with the necessary discovery. View "Morris v. Muniz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against Defendant, holding that the district court did not err by ruling that Plaintiff’s expert was not qualified under Mont. Code Ann. 26-2-601(1)(a).Plaintiff brought this action claiming that Defendant breached the standard of care when performing a spinal surgery on Plaintiff. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff’s expert was not qualified to opine on this malpractice claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by excluding the testimony of Plaintiff’s medical expert under section 26-2-601(1)(a) and granting summary judgment on that basis. View "Melton v. Speth" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from plaintiff Lucia Serico’s motion for attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses pursuant to Rule 4:58 after a jury trial on medical malpractice claims against Robert Rothberg, M.D. At issue was whether Serico could collect attorney’s fees from Rothberg despite entering into a “high-low agreement” that limited the amount she could recover at trial to $1,000,000. Based on the expressed intent of the parties and the context of the agreement, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the agreement set $1,000,000 as the maximum recovery. Therefore, Serico could not seek additional litigation expenses allowed by Rule 4:58. View "Serico v. Rothberg" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a discovery dispute in a medical malpractice action involving a hospital’s and its staff’s care of a patient. The parties disagreed over the boundaries of privileged material under the Patient Safety Act (PSA), N.J.S.A. 26:2H-12.23 to -12.25c, and plaintiff’s ability to receive responsive discovery in order to prepare her action. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate panel’s order shielding the redacted document at issue from discovery because the PSA’s self-critical-analysis privilege prevents its disclosure. The Court also affirmed the determination that, when reviewing a discovery dispute such as this, a trial court should not be determining whether a reportable event under the PSA has occurred. The Court reversed the judgment to the extent it ended defendants’ discovery obligation with respect to this dispute, finding that defendants had an unmet discovery duty under Rule 4:17-4(d) that had to be addressed. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Brugaletta v. Garcia" on Justia Law

At issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case was an appeal of a circuit court's decision to impose sanctions against Pee Dee Health Care, P.A., and its attorney for conduct that occurred before the circuit court entered summary judgment against it. The issue the Court addressed was whether a motion for sanctions filed nine days after remittitur from Pee Dee Health's unsuccessful appeal of the summary judgment order was untimely under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (FCPSA) and Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court found the motion was untimely under the FCPSA, but the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion timely under Rule 11. View "Pee Dee Health Care v. Estate of Hugh S. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court entering judgment upon a jury verdict rendered in favor of Defendant, a doctor, on Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below requiring reversal.Plaintiff filed this action against an emergency room (ER) doctor after his wife died in a hospital room following a visit to the ER. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant negligently provided emergency medical care, resulting in his wife’s death. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. A Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it (1) instructed the jury on a physician’s right to elect treatment; (2) defined “negligence” and “fault” using a comparative fault pattern instruction; and (3) granted a motion in limine prohibiting Plaintiff and his expert witnesses from using derivatives of the word “safe.” View "Biglow v. Eidenberg" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on causation issues but reversed and vacated the $550,000 monetary award, holding (1) Plaintiffs established a causal link between Defendants’ inadequate medical treatment and the suicide of Defendants’ patient; but (2) the evidence supporting the economic damages losses impermissibly distorted the distinction between economic and noneconomic damages.Specifically, the Court held (1) the jury instructions on causation were legally and factually appropriate; (2) the expert testimony was legally sufficient to establish that Defendants’ negligence caused the patient’s suicide; but (3) the award of economic damages for “loss of attention, care, and loss of a complete family” failed the established standard that each item established as an economic loss must be capable of being valued using either expert testimony or the jury’s common-sense understanding about what an item of actual loss costs in the marketplace. See Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 701 P.2d 939 (Kan. 1985). View "Burnette v. Eubanks" on Justia Law