In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter without reaching the merits of the appeal, holding that the discovery order challenged on appeal was now a nullity and did not govern future proceedings in this case and that no exception to the final judgment applied.Appellants appealed from an order of the superior court granting Appellee’s motion to compel them to produce in discovery certain patient medical records that the court found to relevant to Appellees' notice of claim asserting medical negligence. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) given the unusual procedural posture presented in this case, the discovery order was a nullity without legal force or effect and did not govern future proceedings in this case; and (2) no exception to the final judgment rule applied that would require the Court to reach the merits of the parties’ arguments below. View "McCain v. Vanadia" on Justia Law

At issue in this medical malpractice action was whether a surety bond in the amount of $6,000 satisfied the requirement of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 60B that a plaintiff wishing to proceed after a tribunal has found in favor of a defendant must file “bond in the amount of [$6,000] in the aggregate secured by cash or its equivalent.”A medical malpractice tribunal concluded that there was not evidence sufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability appropriate for judicial inquiry, as required by section 60B. Plaintiff then filed a surety bond in the amount of $6,000 in order to pursue his claim through the judicial process. A superior court judge allowed a defendant’s motion to strike the surety bond and to dismiss the complaint, concluding that the surety bond did not satisfy Plaintiff’s statutory obligation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that a surety bond in the face amount of $6,000 is not the “equivalent” of $6,000 in cash for purposes of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 60B. View "Polanco v. Sandor" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly determined that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that a surgical resident was an actual agent of of a hospital when he negligently performed a surgical procedure under the supervision of a member of the hospital’s clinical faculty, who was also Plaintiff’s private physician. Further, the Court that that imposing vicarious liability on the hospital for the surgical resident’s actions was not improper. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the separate motions filed by the hospital and the surgical residents to set aside the verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and remittitur. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment as to the hospital’s vicarious liability for the surgical resident’s negligence and otherwise affirmed. View "Gagliano v. Advanced Specialty Care, P.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Defendant following the grant of Defendant’s motion to strike, holding that an action authorized by the claims commissioner, limited to medical malpractice, may not survive a motion to strike where the plaintiff was not a patient of the defendant, as required by Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802 (2012).Plaintiff, administratrix of the estate of the decedent in this case, sought permission to bring an action against Defendant for medical malpractice based on mental health services and treatment given to Robert Rankin, who allegedly fatally stabbed the decedent. The claims commissioner granted Plaintiff permission to bring an action under Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(b), limited to medical malpractice. Plaintiff then brought this action. Defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint, arguing that Connecticut does not recognize medical malpractice claims brought by nonpatient third parties. The trial court granted the motion to strike and then rendered judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Jarmie prohibits an action, limited by the claims commissioner to medical malpractice, where the plaintiff was not a patient of the defendant; and (2) if Plaintiff’s action sounded in negligence, then the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. View "Levin v. State" on Justia Law

Audrey Trowell filed an action against Providence Hospital and Medical Centers, Inc., after she sustained injuries while she was hospitalized. At issue in this case was whether plaintiff’s claims sounded in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence. If her claims implicated medical malpractice, then they were barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions and defendant was entitled to summary judgment under MCR 2.116(C)(7). If her claims sounded in ordinary negligence, then they were timely. The Court of Appeals couldn't tell based solely on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, so it remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether plaintiff’s claims were in medical malpractice, ordinary negligence, or both. The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed with this approach, holding that under the facts of this case, in which the only material submitted to the trial court was plaintiff’s complaint, the remand was improper and in determining the nature of plaintiff’s claims, the lower courts’ review was limited to the complaint alone. A proper review of the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint lead the Supreme Court to conclude that although the complaint included some claims of medical malpractice, it also contains one claim of ordinary negligence. The case was remanded to proceed on the ordinary negligence claims. View "Trowell v. Providence Hospital & Medical Centers, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Aurora Healthcare, Inc., and Aurora Cares, LLC, d/b/a Tara Cares (referred to collectively as "Aurora"), and Birmingham Nursing and Rehabilitation Center East, LLC ("Birmingham East") appealed a circuit court denial of their motion to compel arbitration of an action filed against them by Sharon Ramsey, as administratrix of the estate of her mother, Mary Pettway, deceased. Ramsey cross-appealed the decision denying her motion for a partial summary judgment concerning the validity of the subject arbitration agreement. In 2003, Mary Pettway, then 75 years old, was discharged from the hospital at the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB Hospital"). On the same day, Pettway was admitted to a nursing home owned and operated by the defendants. During Pettway's admission to the nursing home, Ramsey met with Faye Linard, an administrative assistant, who presented Ramsey with an admissions agreement that included several documents, including a "Resident and Facility Arbitration Agreement." Ramsey refused to sign the arbitration agreement; signing it was not a prerequisite to Pettway's admission to the nursing home. Pettway developed an infection, and, as a result, she was returned to UAB Hospital. Pettway was readmitted to the nursing home a few days later. Ramsey stated in an affidavit that late in the evening on November 26, 2003, she received a telephone call from the admissions office at the nursing home and was asked to return to the nursing home because "there were some documents that I had not signed the first time my mother was admitted and I needed to come in to sign them." An arbitration agreement containing a signature with the name "Sharon Ramsey" dated November 26, 2003, appeared in the record. Ramsey contended the signature was not authentic, and she asserted that, even if it was genuine, the signature was obtained by misrepresentation. After her appointment as administratrix of Pettway's estate, Ramsey filed a complaint against defendants alleging a variety of statutory and common-law claims allegedly arising from Pettway's death, including a wrongful-death claim. Defendants sought to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court discerned the parties' appeal and cross-appeal were premature because they sought review of a nonfinal judgment. As such, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. View "Ramsey v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, a physical therapy company and a hospital, on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, holding that the physical therapist failed to demonstrate an absence of any genuine issue of material fact.The plaintiff patient in this case was diagnosed with a fractured femur after a physical therapy session following her hip surgery. Plaintiffs, the patient and her husband, alleged that the physical therapist was negligent during the physical therapy session and that the hospital was negligent in failing timely to diagnose the fractured femur. The circuit court granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court correctly granted the hospital summary judgment because Plaintiffs were required to, but did not, support their claim with proper expert testimony; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a material issue of fact concerning whether the physical therapist deviated from the required standard of care. View "Hanson v. Big Stone Therapies, Inc." on Justia Law

Owens began using Testim, a topical gel containing 1% testosterone, in July 2011 when his doctor diagnosed him with hypogonadism. Owens used Testim sporadically. Although the medication guide directs users to apply a full tube of Testim to the shoulders and arms, Owens would apply part of a tube to his thighs and stomach. In July 2013, Owens was admitted to a hospital for pain in his leg. An ultrasound revealed blood clots. He was diagnosed with deep vein thrombosis (DVT). Owens was treated with blood thinners and released the following day. Owens sued, asserting strict liability, negligence, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation under Kentucky law. Each claim requires expert testimony to establish causation. Owens’s case was selected for a bellwether trial in multidistrict litigation. Owens planned to rely on testimony by Dr. Abbas that Testim had caused Owens’s DVT. That opinion assumed that Owens was applying the prescribed dose in the proper manner. When asked during his deposition about hypothetical cases that resembled Owens’s use of Testim, Abbas had no opinion. The district court excluded the testimony and granted Auxilium summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court properly applied the Daubert framework when excluding Abbas’s testimony. It did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the testimony did not fit the facts of Owens’s case or by failing to consider an argument Owens never presented. Without expert testimony on causation, Owens’s claims necessarily fail. View "Owens v. Auxilium Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment that Dr. David Huebner was not negligent in his treatment of David Bushong.Bushong was diagnosed with a rare and aggressive form of cancer and died of the cancer in 2009. Plaintiffs filed this action against Dr. Huebner and the Great Falls Clinic, alleging that Dr. Huebner was negligent in failing to diagnose or to take steps to diagnose Bushong’s cancer in 2006. The jury determined that Dr. Huebner was not negligent in his treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error on the part of the district court in failing to instruct the jury on loss of chance was harmless; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Plaintiffs from asking Bushong’s treating physician whether Dr. Huebner breached the applicable standard of care and by limiting Plaintiffs’ impeachment of the treating physician on redirect; and (3) the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in determining that defense counsel’s isolated contemptuous comments over the course of the trial did not affect Plaintiffs’ substantial rights to a fair trial. View "Steffensmier v. Huebner" on Justia Law

The process of involuntary admission of an individual begins with the initiation application for involuntary admission and ends upon a hearing officer’s decision whether to admit or release that individual. If, during the process, a physician applies the statutory criteria for involuntary admission and concludes, in good faith, that the individual no longer meets those criteria, the facility must release the individual. The physician’s decision is immune from civil liability and cannot be the basis of a jury verdict for medical malpractice.Brandon Mackey was taken to Bon Secours Hospital pursuant to an application for involuntary admission after he attempted to commit suicide. Dr. Leroy Bell treated Mackey. Two days before a scheduled hearing to determine whether Mackey should be admitted involuntarily or released, Dr. Bell authorized Mackey’s release. Thereafter, Mackey committed suicide. Plaintiff brought suit contending that Dr. Bell, and Bon Secours vicariously as his employer, were negligent in releasing Mackey. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Chance. The circuit court vacated the judgment based in part on its understanding of the immunity statute. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Dr. Bell’s decision to discharge Mackey, made in good faith and with reasonable grounds, was immune from liability. View "Bell v. Chance" on Justia Law