The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants - a hospital and various doctors and nurses - and dismissing Plaintiff's medical malpractice claims, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed.When she was in active labor Plaintiff was admitted to the University of Louisville Hospital. The next day, Plaintiff delivered her baby. During her delivery, Plaintiff suffered a fourth-degree laceration, and two weeks later she was diagnosed with a rectovaginal fistula. Plaintiff sued several healthcare defendants, including the doctors under whose care Plaintiff delivered her baby. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's claims against her treating physicians were time barred; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the treating physicians were ostensible agents of the hospital, and therefore, the lower courts correctly dismissed the claims against the hospital. View "Sneed v. University of Louisville Hospital" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs' health care liability action as time-barred, holding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations due to their noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121 (section 121).Before Plaintiffs filed a health care liability action Plaintiffs attempted to comply with section 121 by notifying Defendants of their intent to file suit. Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily nonsuited their lawsuit. Less than one year later, Plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit alleging the same health care liability claims against Defendants. To establish the timeliness of the second lawsuit, Plaintiffs relied on the savings statute. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' pre-suit notice was not substantially compliant with section 121, and therefore, Plaintiffs were not entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations so that their first lawsuit was not timely filed. Therefore, Defendants argued, Plaintiffs' second lawsuit was untimely. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish either substantial compliance or extraordinary cause to excuse their noncompliance with section 121; and (2) therefore, Plaintiffs could not rely on the one-year savings statute to establish the timeliness of their lawsuit. View "Martin v. Rolling Hills Hospital, LLC" on Justia Law

In these three medical malpractice actions the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial of Defendants' motions to dismiss and remanded to uphold Plaintiffs' opportunity to develop and present evidence in support of the "fraudulent concealment" exception to the two-year limitations period, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal and that the sufficiency of the evidence was a matter for summary judgment or trial.In each case, Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and that the time bar was not tolled by either the foreign object or fraudulent concealment exceptions set forth in the statute in part because Plaintiffs did not allege fraudulent concealment with the particularity required by Utah R. Civ. P. 2(c). The motions to dismiss were denied in large part. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions denying the motions to dismiss on time-bar grounds and reversed the decision dismissing the negligent credentialing claim, holding (1) Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal; (2) the foreign object exception did not apply in this case; and (3) the Act did not retroactively bar Plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claims. View "Bright v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiffs' medical malpractice action, holding that the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury on the "alternative methods" paragraph of Wis JI-Civil 1023.London Barney was born with severe and permanent neurologic injuries. London and his mother, Raquel Barney, filed a medical malpractice action alleging that Dr. Julie Mickelson was negligent for failing accurately to trace London's fetal heart rate during Raquel's labor. The jury found that Dr. Mickelson was not negligent in her care and treatment of the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the alternative methods instruction given to the jury likely misled the jury. This instruction generally informed the jury that Defendant was not negligent if she used reasonable care, skill and judgment in administering any one of the recognized reasonable treatment methods for monitoring London's heart rate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on all of the expert testimony introduced at trial, the jury was properly given the alternative methods instruction. View "Barney v. Mickelson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of HIMA San Pablo Caguas's motion for judgment as a matter of law as well as its remitted verdict after a jury found HIMA responsible for ten percent of Plaintiff's damages, holding that the jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find HIMA responsible for ten percent of Plaintiff's damages and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in remitting the verdict.Plaintiff's father died from complications relating to the removal of his dialysis catheter at a HIMA facility. Plaintiff sued HIMA and other defendants, alleging negligence. The jury found the co-defendants jointly liable for medical malpractice and awarded Plaintiff $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, finding HIMA responsible for ten percent of Plaintiff's damages. HIMA moved for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, for remittitur of the jury's damages award. The district court denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law but granted remittitur, reducing the damages award to $400,000. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying HIMA's motion for judgment of a matter of law and did not abue its discretion in applying the federal standard in its remittitur analysis and remitting the verdict. View "Suero-Algarin v. HIMA San Pablo Caguas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held a doctor who was permitted to practice medicine in Tennessee under a statutory licensure exemption but was not licensed to practice in Tennessee or a contiguous state during the year before the date of the alleged injury or wrongful conduct does not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(b) to testify as an expert witness in a health care liability action.Plaintiff brought this action against Thomas Killian, M.D. and Frist Cardiology, PLLC (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Defendants' negligent conduct caused her husband's death. Plaintiff named Dr. Jason A. Rytlewski as the expert witness who would testify that Dr. Killian deviated from the applicable standard of care in his treatment of the decedent. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Dr. Rytlewski did not have a medical license in Tennessee or a contiguous state the year before the decedent's heart procedure, as required by section 29-26-115(b). In response, Plaintiff explained that Dr. Rytlewski had been granted an exemption allowing him to practice medicine without a medical license. The trial court allowed Dr. Rytlewski's testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dr. Rytlewski was not qualified to testify as an expert as an expert witness in this health care liability case. View "Young v. Frist Cardiology, PLLC" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court striking the evidence supporting a claim for punitive damages against Defendant, a physician who repeatedly prescribed narcotic pain medication to a patient, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court erred by granting Defendant's motion to strike.The patient in this case died from an accidental overdose of oxycodone, alcohol, and prescription medications. Plaintiff, the administrator of the decedent's estate, filed a wrongful death action against Defendant. In addition to damages permitted in wrongful death actions the administrator requested an award of punitive damages. Defendant conceded that he breached the applicable standard of care with respect to his care and treatment of the decedent but moved to strike the punitive damages claim. The circuit court granted the motion to strike. At issue was whether a jury could have concluded that Defendant's actions constituted a "willful and wanton" disregard for the decedent's health and safety. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the specific circumstances of this case, the administrator's punitive damages claim should have been submitted to the jury. View "Curtis v. Highfill" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony about causation from Dr. John Stark, an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Kevin Stephan, an infection-disease specialist, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the doctors' causation testimony.This action arose from right-knee arthroplasty Dr. James Schaffhausen performed on Plaintiff. In her complaint, Plaintiff argued that, as a result of the surgery, she suffered permanent neurologic damage. The jury found for Plaintiff. Dr. Schaffhausen moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing that it was error for Dr. Stark and Dr. Stephan to testify as to causation because they were not neurologists. The district court denied the motions. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the experts were not qualified to testify as to causation because they lacked the requisite occupational experience in neurology. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the district court carefully weighed the qualifications of Dr. Stark and Dr. Stephan before deciding to admit their testimony, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting their testimony on the issue of causation. View "Marquardt v. Schaffhausen" on Justia Law

Elaine Kirt died in 2010, due to complications that developed shortly after undergoing eye surgery. On September 23, 2011, her son, Neville Kirt, appearing in person and on behalf of his deceased mother and his two brothers, filed a request with the Division of Administration asking for a medical review panel to review the care provided to his mother by three defendants: Dr. Rebecca Metzinger, the attending surgeon; Dr. Theodore Strickland III, the anesthesiologist for the procedure; and Tulane Medical Center. In a reply letter to Neville, the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board (PCF) acknowledged receipt of the request; confirmed Dr. Metzinger, Dr. Strickland, and Tulane University Hospital & Clinic were qualified under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (Act); informed Kirt a filing fee of $100 per qualified defendant was due; and requested payment of $300. The notice stated the failure to pay would render the request invalid, without effect, and would not suspend the time to file suit. Days later, then appearing through counsel, the Kirts sent a second letter asking to amend its previous request, adding two additional nurses. The Kirts included a $500 check to cover filing fees. A medical review panel convened, reviewed the care provided by all named healthcare providers, and found no breach of the standard of care. The Kirts thereafter filed against the doctors and nurses. Claims against the doctors were dismissed by summary judgments because there was no proof they breached the standard of care while treating Elaine Kirt. Those judgments expressly barred allocating fault to the dismissed parties and prohibited introducing evidence at trial to establish their fault. The nurses then filed peremptory exceptions of prescription, claiming the request for a medical review panel was invalid because the Kirts failed to pay the final $100 filing fee, and prescription was not suspended for any claims. The trial court concurred with the nurses and granted an exception of prescription. The Supreme Court determined that because the Kirts paid filing fees for five of six named defendants, dismissal of one of the nurses was proper for lack of a filing fee. The Court determined the lower courts did not consider or decide the merits of the Kirts' argument that they could not have reasonable known about the claims against two of the nurse defendants until one was deposed. Because the lower courts did not consider or decide the merits of the Kirts' basis for the exception of prescription, which could have turned on factual findings, the Supreme Court pretermitted consideration of these arguments and remanded the matter to the trial court for further disposition of the exception. View "Kirt v. Metzinger" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's order granting Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff's complaint failed to comply with N.C. R. Civ. P. 9(j), holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that Plaintiff's expert witness was unwilling to testify that Defendant did not comply with the applicable standard of care.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) both the trial court and the court of appeals erred in failing to view the evidence regarding the expert witness's willingness to testify under Rule 9(j) in the light most favorable to Plaintiff; (2) in its de novo review, the court of appeals erred by deferring entirely to the findings of the trial court; and (3) the complaint should not be dismissed on Rule 9(j) grounds because the factual record demonstrated that the expert witness was willing to testify at the time of the filing of the complaint that Defendant breached the standard of care. View "Preston v. Movahed" on Justia Law