Plaintiff Deborah Dawkins was treated by defendant David Siwicki during an emergency room visit after the plaintiff fell and injured her left wrist. The plaintiff subsequently filed a medical malpractice lawsuit, alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment by the defendant. The plaintiff was initially treated by the defendant and subsequently underwent multiple surgeries over the span of several years, which the plaintiff alleged were necessary because of the defendant's alleged negligent treatment of her injury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed, raising a number of arguments before the Supreme Court, many of which centered around the defense of the plaintiff's comparative negligence based on the defendant's contention that cigarette smoking impeded her treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, finding the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in the arguments raised by the plaintiff regarding pretrial ruling matters, alleged trial errors, and posttrial motions. View "Dawkins v. Siwicki" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, alleging failure to diagnose apendicitis, the court gave Civil Jury Instruction 105.01 (2006), which refers to a "reasonably careful," as opposed to a "reasonably well-qualified" (the 2005 instruction) professional. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the jury instruction does not accurately state the law, but affirmed. The 2006 instruction eliminated the distinction between institutional negligence, which can be proven without expert testimony, and professional negligence, which requires expert testimony. The hospital was not prejudiced by the instruction because expert testimony was presented in connection with a vicarious liability claim. The court rejected the hospital's argument that the instruction was confusing and allowed jurors to consider personal knowledge in determining what is reasonable. View "Studt v. Sherman Health Systems" on Justia Law

Petitioner Loretta Day was referred to Respondent Dr. Bruce Johnson, M.D., for treatment for hypothyroidism. Dr. Johnson determined that surgery was needed to remove both lobes of the thyroid. A few weeks later, Mrs. Day's vocal cords stopped working, and she suffered a permanent speaking disability that she alleged was caused by the surgery. Mrs. Day and her husband sued Dr. Johnson for negligence, asserting that the Doctor incorrectly assessed Mrs. Day's condition, recommended inappropriate treatment, and improperly removed part of her thyroid. The trial court submitted the issue of Dr. Johnson's negligence to the jury which included a jury instruction that mirrored the language of a pattern jury instruction pertaining to negligence. The Days objected to the court's use of this instruction, arguing that the instruction included a misstatement of Colorado law. The court overruled the objection. The jury found that Dr. Johnson was not negligent. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's use of the instruction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Days argued that both the trial and appellate courts erred by using the instruction. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the portion of the pattern jury instructions accurately stated Colorado law.

The West Virginia Medical Imaging & Radiation Therapy Technology Board of Examiners appealed an order of the circuit court. In the order, the court reversed the Board's decision to suspend Appellee Kenneth Harrison's medical license. The Board issued a final administrative decision that found Dr. Harrison practiced outside the scope of his medical imaging and radiation therapy license when he administered intravenous allergy medicine to a patient without the treating physician's involvement. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision.

Plaintiff-Appellants Franz and Betty Suhadolnik appealed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of their doctor, Defendant-Respondent Scott Pressman. Mr. Suhadolnik argued that his cataract surgeon, Dr. Pressman, failed to adequately inquire about his prior use of a prescription drug that resulted in increased risks during surgery. Mr. Suhadolnik presented expert testimony to demonstrate that Dr. Pressman was negligent when he performed the surgery. The district court determined that Mr. Suhadolnikâs expert failed to address any knowledge of the local standard of care, which was necessary to avoid having the testimony stricken from the trial record. Mr. Suhadolnik appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the district court erred by dismissing his expertâs testimony. The Supreme Court found that the district court acted within its discretion in holding the expertâs testimony to be inadmissible. Accordingly the Court affirmed the lower courtâs holding.

A jury found that Morehouse General Hospital (Morehouse) committed four acts of malpractice that caused an injury to the son of Jonathon and Belinda Johnson. The jury apportioned 80% of the fault to Morehouse, and 20% to the treating physician. The appellate court found the jury was wrong in finding Morehouse liable for three of the four acts, and reversed those figures (20% to Morehouse; 80% to the physician). The Supreme Court was asked to review whether the appellate court properly modified the jury verdict. After considering the record and the law, the Supreme Court found that the appellate court was correct in finding Morehouse was only liable for one act of negligence, but it disagreed with its apportionment of fault. The Court split the fault between the parties 50%-50%.

The plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful-birth and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on medical-provider defendants' failure to inform them that their older child had a genetic mutation. They claim that they would not have conceived a second child if they had been given correct information. The trial court held that damages available in a wrongful-birth action do not include the extraordinary costs of caring for a disabled child after he reaches the age of majority. The appellate court held that plaintiff parents in a wrongful-birth case may recover damages for the cost of caring for their dependent,disabled, adult child and that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded, noting a question of fact concerning when the limitations period began to run. The court affirmed the holding that the plaintiffs have a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress; the "zone of danger" test does not apply when damages for emotional distress are an element of another tort. The court reversed and reinstated the judgment that plaintiffs may not recover damages for the postmajority expenses of caring for their son; damages incurred after the age of majority are incurred by the child, who suffered no legal harm.