Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that certain medical malpractice claims that they had asserted in an action against a medical association were covered under an insurance policy issued to the facility by Insurer. Due to Insurer's insolvency during the pendency of the action, Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association assumed liability for Insurer's obligations to the extent that claims were covered under the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Act. The Association filed a counterclaim, contending that the claims against the medical association were not covered because they were subject to a policy provision that excluded them from corporate coverage liability. The trial rendered rendered judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the policy exclusion was inapplicable to the medical association's coverage for claims brought against it predicated solely on liability that it may have occurred through the acts of one of its nurse practitioners. View "Johnson v. Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case arose from a pending medical malpractice case from the Denver district court. Plaintiff Ernest Ortega sued Defendants Dr. David Lieuwen and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado (Kaiser) alleging negligent medical treatment given to him in 2007. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his request for a protective order to cover his electronic medical records encompassing a ten-year period preceding the incident underlying this case. The trial court determined that Plaintiff's electronic medical records were not protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the records were relevant to prepare a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Plaintiff's medical records were not protected as privileged and that Defendants could use unredacted copies of all of Plaintiff's medical records. View "Ortega v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado" on Justia Law

Katherine Lewis filed a medical malpractice suit against her former psychiatrist, Dr. Jeremy Waletzky, for injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of medications he prescribed to her. Lewis did not comply with various administrative filing requirements set forth in the Health Care Malpractice Claims statute (the Act) before filing her complaint in the district court. Waletzky filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Lewis was required to have complied with the Act's filing requirements. Lewis responded that she was not subject to the act because the injury occurred in Washington, D.C., and therefore, D.C. law governed her malpractice suit. The district court granted Waletzky's motion to dismiss after invoking the public policy exception to lex loci delicti. The Court of Appeals granted certification to answer whether Maryland recognizes the public policy exception to lex loci delicti based on the Act. The Supreme Court held (1) the filing provisions at issue in this case were procedural, mandating application of those requirements under Maryland choice-of-law principles, as the law of the forum; and (2) therefore, the doctrine of lex loci delicti did not apply under the circumstances. View "Lewis v. Waletzky" on Justia Law

Kasey Landrum sued Defendants, Chippenham and Johnson-Willis Hospitals and Dr. John Deitrick, for medical malpractice. Because Landrum did not identify her expert witnesses in accordance with the circuit court's scheduling order, Defendants moved to exclude the expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Defendants' motions and gave Landrum's out-of-state counsel extra time to supplement the designation so as to comport with Va. R. Civ. P. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Landrum's out-of-state counsel then filed a supplemental designation without local counsel's signature in violation of Va. R. Civ. P. 1A:4(2). The circuit court then granted Defendants' motions to exclude the expert witnesses and for summary judgment after finding that Landrum could not meet her burden of proof on her medical-malpractice claims without an expert witness to establish the standard of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Landrum's expert's witnesses because of her failure to obey its pretrial orders. View "Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps." on Justia Law

After a surgery at University Hospital, Jennifer Beglin passed away. Appellee, Michael Beglin, brought suit against the Hospital. A jury found that the Hospital, through its employees and agents, acted negligently in causing the death of Jennifer. The trial court then entered judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court properly gave a missing evidence instruction in connection with the unexplained disappearance with an occurrence report because (i) the trier of fact is entitled to such an instruction when it may be reasonably believed that material evidence within the exclusive control of a party was lost without explanation, and the trier of fact may find that the evidence was intentionally and in bad faith destroyed or concealed by the party possessing it, and (ii) the instruction did not unduly affect the general verdict or punitive damages award; but (2) the trial court erred by giving a punitive damages instruction under the circumstances in this case. Remanded. View "Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Beglin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff ProSelect Insurance Company filed this declaratory relief action to determine its duty to indemnify its insured in a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and sexual assault. The trial court construed a policy exclusion to bar coverage and entered judgment in favor of ProSelect. Plaintiff Robyn Levy appealed that judgment, asserting that: (1) the malpractice claims are covered under the concurrent causation doctrine; and (2) the policy exclusion as interpreted by the trial court contravenes public policy. Plaintiff alleged she began psychiatric counseling with Defendant's insured, Dr. Peter McKenna from 2003-2005. In that time, Plaintiff alleged Dr. McKenna negligently failed to properly diagnose her psychological disorder, prescribed harmful medications, encouraged her to pursue "unhealthy lifestyle choices," failed to refer her to a community-based mental health program, and engaged in treatment "at variance with accepted professional protocols." In a separate count, Levy alleged that, "[i]n the course of . . . treatment," Dr. McKenna had committed sexual assault and battery. ProSelect filed suit seeking a declaration that its professional liability policy excluded coverage of Plaintiff's suit. The trial court reasoned that the underlying action was indisputably a "suit" that contains an allegation of sexual assault. Therefore, by its plain terms the policy barred coverage of the complaint in its entirety, "[e]ven assuming" that the medical malpractice count was—as Plaintiff claimed—"totally unrelated" to the sexual assault and therefore otherwise covered. The trial court thus granted ProSelect’s motion and entered judgment in its favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's malpractice and assault claims could not be viewed as separate or independent causes, and coverage can not be grounded on the "concurrent causation doctrine." Furthermore, without a basis in the concurrent causation doctrine, there was no violation of public policy Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "ProSelect Insurance Co. v. Levy" on Justia Law

John Brennan sued his physician, who had a $200,000 professional liability insurance policy, for medical malpractice. The insurer was declared insolvent after Brennan filed his claim but before he recovered. The insurer's insolvency triggered the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association's (KIGA) statutory obligation to cover the insurer's obligations to the extent provided by the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association Act. KIGA, which intervened in the suit, denied liability because Brennan received medical reimbursements from his personal health insurance policy that totaled more than the insolvent insurer's policy limits. The dispositive issue was whether Brennan's due process rights were violated by a retroactive statutory amendment permitting KIGA to offset Brennan's personal health insurance benefits against its liability on the insolvent insurer's $200,000 policy. The district court declared the statute's retroactive feature unconstitutional and entered judgment against KIGA for $200,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the retroactivity provision violated due process, and (2) Brennan's rights were governed by the preamended statute. View "Brennan v. Kan. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

This medical malpractice case arose out of the claimed failure of Defendant, Mandell and Blau, M.D.'s, P.C., properly and promptly to diagnose Plaintiff, Brenda Sawicki, with breast cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate court reversed the trial court, determining that the trial court had abused its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff was not prejudiced by jurors' predeliberation discussions. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that there was ample evidence of repeated, egregious misconduct and that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated prejudice. View "Sawicki v. New Britain Gen. Hosp." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice action against defendants. At issue was whether the five-day extension under CPLR 2103(b)(2) applied to the 15-day time period prescribed by CPLR 511(b) to move for change of venue when a defendant served its demand for change of venue by mail. The court held that, in this instance, defendants who served their motion papers by mail 20 days after they served their demand to change venue were entitled to a five-day extension of the 15-day period prescribed in CPLR 511(2). Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the case remitted for further proceedings. View "Simon v. Usher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Terrance White appealed a superior court's order in his wrongful death action that granted summary judgment to Defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. This case arose from the suicide of Plaintiff's fourteen-year-old daughter. Plaintiff sued Defendant, which employed a psychiatrist who was briefly involved with the decedent's case through a telepsychiatry research study. Plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to decedent by the psychiatrist. Ultimately, the trial court found that the psychiatrist's contact with decedent was "so minimal as to not establish a physician-patient relationship," and consequently found that no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. Even assuming that a doctor-patient relationship was established, the court concluded that it was terminated following the video-conference and, thus, any duty was extinguished by termination of the relationship and no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. The court thus granted defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding that the doctor owed no duty to decedent. They maintained that the doctor had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect decedent from the danger she posed to herself, and that the doctor did not effectively terminate the doctor-patient relationship prior to decedent's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff and thus reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings. View "White v. Harris" on Justia Law