Defendant Hematology-Oncology of Indiana, a health care provider, appealed a trial court judgment awarding attorney fees and litigation expenses brought under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) and the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court entered judgment against defendants for $108,509 in attorney fees and litigation expenses in addition to a $229,148 judgment on the jury verdict for damages exclusive of attorney fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney and litigation expenses was authorized by the AWDS; and (2) the total judgment, including both the jury's damage verdict and the attorney fees and expenses, exceeded the cap limiting damages against individual providers under the MMA. The Court affirmed in part and remanded to limit the provider's aggregate liability to the $250,000 cap prescribed by the MMA. View "Hematology-Oncology of Ind., P.C. v. Fruits" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this diversity action in district court against defendant, a medical device manufacturer, alleging that the SurgiWrap, a product designed and produced by defendant, used in her surgical procedure had a manufacturing defect that caused it to perform in a manner other than as intended, and seeking relief under Georgia products liability law. At issue was whether the district court erred in limiting the testimony of her physicians and in granting summary judgment for defendant. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of her treating physicians in light of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the strictures of Daubert. The court also held that plaintiff failed to produce evidence, expert or otherwise, from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the SurgiWrap implanted in her abdomen contained a manufacturing defect. Accordingly, the district court correctly entered summary judgment for defendant. View "Williams v. Mast Biosurgery USA, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal involved a putative class action filed by three Pennsylvania Medicaid beneficiaries subject to the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare's (DPW) liens against future settlements or judgments. At issue was whether state agencies responsible for administering the Medicaid program have the authority to assert such liens and, if so, whether Pennsylvania's statutory framework was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn. The court examined the text, structure, history, and purpose of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., and held that liens limited to medical costs were not prohibited by the anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)-(b). Accordingly, the court upheld Pennsylvania's longstanding practice of imposing such liens. The court also held that Pennsylvania's current statutory framework, which afforded Medicaid recipients a right of appeal from the default allocation, was a permissible default apportionment scheme. View "Tristani, et al. v. Richman, et al." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Von Linden took her life three weeks after she was discharged as an inpatient from defendant Mercy Hospital's psychiatric ward and six days after her outpatient office visit with Mercy's psychiatrist. Von Linden's husband brought a wrongful death action against Mercy, alleging negligent care. Mercy raised defenses, including Von Linden's comparative negligence. The jury found both Mercy and Von Linden negligent and allocated ninety percent of the total fault to Von Linden and ten percent to Mercy, resulting in a defense verdict. At issue on appeal was whether the state's comparative fault act, Iowa Code chapter 668, permits a jury to compare the fault of a noncustodial suicide victim with the negligence of the mental health professionals treating her. The Supreme Court held that Von Linden owed a duty of self-care as an outpatient, and the district court committed no reversible error in allowing the jury to compare her fault. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment for Mercy. View "Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sohrab Devitre was previously involved in a separate lawsuit in which he agreed to have an independent medical examination by Dr. Mitchell Rotman. After the conclusion of that case, Devitre sued Dr. Rotman and the medical center at which Dr. Rotman practiced for personal injuries caused during the examination. The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit for Devitre's failure to file the health care affidavit as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225, and the trial court dismissed Devitre's action. On appeal, Devitre argued that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the lawsuit because he was not a patient of the defendants, and (2) the medical examination conducted by the doctor did not create a physician-patient relationship that would trigger the requirement in Section 538.225 to file a health care affidavit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that recipients of an independent medical examination are patients of the physician for the limited purpose of conducting the examination, and therefore, a physician-patient relationship existed and triggered the requirement in the statute for the filing of a health care affidavit. View "Devitre v. The Orthopedic Ctr. of Saint Louis, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellant Sarah Dudley filed suit against real parties in interest Erdagon Atasoy, M.D., and Kleinert Kutz and Associates for alleged negligent diagnosis, care, and treatment related to Dudley's adverse reaction to an injection in her shoulder. In a discovery request, the real parties in interest sought appellant's medical records, including her psychiatric records. Appellant filed a motion for a protective order to prevent her psychiatric records from being subject to discovery. Judge Olu Stevens denied appellant's motion, finding that her physical and mental condition was at the heart of her claims. Appellant then filed for a writ of prohibition against Judge Stevens to prevent the discovery of her psychiatric records. The court of appeals denied appellant's petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that her records were subject to the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Ky. R. Evid. 507(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that appellant waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege because she asserted her mental condition as part of her claim and that Judge Stevens did not err by denying appellant's motion for a protective order. View "Dudley v. Jefferson Circuit Court (Stevens)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Martin Malinou filed a wrongful death and medical negligence action against Miriam Hospital and other medical professionals after his ninety-four year old mother died. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff's claims were not supported by competent expert testimony and that plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof on the issues of breach of the standard of care and causation. The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) given plaintiff's repeated noncompliance with discovery orders, the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by precluding two doctors from testifying as expert witnesses; (2) because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his underlying claims for medical negligence and wrongful death, plaintiff did not have a viable claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or for loss of society and companionship; (3) adopting a loss-of-chance doctrine would not preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants; and (4) plaintiff did not raise a genuine issue of material fact in showing one of defendant doctors filed a false death certificate in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws 11-18-1. View "Malinou v. The Miriam Hospital" on Justia Law

Appellant David Maycock, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Marty Maycock, filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against various doctors and Alegent Health based on their treatment of Marty prior to and until his death. The district court dismissed the case against certain doctors and Alegent Health. The court of appeals affirmed these rulings. Meanwhile, at the district court, the remaining doctors moved for summary judgment on the sole basis that the claims against them were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the doctors. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, determining that there were genuine issues of material fact whether Marty was under a mental disorder at the time he was treated by the doctors and that therefore, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-213, the statute of limitations was tolled until the removal of his mental disorder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether and on what dates the action was tolled. View "Maycock v. Hoody" on Justia Law

The State provided prisoner Dewell Pearce extensive medical care during his incarceration. Around the time of his release from custody, Mr. Pearce won a medical malpractice judgment against the State. The State paid part of the judgment, but relying on a reimbursement statute, withheld the medical care costs associated with conditions unrelated to the malpractice claim. The State then sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reimbursement from Mr. Pearce for treatment of the unrelated conditions. The superior court ruled that the statute in question did not authorize the State to seek reimbursement from former prisoners no longer in custody. The State appealed. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that the superior court misinterpreted the law. The Court reversed the superior court's ruling and vacated the judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dep't of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce" on Justia Law

In a medical professional liability action, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellants James and Debbie MacDonald, which included an award of $1,500,000 for noneconomic loss. In accordance with W. Va. Code 55-7B-8, the circuit court reduced the noneconomic damages award to $500,000, finding that James suffered a permanent and substantial physical deformity warranting application of the higher cap amount. On appeal, the MacDonalds argued that the cap contained in the statute was unconstitutional, and therefore, the circuit court erred in reducing the jury's verdict. Appellees, Sayeed Ahmed, M.D. and City Hospital, asserted a cross-assignment of error, arguing that the $250,000 cap should have been applied in this case. City Hosptial also cross assigned as error the circuit court's denial of its motion for summary judgment, motion for judgment as a matter of law, and motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute as amended in 2003 was constitutional, (2) the circuit court did not err in applying the higher cap, and (3) the circuit court did not err in denying the motions filed by City Hospital. View "MacDonald v. City Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law