Teresa Broussard brought a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, Dr. Stephen Seffense and Dr. Michael Coleman, Jr. after she developed and was treated for a burn following a surgery. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Broussard appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-114-206(a), which requires that proof in medical malpractice cases must be made by expert testimony by medical care providers of the same speciality as the defendant, was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the inherent authority of the courts to protect the integrity of proceedings and the rights of litigants. Remanded. View "Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys." on Justia Law

Kristine Malouf took the drug Depakote to control her seizures both before and during her pregnancy. While Kristine gave birth to a seemingly healthy child in March 1997, she and her husband eventually discovered the child had brain damage. In 2002, the Maloufs filed a complaint in Hinds County against Dr. Ruth Fredericks, a neurologist; and in 2006, they filed an amended complaint adding Dr. J. Martin Tucker, Jr., an obstetrician-gynecologist (Defendants) alleging Kristine's treating physicians negligently caused their child's brain damage and other injuries. After the Maloufs joined Dr. Tucker, the Defendants moved to transfer venue to Rankin County. The trial court denied the motion to change venue, finding the Defendants had abandoned it. The Supreme Court granted Defendants' interlocutory appeal to determine whether the trial court erred in its ruling on venue. Upon review, the Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the Defendants abandoned their right to contest venue. View "Fredericks v. Malouf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Dr. Mary Jane Benson, Dr. George C. Rees, and West Florida Hospital, alleging that the doctors were negligent in rendering medical care to her, which resulted in excessive liver damage. Plaintiff's claim against the hospital were based on both vicarious liability for Dr. Benson's negligence, as well as liability for the direct negligence in granting medical staff privileges to both doctors, which led to the medical care and procedures performed. The court approved the First District's decision because it held that the trial court correctly ordered the disclosure of a blank application for medical staff privileges. Section 381.0287(b)1 impermissible attempted to limit the disclosure requirements of article X, section 25 of the Florida Constitution (Amendment 7), and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. 11101 et seq., did not preempt Amendment 7. In accordance with the court's decision, the court disapproved of the decision of the Fourth District in Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc. v. Taitel and its contrary holding that a blank form used by a hospital for nurse credentialing was confidential and protected by disclosure. View "West Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc., etc. v. See, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, a doctor and hospital, for medical malpractice. Defendants filed motions for a preliminary determination requesting that the trial court dismiss the complaint due to Plaintiff's dilatory conduct. The trial court denied the request. The court of appeals (1) determined that the trial court's order was a final judgment, and (2) affirmed the trial court's order as to the hospital but reversed as to the doctor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's order was not a final appealable judgment because it did not dispose of all claims as to all parties and because the trial court's order did not contain the "magic language" of Ind. R. App. P. 2(H)(2). View "Ramsey v. Moore" on Justia Law

After the negligence of government doctors in California caused significant and irreversible brain damage to J.C., his parents brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674, suit against the United States. This case returned to the court after remand to the district court. On remand, the district court held that it could not provide the government with a reversionary interest in the future care award that "would comply with" both the FTCA and California law. The United States appealed. Because granting the government a reversionary interest in J.C.'s future care award eliminated the potential for a windfall without in any way rendering the award less sufficient compensation for J.C., the court found such a remedy approximated Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 667.7 in a manner that was consistent with the FTCA. Accordingly, the court remanded the case with instructions for the district court to fashion such a remedy. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Cibula, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Flying from Cairo to New York, a flight attendant thought plaintiff looked ill and recruited a second-year medical resident to perform an examination. The resident thought that plaintiff was suffering an ischemic stroke or transient ischemic attack. The pilot made an emergency landing and, less than two hours later, plaintiff was treated at a hospital. The hospital did not administer an intravenous shot of tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA), a form of thrombolytic therapy that dissolves clots, but is not appropriate for all patients. His condition deteriorated, then stabilized, and he was transferred for care in New York. The district court held a "Daubert" hearing in plaintiff's malpractice claim and two experts gave vastly different opinions about whether failure to administer t-PA caused plaintiff's injuries. The court held that the standard for causation was "more likely than not" and that Maine had not adopted the "lost chance" doctrine, excluded plaintiff's expert, and granted summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to show causation.View "Samaan v. St. Joseph Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued defendant for negligence and loss of consortium when defendant performed an unsuccessful spinal fusion surgery on one plaintiff. The jury found in favor of defendant and plaintiffs subsequently appealed the court's denial of their motion for a new trial. The court held that the district court did not clearly and prejudicially abuse its considerable discretion in prohibiting the admission of the evidence concerning defendant's other patients under Rule 404(b). The court also held that the district court's exclusion of the evidence was also proper under Rule 403 because any relevance was substantially outweighed by the evidence's greater potential to prejudice defendant unfairly, confuse the jury, and cause undue delay. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion where it properly deferred to the jury's weighing of conflicting expert testimony about whether defendant properly placed the pedicle screws. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bair, et al. v. Callahan" on Justia Law

Decedent was treated at a non-profit clinic, by volunteer physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services deemed those physicians to be Public Health Service employees (Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(o)), immune from suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-2680. A suit against the U.S. was the exclusive remedy for alleged malpractice at the clinic. Decedent also treated at a facility where physicians did not enjoy those protections. Her estate sued the U.S., the clinic, the other facility, the doctors at that facility, and their physicians' group. The district court granted summary judgment for the clinic, predicated on immunity under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act (NJCIA), and ultimately dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, except for remanding with respect to the physicians' group. The trial court properly held that the U.S. was immune from suit under the NJCIA, which provides that a similarly-placed private employer would be entitled to the defense. The court properly held that the treatment provided constituted emergency medicine, so that N.J. Stat. 2A:53A-41 applied and one of plaintiff's experts was not qualified to testify. The court erred in not considering treatment by a physicians' assistant in considering claims against her employer, the physicians' group.View "Lomando v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dewey MacKay, M.D. petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review a decision of the Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that revoked his registration to dispense controlled substances and denied all pending requests for renewal of modification. This case concerned Petitioner's prescribing behavior from 2005 to 2009 when his practice focused primarily on chronic pain management. The DEA began investigating Petitioner after receiving information from local authorities that he was issuing unlawful prescriptions for controlled substances. the Deputy Administrator of the DEA issued an order to show cause why it should not revoke Petitioner's registration, alleging that Petitioner "issued numerous purported prescriptions for controlled substances without a legitimate medical purpose outside the usual course of professional practice." The Tenth Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review: "Petitioner never admitted any fault or taken responsibility for his misconduct. Nor [could] he point to any evidence that he reformed his habits. Instead, he continued to illegitimately dispense controlled substances even when he knew the DEA was investigating him. The Deputy Administrator’s revocation of [Petitioner's] registration is consistent with the DEA’s policy and practice of revoking registration under such circumstances." View "MacKay v. DEA" on Justia Law

After giving birth to a stillborn male, Father and Mother filed suit against the United States in federal district court, alleging medical negligence and requesting damages for their pain and suffering, for the wrongful death of their child, and for expenses related to their child's death. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer whether Utah Code Ann. 78-11-6 allows a claim to be made for the wrongful death of an unborn child. At the time the claim was filed, Utah's wrongful death statute stated that "a parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child when the injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." Although there was no majority opinion, four members of the Court held that the statute allows an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child because the term "minor child," as used in the statute, includes an unborn child. View "Carranza v. United States" on Justia Law