Plaintiff suffered a stroke and claimed that the VA hospital failed to properly diagnose and take appropriate measures. He and his wife sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-80, and also sued their attorney for malpractice. The district court ruled in favor of the government and the attorney. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal as forfeited because plaintiff had supplied only a transcript of the testimony of the government's expert witness Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(3) and had failed to supplement. The district court properly refused to sanction plaintiff's attorney for ex parte communication with treating physicians. The court also properly credited the government expert and held that the hospital's actions were not the proximate cause of the stroke. View "Morisch v. United States" on Justia Law

Alyssa Ray received treatment from Dr. Kara Yamamoto, an employee of Kapiolani Medical Specialists (KMS). Alyssa's parents brought an action in circuit court against KMS for negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The jury found that (1) Dr. Yamamoto's treatment of Alyssa was negligent but it was not a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries; and (2) Dr. Yamamoto failed to properly inform the Rays, and her failure was a legal cause of Alyssa's injuries. The circuit court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim and entered judgment in favor of the Rays. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding (1) the circuit court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Rays on their negligent treatment claim, and a new trial was required because the negligent treatment and informed consent verdicts were irreconcilable; (2) the circuit court did not err by denying KMS' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent; and (3) the circuit court erred by admitting certain testimony and failing adequately to cure the error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists" on Justia Law

After John Sykes died in the emergency room at Calhoun Health Services, his estate sued the hospital for wrongful death, claiming that Mr. Sykes should have been hooked up to a cardiac monitor. Mr. Sykes was admitted after complaining of chest pains. He did not appear to be in distress, was not short of breath and was not sweating. He denied having any other symptoms. Mr. Sykes would later be diagnosed with "severe cardiomegaly" and died of "sudden cardiac death" related to "severe. . . hypertensive heart disease." The trial judge held that the estate failed to prove that the hospital had deviated from an applicable standard of care, and failed to prove that use of the cardiac monitor would have made a difference for Mr. Sykes' care. The Supreme Court found that all of the estate's issues concerned factual determinations that were within the discretion of the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Sykes v. Calhoun Health Services" on Justia Law

Central to this case is the proper interpretation of a 2006 statute of limitations and statute of repose applicable to a claim for medical malpractice. Appellant Lisa Unruh filed suit against her orthodontist, Dr. Dino Cacchiotti, alleging that his negligent treatment when she was a minor resulted in her losing her teeth and having to undergo extensive implant surgery. The Doctor successfully moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute of limitations had expired. At the Court of Appeals, the Doctor raised an alternative ground for dismissing Appellant's case based on an eight-year statute of repose. After requesting supplemental briefing, the Court of Appeals certified the case for the Supreme Court's review. After review of the applicable legal authority, the Court held that neither the statute of limitations nor the statute of repose barred Appellant's claim. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Unruh v. Cacchiotti" on Justia Law

On the last day of a three-year limitations period, Eric Katz filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice in the death of his mother. After discovery, Katz amended the petition by adding several defendants and dropping others. At the time of the amendment, the statute of limitations had expired. Only one defendant named within the limitations period remained in the case. The newly added defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the action was not commenced against them within the limitations period and that the amendment adding them did not relate back to the date of the original filing. The circuit court overruled the motions to dismiss, and the new defendants filed petitions for writs of prohibition. The two separate writ petitions were consolidated for decision. The Supreme Court issued preliminary writs for the petitions. The Court held that the amended petition did not relate back to the filing of the initial petition, and therefore, the statute of limitations barred Katz's lawsuit for wrongful death against the new defendants. The preliminary writs in this case were made permanent. View "State ex rel. Holzum v. J. Schneider" on Justia Law

Larry Engel filed a medical-malpractice suit in the county court of common pleas against Dr. Marek Skoskiewicz, who practiced general surgery at a county hospital. Skoskiewicz asserted he was entitled to personal immunity pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 9.86 because, at the time of the surgeries, he was acting in his capacity as a volunteer clinical instructor of the University of Toledo College of Medicine and was therefore an officer or employee of the state. Accordingly, Engel filed a malpractice action against the College of Medicine in the court of claims, which possesses exclusive jurisdiction over personal-immunity claims, and sought a determination as to whether Skoskiewicz was entitled to personal immunity as a state employee. The court of common pleas stayed Engel's malpractice suit pending resolution of the personal-immunity issue. The court concluded that Skoskiewicz had performed the operations as a state employee and therefore was entitled to personal immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Skoskiewicz was not an employee of the College of Medicine and that he did hold an appointed office or position with the state. Accordingly, Skoskiewicz was not entitled to personal immunity pursuant to the statute. Remanded. View "Engel v. Univ. of Toledo Coll. of Medicine" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether La. Rev. Stat 40:1299.47(H) mandated the admission of a medical review panel when the panel exceeded its statutory authority and rendered an opinion based on Plaintiffs' credibility and not on a medical standard. After submitting their medical malpractice complaint to a medical review panel and the panel rendered an opinion, Plaintiffs Margie and John McGlothlin filed suit against Defendant Christus St. Patrick Hospital. Over both parties' objections, the district court admitted the medical panel's opinion, subject to its redaction of all credibility language. The appellate court reversed, finding the lower court erred in admitting an edited version of the opinion. The court concluded that Plaintiffs proved the hospital's malpractice caused the injury, and awarded Plaintiffs general and special damages. Upon consideration of the vel non of the appellate court's reversal, the Supreme Court found that the medical review panel's opinion was inadmissible, but that the admission was nevertheless harmless. Finding no manifest error in the jury's verdict, the Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Nightengale brought a medical malpractice action against emergency room doctor Defendant Dr. Kevin Timmel. Defendant failed to diagnose a clot in one Plaintiff's vascular arteries. That condition cut off circulation to Plaintiff's left arm, eventually requiring its amputation above the elbow. At trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that Defendant had not breached the relevant standard of care in his treatment of Plaintiff. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the special verdict. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision in support of Defendant. View "Nightengale v. Timmel" on Justia Law

In 2009, Brian and Patricia Shull filed a medical malpractice action against Respondents Monica Reid, Andrew Elimian, Andrew Wagner, Eric Knudston and the OU Medical Center, alleging that doctors failed to properly diagnose a cytomegalovirus infection that adversely impacted Mrs. Shull's pregnancy. Respondents moved for partial summary judgment, contending that the Shulls could only recover damages related to the medical cost of continuing the pregnancy offset by the cost of terminating the pregnancy. The district court found the issue was one of first impression, and that it lacked guidance because there were no published Supreme Court opinions addressing the damages available to parents of an unhealthy, abnormal child who brought claims for wrongful birth and medical malpractice. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that in a wrongful birth action alleging malpractice, the measure of damages allowable is the extraordinary medical expenses and other pecuniary losses proximately caused by the negligence, and not the normal and foreseeable costs of raising a normal, healthy child until it reaches the age of majority. Parents cannot recover for emotional distress or loss of consortium. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Shull v. Reid" on Justia Law

Following the death of his mother, Jeffery McCabe asserted a medical malpractice claim against his mother's medical care providers, who agreed to a settlement sufficient to allow McCabe to petition Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund for additional compensation. McCabe then filed an action pursuant to the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS), seeking additional recovery from the Fund for, inter alia, medical expenses and attorney fees. The trial granted granted partial summary judgment to the Fund, finding that the AWDS does not allow recovery of attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment, holding that reasonable attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of an action under the AWDS are within the damages permitted by the statute. Remanded. View "McCabe v. Comm'r, Ind. Dep't of Ins." on Justia Law