Appellants, Little Rock Healthcare (LRHC), a nursing care facility; Donald Bedell, the sole member of the governing body for LRHC; and Heartland Personnel Leasing, appealed from a judgment in favor of Appellee Brenda Williams, as personal representative of the Estate of Minnie Valentine, who died after being discharged from LRHC. The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing Bedell and remanding for a new trial as to LRHC and Heartland, holding (1) the circuit court erred by denying Bedell's directed-verdict motion and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as Bedell owed no personal duty to Valentine; and (2) the circuit court erred in excluding Valentine's post discharge medical evidence, which error was prejudicial and warranted a new trial. View "Bedell v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the widow of a decedent and the adult children of her marriage with the decedent. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Wrongful Death Statute against University of Maryland Medical Systems Corporation (UMMSC). In their complaint, Plaintiffs did not identify or notify a stepson, Ricky Muti, whom the decedent had adopted during a prior marriage. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims arising from the failure to name Ricky as a "use" plaintiff in violation of Md. R. 15-1001. The court of special appeals held (1) Plaintiffs violated Rule 15-1001, and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs' leave to amend without first considering whether Ricky would be prejudiced by the denial. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the special court of appeals and remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims as a sanction for the omission, where there was no basis for inferring that Ricky was omitted as a use plaintiff for the purpose of hiding the litigation from home or in the hope that Plaintiffs would increase their recovery. View "Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Muti" on Justia Law

The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(B), as amended by S.B. 80, was unconstitutional, in violation of the Ohio Constitution, because it was a procedural law that conflicted with Ohio R. Civ. P. 42(B). Section 2315.21(B) created a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages had been asserted. The state Court of Appeals held that section 2315.21(B) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 24(B), in violation of the separation of powers required by the state Constitution, by purporting to "legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by the Civil Rules." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over Rule 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, as it is a substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule. View "Havel v. Villa St. Joseph" on Justia Law

Appellants, Theresa and Eddie Paulino, filed an action against Appellees, QHG of Springdale and NorthWest Arkansas Hospitals (collectively, NMC), for negligent credentialing and negligent retention after three surgeries left Mrs. Paulino unable to walk. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NMC, concluding that, inter alia, the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing, nor did a cause of action for negligent credentialing exist in Arkansas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that (1) the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing; (2) there did not exist nor was it necessary to create a tort for negligent credentialing; and (3) because the nurse that monitored the surgeries was the employee of an independent contractor, NMC could not be held liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the nurse. View "Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, a medical doctor, was convicted of distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and obtaining morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, and deception, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and was sentenced to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The government was not required to present expert testimony, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple, private houses and hotel rooms The district court properly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice because defendant lied to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents.View "United States v. Pellmann" on Justia Law

After giving birth to a newborn who suffered severe developmental issues resulting from a lack of glucose, Joe and Kathryn Norris (Norris) filed a medical malpractice action against, among others, Dr. Blayne Fritz, a physician who cared for the newborn. The morning before trial, Fritz moved to limit the scope of the testimony of Dr. Tom Strizich, the treating pediatrician, arguing that Norris failed to provide sufficient notice as to Strizich's opinions regarding a newborn's blood glucose level. The district court granted Fritz's motion, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fritz. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court to vacate its judgment and order a new trial, holding that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded Strizich's testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care where (1) Strizich was a hybrid witness for purposes of standard of care testimony; and (2) Fritz could not reasonably claim surprise or prejudice from Strizich's proposed testimony. View "Norris v. Fritz" on Justia Law

A doctor and his wife filed suit against a hospital and several of its treating physicians (collectively, Defendants) alleging medical malpractice. The jury entered a verdict for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding alleged statements made by employees of Defendant under S.D. Codified Laws 19-12-14 as this issue was waived, and even if it was not waived, there was no offer of proof that provided factual context to demonstrate that the statements should not have been excluded under the statute; and (2) the circuit court did not err in precluding the impeachment of a defense expert witness after finding it was not relevant. View "Ronan v. Sanford Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state-law claims against Stryker under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a hip replacement product manufactured by Stryker malfunctioned and caused him injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability, design defect, negligence, and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.41 et seq., claims to the extent they were premised on a failure to warn or a marketing defect; affirmed as to plaintiff's breach of express warranty claims; and reversed and remanded the following: (1) plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims, to the extent they were based on manufacturing defects that violated the FDA's Current Good Manufacturing Practices or are inconsistent with Stryker's manufacturing processes or procedures that were approved by the FDA; (2) his claim for breach of an implied warranty to the extent it relied on the failure to comply with the FDA's requirements; and (3) his DTPA claim, to the extent that it relied on a breach of an implied warranty. View "Bass v. Stryker Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Kristy and Timothy Wilcox, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a general surgeon (Doctor) and his employer, alleging that Doctor negligently performed laparoscopic gallbladder surgery on Kristy. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that the written opinion of a similar health care provider that accompanied the certificate of good faith, as mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(a), did not satisfy the "detailed basis" requirement of the statute because it failed to explain the particular manner in which Doctor had breached the standard of care. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a written opinion satisfies the "detailed basis" requirement of section 52-190a(a) if it states the similar health care provider's opinion as to the applicable standard of care, the fact that the standard of care was breached, and the factual basis of the similar health care provider's conclusion concerning the breach of the standard of care; and (2) the written opinion in the present case was sufficiently detailed to satisfy section 52-190a(a). View "Wilcox v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

In McQuitty I, Dylan McQuitty, by and through his parents, successfully sued Ms. McQuitty's physician and his practice (collectively, Spangler) for having failed to obtain Ms. McQuitty's informed consent to treatment, which resulted in severe injuries to Dylan during his birth. In a series of post-trial motions following McQuitty I, Spangler moved to reduce the verdict in favor of the McQuittys. After the verdict but prior to resolution of the post-trial motions, Dylan died. The circuit court found that Dylan's death did not absolve the portion of the judgment allocated to Dylan's future medical expenses. The Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly denied Spangler's motions for post-trial relief; (2) the post-verdict death of Dylan did not absolve Spangler from the finality of the jury's award of future medical expenses; (3) the hospital, for which summary judgment was entered in its favor as to liability and damages during McQuitty I, was not a joint tort-feasor under Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, such that its settlement release from the McQuittys did not entitle Spangler to a reduction of the judgment against them; and (4) post-judgment interest on the verdict accrued from the date of the original judgment. View "Spangler v. McQuitty" on Justia Law