Following the death of plaintiff's wife, plaintiff amended the complaint for medical malpractice in a pending action against defendants, to include a claim for wrongful death. The wrongful death claim in the amended complaint was subsequently dismissed as time barred pursuant to G.L.c. 260, section 4 (statute of repose), and plaintiff appealed. The court held that a wrongful death claim could be substituted for a personal injury claim only where the trial had not commenced; the original complaint alleging malpractice was filed within the statutes of limitation and repose; and the allegations of liability supporting the personal injury claim were the same as those supporting the wrongful death claim. Accordingly, the court held that the wrongful death claim in this case should not have been dismissed where plaintiff could, after the period of time set forth in the statue of repose had expired, amend a complaint alleging medical malpractice resulting in injury including expected premature death. View "Sisson, Jr., et al. v. Lhowe, et al." on Justia Law

Richard Compere appealed a trial court’s dismissal with prejudice and its imposition of monetary sanctions for his filing a second medical-malpractice action against Dr. Bryan Lantrip and St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital. The Hinds County Circuit Court imposed these sanctions because Compere previously had filed the same action, and it was pending at the time Compere filed his second complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in dismissing the second complaint with prejudice and imposing monetary sanctions. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Compere v. St. Dominic Jackson Mem. Hosp." on Justia Law

On December 12, 2002, Defendant Dr. Steven Wenrich delivered Plaintiff Cynthia Provencio's fourth child via caesarean section. Prior to surgery, Mrs. Provencio consented to Defendant contemporaneously performing a tubal ligation procedure on her sole fallopian tube because she did not wish to have additional children. After completing the surgeries, Defendant sent a portion of what he believed was ligated fallopian tube to a laboratory for analysis. The resulting pathology report revealed that the tissue Defendant had ligated was ligament, not fallopian tube, and Plaintiff still could conceive children. Since the Supreme Court issued "Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez," (111 N.M. 336 (1991)) more than 20 years ago, the Court has not had an opportunity to clarify whether a doctor who negligently performs a tubal ligation procedure, but who then informs the patient of her continued fertility, may be sued for the future costs of raising a subsequently conceived child to the age of majority. Upon review, the Court held that those particular damages are only available when a doctor has breached a duty to inform. In this case, the Court of Appeals held otherwise, concluding that notice of continued fertility, or lack thereof, was merely a factor for the jury to consider as questions of causation and comparative fault. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this action. View "Provencio v. Wenrich" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to sever and transfer venue. Plaintiffs Hattie Douglas, Kevin Hamlin, and the victim’s five siblings (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in circuit court against Sunshine Medical Clinic; Dr. Vibha Vig, in her official and personal capacities and Lisa Hoehn, nurse practitioner, in her official and personal capacities (collectively Defendants). The Plaintiffs alleged a medical-negligence and negligent-hiring cause of action against Defendants concerning the treatment and care of their minor son and brother, Kaddarius Douglas (Kaddarius) received before he died. Plaintiffs, in the same complaint, also brought claims against the Mississippi Crime Laboratory; Mississippi State Medical Examiners; Dr. Steven Hayne, in his official and personal capacities; Expertox, Inc.; and MedScreens, Inc. (Wrongful Incarceration Defendants) asserting that their acts and omissions in performing a postmortem examination and toxicological tests on Kaddarius's body, as well as in storing and handling blood and urine samples, caused the wrongful incarceration of Hattie Douglas for the murder of Kaddarius. All Defendants moved to have the trial court sever the claims and to transfer the claims against the Wrongful-Incarceration Defendants and to transfer the claims against the medical-negligence Defendants to another county court. The trial court denied the motion. All Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to severe the two claims and transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in not severing and transferring the claims to their proper venues. The Court the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for severance and transfer. View "Miss. Crime Lab. v. Douglas" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Husband alleged that Defendants, several physicians, a hospital and others, caused his Wife's death by negligently failing to administer an expensive drug to treat her hypertension. Because the drug needed to be administered indefinitely and could cause deadly symptoms if its administration was interrupted, Wife's treating physicians decided not to administer the drug until Wife's insurer approved it or another source of payment could be found. Wife died before either happened. The jury returned a general verdict for Defendant. Husband then filed a motion for a new trial, which the court granted based on its conclusion that Defendants' expert testimony was inconsistent with the standard of care. At issue on appeal was whether under the circumstances of this case, an expert medical witness is permitted to opine that under the customary standard of care, a physician should consider the health risks to a patient who may be unable to pay for continued treatment. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting a new trial, holding that such testimony is admissible and that, as a matter of law, it could not be said that Defendants' decisions in this case violated the standard of care. View "Murray v. UNMC Physicians" on Justia Law

Until 2005, when the Puerto Rico Board of Medical Examiners promulgated a first-in-the-nation regulation that limited the practice of cosmetic medicine to particular classes of medical specialists, all licensed physicians in Puerto Rico could perform cosmetic surgery. The Board enforced the regulation against a physician who did not possess the required specialty board certification. The district court disposed of challenges on the ground that the defendants enjoyed various kinds of immunity and did not reach constitutional issues. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the suspension of plaintiff's license amounted to a substantive due process violation and was retaliation for past testimony. The Board afforded due process protections in its hearing process. View "Gonzalez-Droz v. Gonzalez-Colon" on Justia Law

Lita St. John sued Dr. Linda Peterson, alleging medical malpractice in repairing a vesicovaginal fistula. The jury entered a verdict for Peterson. St. John appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other cases where Peterson failed to repair vesicovaginal fistulas. The Supreme Court held that the trial court misstated and apparently misapplied the balancing test of S.C. R. Evid. 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because it was possible that the exclusion of the evidence in all probability affected the outcome of the jury's verdict and thereby constituted prejudicial error, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded. View "St. John v. Peterson" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff, by her mother and natural guardian, brought a medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2401, 2671-2680, claiming that the injury plaintiff sustained at birth might have been caused by her doctor. At issue was whether plaintiff's claim was "forever barred" by the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations period. The court held that, because plaintiff failed to comply with the two-year limitations period set out in section 2401(b) and because equitable tolling, even if available, was unwarranted, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint as untimely was affirmed. View "A.Q.C. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on appeal from a jury verdict entered in a wrongful death case in favor of Jose Aguilar, Guadalupe Aguilar, Alejandro Aguilar, Lorena Aguilar and Jose Aguilar, Jr. (collectively, "the Aguilars") against Dr. Nathan Coonrod, his employer Primary Health Care Center (Primary Health) and employees of Primary Health. On appeal Dr. Coonrod asserted that the district court abused its discretion in barring him from questioning the Aguilars' expert about his opinion as to the professional negligence of Dr. Chai and Dr. Long (two previous defendants who settled or were dismissed prior to trial) in their treatment of the decedent Maria Aguilar either on cross-examination or during his case in chief. Dr. Coonrod alleged that the district court also abused its discretion in forbidding him to read portions of Dr. Blaylock’s deposition into the record. Finally, Dr. Coonrod alleged that the district court erred in interpreting the statutory cap on non-economic damages as applying to each of the Aguilars individually instead of collectively. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Dr. Coonrod's motion for a new trial, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr. Coonrod from questioning the expert on the issue of the purported negligence of Drs. Chai and Long. Dr. Coonrod failed to properly disclose Dr. Blaylock as an expert he intended to call, and was thus barred from calling him during his case in chief. Furthermore, the Court held that the district court correctly found that the statutory limitation on noneconomic damages applied on a per claimant basis, rather than a per claim basis. View "Aguilar, Jr. v. Coonrod" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the administrators of Decedent's estate, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a thoracic surgeon and the surgeon's employer. Plaintiffs attached to their original complaint an opinion letter from a physician who was board certified in internal medicine with a subspecialty in cardiovascular disease. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' original complaint on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of filing a medical malpractice lawsuit mandated by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-109a(a) as a result of their failure to attach to their complaint an opinion letter from a similar health care provider. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Defendants waived their right to challenge the sufficiency of the original complaint and its attachment by failing to timely file a motion to dismiss. Remanded. View "Morgan v. Hartford Hosp." on Justia Law