Patient filed suit against Doctor for malpractice and Hospital for negligent credentialing. During trial, Hospital produced Doctor's credentialing file, which was admitted into evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Patient. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that evidence admitted at trial concerning Doctor's disciplinary hearing was confidential and should have been excluded. Meanwhile, the court of appeals decided Day v. Finley Hospital, which held that the contents of a credentialing file fell within Iowa Code 147.135's peer review protection. On remand, Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Doctor's previously produced credentialing file was inadmissible and that, without the documents, Patient lacked sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the law of the case did not bar Hospital from objecting to the use of Doctor's credentialing file on remand for retrial because the Court's earlier opinion did not expressly or impliedly decide the admissibility of the credentialing file; and (2) section 147.135(2) sets forth not only a privilege but a separate rule of inadmissibility, so principles of waiver did not foreclose the district court from revisiting the admissibility of the credentialing file. View "Cawthorn v. Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp." on Justia Law

The Board of Physicians sanctioned Petitioner, a medical doctor, upon finding that Petitioner violated several subsections of Md. Code Ann. Health Occ. 14-404 when he falsely indicated on an application for renewal of his medical license that he was not involved in a medical malpractice action. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board did not err in either its interpretation of Md. Code Regs. 10.32.02.03.C(7)(d) or its application of that regulation to the statement of Petitioner's counsel that Petitioner would be in court on a date proposed to conduct an unrelated case resolution conference; (2) the Board properly decided that Petitioner violated section 14-404(1)(3) by failing to include on his application the pendency of the malpractice action; and (3) the Board did not err in determining that the term "willful" means intentional for purposes of section 14-404, and the record contained substantial evidence that Petitioner willfully made false statements in connection with his involvement in a medical malpractice action in his application for license renewal. View "Kim v. Bd. of Physicians" on Justia Law

After his unsuccessful cataract surgery, plaintiff brought a claim for battery against the United States government and his United States Navy surgeon. The United States invoked the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. 1089, immunizing individual military medical personnel from malpractice liability. At issue was whether section 1089(e) waived the government's sovereign immunity for common law battery claims. The court held that it did not and affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court did not address plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Levin v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice suit against defendants for injuries allegedly sustained by Mrs. Cadichon during surgery in July 2002. At issue on appeal was the May 3, 2007 stipulation. The court subsequently concluded that it was apparent from the record that neither plaintiffs nor defendants acted with expediency in moving the case forward. Where, as here, the case proceeded to the point where it was subject to dismissal, it should be the trial court, with notice to the parties, that should make the decision concerning the fate of the case, not the clerk's office. Therefore, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, was reversed and plaintiffs' complaint reinstated. View "Cadichon v Facelle" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal of a medical malpractice action, the court considered whether a doctor owed a duty of care to a patient after the doctor referred the patient to a specialist. The patient allegedly suffered serious injuries as a result of the specialist's negligence. The court held that the referring doctor had no duty to the patient at the time of her injury and that the referring doctor's alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the patient's injury. Accordingly, the Superior Court correctly granted summary judgment in the referring doctor's favor. View "Spicer, et al. v. Osunkoya, M.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against nursing home staff members alleging that defendants committed medical negligence that resulted in his father's death. A Superior Court judge dismissed the suit, stating that plaintiff's Affidavit of Merit failed to comply with 18 Del. C. 6853 because plaintiff failed to enclose a copy of the testifying expert's curriculum vitae. The court held that, since this error was procedural, a proper exercise of the trial judge's discretion would have permitted the later submission of the curriculum vitae. Therefore, the Superior Court judge erroneously dismissed the complaint. View "Dishmon, et al. v. Fucci, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that certain medical malpractice claims that they had asserted in an action against a medical association were covered under an insurance policy issued to the facility by Insurer. Due to Insurer's insolvency during the pendency of the action, Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association assumed liability for Insurer's obligations to the extent that claims were covered under the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Act. The Association filed a counterclaim, contending that the claims against the medical association were not covered because they were subject to a policy provision that excluded them from corporate coverage liability. The trial rendered rendered judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the policy exclusion was inapplicable to the medical association's coverage for claims brought against it predicated solely on liability that it may have occurred through the acts of one of its nurse practitioners. View "Johnson v. Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

This case arose from a pending medical malpractice case from the Denver district court. Plaintiff Ernest Ortega sued Defendants Dr. David Lieuwen and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado (Kaiser) alleging negligent medical treatment given to him in 2007. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his request for a protective order to cover his electronic medical records encompassing a ten-year period preceding the incident underlying this case. The trial court determined that Plaintiff's electronic medical records were not protected by the physician-patient privilege and that the records were relevant to prepare a defense. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Plaintiff's medical records were not protected as privileged and that Defendants could use unredacted copies of all of Plaintiff's medical records. View "Ortega v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado" on Justia Law

Katherine Lewis filed a medical malpractice suit against her former psychiatrist, Dr. Jeremy Waletzky, for injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of medications he prescribed to her. Lewis did not comply with various administrative filing requirements set forth in the Health Care Malpractice Claims statute (the Act) before filing her complaint in the district court. Waletzky filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Lewis was required to have complied with the Act's filing requirements. Lewis responded that she was not subject to the act because the injury occurred in Washington, D.C., and therefore, D.C. law governed her malpractice suit. The district court granted Waletzky's motion to dismiss after invoking the public policy exception to lex loci delicti. The Court of Appeals granted certification to answer whether Maryland recognizes the public policy exception to lex loci delicti based on the Act. The Supreme Court held (1) the filing provisions at issue in this case were procedural, mandating application of those requirements under Maryland choice-of-law principles, as the law of the forum; and (2) therefore, the doctrine of lex loci delicti did not apply under the circumstances. View "Lewis v. Waletzky" on Justia Law

Kasey Landrum sued Defendants, Chippenham and Johnson-Willis Hospitals and Dr. John Deitrick, for medical malpractice. Because Landrum did not identify her expert witnesses in accordance with the circuit court's scheduling order, Defendants moved to exclude the expert witnesses and for summary judgment. The circuit court denied Defendants' motions and gave Landrum's out-of-state counsel extra time to supplement the designation so as to comport with Va. R. Civ. P. 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Landrum's out-of-state counsel then filed a supplemental designation without local counsel's signature in violation of Va. R. Civ. P. 1A:4(2). The circuit court then granted Defendants' motions to exclude the expert witnesses and for summary judgment after finding that Landrum could not meet her burden of proof on her medical-malpractice claims without an expert witness to establish the standard of care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Landrum's expert's witnesses because of her failure to obey its pretrial orders. View "Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps." on Justia Law