Following the death of Waeschle’s mother, the medical examiner performed an autopsy to determine the cause of her death. While the mother’s remains were returned to Waeschle, the medical examiner retained the brain for further study without Waeschle’s knowledge. After Waeschle discovered that her mother’s brain had been retained and later incinerated as medical waste, she sued, alleging due process violations. The district court dismissed state law claims but declined to dismiss the due process claim, finding that, under Michigan’s clearly established law, next-of-kin have an interest in their deceased relative’s remains/body parts. Following remand and certification of the question, the Michigan Supreme Court responded that: Assuming that a decedent’s brain was removed by a medical examiner to conduct a lawful investigation into the decedent’s cause of death, the decedent’s next of kin does not have a right under Michigan law to possess the brain in order to properly bury or cremate the same after the brain is no longer needed for forensic examination. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, declining to sanction plaintiff for frivolous appeal. View "Waeschle v. Oakland Cnty. Med. Exam'r" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to review a summary judgment ruling dismissing a wrongful death action because it was commenced later than is allowed under Iowa Code 614.1(9), a statute of repose limiting the time allowed for commencing medical negligence cases. Plaintiffs contended their case should not have been dismissed because Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that a tissue specimen harvested from Plaintiffs' decedent more than six years before the filing of this action was not evaluated by a board-certified pathologist. In the alternative, Plaintiff contended the continuum-of-negligent-treatment doctrine precluded the summary dismissal of this case notwithstanding the statute of repose. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 614.1(9) in this case operated to extinguish the decedent's cause of action even before she and her husband knew it had accrued; and (2) under the the circumstances, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine and the continuum-of-negligent-treatment doctrine did not preserve Plaintiffs' causes of action, and section 614.1(9) denied Plaintiffs a remedy for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than six years prior to the commencement of this action. View "Estate of Anderson v. Iowa Dermatology Clinic, PLC" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., practicing through a medical practice which bore his name, negligently failed to advise Plaintiff or his dentist of the known risks associated with a tooth extraction while Plaintiff was taking intervenous doses of a medication called "Zometa," prescribed for multiple myleoma. Defendant allegedly approved the procedure; Plaintiff's dentist pulled the tooth. Following the procedure, Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw. All parties agreed that the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff's malpractice claims would expire October 9, 2009. By a letter dated in September, Plaintiff's counsel proposed to Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement to toll the statute of limitations for ninety days so that the parties could pursue settlement. Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all defendants did. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement with all defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on October 7, 2009. Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to Plaintiff's counsel in January, 2010. Plaintiff did not filed the acceptance with the court at that time. The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011 based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim. Three days later, Plaintiff filed the signed acceptances of service. Dr. Eisemann moved to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Eisemann defendants are equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Beebe v. Eisemann" on Justia Law

After William Weborg died of severe coronary artery disease, his wife and their minor sons (collectively, the Weborgs) commenced a medical malpractice action against three physicians, their insurer, and the Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fund (collectively, the physicians), claiming that the three physicians were negligent in their care and treatment of William, resulting in his death. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the physicians, and the circuit court dismissed the Weborgs' complaint against the physicians. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court applied an improper legal standard in admitting the evidence of life insurance proceeds and social security benefits, but the error was harmless; and (2) the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in modifying the standard jury instruction on expert testimony, but the error was harmless. View "Weborg v. Jenny" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs alleged medical negligence. The civil suit and eventual trial took place in the wake of the death of Peter Almonte, who in 2000, killed himself approximately thirty-six hours after he was discharged from a hospital emergency room after an "severe psychological episode." Hospital personnel "decided" to honor Mr. Almonte's demand to be discharged, which plaintiffs alleged was a breach of the doctors' and hospital's duty arising from a patient/physician relationship. The jury returned a verdict of no negligence on the part of one of the defendants, Dr. Rita Kurl, M.D. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial, and defendants renewed their previously made motion for judgment as a matter of law. The trial court rejected the jury's findings as to the absence of negligence, but granted defendants motion because the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion was denied. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the trial justice erred: (1) in granting defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) in refusing to give jury instructions with respect to the doctrine of spoliation; (3) in refusing plaintiffs' request for an evidentiary presumption on the issue of causation; and (4) in denying plaintiffs' Rule 59 motion for a new trial. Finding no basis upon which it could grant plaintiffs the relief they sought, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions. View "Almonte v. Kurl" on Justia Law

Appellant Angelia Anderson brought a medical malpractice action in the U.S. District Court against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA contains a two-year statute of limitations regarding the timeliness of bringing claims against the government. However, if there is substantive law in the state where the claim arose governing the timeliness of a similar claim, the state provision controls over the FTCA's statute of limitations. A state statute of repose is considered substantive law and prevails over the procedural FTCA statute of limitations. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jursidiction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Maryland Supreme Court. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109(a)(1), which provides that the time period allowed for bringing a medical malpractice action is five years from the time the injury was committed, was a statute of limitation or a statute of repose. The Court held that the plain language of section 5-109(a)(1), confirmed by its legislative history, demonstrates that the statute is a statute of limitations, rather than repose. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Infant was born with severe brain damage. Respondent, Infant's mother, on behalf of Infant, applied for and received Medicaid benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). Respondent later filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of Infant. Subsequently, Respondent petitioned the circuit court for approval of the settlement, requesting that Medicaid not be reimbursed. DHHR intervened. The court granted the motion of Respondent for allocation of the $3,600,000 settlement, holding that, pursuant to Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, a proportional reduction of DHHR's recovery was required based on the ratio of the settlement to the "full value" of the case among the various damages categories. Using this allocation method, the court reduced DHHR's statutory reimbursement from the requested amount of $289,075 to $79,040 and directed that the net settlement proceeds be placed in a special needs trust for the benefit of Infant. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages was applicable in this case; and (2) under the formula applied in Ahlborn, the DHHR was entitled to approximately $98,080, less its pro rata share of attorney's fees and costs. Remanded. View "In re E.B." on Justia Law

After a jury returned a verdict for Dr. Mary Johnson on her legal malpractice claim against Steven K. Leibel, Leibel filed a motion for JNOV and a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for JNOV but granted the motion for new trial. Both parties appealed and the court of appeals reversed the grant of Leibel's motion for new trial but affirmed the denial of the motion for the JNOV. The court held that, contrary to the court of appeals' reasoning, the second jury in the malpractice case was not deciding what the first jury would have done in the underlying case had the attorney not been negligent, but only what a reasonable jury would have done had the underlying case been tried without the attorney negligence alleged by plaintiff. Because the jury in the malpractice case was not being asked to decide what a prior jury would have done, it was merely being asked to do exactly what any jury in a discrimination lawsuit would do, which was, evaluate the evidence in the case and decide the case on the merits. This was a task that was solely for the jury, and that was not properly the subject of expert testimony. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the expert testimony at issue was admissible in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Leibel, et al. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant, a young child with severe cerebral palsy, was excluded from most of the liability phase of the trial of her and her parents' lawsuit alleging that her condition was caused by appellees' medical malpractice. At issue was whether a party could be denied a right to be present in court during the trial of their case and excluded from the courtroom because her physical and mental condition could evoke undue sympathy from the jury and thereby improperly prejudice the other party. The court concluded that a party could not be excluded from her own trial simply because her physical and mental condition could evoke sympathy, even under these circumstances. Instead, trial courts could and should address the risk of undue sympathy by using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties received a fair trial, without infringing on the parties' right to be present. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Kesterson, et al. v. Jarrett, et al." on Justia Law