This was an appeal after summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. A kidney donor brought suit after his donated kidney was rendered useless by allegedly negligent medical treatment provided to the donee. At issue was whether a duty of care is owed to a kidney donor by the physicians providing posttransplant treatment to the donee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in this instance, a physician does not owe a duty of care to a kidney donor during the posttransplant treatment and care of the donee, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Olson v. Wrenshall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her doctor, who mistakenly removed her left ovary during a laparoscopic surgery intended to take the right ovary, and a jury awarded her $759,680 in damages. The district court reduced that amount by $425,000 because of a state law limiting non-economic damages in personal injury lawsuits and a posttrial ruling finding Plaintiff's evidence of future medical expenses insufficient. Both sides appealed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-19a02, which operated to cap Plaintiff's jury award for non-economic damages, as applied to Plaintiff; (2) reversed the district court's decision to strike the jury's award for Plaintiff's future medical expenses and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate that award; and (3) denied the doctor's trial error claims. View "Miller v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against several health care providers and subsequently dismissed the lawsuit, Plaintff re-filed the action after the legislature enacted Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121 and Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-12. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Plaintiff's failure to comply with sections 29-26-121 and 122. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff's original suit constituted substantial compliance with the statutes' requirements and that extraordinary cause existed to excuse complaince with the requirements of section 29-26-121. The court of appeals reversed on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory requirements that a plaintiff give sixty days presuit notice and file a certificate of good faith with the complaint are mandatory requirements and not subject to substantial compliance; and (2) Plaintiff's failure to comply with section 29-26-122 by filing to certificate of good faith with his complaint required a dismissal with prejudice. View "Myers v. Amisub (SFH), Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was one of first impression: whether a medical general practitioner who provides incidental mental health treatment to a patient, with whom he then engages in a sexual affair, may be held to a particularized "specialist duty," applicable to mental health professionals, that prohibits consensual sexual contact with patients, such that the defendant general practitioner may be subject to medical malpractice liability in tort. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court declined to impose such a duty as a matter of Pennsylvania common law. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on any preserved issues remain that were not addressed as a result of the Superior Court's disposition. View "Thierfelder v. Wolfert" on Justia Law

Defendants Randall Boudreaux, M.D., Don Ortego, and Coastal Anesthesia, P.C. appealed a $4,000,000 judgment against them, following a remittitur of a $20,000,000 jury verdict in favor of Paula Pettaway, as administratrix of the estate of Paulett Pettaway Hall, on her wrongful-death/medical-malpractice claim. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly denied the defendants' request for a new trial and appropriately refused to further remit the jury's punitive damages award. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Boudreaux v. Pettaway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent several medical procedures performed by Defendants, two medical doctors. Two years and three months after the treatment ended, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against Defendants. Upon a motion by Dr. Grigsby, one of the doctors, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's claim, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly found that, as a matter of law, Dr. Grigsby failed to show Plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered or should have discovered her legal injury; but (2) when a plaintiff alleges a course of negligent treatment, a defendant may show that the claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations without identifying the specific procedure within the course of treatment that caused the patient's injury. Rather, to prevail, a defendant need only show that the plaintiff filed her claim more than two years after she discovered that the course of treatment was negligent. Remanded. View "Arnold v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal concerned a discovery dispute involving birth injuries sustained by Jordan Gallinat at Southwest Washington Medical Center in Vancouver, Washington, in 1996. In June 2009, Douglas Fellows, as litigation guardian for Gallinat, filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and corporate negligence against Dr. Daniel Moynihan, Dr. Kathleen Hutchinson, and the Center. The trial court determined that the Center's credentialing, privileging, and personnel records for the doctors were protected from disclosure under the quality improvement privilege (RCW 70.41.200(3)). This case also implicated the applicability of the peer review privilege codified in RCW 4.24.250. After the Court of Appeals denied discretionary review, the Supreme Court court granted petition for review. Because the Court found that the trial court erred in concluding that no other information or records need be disclosed, it remanded the case for in camera review of the records sought by Fellows. View "Fellows v. Moynihan" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, Louis Diaz sought a new trial because the trial court admitted evidence that he settled before trial with two of the defendants. Diaz contended that the trial court misapplied RCW 7.70.080 in ruling the evidence admissible. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, concluding that: (1) RCW 7.70.080 permitted only a settling health care provider, not the nonsettling defendants, to introduce evidence of the settlement; (2) to the extent it dealt with settlements, RCW 7.70.080 was superseded by subsequent statutes that treat settlements inconsistently with subsection .080; and (3) the trial court's reading of RCW 7.70.080 would have violated the separation of powers doctrine. However, having found error, the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless because no settlement evidence was admitted at trial, the issue was a minor feature of a fairly lengthy trial, and the court gave a curative instruction at Diaz's request, which was presumed the jury followed. View "Diaz v. Washington" on Justia Law

Physician diagnosed and treated Patient for various liver and kidney ailments but failed to warn her of the latent driving impairment associated with her condition. After leaving Physician's office, Patient blacked out while operating her motor vehicle and struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action against Physician and his employer (collectively, Defendants) for professional negligence. The trial court found in favor of Defendants, finding that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to warn Patient of the driving risks associated with her medical conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, and in so doing, declined to extend a health care provider's duty through judicial modification, holding that the trial court properly found that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to advise or warn Patient of the latent driving impairment associated with her medical condition. View "Jarmie v. Troncale" on Justia Law

Appellants, several individuals and the administratrix of the estate of Arvilla Langston, filed a medical-malpractice action against Appellees, Sparks Regional Medical Center (SRMC) and Sparks Medical Foundation, alleging that Langston died as the result of SRMC's alleged failure to properly care for, diagnose, and treat Langston. Appellees filed an amended answer, and the circuit court dismissed the case on the grounds of charitable immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to strike the amended answer. On remand, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Appellees. Appellants subsequently filed an amended complaint attempting to raise a pre-death claim not pled in the initial complaint. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for reconsideration and new trial and granted SRMC's motion to strike Appellants' amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment; (2) Appellants' failed to preserve for appeal their argument that the circuit court erred in failing to rule on a loss-of-chance theory of recovery; and (3) the circuit court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in striking Appellants' amended complaint. View "Neal v. Sparks Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law