At age four, B.O. was diagnosed with a mild form of cerebral palsy called spastic diplegia. Subsequently, his parents filed a complaint under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, claiming that the healthcare providers who attended B.O.'s birth were negligent. Shortly before trial, B.O.'s healthcare providers settled for a sum allowing B.O. to seek excess damages from the Indiana Patients Compensation Fund (PCF). B.O.'s parents then filed a petition for excess damages, after which the PCF disclosed five expert witnesses prepared to testify either that B.O. did not have spastic diplegia or that if he did, it did not result from the conduct of the healthcare providers at his birth. The parents then sought partial summary judgment seeking to limit the issue at trial, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCF was precluded from disputing the existence or cause of B.O.'s claimed injury under Ind. Code 34-18-15-3(5). View "Robertson v. B.O." on Justia Law

In this petition for original jurisdiction, defendants Southern New Hampshire Medical Center (SNHMC) and Bernard Bettencourt, Jr., D.O., sought review of a superior court's decision that three provisions of the statute governing medical injury screening panels (RSA 519-B:8-:10 (2007)), violated the Separation of Powers Clause of the State Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in so ruling, the trial court erred. Nonetheless, the Court affirmed portions of the trial court's decision on alternative grounds. View "Petition of Southern New Hampshire Medical Center" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice action brought by the administrator of the Estate of Mindi Tucker, who died of complications from an infection that developed after a caesarian delivery of her child. Her obstetrician was Dr. Susan Brunch, a member of Women's Care Physicians of Louisville, P.S.C. (collectively, Defendants). The claim of medical negligence centered on the failure to administer the antibiotic Cefotan during the delivery process, which the Estate alleged would have prevented the infection. The trial court ruled in favor of Defendants. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in not allowing expert testimony on the meaning of the doctor's standing order regarding the antibiotic, and whether the Estate should have been allowed to impeach the doctor's expert witness with the deposition of another physician. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) not allowing the expert testimony; and (2) not allowing impeachment of the doctor's expert witness by the use of the other physician's deposition, as the deposition did not impeach the expert. View "Tucker v. Women's Care Physicians of Louisville, P.S.C." on Justia Law

This case began when Appellants brought an action against Appellee, a medical center, alleging medical malpractice in a surgical procedure. The first trial ended in a verdict favorable to Appellants. The trial court denied Appellee's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) but granted Appellee's request for a new trial. The second trial resulted in a verdict even more favorable for Appellants. The court of appeals reversed and dismissed Appellants' claim, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to grant Appellee's motion for JNOV and granting the new trial instead. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it ordered the new trial and denied Appellee's request for JNOV. View "Savage v. Three Rivers Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This case interpreted Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.050, which provides civil and criminal immunity to the reporters of suspected child dependency, neglect, and abuse. On the basis of that immunity, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, Norton Hospitals, Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, and Dr. Ketan Mehta, in a civil suit filed by Brandi Peyton for medical malpractice, negligence, and emotional distress, among other claims. Peyton alleged negligence in generating, interpreting, and reporting toxicology reports that showed Peyton had a high blood alcohol concentration the evening before giving birth to a baby. The court of appeals reversed, opining that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to who initiated the toxicology screening, which, in the court's view, affected the availability of immunity under sections 620.050(1) and 620.050(14). The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Appellants acted in good faith under Ky. Rev. Stat. 620.030 in reporting the toxicology reports; and (2) Appellants were therefore entitled to immunity under section 620.050(1) as a matter of law. Remanded. View "Norton Hosps., Inc. v. Peyton" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a medical negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Hospital after Appellant's husband, who had been admitted to a psychiatric unit in Hospital where suicide precautions were taken, hung himself and died. The circuit court court ordered the disclosure of various documents that Hospital claimed were protected by the attorney-client privilege. The court of appeals found the documents were privileged and granted Hospital's requested writ of prohibition stopping the circuit court from order the disclosure of the documents. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' order, holding that the writ was erroneously granted, as Hospital failed to show that the privilege applied. View "Collins v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sally J. Taylor sued Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC) for medical negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress in connection with her medical care following a surgery performed on her lumbar spine. After plaintiff failed to disclose any expert witness in response to discovery requests, FAHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law without an expert witness. The trial court granted FAHC’s motion. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this case was sufficiently complex that plaintiff could not prove her claims without expert testimony. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. Fletcher Allen Health Care" on Justia Law

A patient sued his dentist, claiming she negligently administered anesthesia, resulting in pain, swelling, and nerve damage. The trial court granted the dentist a directed verdict because the patient's expert failed to state the applicable standard of care. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. Because the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's decision, it reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and affirmed the trial court's grant of directed verdict. View "Braswell, Jr. v. Stinnett" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice claim for the wrongful death of Rosalie Stamper. At issue on appeal was a discovery violation question about the use of deposition testimony of a treating physician, who was originally a defendant in the case but was dismissed prior to trial. The trial court allowed the physician's deposition to be played to the jury, including a portion about Defendant's compliance with the standard of care, even though Plaintiff argued that the physician had not been identified as an expert witness and no Ky. R. Civ. P. 26 information had been provided about his testimony. The jury found for Defendant. The court of appeals reversed, finding the Defendant had not complied with the language or spirit of Rule 26. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court erred when in admitting the testimony without considering the effect of the requirements of Rule 26 and without considering the admissibility of the proposed "expert" testimony as to standard of care; but (2) the error was harmless. View "Hashmi v. Kelly" on Justia Law

This was an appeal after summary judgment in a medical malpractice action. A kidney donor brought suit after his donated kidney was rendered useless by allegedly negligent medical treatment provided to the donee. At issue was whether a duty of care is owed to a kidney donor by the physicians providing posttransplant treatment to the donee. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in this instance, a physician does not owe a duty of care to a kidney donor during the posttransplant treatment and care of the donee, and therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Olson v. Wrenshall" on Justia Law