Plaintiffs sent a proposed medical malpractice complaint to the Indiana Department of insurance without including $7 in required statutory filing and processing fees. Plaintiffs subsequently filed their medical malpractice complaint against Defendants. After the Department discovered the fee omission, it sent Plaintiffs a letter stating that if the mandatory fee was not sent, the complaint would not be considered filed with the Department. Plaintiffs sent a check to the Department the day they received the letter. The Department received the processing fees three days after the statutory period ended. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding Plaintiffs' complaint was not timely filed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' proposed complaint was timely filed with the Department. View "Miller v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in the course of a surgery performed by Doctor. Two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations Plaintiff filed sued against Doctor and his practice. Doctor wasn't properly served. The district court later granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the malpractice action without prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently filed through different counsel a new lawsuit seeking damages against Doctor. Doctor filed a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. Plaintiff's original attorneys (Attorneys) filed a motion to intervene to oppose Doctor's motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. Thereafter, the court granted Doctor's motion to dismiss based on an expired statute of limitations. Attorneys appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Attorneys again appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Attorneys lacked standing to intervene in district court and thus lacked standing to take this appeal. View "Ternes v. Galichia" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia ("MCG") were entitled to official immunity in treating a patient at MCG's Children's Medical Center. Plaintiffs-Appellees Kenneth Jones and Clara Ramon filed a medical malpractice action against Appellants Prem Singh Shekhawat, M.D. and Wayne Mathews, M.D., along with other defendants, arising from treatment rendered to Plaintiffs' child at the Center in 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellants, concluding that they were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants, in treating Plaintiffs' child, were acting within the scope of their employment with the State, using the Supreme Court's holding in "Keenan v. Plouffe," (482 SE2d 253 (1997)). After further review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Keenan" should have been overruled, because it conflated the standard for official immunity with that for sovereign immunity. Utilizing the proper analysis, the Court held that Appellants were entitled to official immunity because they were acting within the scope of their state employment in rendering the medical care at issue. View "Shekhawat v. Jones " on Justia Law

Respondents filed this health care liability action against Petitioner. The trial court awarded Respondents $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirmance of the actual damages award, finding that Petitioner's liability was statutorily capped. On remand, the trial court vacated the original judgment and awarded Respondents actual damages capped according to the relevant statute plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. The court of appeals reversed the remand judgment, holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating the postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was error, but it was not reversible error. Remanded. View "Phillips v. Bramlett" on Justia Law

Decedent died following complications that arose when she received anesthesia. Decedent's husband (Plaintiff) filed suit against various health care providers, including Defendant, which contracted with the hospital to provide anesthesia services to its obstetric patients. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its corporate owner and president, a medical doctor, who was on call the night Decedent received the anesthesia but refused to come to the hospital to administer the anesthesia. Defendant failed to raise the statute of repose as a defense to the vicarious liability claim. After a jury trial, the trial court set aside the verdict for Defendants and granted a new trial. Defendant then moved to amend its answer to assert a repose defense and to dismiss the case based on the statute of repose. The trial court denied Defendant's motions, ruling that Defendant had waived the statute of repose defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to timely raise the statute of repose as an affirmative defense. View "Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a non-health care provider could be a joint tortfeasor with a health care provider being sued for medical malpractice. The non-health care provider in this case was an answering service tasked with relaying calls from a patient to their doctor after office hours. The patient learned that the service failed to convey his messages to his doctor despite the doctor giving the service explicit instructions to call. The patient sued the doctor for malpractice, and included the answering service. The service moved to dismiss, claiming that it could not be considered a joint tortfeasor under the statute under which the doctor had been sued. Finding that the clear language of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(a) applied to filing suit against the non-health care provider, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court rulings which granted and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the non-health care provider. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Milbert v. Answering Bureau, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as the administrator of his sister's estate, sued defendant in Connecticut state court, alleging that it negligently failed to timely diagnose the colon cancer that caused her death. Defendant removed the case to federal court. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his medical malpractice claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the district court may have mistakenly interpreted its precedent in A.Q.C. ex rel. Castillo v. United States, which held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny equitable tolling to a plaintiff whose law firm did "literally nothing" to determine the federal status of plaintiff's health care provider; the district court did not fully consider whether, despite the differences between this case and A.Q.C., plaintiff's lawyers had reason to know that they should have investigated defendant's federal status; and, therefore, the court remanded for reconsideration because it could not be certain on the present record whether the district court's decision should be affirmed under the correct legal standard. View "Phillips v. Generations Family Health Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants, a medical doctor and his practice, for medical malpractice after the doctor failed to remove a localization guide wire during a biopsy of part of Plaintiff's lung. After a second operation two months after the first procedure, the doctor removed the wire. The trial court granted a directed verdict in Defendants' favor and dismissed Plaintiffs' amended complaint based on Plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate a prima facie case of medical malpractice. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the amended complaint was properly dismissed where Plaintiff failed to establish that the doctor's judgment deviated from accepted community standards of practice and that such deviation was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury; and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff argued that res ipsa loquitur applied in this case, Plaintiff failed to establish the elements of res ipsa. View "James v. Wormuth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who was severely intoxicated, arrived at the emergency room of a hospital, where he sought admission to Defendant's detoxification facility. Defendant was accepted to the program, and, four hours after his arrival, was waiting to be transported to the facility when he left the grounds unescorted. An emergency room doctor notified hospital security but did not call the police. Plaintiff was subsequently hit by a car. Plaintiff's estate sued the hospital, the doctor, and the doctor's professional corporation (together, Defendants) for negligence and medical malpractice. Supreme Court denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Defendants lacked authority to confine Plaintiff upon his departure from the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendants did not have a duty to prevent Plaintiff from leaving the hospital. View "Kowalski v. St. Francis Hosp. & Health Ctrs. " on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in two separate lawsuits, sued a medical doctor and medical center for medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraud. Prior to the trial date, Defendants successfully moved to bifurcate the trials. The administrative judge of the circuit court vacated the trial judge's orders bifurcating the trials and reassigned the cases to another judge for trial. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition to reverse the administrative judge's orders. The Court of Appeals vacated the administrative judge's orders and reinstated the orders of the trial judge, holding that, under the circumstances, the administrative judge did not have the authority to review and vacate the trial judge's decision to bifurcate the trials and to unilaterally reassign the cases. View "St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Circuit Court (Turnbull)" on Justia Law