Respondents, on behalf of their six-year-old daughter, Jocelyn, alleged that Appellants, a medical doctor and medical center, negligently failed to diagnose Jocelyn's cancer and that if they had timely diagnosed Jocelyn's cancer, her cancer would have been curable. But, Respondents asserted, because of the delayed diagnosis, it was likely Jocelyn's cancer would be fatal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding (1) Minnesota law does not permit a patient to recover damages when a physician's negligence causes the patient to lose only a chance of recovery or survival; and (2) Respondents' proof of causation failed as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Minnesota law permits recovery for "loss of chance" in a medical malpractice action; and (2) Respondents created a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of causation. View "Dickhoff v. Green" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Wall (Patient) filed a petition for medical negligence against Dr. John S. Marouk, D.O. (Physician). Wall alleged that the physician negligently cut the median nerve in his right arm during a carpal tunnel surgery, resulting in loss of feeling in his right fingers. The patient did not attach an affidavit of merit as required by 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19. The physician filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the patient failed to include the affidavit of merit. In response to the physician's motion to dismiss, the patient argued that 12 O.S 2011 sec.19 was unconstitutional based on this court's holding in "Zeier v. Zimmer." The trial court entered a certified interlocutory order denying the physician's motion to dismiss, and giving the patient twenty days from the date of the order to file an affidavit of merit or face dismissal of the cause. The trial court subsequently entered an amended certified interlocutory order stating that 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 required an affidavit of merit finding the patient's arguments unpersuasive. The Supreme Court granted the patient's Petition for Certiorari to consider the constitutionality of 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Title 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 created a monetary barrier to access the court system, and then applied that barrier only to a specific subclass of potential tort victims, those who are the victims of professional negligence. The result was a law that was unconstitutional both as a special law, and as an undue financial barrier on access to the courts. "Although we express no opinion on the viability of the patient's claim, because we hold 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 19 to be unconstitutional, an affidavit of merit is not required." The district court's order requiring submission of an affidavit of merit was overruled, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Wall v. Marouk" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Defendant Cox Retirement Properties, alleging Richard Douglas died as a result of the facility's negligent care and treatment. Defendant moved to dismiss the case for Plaintiff's failure to comply with 12 O.S. Supp. 2009 19. Section 19 was enacted in 2009 as part of H.B. 1603, known as the Comprehensive Lawsuit Reform Act of 2009. Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing the CLRA of 2009 was unconstitutional logrolling in violation of the single-subject rule of Article 5, section 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The trial court granted the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and certified the dismissal order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's Petition for Certiorari and held that hold that H.B. 1603 violated the single-subject rule of Article 5, section 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution and was unconstitutional and void in its entirety. View "Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a disparate screening claim in the U.S. district court alleging that she arrived at the emergency department of Hospital with an emergency medical condition as defined by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), that Hospital failed to screen her appropriately, and that Hospital failed to stabilize or properly transfer her before release, thus violating the requirements of EMTALA. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint as stating facts limited to a medical malpractice claim and holding that EMTALA does not create a federal cause of action for medical malpractice. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's dismissal, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to show that a trialworthy issue existed as to her disparate screening claim. Remanded for trial on Plaintiff's EMTALA claim as well as her Puerto Rico law claims. View "Cruz-Vazquez v. Mennonite Gen. Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., claim. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint was filed after the FTCA's two year statute of limitations had expired. The court concluded that plaintiff's claim was not constructively filed in time. Further, without intentional concealment of the appropriate agency or other circumstances that made obtaining the required information truly out of plaintiff's control, there could be no equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Motta v. United States" on Justia Law

Krystal Meredith was twenty years old and thirty-seven weeks pregnant when she began to experience abdominal pain. Krystal visited the Norton Hospital emergency three times in the next three days and was treated by Dr. James Haile. She was sent home following the first two visits but was admitted to the hospital after the third. Subsequent blood work revealed an ongoing infection. After Krystal gave birth to a healthy daughter under the care of Dr. Luis Velasco, it was discovered Krystal had a ruptured appendix and abscess. Krystal later developed acute respiratory distress syndrome and died. Plaintiffs, Krystal's parents, filed suit against Dr. Haile, Dr. Velasco, and the Hospital for wrongful death and loss of parental consortium. A jury found in favor of Defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court twice erred in refusing to strike jurors for cause, and the error was not harmless. Remanded. View "Grubb v. Norton Hosps., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas R. Taylor filed this action seeking to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice. Pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1001, he then filed a request for a prelitigation screening panel four days later. The panel appointed regarding the alleged malpractice in this case conducted its proceedings and then issued its report on April 19, 2011. Although Plaintiff filed this action on January 20, 2011, he did not attempt to serve the summons and complaint upon any of the Defendants within six months after filing the complaint as mandated by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On August 16, 2011, defendant Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss this action as to it for the failure of Plaintiff to serve the summons and complaint upon it within the six-month period. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the district court to stay this lawsuit "nunc pro tunc from January 24, 2011, to April 19, 2011, or, alternatively, to extend [Plaintiff's] deadline for serving all Defendants to this lawsuit from July 19, 2011, to October 12, 2011." The district court entered an order denying Plaintiff's motions and granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. Because the partial judgment was not yet final due to the fact that there was no judgment resolving the claims against the remaining defendants, the Supreme Court then issued a notice that the appeal would be dismissed. Plaintiff then filed an amended notice of appeal timely appealing both the initial judgment and the amended judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court: if there is not good cause for the failure to serve a defendant with the summons and complaint within six months after the complaint was filed, Rule 4(a)(2) states that "the action shall be dismissed as to the defendant without prejudice." Had Plaintiff served the Defendants before the prelitigation screening panel had completed its work, the worst that could have happened is that the district court would have stayed the court proceedings until after the panel had completed its work and for thirty days thereafter. Even if Plaintiff had thought he should wait until thirty days after the panel issued its report before serving the Defendants with a summons and complaint, he had from May 19, 2011, until July 20, 2011 to do so, but did not even attempt service during that time. View "Taylor v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

Following the death of his wife, appellee James Jordan initiated this medical malpractice action against appellants Wellstar Health System, Inc. and Dr. James Sutherland (collectively "Wellstar"). As part of its discovery plan, Wellstar sought to conduct informal ex parte interviews of certain non-party health care providers who previously had treated Jordan's spouse. Wellstar moved the trial court for a protective order. After a hearing, the trial court issued a qualified protective order authorizing Wellstar to conduct ex parte interviews of named health care providers for the limited purpose of questioning them about the "development of, diagnosis of, and treatment of the cancerous condition which caused or contributed to the death of Marilyn Kay Adams Jordan." Although the trial court determined that the circumstances did not require Wellstar's counsel to provide Jordan with prior notice of or an opportunity to appear at the interviews, it did require that "the interviews be transcribed by a court reporter should Jordan make a written request for transcription." Jordan asked that the interviews be transcribed and subsequently sought their production. Wellstar objected to production of the transcripts, claiming they were not subject to discovery because they constituted protected work product. Jordan filed a motion to compel, which the trial court granted without conducting an in-camera review in an order summarily rejecting Wellstar's work product claim. The Court of Appeals denied Wellstar's application for interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine the propriety of the trial court's production order. The Court found that production of such material was not required by the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") or the language of the protective order entered in this case, but the Court vacated the trial court's judgment. "HIPAA . . .does not require the production of the transcripts at issue. Because no findings have been made with regard to waiver or the second criteria for production of the transcripts and the trial court sits as the trier of fact in discovery disputes, the case must be remanded to the trial court." View "Wellstar Health System, Inc. v. Jordan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff underwent open-heart surgery at Hospital in January 2004. Dr. Singh performed the surgery, and Dr. Schwartz was the echocardiologist assisting with the surgery. Plaintiff was required to undergo a second open-heart surgery in August 2004 because of an errant suture stitched by Dr. Singh during Plaintiff's January surgery. While in recovery from his second surgery, Plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest. Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against Hospital, Dr. Singh, and Dr. Schwartz. Plaintiff subsequently settled his claims against Hospital and Dr. Singh. Plaintiff proceeded to trial on his claims against Dr. Schwartz, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not commit reversible error in (1) refusing to instruct the jury on intervening and superseding cause; (2) admitting certain testimony pertaining to Plaintiff's cardiac arrest following surgery in August; (3) denying Defendant's request for a remittutur and motion to vacate the damage award; and (4) instructing the jury on insurance. Additionally, the Court held that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-21-10(b), which mandates prejudgment interest at a rate of twelve percent in certain cases, is constitutional. View "Oden v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff underwent surgery for a tumor in his neck. Analysis of the tumor on the same day revealed it was a form of cancer. Plaintiff alleged he learned he had cancer on June 21, 2005. Plaintiff and his wife filed a medical malpractice action against several doctors and health care facilities for failing to diagnose and treat Plaintiff's cancer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding that the three-year statute of limitations began to run on June 2, 2005, when a separate medical doctor diagnosed the mass in Defendant's neck as a cervical tumor, and had expired before Plaintiffs filed suit on June 9, 2008. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when Plaintiff was diagnosed as having a cervical tumor and that diagnosis was shared with Plaintiff, a "reasonable person in similar circumstances" would have discovered that the wrongful conduct of Defendants caused Plaintiff's injuries. View "Bustamante v. Oshiro" on Justia Law