Plaintiff Carmen Talavera suffered a stroke while visiting a store, incurring permanent disabilities that she attributed to the medical malpractice of personnel at the Southwest Medical Center (SWMC). Plaintiff brought claims against a number of the medical personnel defendants alleging that they should have diagnosed and immediately treated her stroke symptoms with blood-clotting therapy or proceeded with early surgical intervention to prevent damage caused by swelling in her brain. The district court granted summary judgment finding Plaintiff failed to demonstrate their negligence caused her injuries. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err. Plaintiff failed to: establish a dispute of fact that she would have qualified for blood-clotting therapy, or show that any doctor owed her a duty of care when this therapy was still a viable treatment option. View "Talavera v. Wiley, et al" on Justia Law

Decedent admitted herself to Hospital for treatment for major depression and personality disorder. At the time of her admission, Decedent was diagnosed with high suicide ideation and had previously attempted suicide. One week later, Decedent committed suicide at Hospital. Plaintiff, the executor of Decedent's estate, filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital and Decedent's treating psychiatrist. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court improperly declined to the poll the jury to determine whether any of the jurors had read an article regarding the subject matter of the case published prior to trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the appellate court improperly determined that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining to poll the jury. View "Kervick v. Silver Hill Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a number of defendants, including Physician. After the medical malpractice tribunal determined there was not sufficient evidence to raise a legitimate question of Physician's liability appropriate for judicial inquiry, Plaintiffs moved for a reduction of the $6,000 bond they were required to file to continue to pursue their claim. The judge concluded that Plaintiffs were indigent. However, because the judge believed Plaintiffs' attorney was funding the expenses of litigation, including the cost of the bond, the judge refused to reduce the amount of the bond. The Supreme Court vacated the denial of Plaintiffs' motion to reduce the amount of the bond, holding that a judge cannot consider the potential resources of counsel in determining whether to reduce the bond amount under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 60B. Remanded. View "Faircloth v. DiLillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against a number of defendants, including Physician. A medical malpractice tribunal determined that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of liability as to Physician. Plaintiffs were informed they had to provide a $6,000 bond to avoid dismissal of the claim pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 60B. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an emergency motion to reduce the amount of the bond, asserting that they were indigent and that failing to lower the bond amount would result in the dismissal of the case against Physician. The judge found Plaintiffs were indigent but denied the motion because he believed Plaintiffs' attorney was paying for Plaintiffs' litigation expenses. The Supreme Court vacated the denial of Plaintiffs' emergency motion and remanded, holding that, in denying Plaintiffs' motion without evaluating Plaintiffs' effort to present a sufficient offer of proof at the tribunal or the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' continued pursuit of their claim, the judge based his ruling on a legally erroneous standard and therefore abused his discretion. View "Cruz v. Siddiqi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gilbert and Shelagh McCormack appealed a superior court's denial of their motion for a new trial on the grounds of alleged juror bias. The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether plaintiffs' motion was timely; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under "In re Nash," (614 A.2d 367 (1991)); and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under "implied bias." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "McCormack v. Rutland Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Felice McGathey appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brookwood Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Brookwood Medical Center, and Scott Appell, M.D., in her medical malpractice action; she also challenged the trial court's order denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint to substitute real parties for fictitiously named defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. McGathey suffered a severe burn on the little finger of her left hand, permanent disfigurement and impaired mobility following left-shoulder arthroscopy, subacromial decompression, and distal clavicle resection. A Spider Limb Positioner was used in the surgery. A part of the positioner was sterilized, but was not given a chance to cool down before it was used in the surgery. And because defendants allowed the hot part to be used on McGathey during the surgery, she suffered her injuries. Based on a review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that McGathey produced substantial evidence of negligence for one of the Brookwood employees and reversed the grant of summary judgment in that defendant's favor. The Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Appell. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McGathey v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sent a proposed medical malpractice complaint to the Indiana Department of insurance without including $7 in required statutory filing and processing fees. Plaintiffs subsequently filed their medical malpractice complaint against Defendants. After the Department discovered the fee omission, it sent Plaintiffs a letter stating that if the mandatory fee was not sent, the complaint would not be considered filed with the Department. Plaintiffs sent a check to the Department the day they received the letter. The Department received the processing fees three days after the statutory period ended. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment for Defendants, finding Plaintiffs' complaint was not timely filed. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs' proposed complaint was timely filed with the Department. View "Miller v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in the course of a surgery performed by Doctor. Two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations Plaintiff filed sued against Doctor and his practice. Doctor wasn't properly served. The district court later granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the malpractice action without prejudice. Plaintiff subsequently filed through different counsel a new lawsuit seeking damages against Doctor. Doctor filed a motion to dismiss on limitations grounds. Plaintiff's original attorneys (Attorneys) filed a motion to intervene to oppose Doctor's motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. Thereafter, the court granted Doctor's motion to dismiss based on an expired statute of limitations. Attorneys appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. Attorneys again appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Attorneys lacked standing to intervene in district court and thus lacked standing to take this appeal. View "Ternes v. Galichia" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether physicians employed as faculty members at the Medical College of Georgia ("MCG") were entitled to official immunity in treating a patient at MCG's Children's Medical Center. Plaintiffs-Appellees Kenneth Jones and Clara Ramon filed a medical malpractice action against Appellants Prem Singh Shekhawat, M.D. and Wayne Mathews, M.D., along with other defendants, arising from treatment rendered to Plaintiffs' child at the Center in 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment to both Appellants, concluding that they were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants, in treating Plaintiffs' child, were acting within the scope of their employment with the State, using the Supreme Court's holding in "Keenan v. Plouffe," (482 SE2d 253 (1997)). After further review, the Supreme Court concluded that "Keenan" should have been overruled, because it conflated the standard for official immunity with that for sovereign immunity. Utilizing the proper analysis, the Court held that Appellants were entitled to official immunity because they were acting within the scope of their state employment in rendering the medical care at issue. View "Shekhawat v. Jones " on Justia Law

Respondents filed this health care liability action against Petitioner. The trial court awarded Respondents $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the punitive damages award. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment affirmance of the actual damages award, finding that Petitioner's liability was statutorily capped. On remand, the trial court vacated the original judgment and awarded Respondents actual damages capped according to the relevant statute plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. The court of appeals reversed the remand judgment, holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating the postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was error, but it was not reversible error. Remanded. View "Phillips v. Bramlett" on Justia Law