Plaintiff sued several entities she believed to be responsible for her husband’s death. As required by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Plaintiff first presented her malpractice claims to a prelitigation panel. During the ensuing litigation, designated her expert witnesses. The district court struck the witnesses because Plaintiff’s attorney revealed confidential information about them about the proceedings before the panel. Plaintiff then named two additional expert witnesses. The district court struck the replacement experts because they were designated after the cutoff date established by the scheduling order. Because Plaintiff was then deprived of any experts to establish the necessary elements of her malpractice claim, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by striking the original experts without inquiring whether the confidential information revealed to them influenced their opinions; and (2) erred when it excluded the second set of witnesses because it applied the wrong rule when it sanctioned Plaintiff for violating the scheduling order, and moreover, the sanction of witness exclusion was not warranted in this case. View "Coroles v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that he suffered from spinal injuries as a result of Defendants’ medical malpractice. During discovery, Plaintiff requested a recorded surveillance video that Defendants had created of him. Defendants refused to turn over the video, claiming that it was attorney work product that they intended to use only as impeachment evidence. The court of common pleas ordered Defendants to produce the tape. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the discovery order was final and appealable. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court’s discovery order was a final, appealable order, and therefore, neither this Court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the interlocutory order. View "Smith v. Chen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against a hospital and a registered nurse, alleging that Defendants negligently discharged Plaintiffs’ suicidal son and that they suffered severe emotional distress when they discovered that their son had hung himself only thirty-five minutes after his discharge. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ bystander emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs suffered severe and debilitating emotional distress as a result of Defendants’ alleged negligence. View "Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against medical malpractice action against multiple defendants, including FMC Hospital, Ltd., d/b/a Florida Medical Center, and FMC Medical, Inc., d/b/a Florida Medical Center. A proposed settlement offer was served upon Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not accept the offer. A jury subsequently returned a verdict adverse to Plaintiff, and the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that the entities were joint offerors and that the proposal was invalid because it failed to apportion the amount offered as required by Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that there was only a single offeror - Florida Medical Center - and therefore, apportionment of the amount offered was not required. The district court affirmed, concluding that because the offer was made on behalf of the single hospital entity allegedly responsible for Plaintiff’s injury, the settlement proposal complied with the statute and rule. The Supreme Court quashed the district court’s decision, holding that the offer constituted a joint proposal and, under a strict construction of section 768.79 and rule 1.442, apportionment of the settlement amount was required. View "Pratt v. Weiss" on Justia Law

The Estate of Karla McLaren brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Wesley Sufficool in connection with a surgery performed on McLaren. Judgment was entered for the Estate. The Estate subsequently sought disbursement for video depositions of Dr. Sufficool, Karla’s treating physician, and Dr. Sufficool’s expert. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the Estate the transcript costs for the depositions but not for the videographer or video costs. The Estate appealed, arguing that the video depositions were necessary for impeachment purposes at trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court’s ambiguous oral comments on the issue of the necessity of the video depositions were insufficient to permit meaningful review of the issue on appeal. Remanded for further factual determinations. View "McClaren v. Sufficool" on Justia Law

This case centered on a claim for reimbursement made by California's State Department of Health Care Services for funds expended on behalf of an injured party by the state's Medi-Cal program. The injured party, Ashlynn Aguilera, filed a special motion to determine the Department's lien under Welfare & Institutions Code section 14124.76. When Ashlynn was two months old she suffered injuries as a result of the negligence of a physician. She underwent a hemispherectomy (removal of half of the cerebral portion of her brain). Ashlynn suffered from global developmental delay, mental retardation and behavioral disorders. Ashlynn filed an action for medical malpractice and her parents settled the action for $950,000. The settlement was near the defendant's liability policy limits. The trial court approved the settlement, along with the request of Ashlynn's counsel for attorney fees and costs totaling $253,006. Ashlynn's parents received $85,000 of the settlement as a resolution of their prospective wrongful death action against the defendant. The balance of the settlement was placed in a special needs trust. The Department asserted a lien on Ashlynn's recovery, based on the $211,191 that it spent on her behalf. Ashlynn supported her special motion with declarations from her counsel and two physicians, presenting evidence regarding: her life expectancy; the care she will need throughout her life; the cost of future care; lost earning capacity; and the value of her pain and suffering. Among other things, Ashlynn presented evidence that she needs 16 hours per day of licensed vocational nurse (LVN) attendant care until she reaches the age of 21, and 24 hours per day LVN attendant care for the rest of her life. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly employed the methodology used in "Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn,"(547 U.S. 268 (2006)) but erred when it refused to reduce the Department's lien to account for the attorney fees and expenses Ashlynn incurred. The matter was remanded to the trial court to set aside the order and conduct further proceedings: (1) regarding whether the cost of Ashlynn's future at-home attendant care and medical care should be included in its Ahlborn calculation; and (2) apply section 14124.72 (d) to determine the Department's share of Ashlynn's attorney fees and costs. View "Aguilera v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against a physician and his employer alleging that Defendants negligently failed to protect the confidentiality of his HIV test results and seeking to recover both compensatory and exemplary damages. The superior court granted Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff’s claims for exemplary damages and severed Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages without holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Palmisano v. Toth. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the superior court, holding that the hearing justice erred failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the Court’s holding in Palmisano on Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages. Remanded. View "Sherman v. Ejnes" on Justia Law

Ronald Hines was a Texas-licensed veterinarian who practiced since the mid-1960s. He worked mainly in traditional veterinary practices until he retired in 2002. After his retirement, he founded a website and began to post articles about pet health and care. These general writings soon turned to more targeted guidance and, as he acknowledged in his complaint, he began “to provide veterinary advice to specific pet owners about their pets.” This advice was given via email and telephone calls, and Hines “never physically examine[d] the animals that are the subject of his advice,” though he did review veterinary records provided by the animal owners. Texas required veterinarians to conduct a physical examination of an animal or its premises before they can practice veterinary medicine with respect to that animal. In 2012, the Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners informed Hines that by providing veterinary advice without a physical examination, he had violated Texas law. Hines eventually agreed to: abide by the relevant state laws, including the physical examination requirement, one year of probation; a stayed suspension of his license; a $500 fine; and to retake the jurisprudence portion of the veterinary licensing exam. Hines thereafter filed suit in federal court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He argued that the physical examination requirement violates his First Amendment right to free speech as well as his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Board moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the Board’s motion in part and denied it in part. With respect to the equal protection claim, the court concluded that because the law did not discriminate on the basis of any suspect classification, the count was evaluated pursuant to rational basis review, and held that the physical examination requirement passed that deferential standard. The court dismissed Hines’s substantive due process claim for similar reasons. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the First Amendment claims. It recognized that states have broad power to regulate professionals, but determined that because the physical examination requirement “regulate[s] professional speech itself,” it is subject to the First Amendment. Relying on federal Supreme Court precedent, the district court held that Hines had stated a plausible claim that the Board had infringed his First Amendment rights. The Board moved to certify for interlocutory review the district court’s order. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's review thus centered on whether Hines' First or Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court concluded it offends neither, reversing the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amendment counts and affirming the district court’s granting of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment counts. View "Hines v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

Reed claims that during a 2012 stay at the hospital, its staff ignored her requests, treated her poorly, refused to consult with her regarding her care, and physically injured her when she was forcibly discharged. An amended complaint alleged an unelaborated claim of “retaliation,” a violation of the ADA, and state-law claims. The judge dismissed, without prejudice, after considering whether any of her claims asserted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 or the retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12203. Reed filed a second case, asserting that she suffers from tardive dyskinesia plus post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and acute anxiety; she uses a computer to communicate. The complaint alleged specific instances of mistreatment and various constitutional violations 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, finding that her claims were precluded by the dismissal of her earlier suit and that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act could offer her any remedy. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the complaint stated viable claims. View "Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp." on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died from an acute intra-abdominal bleed from a hematoma with adjacent tissue damage. The day before his death, the decedent visited an emergency department, where CT scans of the decedent’s abdomen, pelvis, and chest were performed and sent to Defendant, a radiologist. The decedent’s widow (Plaintiff) sued the radiologist, alleging that the radiologist negligently evaluated the CT scans. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant’s negligence caused the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted judgment for Defendant because Plaintiff failed to establish causation, an essential element of Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim, by failing to establish that the decedent would not have died but for Defendant’s alleged breach of the standard of care. View "Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist" on Justia Law