Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice after Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the certificate of good faith was noncompliant with the requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-122(d)(4) that a certificate of good faith filed in a medical malpractice action disclose the number of prior violations of the statute by the executing party. Defendants appealed, arguing that the action should have been dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff did not disclose that there were no prior violations by Plaintiff’s counsel. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 29-26-122(d)(4)’s requirement does not also require disclosure of the absence of any prior violations of the statute. View "Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ibach" on Justia Law

Fairfield Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC; D&N, LLC; DTD HC, LLC; Aurora Cares, LLC (alleged to be doing business as "Tara Cares"); and Aurora Healthcare, LLC (collectively, "the defendants"), petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its February 6, 2015, order denying their "Motion to Quash Depositions and Motion for Protective Order, and Motion to Reconsider January 30, 2015[,] Order." The defendants also requested that the Supreme Court direct the trial court to grant their motion. In May 2006, Myrtis Hill was a patient at Fairfield. While under Fairfield's care, Hill suffered a broken leg when a Fairfield employee, while attempting to transfer Hill to a bedside commode, allegedly dropped her to the floor thereby breaking Hill's right leg and causing severe injury to both of her legs. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the defendants demonstrated they had a clear legal right to the relief they requested, and that the trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a protective order. Hill's "Motion for Award of Damages based on [the defendants'] pattern and practice of filing frivolous appeals" was denied. View "Ex parte Fairfield Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Joan Johnson, as personal representative of the Estate of Herman B. Johnson, and Marguerite Johnson, Herman Johnson's widow, appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their action against Mid Dakota Clinic. On the morning of December 18, 2012, Herman Johnson experienced confusion and swelling of his legs and calves. That morning, Joan Johnson, Herman Johnson's daughter and attorney-in-fact, called the Veteran's Administration Clinic to schedule an appointment for Herman, but the VA Clinic did not return her call. As a result, Joan Johnson called Mid Dakota to schedule an appointment. Although she had requested a specific doctor, she was advised she would not be able to see him that day and was given an appointment with Donald Grenz, M.D. later that afternoon. Upon arriving at Mid Dakota Clinic at Gateway Mall, Joan and Herman Johnson checked in with the receptionist approximately seven minutes late for the appointment. Because they were more than five minutes late, they were told Dr. Grenz would not see them but they could reschedule with Dr. Grenz for another day or go to the emergency room or the "Today Clinic," a walk-in clinic within Mid Dakota's main clinic downtown. Joan and Herman Johnson subsequently left the clinic to seek alternative care. Upon entering the east vestibule of the Gateway Mall, Joan Johnson decided to seek the assistance of the VA Clinic, which was located in the mall immediately adjacent to Mid Dakota. As Joan and Herman Johnson turned to re-enter the mall, Herman Johnson fell and hit his head on the floor of the vestibule. As a result, he suffered a laceration along his forehead. Joan Johnson then returned to Mid Dakota and announced that Herman Johnson had fallen and was injured. A registered nurse employed by Mid Dakota assisted Herman Johnson until he was taken by ambulance to St. Alexius Medical Center and was admitted for observation. While Herman Johnson was hospitalized, he suffered two episodes of respiratory arrest, and he died on December 27, 2012. The Johnsons sued Mid Dakota for negligence, breach of contract and professional negligence. Because the Johnsons failed to present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint against Respondent-doctor alleging that Respondent was negligent in failing to diagnose and treat her post-surgical infection. Because Plaintiff failed to file the required expert report to prosecute her first claim against Respondent, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed a three-count complaint that was similar to her first complaint and that included a new claim of negligence related to her initial surgery. The circuit court dismissed the complaint because the claim was filed after the expiration of the relevant period of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not rely on the saving provision of Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-119(b) to refile her untimely claim because she voluntarily dismissed her previous claim. View "Wilcox v. Orellano" on Justia Law

Askew, a military veteran and a former U.S. Postal Service employee, underwent a cardiac stent placement at the St. Louis Veterans Administration Medical Center. He was readmitted with an infection and the medical center responded negligently. As a result of the infection and attendant loss of blood, Askew suffered severe anoxic brain injury and amputation of his right leg. In Askew’s suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, the government did not dispute liability. The government requested that the court structure an award for future medical damages as a trust to provide periodic payments to Askew, with a reversionary interest in favor of the government upon Askew’s death. The district court declined to order a reversionary trust, awarded $253,667 in past economic damages, $525,000 in past non-economic damages, $4,000,000 in future economic damages, and $2,000,000 in future non-economic damages to Dirk Askew. The court awarded $1,525,000 to Askew’s wife for loss of consortium. The Eighth Circuit vacated and remanded, describing the reversionary trust remedy as the most reasonable analogy to the relief available against a private individual in like circumstances under Missouri law. View "Askew v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, joined by her husband, filed a lawsuit alleging that she suffered permanent injuries due to Defendant’s surgical malpractice. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff and awarded, along with economic damages, noneconomic damages for pain and suffering amounting to $1.45 million. Defendant moved to reduce the award of noneconomic damages to $500,000 pursuant to Fla. Stat. 766.118(2), which became effective after Plaintiff underwent the disputed surgical procedure. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the statute was not retroactive. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that it was constitutionally permissible to retroactively apply section 766.118 because Plaintiff had no vested right to a particular damage award and thus suffered no due process violation. On remand, the trial court entered a judgment for Plaintiff based on the $500,000 statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The Third District affirmed. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision in Miles II, disapproved Miles I, and remanded with instructions that the original final judgment be reinstated, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to hear this appeal; and (2) generally, a litigant’s substantive and vested rights may not be infringed upon by the retroactive application of a substantive statute. View "Miles v. Weingrad" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sharp Memorial Hospital (dba Sharp Rehabilitation Center) appealed the trial court's order granting plaintiff-respondent's Berthe Kabran's motion for new trial following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice in which the jury found Sharp was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff's predecessor, Dr. Eke Wokocha, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Sharp argued on appeal that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because the motion was untimely, rendering the order void. It further argued the court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the new trial motion was cumulative and consistent with defense expert trial testimony, and thus would not change the outcome of the trial. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that no jurisdictional defect appeared in the court's new trial order and, as a result, Sharp could not raise its appellate contentions as to the motion's timeliness for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the new evidence and ruling on the record that plaintiff should have been granted a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial" on Justia Law

Doctor performed a spinal fusion on Patient. When Patient’s back pain worsened, Patient sued Doctor, alleging that Doctor failed to give him adequate information to enable him to give an informed consent to the surgery. In a pretrial deposition, Patient’s expert testified that to obtain informed consent, Doctor was required to inform Patient about all the potential risks that might arise from the surgery. The trial court granted Doctor’s motion to limit Patient’s expert witness testimony only to those risks that allegedly materialized and injured Patient. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Doctor’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the expert medical testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony regarding undisclosed medical risks that had not materialized, and this error, more likely than not, affected the jury’s verdict. Remanded for a new trial on the issue of informed consent. View "White v. Beeks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated a medical malpractice suit against numerous medical organizations and professionals twelve years after their daughter, Yendee, was born with a genetic disorder. Plaintiffs alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment relating to Yendee’s genetic disorder and also asserted their own claims for loss of consortium. The superior court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding (1) Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations set forth in R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1; and (2) in light of Yendee’s status as a minor, the tolling provision in section 9-1-14.1(1) would allow Yendee to file suit in the future on her own behalf upon reaching the age of majority, but Yendee’s parents would not be permitted to attach their loss-of-consortium claims to Yendee’s future suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-1-14.1(1), a minor’s parent or guardian may file suit on the minor’s behalf within three years of the occurrence or reasonable discovery of alleged malpractice, or the minor may file suit on her own behalf, but not until she reaches the age of majority; but (2) Plaintiffs’ claims may be asserted alongside Yendee’s claims if she elects to file suit upon reaching the age of majority. View "Ho-Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital" on Justia Law

Captain Heather Ortiz was an active-duty service member in the United States Air Force. In March 2009, Captain Ortiz was admitted to Evans Army Community Hospital for a scheduled Caesarean section. Complications caused by the medical staff’s administering of drugs in preparation for the surgery caused a precipitous drop in Captain Ortiz’s blood pressure, leading to hypotension. As a result of Captain Ortiz’s hypotension, her baby, “I.O.,” was deprived of oxygen in utero, leading to severe injuries. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the federal government was immune from damages for injuries its agents caused to the baby during childbirth. Resolution of the issues in this case was controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in "Feres v. United States," which found that military service members were barred from bringing claims against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries incident to their military service. Under the Feres doctrine, federal courts lose their subject matter jurisdiction over claims like this because the Tenth Circuit concluded the injured child’s in utero injuries were unmistakably derivative of an injury to her mother, an active service-member who gave birth at an Army Base hospital. "Feres is not ours to overrule. Applying controlling law, the government is not liable under the FTCA for the claims of negligence in this case." View "Ortiz v. United States" on Justia Law