Nancy Ortega appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Sanford Bismarck and Dr. Christie Iverson on her professional negligence claim. The matter was dismissed without prejudice. Ortega was seen at Sanford Bismarck for upper right abdomen pain. A CT scan revealed she had a right ovarian tumor. Dr. Iverson performed surgery to remove her left ovary. The surgery included a hysterectomy, bilateral salpingectomy, left oophorectomy and lysis of adhesions. Several months later, Dr. Iverson performed a second surgery to remove the right ovary. Ortega filed suit alleging malpractice when Dr. Iverson removed the left ovary instead of the right. The hospital and doctor moved to dismiss, arguing Ortega could not establish she suffered any damages. Although not argued by the hospital or doctor, the trial court held Ortega failed to file an admissible expert opinion supporting a prima facie medical malpractice claim within three months of filing her action, as required under N.D.C.C. 28-01-46. The court held Dr. Iverson’s removal of the ovary was not an “obvious occurrence” precluding application of 28-01-46, and that the “wrong organ” exception in the statute did not apply. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that Sanford and Dr. Iverson did not assert Ortega’s claims were barred by N.D.C.C 28-01-46, and they conceded the statute would not apply. Under these facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in applying N.D.C.C. 28-01-46 to grant summary judgment. The judgment was therefore reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Ortega v. Sanford Bismarck, et al." on Justia Law

Tessa Bride, as personal representative of the estate of John Pelkey, appealed an order dismissing without prejudice her medical malpractice action against Trinity Hospital, Marc Eichler, M.D., Kim Koo, M.D., and unnamed others. On September 11, 2015, Pelkey fell at home and was transferred to Trinity where he was treated for spinal cord injuries. Neurosurgeons Dr. Eichler and Dr. Koo both operated on him. On September 20, 2015, Pelkey fell at the hospital and sustained serious injuries. Pelkey died on February 2, 2017. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed because Bride failed to serve an affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion supporting a prima facie case of professional negligence within three months of the commencement of the action and failed to request an extension of the time period to serve the affidavit within the three months as required by N.D.C.C. 28-01-46. View "Bride v. Trinity Hospital, et al." on Justia Law

Dr. Allen Booth and St. Alexius Medical Center appeal from a district court judgment finding North Dakota’s noneconomic damages cap in medical malpractice cases unconstitutional. Dr. Booth and St. Alexius also argue the district court erred in denying a motion for a new trial. On May 29, 2012, Chenille Condon gave birth to a child at St. Alexius Medical Center. Within hours, Condon complained about chest discomfort and shortness of breath. A pulmonary embolism was suspected and testing was ordered in an effort to diagnose the issue. Testing revealed multiple pulmonary nodules in Condon’s mediastinum. Condon was eventually referred to Dr. Booth for a mediastinoscopy for the purpose of collecting a larger tissue sample. The larger tissue sample was necessary for a definitive diagnosis. Not long into the procedure, an injury occurred to Condon’s right innominate artery, resulting in life-threatening bleeding. Condon was placed in intensive care where she had a stroke. The stroke was related to the injury that occurred during surgery. Condon underwent rehabilitation for several months. Condon filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Booth. After nine days of proceedings, the jury returned a verdict finding negligence and awarding Condon $265,000 in past economic loss, $1.735-million in future economic loss, $150,000 in past noneconomic loss, and $1.350-million in future noneconomic loss. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the damage cap in N.D.C.C. 32-42-02 did not violate the equal-protection provisions of N.D. Const. art. I, section 21. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for a reduction in noneconomic damages consistent with the statute. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Dr. Booth’s request for a new trial. View "Condon v. St. Alexius Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

T.L. consulted Dr. Jack Goldberg for a blood condition. In October 2010, Dr. Goldberg told T.L. about a new medication, Pegasys. After taking Pegasys, T.L. experienced a number of symptoms, but Dr. Goldberg advised that T.L. should continue taking Pegasys. T.L. began experiencing severe pain in her neck and both arms, requiring hospitalization and rehabilitation. T.L. was diagnosed with inflammation of the spinal cord and experienced partial paralysis on her right side. T.L. brought suit against Dr. Goldberg and his employer, Penn Medicine Cherry Hill. T.L. claimed that Dr. Goldberg deviated from accepted standards of care by prescribing Pegasys to her because she was diagnosed with, and took medication for, chronic depression. During Dr. Goldberg’s deposition, when asked whether he was aware of any studies in the Journal of Clinical Oncology pertaining to the use of Pegasys to treat patients with T.L.’s condition, Dr. Goldberg answered “no.” On T.L.’s motion, the court barred Dr. Goldberg from using any medical literature at trial that was not produced during the course of discovery. At trial, Dr. Goldberg testified that he prescribed Pegasys to T.L. because he relied upon a clinical trial, published in the Journal of Clinical Oncology in 2009, that included patients with a history of depression. T.L.’s counsel did not object. The jury found that Dr. Goldberg did not deviate from the applicable standard of care. T.L. was granted a new trial on grounds that Dr. Goldberg’s discussion of the 2009 publication constituted reversible error. Dr. Goldberg appealed as of right based on a dissenting justice in the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding there was no demonstration that the changed testimony caused prejudice to T.L., and the plain error standard did not compel reversal, "especially because counsel’s failure to object was likely strategic." Under the circumstances, T.L. was not entitled to a new trial. View "T.L. v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to Defendant, Dr. Leslie Smith, based on quasi-judicial immunity, holding that Defendant was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because the suit sought to hold him liable for his performance of functions integral to the judicial process. In 2011, Kenneth McFadden stabbed Virgil Brown to death in their shared apartment. At the time of the murder, McFadden was in custody of Greater Assistance to Those in Need, Inc. as part of his conditional release under Act 911 of 1989 and was serving psychiatric treatment by Dr. Smith. Plaintiff, Brown's daughter, filed this action against Dr. Smith on behalf of her father's estate, claiming that Dr. Smith's alleged failure to provide adequate treatment to McFadden rendered him liable for her father's death. The circuit court concluded that Dr. Smith was entitled to immunity because his treatment of McFadden arose solely from the conditional release order and was within the scope of that order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that to the extent Dr. Smith's actions fell within the scope of the court's order he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. View "Martin v. Smith" on Justia Law

In December 2007, the decedent had gastric bypass surgery and developed a bed sore that became infected. The Hospital discharged him four days after the procedure. In January 2008, the decedent died from complications associated with a bacterial infection. Ward's initial nine-count complaint was dismissed for failure to comply with the Code of Civil Procedure. First and second amended complaints were also dismissed. The Hospital filed its answer to a third amended complaint. Four years later, in December 2015, the judge issued a pretrial conference order. A jury trial was set for January 2016. On December 31, 2015, the Hospital moved to bar Ward’s disclosure of a rebuttal witness the day before, 20 days before the start of the trial, noting that the case had been pending for six years. Ward unsuccessfully sought leave to file a fourth amended complaint, alleging a survival claim against the Hospital under a theory of respondeat superior and a wrongful death claim against the Hospital under a theory of respondeat superior. Ward successfully moved to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. In May 2016, Ward initiated another lawsuit against the Hospital, nearly identical to the proposed fourth amended complaint. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ward, overturning summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. None of the orders dismissing counts of the various complaints in the initial action were final. The lack of finality renders the doctrine of res judicata inapplicable. View "Ward v. Decatur Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Petitioners Dr. John Roberts and the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Johnson v. Roberts, 812 S.E.2d 207 (Ct. App. 2018). Respondent Clair Johnson filed a medical malpractice action alleging Roberts and MUSC negligently treated Johnson with electroconvulsive therapy. Roberts and MUSC moved for summary judgment, contending the six-year statute of repose barred her claims, and the circuit court agreed, holding the repose period began on the first date of treatment. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, relying on its decision in Marshall v. Dodds, 789 S.E.2d 88 (Ct. App. 2016), to hold that there was evidence to support Johnson's claim that Roberts and MUSC acted negligently within six years of filing her lawsuit. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently affirmed as modified the court of appeals' Marshall decision, holding the statute of repose began to run after each occurrence. In this case, Roberts and MUSC contended the court of appeals erred in finding Johnson's claims preserved for review and in holding the statute of repose began after each occurrence. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. View "Johnson v. Roberts" on Justia Law

In a medical negligence case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the admissibility of evidence regarding the risks and complications of a surgical procedure in a medical negligence case. Consistent with the Court's recent decision in Brady v. Urbas, 111 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2015), the Court found that evidence of the risks and complications of a surgery may be admissible at trial. View "Mitchell. v. Shikora" on Justia Law

While serving a prison sentence at the Lawrence Correctional Center in Illinois, Gabb experienced severe back pain whenever he stood too long (15-20 minutes). After treatments he received did not relieve his pain, Gabb sued two members of Lawrence’s medical staff, Dr. Coe and Nurse Kimmel, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his back pain in violation of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments. Gabb also sued Wexford, the private company that provided medical services at Lawrence. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gabb has not presented any evidence showing the defendants caused him any harm. The lack of evidence of what the “better” treatments were and whether they would have been effective would leave a jury entirely to its own imagination about what could have been done. View "Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial and renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the verdict in this case should be upheld. Petitioner failed a medial professional liability action against Respondents alleging that Respondents were negligent and breached the applicable standards of care by failing to timely deliver an infant, thereby resulting in the infant's death. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondents, and the circuit court denied both of Petitioner's post-trial motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, among other things, that, contrary to Petitioner's arguments on appeal, the evidence at trial did not constitute a clear case of medical negligence, and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. View "Smith v. Clark" on Justia Law