Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a healthcare liability action filed by the plaintiff, Payton Castillo, against CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians, alleging negligence in the care provided to her husband, who died shortly after being discharged from the hospital's emergency room. The defendants sought a protective order based on the quality improvement committee (QIC) privilege under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272 to prevent inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent's family. The trial court denied the defendants' motion.The Hamilton County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case and denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, finding that statements made during the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process. However, the court found that Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed the privileged information during the meeting with Mrs. Castillo. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on separate grounds and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castillo v. Rex" on Justia Law

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PorterCare Adventist Health Systems had inadequate surgical-sterilization procedures for about two years, leading to over $40 million in liability from thousands of patients' claims. PorterCare sought coverage from AdHealth, its excess-liability insurer, for the full $40 million policy limit, arguing that the claims arose from one medical incident. AdHealth refused coverage, asserting that a medical incident covers injuries to a single person, not multiple people, and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. PorterCare counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to AdHealth, agreeing with its interpretation that a medical incident is limited to the acts or omissions causing injury to one person. The court found that AdHealth owed coverage only for the claims of a single patient that trigger the excess policy’s liability threshold, not for multiple patients' claims grouped together.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the policy’s definition of “medical incident” unambiguously applies to the injuries of a single person. Therefore, AdHealth is liable only for individual claims exceeding PorterCare’s $2 million self-insurance retention, not for the aggregated claims of multiple patients. View "Adhealth, Limited v. PorterCare Adventist Health Systems" on Justia Law

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An employee, Sharon Dunn, was injured while working as an emergency-department nurse for East Texas Medical Center Athens (ETMC Athens), a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers’ compensation program. Dunn alleged that an emergency medical technician (EMT), who was not employed by ETMC Athens, negligently pushed a stretcher into her, causing a serious back injury. Dunn initially sued the EMT and his employer, but those claims were dismissed due to her failure to timely serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. Dunn then amended her pleadings to assert negligence claims against ETMC Athens.The trial court granted ETMC Athens's motion to designate the EMT and his employer as responsible third parties under the Texas proportionate-responsibility statute. However, eleven months later, Dunn moved to strike the designations, arguing that her suit was an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits, to which the proportionate-responsibility statute does not apply. The trial court granted Dunn’s motion, and the court of appeals denied ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the designations. The court held that the proportionate-responsibility statute applies because Dunn’s negligence claim against ETMC Athens is not an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also held that the Act does not prohibit nonsubscribing employers from designating responsible third parties and that there was sufficient evidence of the third parties’ responsibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its order striking the designations. View "IN RE EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER ATHENS" on Justia Law

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Shannon Reed arrived at Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle's emergency room with severe chest pain, nausea, shortness of breath, and numbness in his left arm. Dr. Keith McCoy ordered several tests, including EKGs and Troponin measurements. Despite Reed's fluctuating pain levels, he was discharged with a diagnosis of unspecified chest pain and instructions to follow up with a cardiologist. Reed died later that night. Oliver Miller, on behalf of Reed's wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed medical negligence claims against the hospital, United Emergency Services, and Dr. McCoy.The Lowndes County Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact for the jury to determine. The defendants argued that Miller's claims failed due to lack of causation, as affidavits from cardiologists indicated they would not have admitted Reed even if consulted. The court found that Miller's experts provided sufficient evidence of breaches in the standard of care that could have contributed to Reed's death.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment in part, while reversing and rendering in part. The court held that Miller failed to establish causation for the claim that Dr. McCoy should have admitted Reed to the hospital, as the on-call cardiologists would not have admitted him. However, the court found that Miller's other claims, including improper discharge and failure to report pain increase, presented genuine issues of material fact. The case was remanded to the Lowndes County Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "United Emergency Services of Mississippi, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

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In 2003, Sarah Ramey underwent a urethral dilation performed by Dr. Edward Dunne, which resulted in severe pain and subsequent debilitating medical conditions. Over the next fourteen years, Ramey sought medical advice from numerous doctors to determine the cause of her ailments. In 2017, Drs. Mario Castellanos and Lee Arnold Dellon linked her symptoms to the 2003 procedure. Ramey filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dunne and Foxhall Urology in 2019.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bifurcated trial to determine if Ramey’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The jury found that Ramey failed to file her suit within the three-year statute of limitations. Ramey then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its rulings and jury instructions. The trial court denied her motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ramey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ramey had received medical opinions linking her symptoms to the urethral dilation before 2017. The court also found that Ramey waived her claim regarding the jury instructions by affirmatively agreeing to them during the trial.However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on the improper invocation of inquiry notice by appellees’ counsel during rebuttal closing arguments. The court found that the trial court’s corrective instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudicial impact of the improper argument. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ramey v. Foxhall Urology, Chartered" on Justia Law

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Mario Mancini, an inmate at FCI Sandstone, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical malpractice. Mancini alleged that the government caused him permanent injury by negligently delaying necessary medical care. He experienced neck and back pain from a prior workplace injury, which worsened in 2017. Despite reporting increasing pain and numbness, his MRI and subsequent surgery were delayed. Mancini claimed these delays resulted in permanent nerve damage, loss of strength, muscle atrophy, numbness, and pain.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Mancini's FTCA claim. The court found that Mancini's expert affidavit, provided by Dr. Gary Wyard, failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 145.682. The affidavit did not adequately define the standard of care, explain how the government deviated from that standard, or establish a causal connection between the delays and Mancini's injuries. The court also excluded Dr. Wyard's testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert, citing factual errors and a lack of methodology in his affidavit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Dr. Wyard's affidavit did not satisfy the statutory requirements of Minn. Stat. § 145.682. The affidavit lacked specific details about the standard of care and failed to outline a chain of causation between the government's actions and Mancini's injuries. The court also upheld the exclusion of Dr. Wyard's testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice, as Mancini did not correct the deficiencies in the affidavit within the provided safe-harbor period. View "Mancini v. United States" on Justia Law

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An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

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Fatima Shaw-McDonald filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. after suffering vision loss following cataract surgery. While the lawsuit was pending, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not initially disclose the lawsuit in her bankruptcy filings. Eye Consultants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Shaw-McDonald no longer had standing to pursue it because her interest in the lawsuit had transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. Shaw-McDonald later amended her bankruptcy filings to include the lawsuit and obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.The circuit court dismissed the medical malpractice case, concluding that Shaw-McDonald lost standing when she filed for bankruptcy. The court relied on the precedent set by Kocher v. Campbell, which held that a plaintiff loses standing when a cause of action becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Shaw-McDonald appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that Shaw-McDonald had standing to maintain her medical malpractice action. The court reasoned that once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claim, it reverted to Shaw-McDonald as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Shaw-McDonald did not lose standing permanently when she filed for bankruptcy; rather, her standing was temporarily suspended. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to hold the medical malpractice case in abeyance until the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, rather than dismissing it. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald" on Justia Law

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A personal representative of a deceased resident's estate filed a complaint against a hospital district and its associated rehabilitation center, alleging negligence and vicarious liability for injuries suffered by the resident due to physical abuse by a temporary certified nursing assistant (CNA). The hospital district denied liability, claiming the CNA was an independent contractor. After a six-day trial, the jury found the CNA was an agent of the hospital district, and her negligence was a proximate cause of the resident's damages. The jury apportioned fault between the CNA and the hospital district, awarding $660,000 in damages to the estate.The district court reduced the damages by the percentage of fault attributed to the CNA, leading to an appeal by the personal representative, who argued the reduction was contrary to Wyoming law and inconsistent with the jury's verdict. The hospital district cross-appealed, asserting the district court should not have allowed the jury to consider whether the CNA was an agent and should have granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the district court did not err in denying the hospital district's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court held there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the personal representative on both direct and vicarious liability claims. The court also found the jury instructions adequately informed the jury of the applicable law and did not cause confusion.However, the Supreme Court determined the district court erred in reducing the damages. The jury found the CNA's conduct was negligent and that she was an agent of the hospital district, making the hospital district vicariously liable for her actions. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment for the full $660,000 in favor of the estate. View "Campbell County Hospital District v. Elsner" on Justia Law

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Raymond Tackett, an inmate with the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), suffered from Hepatitis C (HCV) and did not receive direct-acting antivirals (DAAs), a treatment that cures HCV. He died on November 29, 2019, from complications related to HCV. His daughter, Skyler Tackett, as the personal representative of his estate, filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state law medical malpractice claim against the medical professionals who treated him, Wexford Health Services, and Dr. Kristen Dauss, the Chief Medical Officer of the IDOC. She later dismissed all claims except the deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Dauss.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Dauss, finding that she took reasonable steps to expand access to DAAs and was not responsible for the treatment decisions that led to Mr. Tackett’s death. Ms. Tackett appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found that Ms. Tackett presented insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Dr. Dauss liable in her individual capacity. The court noted that Mr. Tackett was in a treatment priority group and that Nurse Myers had requested DAAs for him, but there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions or the IDOC policy prevented him from receiving the treatment. The court concluded that while Mr. Tackett’s death was tragic, there was no evidence that Dr. Dauss’s actions amounted to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. View "Tackett v Dauss" on Justia Law