Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A woman, acting as administrator of her late husband’s estate and in her individual capacity, filed a medical malpractice action against multiple doctors and medical practices. The complaint alleged that after an MRI detected a lesion on her husband’s kidney in 2017, recommended follow-up care was not pursued by his medical providers. In 2020, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer and died within months. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ failure to act constituted a breach of the standard of care. Before trial, some defendants were dismissed, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against several remaining doctors and practices.During jury selection, the plaintiff’s counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, arguing that their responses during voir dire showed they could not be fair and impartial or would not follow the law as instructed by the court. The trial court denied these for-cause challenges, finding the prospective jurors’ answers did not establish actual bias or unwillingness to follow the law. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the for-cause challenges under an abuse-of-discretion standard.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), when a principal challenge is made to a prospective juror on grounds of bias or unwillingness to follow the law, the trial court must determine the validity of the challenge, and, if valid, the juror must be absolutely disqualified. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it permitted discretion at this stage. However, it found that competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. View "Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Pamela Smith died after surgery at Lovelace Medical Center, operated by Lovelace Health System, LLC. Smith’s estate brought wrongful death claims against Lovelace, asserting both direct negligence and vicarious liability based on the conduct of Lovelace’s employed registered nurses. Lovelace was a “qualified health care provider” (QHP) under the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but its employed registered nurses were not, nor could they be under the version of the Act in effect at the time.The Plaintiff sought summary judgment in the Second Judicial District Court, arguing that the MMA did not apply to claims based on the conduct of non-QHP registered nurses, and therefore Lovelace was not entitled to the MMA’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment and concluding that Lovelace was not entitled to the Act’s benefits regarding its nurse employees’ actions. Lovelace sought interlocutory appeal; the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied review, but the Supreme Court of New Mexico granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of New Mexico reviewed the statutory construction de novo. It held that the plain language of the MMA covers vicarious liability claims against QHPs, regardless of whether the agent (here, a nurse) is a QHP, so long as the agent’s conduct constitutes medical treatment or a departure from accepted standards resulting in injury. The Court rejected the argument that only the conduct of a QHP can be the basis for a malpractice claim under the MMA, and affirmed that Lovelace is entitled to the Act’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff was reversed. View "Ferlic v. Lovelace Health Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

A woman with an enlarged lymph node was initially diagnosed by a pathologist as having metastatic breast cancer. However, subsequent imaging and tests did not confirm a breast origin and suggested lymphoma as a possible diagnosis. Her treating oncologist, despite access to these conflicting findings, did not consult further with pathology or pursue additional investigation, and instead proceeded to treat her for breast cancer with chemotherapy and radiation. After about a year, her cancer had advanced, and a later biopsy revealed she actually had ALK positive large B-cell lymphoma, a rare and aggressive cancer. She then received appropriate treatment but did not respond positively and died. The plaintiffs, her husband and her estate, alleged that the oncologist breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose and consult, resulting in delayed proper treatment and increased harm.The case was first tried in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, resulting in a mistrial. At retrial, after the plaintiffs presented their evidence, the defendants moved for compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court granted, finding insufficient evidence of causation. The plaintiffs’ post-trial motions were denied, and judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a new trial, concluding there was sufficient expert evidence under Pennsylvania’s “increased risk of harm” standard to permit the case to go to the jury.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed whether the Superior Court correctly applied the “increased risk of harm” standard from Hamil v. Bashline. The Court held that the Superior Court properly applied this relaxed causation standard, finding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the oncologist’s conduct increased the risk of harm. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, requiring the case be submitted to the jury. View "Estate of Smith v. Kannarkatt" on Justia Law

Charles L. Hinkel, III experienced chest pain at home and, after his son called 911, emergency responders Kristian Brock (an EMT) and Christopher Stone (a paramedic) were dispatched to assist. They used a phone app called “Active 911” for navigation, but due to darkness, rain, and poor lighting, they initially missed the house, arriving about sixteen minutes after dispatch. After bringing Hinkel to the ambulance, he suffered cardiac arrest, and the defibrillator malfunctioned. The responders stopped at another paramedic’s home to get a working defibrillator and continued resuscitation, but Hinkel was pronounced dead at the hospital. Hinkel’s estate sued Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, alleging negligence related to their navigation choices and equipment checks.The Henry Circuit Court dismissed claims against Henry County EMS and the defendants in their official capacities but denied summary judgment for Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, finding their actions involved ministerial duties not protected by qualified official immunity. Rather than immediately appealing, Brock and Stone proceeded to trial, which ended in a mistrial. Afterward, they filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Brock and Stone forfeited their right to an interlocutory appeal by proceeding to trial rather than appealing the immunity denial before trial. The Court clarified that once trial begins, the summary judgment record is superseded and further appellate review of immunity must occur on the trial record, not the pretrial record. The Court also found it lacked appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine in these circumstances. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "BROCK V. HINKEL" on Justia Law

The plaintiff experienced serious medical complications after being misdiagnosed by his primary care provider, a physician assistant. Initially presenting with abdominal pain and urinary issues, the plaintiff was diagnosed with urinary retention and prescribed medication. His condition worsened, leading to emergency hospitalization where it was determined he had acute diverticulitis, resulting in a perforated bowel and septic shock. The plaintiff sued the physician assistant for negligence, alleging that the examination and treatment were deficient and caused significant injuries.The Iowa District Court for Dallas County reviewed the case. The plaintiff had submitted a certificate of merit affidavit, required under Iowa law for medical malpractice actions, signed by a physician board-certified in surgery. The defendant argued, and the district court agreed, that this expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for a physician assistant practicing family medicine, as the fields and certifications were deemed too distinct. The court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of a qualified expert.The Iowa Supreme Court considered whether a physician is qualified to serve as an expert in a malpractice case against a physician assistant under Iowa Code section 147.139. Applying a categorical approach established in Jones v. Lindell, the court held that “field” in the statute is defined by licensure rather than specialty or area of practice. It determined that physicians and physician assistants are licensed to practice in substantially similar fields because their scopes of practice, education, and statutory definitions overlap significantly. The court concluded the physician was a qualified expert and reversed the district court's dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Davenport v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The case involves a patient who was admitted to a hospital for acute coronary syndrome. After initially declining surgery, he agreed to undergo bypass surgery and signed a consent form authorizing three specific procedures: coronary bypass graft surgery, endoscopic vein harvest, and placement of a left atrial appendage clip. The list of procedures was handwritten on a standard consent form. The patient later received surgery in which the left atrial appendage clip was placed.Subsequently, the patient filed a lawsuit in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, alleging medical battery against the physician and the hospital. He contended that the use of the singular term “procedure” on the consent form implied consent for only one procedure and not for the placement of the atrial appendage clip. He also claimed that the physician did not discuss the atrial clip with him or conduct appropriate follow-up. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the patient had consented to all procedures listed on the form. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the patient had expressly consented to the placement of the atrial appendage clip, and dismissed the medical battery claim.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, holding that medical battery requires the absence of consent or performance of a substantially different procedure than authorized. The Supreme Court found the patient expressly consented to the placement of the left atrial appendage clip, and did not allege that the procedure performed was substantially different from the one authorized. The Court emphasized that a lack of understanding or information about the procedure is a potential claim for lack of informed consent (medical malpractice), not medical battery. The dismissal was affirmed. View "Ford v. Polomsky" on Justia Law

After suffering catastrophic injuries during a surgery at a hospital, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the hospital and the lead surgeon. During its investigation, the hospital identified three nonparty doctors who had participated in the surgery and who might have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. These doctors were no longer employed by the hospital, but the hospital remained contractually obligated to defend and indemnify them. Without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent, the hospital communicated with these doctors outside the formal discovery process. Additionally, a member of the hospital's quality improvement committee, also the chief medical officer, engaged in conversations regarding the case with one of these doctors.The case was first reviewed by the King County Superior Court, where the plaintiff sought sanctions, including default judgment, and moved to compel production of communications and quality improvement materials. The trial court found that the hospital had violated the rule against ex parte communications with the plaintiff's nonparty doctors but denied default judgment, citing insufficient information to determine substantial prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to compel production of quality improvement materials, maintaining the statutory privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding that the hospital's ex parte communications violated established rules, that the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating prejudice, and that the failure to screen the quality improvement committee member did not waive the statutory privilege.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the hospital violated the rule prohibiting ex parte communications with the plaintiff's nonparty doctors and rejected the hospital's arguments for exceptions. The Court further held that prejudice is presumed when this rule is violated, and plaintiffs do not bear the burden to prove litigation prejudice to obtain relief. Regarding the quality improvement privilege, the Court concluded that by failing to screen a committee member involved in litigation, the hospital at least partially waived the statutory privilege. The Court vacated the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motions and remanded for further proceedings, including in camera review of relevant materials. View "Snyder v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A newborn, Layla, was admitted to Druid City Hospital in July 2019, where her condition deteriorated, prompting a transfer to Children's Hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. Despite medical intervention, Layla passed away shortly after her transfer. Nearly two years later, her parents filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the hospital, a physician, and several fictitiously named defendants, alleging failures in timely transfer and communication. The complaint specifically described one fictitious defendant as the physician responsible for Layla's care during the events in question.After the statute of limitations had expired, the parents amended their complaint to substitute Dr. Sam Gentle for one of the fictitiously named defendants, alleging he had delayed Layla's transfer. Dr. Gentle moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, arguing that the claims against him were barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to the original filing because the plaintiffs knew or should have known his identity earlier. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that the original allegations lacked specificity required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act and that the parents failed to exercise due diligence in identifying Dr. Gentle before the limitations period ended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the summary judgment under the same standard as the lower court. The Supreme Court held that for a substitution of a fictitiously named defendant to relate back, plaintiffs must exercise due diligence to ascertain the party’s identity. Because the parents had information in medical records indicating Dr. Gentle’s involvement but did not investigate further before the statute expired, the Court concluded that due diligence was not shown. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gentle. View "Bauman v. Gentle" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old girl, after suffering a rape, was admitted to an adolescent psychiatric unit for mental health treatment. While in the facility, she alleged that another patient, Z.L., touched her buttocks with his foot and later, while she was awake, put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina. The incident allegedly occurred in a common room under indirect staff supervision. After reporting the event and undergoing a sexual assault exam, she was discharged from the facility three days later. Her co-conservators filed a medical malpractice action against the health facility, claiming that inadequate supervision enabled the alleged assault and caused her further harm.The matter proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in the District Court of Campbell County. The court approved a special verdict form with a threshold question asking whether Z.L. “inappropriately touched” the plaintiff; the form did not define this term. The jury answered the question in the negative and returned a verdict for the defendant hospital. The plaintiffs objected to the structure of the verdict form and the absence of a legal definition for “inappropriate touch.” They moved for a new trial, which was denied, and the court awarded costs to the defendant after finding the plaintiffs’ objections to costs untimely.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiffs had properly preserved their objections for appeal, but found no error in the special verdict form or jury instructions, concluding that the language used was consistent with the evidence and arguments presented. The court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to jury questions, denying a new trial, or awarding costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, denial of a new trial, and the award of costs. View "Rose v. Campbell County Health" on Justia Law

After a patient underwent knee replacement surgery, a suturing needle became dislodged and was lost inside her knee during the procedure. The surgical assistant attempted to locate the needle but was unsuccessful. The surgical team, including the supervising surgeon, searched for the needle and ordered x-rays, which were reviewed by radiologists. The needle was not detected at that time, and the surgery was completed without informing the patient of the possible retained foreign object. Subsequent follow-up appointments and further x-rays revealed the presence of the needle, which was eventually removed in a later procedure. The patient suffered complications requiring additional surgeries and prolonged antibiotic treatment.The patient initiated a medical negligence lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court against the surgical assistant, radiologists, and the hospital. The surgeon settled and was dismissed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the surgical assistant and radiologists, finding that expert testimony was required to establish a breach of the standard of care and that such testimony was absent. The court also determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant and that neither expert identified the radiologists’ standard of care. The patient’s motion to reconsider was denied.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the orthopedic expert could testify against the radiologists despite not being in their specialty, and that expert testimony was not required against the surgical assistant based on res ipsa loquitur exceptions. The Court of Appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained for jury determination.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for both the surgical assistant and radiologists. The Court held that expert testimony specifying the applicable standard of care was required in medical negligence cases and was lacking against the radiologists. It further held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant, as the evidence showed no negligence and exclusive control was absent at the relevant time. View "DIAGNOSTIC X-RAY PHYSICIANS, PSC (DXP) V. LLOYD" on Justia Law