Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A woman named Lewis sought medical care at Marion General Hospital for abdominal pain and constipation. She was evaluated by multiple physicians, including Dr. Armstead, Dr. Verucchi, and Dr. Jensen, and was diagnosed with sepsis and severe abdominal issues. After various tests and a transfer to the intensive care unit, her condition worsened, leading to her eventual transfer to another hospital where she was diagnosed with abdominal compartment syndrome and underwent emergency surgery. Lewis continued to suffer complications and ultimately died several months later. Her wrongful death beneficiaries brought suit against the hospital and the physicians, alleging medical negligence for failure to diagnose and treat her condition, failure to timely transfer her to a facility with higher-level care, and failure to consult appropriate specialists.The Marion County Circuit Court initially denied summary judgment to the defendants and allowed limited discovery. After further proceedings, the defendants again sought summary judgment, arguing that Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7 granted them legal immunity due to resource limitations caused by the COVID-19 state of emergency. The trial court agreed, finding the defendants immune and dismissing all claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Court held that Section 11-71-7 did not apply to all of the plaintiffs’ claims, as there was no evidence that several alleged acts of negligence—such as failure to diagnose, treat, or consult—were attributable to the COVID-19 state of emergency. The Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ failure to timely transfer Lewis was related to COVID-19 resource limitations. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bush v. Marion General Hospital" on Justia Law

Several patients suffered harm after undergoing surgeries performed by Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., whose conduct involved unnecessary procedures and fraudulent misrepresentations about the need for surgery. Following Durrani’s indictment and flight from the United States, hundreds of injured patients pursued civil suits in Ohio state court, obtaining judgments against Durrani for negligence, fraud, and, in some cases, battery or lack of informed consent. After prevailing at trial but unable to collect damages directly from Durrani, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgments against his insurer, the Medical Protective Company (MedPro), under the terms of Durrani’s malpractice insurance policy.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the plaintiffs filed enforcement actions to compel MedPro to pay their verdicts and initiated a direct action against MedPro and its vice president, alleging bad faith and other torts related to MedPro’s handling of the litigation and denial of payment. The district court dismissed all claims, finding that the policy’s exclusion for damages “in consequence of” intentional torts (including fraud) barred coverage where the damages were inseparable from Durrani’s fraudulent acts, and that Ohio law permits only the insured—not third-party claimants—to assert bad faith claims against insurers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that MedPro’s policy exclusion applies when the plaintiffs’ damages directly arise from and cannot be separated from Durrani’s fraud. Where jury verdicts did not allocate damages between negligence and fraud, or where all remaining damages were tied to fraudulent acts, the plaintiffs could not plausibly claim coverage. The court further held that, under Ohio law, third-party claimants may not bring bad faith claims against insurers, and the plaintiffs failed to state any viable independent tort claims. The district court’s dismissals were therefore affirmed in all respects. View "Adams v. Med. Protective Co." on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law

In 2018, a patient named Crystal Allen suffered a stroke and was admitted to a skilled nursing facility. During her stay, Dr. Oyesiji Arojojoye evaluated and performed a debridement procedure on a pressure ulcer on her hip. Afterward, Crystal developed an infection that progressed to sepsis, resulting in her death. Vickie Allen, Crystal’s mother and the statutory beneficiary, brought a lawsuit against Dr. Arojojoye and others, alleging that they failed to prevent sepsis and abscesses, did not timely assess or refer Crystal for immediate treatment, and did not provide adequate medical care. Vickie Allen retained Dr. Andrew Meillier, an internist, as her medical expert.Dr. Arojojoye moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court in Maricopa County, arguing that he was a board-certified wound care specialist and, under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 12-2604), only an expert with the same board certification could testify about the standard of care. The trial court found that while Dr. Arojojoye was board-certified in wound care, the relevant treatment fell within internal medicine, so Dr. Meillier was qualified to testify. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, disagreed, concluding the treatment was wound care and that a wound care specialist was required as an expert. It reversed the trial court and directed entry of judgment for Dr. Arojojoye.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed whether the lower courts properly applied § 12-2604 and its own precedent in Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare. The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals failed to properly identify the care or treatment at issue and did not conduct the necessary analysis regarding Dr. Arojojoye’s claimed specialty. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decisions of both lower courts and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that lower courts must correctly identify the care at issue and conduct a thorough analysis of any claimed specialty under § 12-2604 before determining expert witness qualifications. View "AROJOJOYE v. ALLEN" on Justia Law

Kevin Welch underwent emergency surgery for an ascending aortic dissection and was subsequently treated in the intensive care unit of a hospital. After the operation, he exhibited confusion and, later, weakness in his lower extremities. Neurological consultation and imaging were recommended, but an MRI was delayed for safety and stability reasons. When eventually performed, the MRI indicated that Welch had suffered a stroke. He later reported ongoing cognitive and physical impairments, while the hospital maintained that his physical function had largely recovered and that any permanent disability was cognitive rather than physical.Following these events, Welch’s power of attorney, Shana Hargrove, filed a medical malpractice suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the hospital and several physicians, alleging that delays and omissions in post-surgical care worsened Welch’s outcome. After discovery, the hospital moved to exclude the causation testimony of Welch’s experts, Dr. Elakil and Dr. Schulman, and for summary judgment. The District Court excluded Dr. Elakil’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 due to insufficient basis for his causation opinions and excluded Dr. Schulman’s testimony because he was not properly disclosed as a causation expert under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37. With no admissible expert testimony on causation, the court granted summary judgment for the hospital.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the exclusions for abuse of discretion and the summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s rulings, holding that both expert testimonies were properly excluded and summary judgment was warranted, as expert testimony on causation is required under District of Columbia law for medical malpractice claims of this nature. View "Hargrove v. MedStar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment for back pain at a hospital and subsequently left partially paralyzed. He retained an attorney on a contingency fee basis to pursue claims for medical malpractice. The agreement set attorney fees at varying percentages, depending on when the case was resolved. The attorney then brought in a second law firm as co-counsel under a similar agreement. During the course of litigation, the patient’s attorneys amended the complaint to add an ordinary negligence claim alongside the professional negligence claims. The case settled for a confidential amount. After settlement, the attorneys claimed that the ordinary negligence claim removed the settlement from Nevada’s statutory cap on attorney fees in medical professional negligence cases, and they sought to collect higher fees under their agreements. The client disputed this, asserting that the statutory cap should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County ruled in favor of the attorneys, finding that the ordinary negligence claim was not subject to the statutory cap on attorney fees and that the attorneys were entitled to the full contingency fee amounts. The court also found that the attorneys had properly perfected their attorney liens on the settlement proceeds, even though notice of the liens was sent after receipt of the first settlement check.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that, under the recent decision in Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC, the substance of the patient’s ordinary negligence claim sounded in professional negligence, so the statutory cap on attorney fees applied. The Supreme Court further held that attorney liens must be perfected (by notice to the client) before the attorney receives settlement funds, so only the lien on the second settlement check was validly perfected. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "CASTILLO VS. ATKINSON WATKINS & HOFFMANN, LLP" on Justia Law

A patient presented to an emergency department with symptoms of COVID-19. He was examined by a physician, who determined that he was stable and did not exhibit severe symptoms, so she did not prescribe monoclonal antibodies—a treatment option available at the hospital. Instead, the patient was discharged with advice to use over-the-counter medications and to return if his condition worsened. A few days later, his condition deteriorated, and he was readmitted to the hospital, where he ultimately died from complications related to COVID-19.The patient’s survivors filed a negligence lawsuit in the San Bernardino County Superior Court against the treating physician, her medical group, and the hospital. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) provided them immunity because their treatment decisions involved allocation of a covered countermeasure (monoclonal antibodies) during a period of constrained supply. The Superior Court denied the motion, finding a triable issue as to whether the physician’s decision not to prescribe the medication fell within the scope of PREP Act immunity, specifically whether it was related to prioritization due to limited supply.On review, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, considered whether the PREP Act constituted a complete defense to the alleged liability for not prescribing monoclonal antibodies. The court held that the PREP Act does provide such immunity when failure to administer a covered countermeasure results from a conscious decision to prioritize or allocate it, rather than from mere neglect or lack of decision-making. The court found no triable issue of material fact regarding the physician’s conscious allocation decision and directed the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Nassman v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Irma Herrera alleged that her obstetricians committed medical malpractice during her childbirth at a federally funded community health clinic in Chicago, resulting in serious injuries. Because the clinic receives federal funding, her legal remedy was limited to an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. After initially filing suit in state court, the Attorney General certified that the doctors were acting within the scope of their federal employment, leading to removal of the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Herrera’s case because she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). In an attempt to preserve her claim, Herrera complied with the saving provision in the Westfall Act and refiled her case in federal court. However, the district court again dismissed her suit, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s precedent in Evans v. United States, which had held that the Westfall Act’s saving provision does not apply to medical malpractice cases removed under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether to overturn its holding in Evans in light of Herrera’s arguments that Evans was wrongly decided. The court declined to do so, emphasizing the importance of stare decisis and finding no compelling reason to depart from its recent precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the Westfall Act’s saving provision does not apply to medical malpractice cases removed under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), thereby precluding Herrera’s claim. View "Herrera v USA" on Justia Law

A woman employed as an office support technician with the FBI underwent carpal tunnel surgery on her right hand in January 2017, performed by an orthopedic surgeon. After the surgery, she continued to experience symptoms such as numbness, pain, and decreased grip strength. Her physician reassured her that these ongoing symptoms were normal and that she was healing well. She continued therapy and work with certain restrictions but did not realize the surgery might have been unsuccessful until 2021, when another physician diagnosed her with an incomplete release of her transverse carpal ligament during the original surgery. She subsequently underwent a corrective surgery.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of the surgeon and his medical group, finding the plaintiff’s claims barred by the statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The court reasoned that her postoperative symptoms in 2017 were sufficient to trigger the three-year limitations period, which had expired before she filed suit in July 2022. The plaintiff appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact regarding when she knew or should have known of the alleged injury and its negligent cause.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held that triable issues of material fact remained as to when the plaintiff’s injury became sufficiently appreciable to trigger the statute of limitations and when she knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known the cause of her injury was the 2017 surgery. The court concluded that summary judgment was improper because reasonable minds could differ on when the statute began to run. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellants. View "Godshall v. Peterson" on Justia Law

A physician who operated an addiction clinic was indicted on multiple counts of unlawfully prescribing controlled substances to five undercover law enforcement officers and four actual patients, as well as several counts of obstruction of justice for altering patient records after being indicted. At trial, four former patients testified that the physician prescribed drugs to them following minimal or inadequate medical evaluation, with several testifying to sexual misconduct or exploitation by the physician in connection with their prescriptions. Five undercover officers also testified to receiving prescriptions with little or no medical assessment, and video evidence corroborated their accounts. The prosecution further showed that after his indictment, the physician added false or misleading entries to the medical records of the undercover officers to make it appear that he had conducted more thorough evaluations than he actually had.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the physician’s motion for acquittal only as to the conspiracy count but let the case proceed on the remaining charges. A jury convicted the defendant on all remaining counts. At sentencing, the district court adopted a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months but imposed a sentence of 144 months, an upward variance, citing the physician’s sexual misconduct against patients as a significant aggravating factor. The district court explained that the guidelines did not adequately capture the seriousness of the sexual abuse committed in connection with the unlawful prescriptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported all convictions for unlawful prescription and obstruction of justice. The court also found that the upward variance in sentencing was reasonable, given the aggravating circumstances, and that the district court did not commit procedural or substantive error. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Hollington" on Justia Law