An expert report required by the Texas Medical Liability Act must address proximate cause. Plaintiff brought this health care liability claim against Hospital and others for the death of Yolanda Iris Flores. To satisfy the Act’s expert-report requirement, Plaintiff served two reports. Hospital argued that the expert reports did not adequately show causation. The trial court overruled the objection and denied Hospital’s motion to dismiss. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that an expert report is not required to address proximate cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s expert reports did not show how Hospital caused Flores’s death, and therefore, the court of appeals’ judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. v. Zamarripa" on Justia Law

The caps on personal injury noneconomic damages in medical negligence actions provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. This case arose after complications from surgery left Appellee severely injured. After trial, Appellee’s noneconomic damages were capped by Fla. Stat. 766.118(2) and (3). The Fourth District Court of Appeal directed the trial court to reinstate the total damages award as found by the jury, concluding that section 766.118 was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the caps on noneconomic damages in sections 766.118(2) and (3) arbitrarily reduce damage awards for plaintiffs who suffer drastic injuries; and (2) there is no rational relationship between the personal injury noneconomic damage caps in section 766.118 and alleviating a purported medical malpractice insurance criss. View "North Broward Hospital District v. Kalitan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Nancy Brenner, individually and in her representative capacity as representative of the estate of Dale Brenner, and Zach Brenner, individually, appealed judgments entered in favor of defendants Universal Health Services of Rancho Springs, Inc., doing business as Southwest Healthcare System - Inland Valley Medical Center (UHS) and Dr. Young H. Lee, M.D. (Dr. Lee or Lee). Dale Brenner, Nancy's husband and Zach's father, was a patient at the Inland Valley Medical Center for approximately 23 days after he suffered a stroke a few hours after arriving at the emergency department of the hospital. He was eventually transferred to another medical facility, where he later died. Approximately a year after Dale Brenner's death, the plaintiffs sued UHS, Lee, and additional defendants, asserting causes of action for wrongful death based on medical negligence; retaliation; and elder abuse. Lee and UHS moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the plaintiffs contended the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of UHS and Lee. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Brenner v. Universal Health etc." on Justia Law

Moshiri, other physicians, and hospital administrators were charged (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)) based on a kickback scheme. The former director of the podiatry residency program (Noorlag) testified that teaching contracts were a vehicle to pay physicians for referrals. Moshiri received $2,000 per month and was named as the Director of External Podiatric Office Rotations. Another doctor was named to that position at the same time. According to Noorlag, neither doctor was considered to hold that position, and neither performed the related duties. The Chair of the Counsel on Podiatric Medical Education, which oversees and certifies residency programs nationally and publishes standards, offered an expert opinion that teaching stipends are uncommon for attending physicians at residency programs and that he had never heard of such a physician being paid $2,000 per month. According to multiple witnesses, Moshiri did not conduct workshops and did not manage external rotations. Moshiri worked with residents about three times per month, while 11 other program physicians averaged 10 cases per month with residents. During the period at issue, the Hospital billed Medicare and Medicaid $482,000 for patients Moshiri treated. The Hospital’s Chief Operating Officer had recorded conversations in which Moshiri discussed his referrals. The agent who arrested Moshiri testified that Moshiri said that “the contract turned into basically paying for patients.” The Seventh Circuit upheld Moshiri’s conviction, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the expert testimony. View "United States v. Moshiri" on Justia Law

The district court erred in dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction plaintiff's administratively exhausted Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, claim following the United States' second removal. In this case, plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against his medical providers, alleging that his mother had died of postpartum hemmorhage shortly after giving birth to him. The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims arising from Dr. Bencomo's actions, dismissed those claims without prejudice, and once again remanded the state claims against the individual defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff's initial failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as to Dr. Bencomo whom plaintiff reasonably did not know was covered by the FTCA deprived the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's FTCA claim even after plaintiff dismissed his initial suit against Dr. Bencomo, and then exhausted his administrative remedies before amending his complaint in state court to add Dr. Bencomo again. View "D. L. V. United States" on Justia Law

Pursuant to ORCP 54 B(1), the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s wrongful death action because it found that plaintiff’s counsel willfully failed to comply with two court orders and that, as a result, dismissal was an appropriate sanction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the resulting judgment without opinion. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed plaintiff’s petition for review to clarify the standard that applies when a trial court dismisses an action pursuant to ORCP 54 B(1) for failing to comply with a court order. The Court recognized the difficulty posed by counsel who, for one reason or another, seemed unable to move a case forward in a fair and efficient way. "We trust, however, that ordinarily courts will be able to take remedial steps and impose sanctions short of dismissal when faced with such problems." On this record, the Court could not say that the trial court’s dismissal was supported by evidence that plaintiff’s counsel willfully failed to comply with the court’s orders. The Court accordingly reversed the trial court’s judgment and the Court of Appeals decision and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Lang v. Rogue Valley Medical Center" on Justia Law

Parents of a child born with severe disabilities may bring a wrongful birth claim based on the physicians’ failure to inform them of prenatal test results showing a congenital defect that would have led them to terminate the pregnancy. Plaintiff filed suit against several medical defendants, alleging that the doctors negligently failed to accurately interpret, diagnose, and respond to fetal abnormalities in her ultrasound and that, as a result of this negligent care, Plaintiff gave birth to a child with severe brain abnormalities. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Iowa has not recognized “wrongful birth” as a cause of action. On appeal, Defendants alleged that a wrongful birth claim is a new cause of action unsupported by Iowa law. Plaintiffs, in turn, noted a clear majority of other jurisdictions allow parents to sue under these facts. The Supreme Court held that wrongful birth fits within common law tort principles governing medical negligence claims, and no public policy or statute precludes the cause of action. The Supreme Court thus reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Defendants, holding that wrongful birth is a cognizable claim under Iowa law. View "Plowman v. Fort Madison Community Hospital" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellee Sean Elliott filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Appellants Resurgens and Dr. Tapan Daftari in the State Court of Fulton County. Elliott alleged that Dr. Daftari failed to timely diagnose and treat an abscess in his thoracic spinal cord, which resulted in his paralysis. During trial four years later, Elliott attempted to call Savannah Sullivan, a nurse who was not specifically identified as a potential witness in either Elliott’s written discovery responses or in the parties’ pre-trial order (“PTO”). The trial court subsequently excluded Sullivan as a witness. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Elliott appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court’s exclusion of Sullivan was error. The Court of Appeals agreed, reversing the jury’s judgment and remanding for a new trial. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment, and reversed. View "Resurgens, P.C. v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Ollis, a veteran, sought disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. 1151, which provides benefits for certain injuries incurred as a result of VA medical care. Ollis suffers from atrial fibrillation and claims a disability resulting from complications of a heart procedure to treat that condition. The procedure (miniMAZE) was allegedly recommended by a VA doctor but was performed by a private doctor. The VA denied Ollis’s application for benefits. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed. The Federal Circuit vacated in part, remanding the question of whether Ollis’s VA doctors were negligent by recommending the mini-MAZE procedure to him. The Veterans Court focused on whether VA medical treatment caused Ollis to utilize Dr. Hall and Methodist Medical Center, rather than on whether VA medical treatment caused him to have the mini-MAZE procedure itself. On remand, the Veterans Court must also address the “not reasonably foreseeable” and “proximate cause of the disability” requirements. The court affirmed rejection of an argument that VA’s failure to provide him notice that a referral to a private facility for his miniMAZE procedure could extinguish his eligibility for benefits constituted a violation of his right to due process. View "Ollis v. Shulkin" on Justia Law

Evidence of non-party negligence was properly admitted in this case. Petitioners alleged that John S. Park, M.D. was negligent when he interpreted radiological images, leading to Lance Copsey’s fatal stroke. Petitioners originally sued Dr. Park and three subsequent treating physicians but partially settled their claims and dismissed the subsequent treating physicians. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Park. On appeal, Petitioners argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motions in limine opposing the admission of evidence regarding the non-parties’ statuses as former defendants and Dr. Park’s defense that the negligence of the subsequent treating physicians was an intervening and superseding cause of Copsey’s death. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the motions in limine were properly denied because Martinez ex rel. Fielding v. Johns Hopkins Hops, 70 A.3d 397 (2013) permits the introduction into evidence of non-party negligence and causation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) evidence of non-party negligence was relevant and necessary in providing Dr. Park a fair trial; and (2) causation was an issue for the trier of fact, and the evidence tended to show that Dr. Park was not negligent and that other independent causes contributed to Copsey’s death. View "Copsey v. Park" on Justia Law