Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Irma Herrera alleged that her obstetricians committed medical malpractice during her childbirth at a federally funded community health clinic in Chicago, resulting in serious injuries. Because the clinic receives federal funding, her legal remedy was limited to an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. After initially filing suit in state court, the Attorney General certified that the doctors were acting within the scope of their federal employment, leading to removal of the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Herrera’s case because she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). In an attempt to preserve her claim, Herrera complied with the saving provision in the Westfall Act and refiled her case in federal court. However, the district court again dismissed her suit, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s precedent in Evans v. United States, which had held that the Westfall Act’s saving provision does not apply to medical malpractice cases removed under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether to overturn its holding in Evans in light of Herrera’s arguments that Evans was wrongly decided. The court declined to do so, emphasizing the importance of stare decisis and finding no compelling reason to depart from its recent precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the Westfall Act’s saving provision does not apply to medical malpractice cases removed under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), thereby precluding Herrera’s claim. View "Herrera v USA" on Justia Law

A woman employed as an office support technician with the FBI underwent carpal tunnel surgery on her right hand in January 2017, performed by an orthopedic surgeon. After the surgery, she continued to experience symptoms such as numbness, pain, and decreased grip strength. Her physician reassured her that these ongoing symptoms were normal and that she was healing well. She continued therapy and work with certain restrictions but did not realize the surgery might have been unsuccessful until 2021, when another physician diagnosed her with an incomplete release of her transverse carpal ligament during the original surgery. She subsequently underwent a corrective surgery.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of the surgeon and his medical group, finding the plaintiff’s claims barred by the statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The court reasoned that her postoperative symptoms in 2017 were sufficient to trigger the three-year limitations period, which had expired before she filed suit in July 2022. The plaintiff appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact regarding when she knew or should have known of the alleged injury and its negligent cause.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held that triable issues of material fact remained as to when the plaintiff’s injury became sufficiently appreciable to trigger the statute of limitations and when she knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known the cause of her injury was the 2017 surgery. The court concluded that summary judgment was improper because reasonable minds could differ on when the statute began to run. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellants. View "Godshall v. Peterson" on Justia Law

A physician who operated an addiction clinic was indicted on multiple counts of unlawfully prescribing controlled substances to five undercover law enforcement officers and four actual patients, as well as several counts of obstruction of justice for altering patient records after being indicted. At trial, four former patients testified that the physician prescribed drugs to them following minimal or inadequate medical evaluation, with several testifying to sexual misconduct or exploitation by the physician in connection with their prescriptions. Five undercover officers also testified to receiving prescriptions with little or no medical assessment, and video evidence corroborated their accounts. The prosecution further showed that after his indictment, the physician added false or misleading entries to the medical records of the undercover officers to make it appear that he had conducted more thorough evaluations than he actually had.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the physician’s motion for acquittal only as to the conspiracy count but let the case proceed on the remaining charges. A jury convicted the defendant on all remaining counts. At sentencing, the district court adopted a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months but imposed a sentence of 144 months, an upward variance, citing the physician’s sexual misconduct against patients as a significant aggravating factor. The district court explained that the guidelines did not adequately capture the seriousness of the sexual abuse committed in connection with the unlawful prescriptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported all convictions for unlawful prescription and obstruction of justice. The court also found that the upward variance in sentencing was reasonable, given the aggravating circumstances, and that the district court did not commit procedural or substantive error. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Hollington" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical treatment for vision issues and was referred to a board-certified ophthalmologist, who performed cataract surgery on both eyes in March and April 2018. After follow-up appointments and an additional procedure on one eye, the plaintiff’s vision improved compared to before surgery. However, nearly a year later, he experienced retinal detachments in both eyes, which required surgical repairs by another physician. Following these procedures, the plaintiff suffered diminished vision in both eyes.The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting that the physician failed to obtain informed consent prior to the cataract surgeries, particularly by not discussing specific risks associated with prior radial keratotomy (RK) procedures. The physician answered that he met the applicable standard of care and denied any negligence or causation. The district court initially granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the limitations defense had not been properly raised. On remand, after the plaintiff failed to designate any expert witnesses by the deadline, the physician again moved for summary judgment, offering his own affidavit and evidence that the plaintiff had no expert to testify at trial. The plaintiff responded with depositions and affidavits asserting he was not informed of relevant risks and would have declined surgery if properly informed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that, although there was a factual dispute regarding whether the physician breached the standard of care in obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence on proximate causation, an essential element of his claim. The Court found expert testimony was required to establish causation and rejected arguments based on the common knowledge exception and “self-evident damages.” The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the physician was affirmed. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

A woman experienced a difficult third pregnancy, complicated by multiple medical issues that warranted an early, medically induced labor. Before delivery, she signed a consent form authorizing her obstetrician to perform a vaginal delivery with possible laceration/episiotomy repairs and possible cesarean section. During labor, as the infant was crowning, she pleaded with her doctor not to perform an episiotomy, but the procedure was carried out. She later required reconstructive surgery due to complications from the episiotomy.She initiated legal action in the Hinds County Circuit Court against her obstetrician, the medical group, and other entities, alleging lack of informed consent and battery related to the episiotomy, along with other claims against additional defendants. Over time, the trial court issued a series of orders dismissing various claims and defendants, culminating in summary judgment for the obstetrician on the informed consent and battery claims, primarily due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide expert medical testimony. The plaintiff argued that expert testimony was unnecessary because she had withdrawn consent during labor, but the court disagreed.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. It held that while a medical procedure performed without consent may constitute battery and not require expert testimony, this scenario involved consent given prior to delivery and alleged withdrawal during labor. In such cases, it is necessary to prove that stopping the procedure was medically feasible and would not cause harm, which requires expert testimony. The Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s lack of expert evidence prevented her claims from proceeding, and upheld the trial court’s denial of reconsideration. View "Brown v. Davey-Sullivan" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment at a state medical center for vision issues and was diagnosed with idiopathic intracranial hypertension. She initially chose medication over surgery but later agreed to undergo an optic-nerve sheath fenestration. Following continued vision decline, she received a shunt placement. Shortly after this procedure, she and her mother discussed concerns about her treatment, expressing suspicions that something had gone wrong and that she should seek care elsewhere. The patient continued follow-up visits at the center, but months later obtained a second medical opinion, which suggested prior care had been incorrect and provided an alternative diagnosis.The patient filed a notice of claim against the medical center more than a year after her suspicions of negligence but within a year of receiving the second opinion. She then filed suit for medical negligence. The University of Mississippi Medical Center moved for summary judgment in the Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing the claim was time barred under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding a genuine issue as to when the patient discovered the alleged negligence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. It held that the statute of limitations began running when the patient first suspected negligent care, as shown by her own statements and those of her mother shortly after the shunt procedure, not when she received the second opinion. The court found no genuine issue of material fact that her suspicions triggered the limitations period, making her claim time barred. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered summary judgment in favor of the medical center. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Carter" on Justia Law

Mary Margaret Upchurch, who suffered from chronic back pain, underwent multiple surgeries involving spinal cord stimulators and pain pumps. In 2016, after moving to Mississippi, she had a pain pump replaced by Dr. Adam Lewis, a neurosurgeon at Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic. During surgery, Dr. Lewis attempted to replace the battery of her spinal cord stimulator with one from a different manufacturer, but encountered issues with the compatibility of the leads. This led to additional procedures, including a laminectomy and the eventual replacement of the stimulator, after which Mary experienced severe neurological complications, including paralysis. The Upchurches alleged that Dr. Lewis failed to properly prepare for surgery, did not obtain informed consent, and failed to communicate adequately with hospital staff.The case was tried in the Rankin County Circuit Court, where the jury found in favor of Dr. Lewis and Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, concluding there was no negligence in Dr. Lewis’s care. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and denied the Upchurches’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The Upchurches appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment, finding insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict and remanding the case for a new trial.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Upchurches’ failure to object to Dr. Lewis’s testimony at trial constituted waiver, and that his unobjected-to testimony should have been considered as evidence. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Lewis and Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic. Additionally, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s order assessing appellate record costs against Dr. Lewis and the Clinic. View "Upchurch v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The case centers on the tragic death of a young woman who was murdered by her former romantic partner shortly after he was discharged from a psychiatric hospital. The partner had previously expressed homicidal ideations toward her, both to medical staff and law enforcement, and was involuntarily committed under Connecticut law for psychiatric disabilities and being a danger to others. After a brief stay, he was discharged from the psychiatric facility with no further supervision or warning provided to either the victim or law enforcement. The plaintiff, administratrix of the victim’s estate, sued the mental health care provider, alleging both ordinary negligence and medical malpractice for failing to protect the victim from a known risk.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford granted the provider’s motion to strike, finding that all claims sounded in medical malpractice since the alleged negligence involved medical judgment relating to diagnosis and treatment. Relying on Jarmie v. Troncale, the court concluded that, under Connecticut law, medical malpractice actions can only be brought by patients, and since the victim was not a patient, the claims were barred. The court also determined that Connecticut does not recognize gross negligence as a separate cause of action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that some allegations did implicate medical malpractice and were barred, but others, liberally construed, sounded in ordinary negligence. These included claims that the provider actually knew of a substantial risk of imminent harm to an identifiable third party and failed to take reasonable steps to protect or warn her. The Court, for the first time, recognized a limited duty: a mental health care provider who knows a patient poses a substantial risk of imminent harm to an identifiable third party must take reasonable steps to protect that party, which may include warning or controlling the patient. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings on the ordinary negligence claims. View "Ashworth v. Branford" on Justia Law

After surgery to remove an ovarian cyst in May 2019, April S. Clark suffered a bowel perforation and subsequent complications while under the care of several doctors. She ultimately died in June 2019. Her husband, Charles Clark, and her daughter, April D. Clark, brought wrongful death claims against Dr. Thomas Leigh, Dr. William Shirley, and OB/GYN Specialists, LLP, alleging negligent post-operative care. At trial in July 2024, the jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the full value of Clark’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.Following the verdict, the defendants filed post-trial motions seeking to apply the statutory cap on noneconomic damages under OCGA § 51-13-1(b), which limits such awards in medical malpractice actions to $350,000. The State Court of Bibb County granted the motion to remit and amend the judgment, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 but leaving the pain and suffering and medical expenses awards unchanged. The court denied the motion for new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the constitutionality and application of the statutory damages cap. The Court reaffirmed its prior decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, holding that the Georgia Constitution’s right to trial by jury prohibits applying the cap to damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium in medical malpractice actions. The Court further determined that, as a matter of statutory construction, OCGA § 51-13-1(b) cannot operate in cases where a verdict includes damages to which Nestlehutt applies, since the statute requires combining all noneconomic damages into a single capped amount. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s amended judgment and remanded for consideration of the defendants’ remaining claim regarding excessiveness of the wrongful death award. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman who was diagnosed with placenta previa during her pregnancy developed placenta accreta spectrum (PAS) during a cesarean section at a hospital, which led to a massive hemorrhage and an emergent hysterectomy. After extensive surgery, she was moved to the ICU for monitoring. The ICU physician and a medical staffing agency were responsible for her care there. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children sued the ICU doctor and the staffing agency, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. The plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding deviations from the standard of care by the ICU doctor.The Superior Court of Rockdale County presided over the trial. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only the ICU physician and the staffing agency. The jury found both defendants liable, awarding $10 million to the estate for pain and suffering and $32 million to the children for wrongful death. After trial, the defendants moved for a new trial and, alternatively, to amend the judgment to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The court denied both motions, concluding the cap had been waived and, in the alternative, that the statutory cap was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees under Georgia law after the defendants rejected a qualifying settlement offer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding portions of the defendants’ expert testimony, nor did it err in its jury instructions, as any alleged error was affirmatively waived by the defendants. The Court also held, consistent with its contemporaneous decision in Clark v. Leigh and Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases cannot constitutionally be applied to the jury’s verdict in this case. The award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs was affirmed. Judgment affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law