Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Wind River Rehabilitation and Wellness's motion to compel arbitration in this action alleging medical malpractice, holding that the district court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration.Plaintiff, the wrongful death representative of Loy Forshee, filed this action against Wind River, where Forshee lived when he fell and broke his hip, alleging medical malpractice. Wind River moved to compel arbitration under the parties' arbitration agreement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Wind River waived his right to arbitration by waiting fourteen months to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record did not support a conclusion that Wind River waived its right to arbitrate. View "Empres at Riverton, LLC v. Osborne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents in this medical negligence suit brought pursuant to the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment for Respondents.In his lawsuit, Petitioner claimed that Respondents overprescribed and improperly filled prescriptions for controlled substances that were known to have addictive qualities, causing him to develop an addiction to pain medication. Respondents filed motions to dismiss asserting that Petitioner's complaint was filed after the expiration of the relevant statute of limitations. The circuit court converted the motions to dismiss for motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by granting summary judgment for Respondents and dismissing the complaint. View "Sager v. Duvert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a certified question brought to it by the circuit court, concluding that a healthcare provider who was named in a complaint but voluntarily dismissed as a party is an "alleged party" for purposes of W. Va. Code 55-7B-9(b).Plaintiff brought this medical malpractice complaint under the Medical Professional Liability Act against several healthcare providers. At issue was section 55-7B-9(b), which states that the jury "shall" consider the fault of "all alleged parties" and whether the parties who were dismissed but who did not settle their claims with Plaintiff may be considered by the jury in apportioning fault under section 55-7B-9(b). The Supreme Court concluded that the term "alleged parties" encompasses those originally named as a party in the complaint as having contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, regardless of whether they remain parties to the litigation at the time of trial. View "Wingett v. Challa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court certifying a class action in the underlying lawsuit brought under the Patient Right-to-Know Addfct, Ark. Code Ann. 20-6-201 et seq., holding that the court abused its discretion in concluding that the predominance prerequisite of a class action had been satisfied.In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, after terminating his primary care physician, Dr. Anderson, St. Vincent Medical Group failed to provide Dr. Anderson with a list of his patients or to send them notice of his new location. The circuit court certified a class action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that Plaintiff identified "a common course of conduct that affected all members of the class." View "St. Vincent Medical Group v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari in this medical malpractice matter in order to consider whether the gross negligence standard of La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) was to be considered by a medical review panel when the medical treatment occurred during a declared state of public health emergency pursuant to La.R.S. 29:766(A). To this, the Court found the trial court did not err in declaring that La.R.S. 29:771(B)(2)(c) should not be considered or applied in medical review panel proceedings and, therefore, did not err in granting Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Likewise, the court of appeal did not err in its affirmation. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sebble v. St. Luke's #2, LLC d/b/a St. Luke's Living Center, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Corizon Healthcare Inc. in this medical malpractice action, holding that the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2604 do not apply to claims against medical institutions not based on vicarious liability.David Windhurst, an inmate, was provided with health care through the Arizona Department of Corrections' contractor Corizon Healthcare Inc. David later died due the infections complications of diabetes mellitus. Plaintiff, David's widow, filed a wrongful death action against Corizon and other defendants, alleging, inter alia, institutional negligence by Corizon and vicarious liability based on the negligence of its medical personnel. The trial court granted summary judgment for Corizon on the medical negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when it is unclear which provider breached the standard of care, an expert on institutional standards of care may address an alleged breach by establishing that a class of providers failed to exercise appropriate care; (2) the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment for Corizon; and (3) a registered nurse may testify regarding gate cause of death in a medical malpractice case. View "Windhurst v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the two pretrial orders of the trial court challenged by the defendant physician in a health care liability action in this interlocutory appeal, holding that this Court declines to modify its holding in George v. Alexander, 931 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn. 1996), and that the collateral source rule remains in effect in this case.The first pretrial order excluded evidence that a nonparty physician was the cause-in-fact of the claimant's injuries because Defendant did not amend his answer to include that allegation, as required under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03, as applied in George. In the second order, the trial court held that Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-199, a provision that partially abrogates the common-law collateral source rule in health care liability actions, did not abrogate the collateral source rule under the facts of this case. The Supreme Court affirmed both pretrial rulings at issue in this interlocutory appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court did not err. View "Crotty v. Flora" on Justia Law

Bauer worked as a physician for over 50 years, most recently in pain management at ANA. Bauer’s practice, which included regular prescribing controlled substances, became the subject of a DEA investigation. Bauer was indicted for knowingly or intentionally” distributing or dispensing controlled substances “except as authorized,” 21 U.S.C. 841(a), concerning 14 patients. The prosecution’s expert, Dr. King, opined that Bauer did not sufficiently establish a diagnosis and ignored “red flags.” Each patient had a history of at least two mental health conditions; several had histories of illegal drug use. Bauer drastically exceeded recommended thresholds and prescribed opioids together with other controlled substances. One patient died from an accidental overdose. None showed improvement. A drug task force officer alerted Bauer that a patient was selling his pills. Bauer did not terminate the patient but provided additional prescriptions. Several pharmacies would not fill his prescriptions. Dr. King opined that Bauer prescribed opioids “in most cases” to support “addiction and dependency,” “without a legitimate medical purpose.”The Sixth Circuit affirmed Bauer’s convictions and 60-month sentence (below the Guidelines range). A jury could reasonably find that Bauer knew his prescriptions were without authorization, satisfying the mens rea requirement clarified by the Supreme Court in 2022. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction on the good-faith defense. The court rejected Bauer’s challenges to the exclusion of his proffered expert witnesses and his argument that he had a constitutional right to testify as an expert in his own defense. View "United States v. Bauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court following a jury verdict in favor of Glacier Eye Center, P.C. (GEC) and Kalispell Regional Medical Center, Inc. (KRMC) in this medical malpractice action, holding that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give certain jury instructions, requiring that this matter be remanded for a new trial.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give the jury a proportionate duty instruction and a loss of chance instruction under the facts of this case, and the court's failure to give these instructions resulted in the jury not being fully and fairly instructed in the applicable law, prejudicing Defendant and requiring a new trial; and (2) the district court erred by failing to poll the jury in the manner required by statute. View "Camen v. Glacier Eye Clinic, P.C." on Justia Law