Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A sixteen-year-old girl, after suffering a rape, was admitted to an adolescent psychiatric unit for mental health treatment. While in the facility, she alleged that another patient, Z.L., touched her buttocks with his foot and later, while she was awake, put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina. The incident allegedly occurred in a common room under indirect staff supervision. After reporting the event and undergoing a sexual assault exam, she was discharged from the facility three days later. Her co-conservators filed a medical malpractice action against the health facility, claiming that inadequate supervision enabled the alleged assault and caused her further harm.The matter proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in the District Court of Campbell County. The court approved a special verdict form with a threshold question asking whether Z.L. “inappropriately touched” the plaintiff; the form did not define this term. The jury answered the question in the negative and returned a verdict for the defendant hospital. The plaintiffs objected to the structure of the verdict form and the absence of a legal definition for “inappropriate touch.” They moved for a new trial, which was denied, and the court awarded costs to the defendant after finding the plaintiffs’ objections to costs untimely.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiffs had properly preserved their objections for appeal, but found no error in the special verdict form or jury instructions, concluding that the language used was consistent with the evidence and arguments presented. The court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to jury questions, denying a new trial, or awarding costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, denial of a new trial, and the award of costs. View "Rose v. Campbell County Health" on Justia Law

After a patient underwent knee replacement surgery, a suturing needle became dislodged and was lost inside her knee during the procedure. The surgical assistant attempted to locate the needle but was unsuccessful. The surgical team, including the supervising surgeon, searched for the needle and ordered x-rays, which were reviewed by radiologists. The needle was not detected at that time, and the surgery was completed without informing the patient of the possible retained foreign object. Subsequent follow-up appointments and further x-rays revealed the presence of the needle, which was eventually removed in a later procedure. The patient suffered complications requiring additional surgeries and prolonged antibiotic treatment.The patient initiated a medical negligence lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court against the surgical assistant, radiologists, and the hospital. The surgeon settled and was dismissed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the surgical assistant and radiologists, finding that expert testimony was required to establish a breach of the standard of care and that such testimony was absent. The court also determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant and that neither expert identified the radiologists’ standard of care. The patient’s motion to reconsider was denied.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the orthopedic expert could testify against the radiologists despite not being in their specialty, and that expert testimony was not required against the surgical assistant based on res ipsa loquitur exceptions. The Court of Appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained for jury determination.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for both the surgical assistant and radiologists. The Court held that expert testimony specifying the applicable standard of care was required in medical negligence cases and was lacking against the radiologists. It further held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant, as the evidence showed no negligence and exclusive control was absent at the relevant time. View "DIAGNOSTIC X-RAY PHYSICIANS, PSC (DXP) V. LLOYD" on Justia Law

While detained in jail after allegedly assaulting his father, the plaintiff experienced a severe mental-health crisis. Medical staff from Hennepin Healthcare System evaluated him, but he was uncooperative and refused treatment. Over several weeks, his condition deteriorated, exhibiting erratic behavior, withdrawal, and ultimately refusing to eat or communicate. Dr. Sloan, a psychiatrist, initially assessed him as not an immediate danger and attributed his symptoms to substance withdrawal, opting for continued monitoring rather than immediate psychiatric hospitalization. When the plaintiff’s health worsened, Dr. Sloan transferred him to an acute psychiatric ward, where his condition improved with medication. After discharge, delays in transferring him to the Minnesota Security Hospital for long-term care, controlled by the Minnesota Department of Human Services, left him in jail for more than a year. During this time, Dr. Sloan continued to treat him, including obtaining a court order for forced medication when he again refused treatment.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota denied Dr. Sloan’s motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and thus denying qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint did not plausibly allege deliberate indifference by Dr. Sloan, finding that her actions constituted medical judgment and, at most, medical negligence—not deliberate disregard for the plaintiff’s medical needs. The court also noted that delays in transferring the plaintiff were not attributable to Dr. Sloan, and that she continued to treat him during those periods. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Dr. Sloan on the deliberate-indifference claim. View "Doe v. Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc." on Justia Law

Aryn Rogers, who had a ventriculoperitoneal shunt installed as an infant to treat hydrocephalus, was hospitalized for pancreatitis and later experienced worsening symptoms including headache, vomiting, and seizure. Her parents brought her to the emergency room, where Dr. Matthew Moll evaluated her. Dr. Moll ordered a CT scan and, based on its results and other information, concluded that her symptoms were probably not caused by shunt malfunction. He did not consult a neurosurgeon or order additional shunt-related imaging. Aryn was admitted to the hospital; her condition deteriorated and she died. Her parents, Sharon and Robert Rogers, sued Dr. Moll and other providers for medical malpractice, alleging that Dr. Moll’s failure to properly diagnose and treat the shunt malfunction caused Aryn’s death.In Butler District Court, only Dr. Moll remained as a defendant at trial. The jury heard conflicting expert testimony regarding whether Dr. Moll breached the standard of care and whether his actions contributed to Aryn’s death. The district court issued instructions that did not separately define “fault” or “causation,” and the verdict form simply asked the jury which party it found for. The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Moll. The Rogers appealed, challenging the adequacy of the jury instructions and verdict form. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed, finding no legal error, though it noted the instructions could have been clearer.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed the case. It held that the jury instructions and verdict form, taken together, sufficiently conveyed the law regarding causation and fault, and were not misleading. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Butler District Court, but highlighted concerns about the lack of a causation definition in pattern instructions for future consideration. View "Rogers v. Moll " on Justia Law

A woman employed as an office support technician sought treatment from an orthopedic surgeon in 2016 for symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome in her right hand. After conservative treatment failed, the surgeon performed carpal tunnel release surgery in January 2017. Following surgery, the patient continued to experience symptoms such as pain, grip weakness, and functional limitations. Her surgeon repeatedly reassured her that these symptoms were normal and that her healing was progressing as expected. Occupational therapy records indicated improvement, and at the time, both the patient and her doctor attributed any lingering issues to normal recovery or her repetitive work duties.Nearly four years later, in April 2021, the patient consulted a different physician due to worsening symptoms. Diagnostic imaging revealed the ligament that should have been severed during the 2017 surgery remained intact. The new physician explained the possibility of an incomplete release during the prior surgery, and a revision surgery was performed. The patient and her husband then filed a medical malpractice action against the original surgeon and his practice, alleging negligent surgery and delayed diagnosis. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the claims barred by the statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, reasoning that the injury had manifested within months after the 2017 surgery.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding when the plaintiff’s injury became sufficiently appreciable to trigger the statute of limitations. The appellate court concluded that the record supported the plaintiffs’ contention that the injury was not manifest until 2021, and thus summary judgment was improper. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Godshall v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a series of medical treatments at Presbyterian Hospital, including a gallbladder removal, after which she was discharged despite abnormal lab results by Dr. Kaur. She subsequently returned and was diagnosed with pneumonia and pulmonary emboli, then discharged again, only to return with abdominal pain and be diagnosed with a bile leak. She spent seven weeks hospitalized for treatment. In 2017, the plaintiff filed a medical negligence lawsuit against Presbyterian Healthcare Services and Dr. Kaur.The First Judicial District Court issued a scheduling order requiring expert disclosures by April 2019 and the completion of discovery by June 2019. The plaintiff initially disclosed Dr. Arnaout as an expert, but his deposition testimony was equivocal regarding the timing and diagnosability of the bile leak. After discovery closed and defendants moved for summary judgment for lack of causation evidence, the plaintiff submitted an amended expert disclosure and an affidavit from Dr. Arnaout asserting causation for the first time. Defendants moved to strike the affidavit, arguing it was untimely and contradictory. The district court granted the motions to strike and summary judgment, finding the affidavit untimely, unsupported by good cause, and prejudicial. The plaintiff appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. It held that the district court did not impose a sanction but properly exercised its inherent authority to enforce its scheduling order by striking the untimely and contradictory expert affidavit. The exclusion of the affidavit and subsequent grant of summary judgment were upheld, as the district court acted within its discretion and authority to manage its docket. View "Burns v. Presbyterian" on Justia Law

A woman named Lewis sought medical care at Marion General Hospital for abdominal pain and constipation. She was evaluated by multiple physicians, including Dr. Armstead, Dr. Verucchi, and Dr. Jensen, and was diagnosed with sepsis and severe abdominal issues. After various tests and a transfer to the intensive care unit, her condition worsened, leading to her eventual transfer to another hospital where she was diagnosed with abdominal compartment syndrome and underwent emergency surgery. Lewis continued to suffer complications and ultimately died several months later. Her wrongful death beneficiaries brought suit against the hospital and the physicians, alleging medical negligence for failure to diagnose and treat her condition, failure to timely transfer her to a facility with higher-level care, and failure to consult appropriate specialists.The Marion County Circuit Court initially denied summary judgment to the defendants and allowed limited discovery. After further proceedings, the defendants again sought summary judgment, arguing that Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7 granted them legal immunity due to resource limitations caused by the COVID-19 state of emergency. The trial court agreed, finding the defendants immune and dismissing all claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Court held that Section 11-71-7 did not apply to all of the plaintiffs’ claims, as there was no evidence that several alleged acts of negligence—such as failure to diagnose, treat, or consult—were attributable to the COVID-19 state of emergency. The Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ failure to timely transfer Lewis was related to COVID-19 resource limitations. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bush v. Marion General Hospital" on Justia Law

Several patients suffered harm after undergoing surgeries performed by Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., whose conduct involved unnecessary procedures and fraudulent misrepresentations about the need for surgery. Following Durrani’s indictment and flight from the United States, hundreds of injured patients pursued civil suits in Ohio state court, obtaining judgments against Durrani for negligence, fraud, and, in some cases, battery or lack of informed consent. After prevailing at trial but unable to collect damages directly from Durrani, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgments against his insurer, the Medical Protective Company (MedPro), under the terms of Durrani’s malpractice insurance policy.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the plaintiffs filed enforcement actions to compel MedPro to pay their verdicts and initiated a direct action against MedPro and its vice president, alleging bad faith and other torts related to MedPro’s handling of the litigation and denial of payment. The district court dismissed all claims, finding that the policy’s exclusion for damages “in consequence of” intentional torts (including fraud) barred coverage where the damages were inseparable from Durrani’s fraudulent acts, and that Ohio law permits only the insured—not third-party claimants—to assert bad faith claims against insurers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that MedPro’s policy exclusion applies when the plaintiffs’ damages directly arise from and cannot be separated from Durrani’s fraud. Where jury verdicts did not allocate damages between negligence and fraud, or where all remaining damages were tied to fraudulent acts, the plaintiffs could not plausibly claim coverage. The court further held that, under Ohio law, third-party claimants may not bring bad faith claims against insurers, and the plaintiffs failed to state any viable independent tort claims. The district court’s dismissals were therefore affirmed in all respects. View "Adams v. Med. Protective Co." on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law

In 2018, a patient named Crystal Allen suffered a stroke and was admitted to a skilled nursing facility. During her stay, Dr. Oyesiji Arojojoye evaluated and performed a debridement procedure on a pressure ulcer on her hip. Afterward, Crystal developed an infection that progressed to sepsis, resulting in her death. Vickie Allen, Crystal’s mother and the statutory beneficiary, brought a lawsuit against Dr. Arojojoye and others, alleging that they failed to prevent sepsis and abscesses, did not timely assess or refer Crystal for immediate treatment, and did not provide adequate medical care. Vickie Allen retained Dr. Andrew Meillier, an internist, as her medical expert.Dr. Arojojoye moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court in Maricopa County, arguing that he was a board-certified wound care specialist and, under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 12-2604), only an expert with the same board certification could testify about the standard of care. The trial court found that while Dr. Arojojoye was board-certified in wound care, the relevant treatment fell within internal medicine, so Dr. Meillier was qualified to testify. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, disagreed, concluding the treatment was wound care and that a wound care specialist was required as an expert. It reversed the trial court and directed entry of judgment for Dr. Arojojoye.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed whether the lower courts properly applied § 12-2604 and its own precedent in Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare. The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals failed to properly identify the care or treatment at issue and did not conduct the necessary analysis regarding Dr. Arojojoye’s claimed specialty. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decisions of both lower courts and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that lower courts must correctly identify the care at issue and conduct a thorough analysis of any claimed specialty under § 12-2604 before determining expert witness qualifications. View "AROJOJOYE v. ALLEN" on Justia Law